


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































« 














Page 

Line 

For 

PiEAD 

10, 

(Xote) 5th, 

“in the Xaval,” 

in Xaval. 

26, 

Heading of 9th col., 

“ Mean,” 

Near. 

30, 

10th, 

“ 979,” 

977. 

35, 

1st of Xote, 

“ of this gun,” 

with this gun. 

55, 

11th, 

“ 12'/ ” 

21” 

56, 

7 th, 

“ 03” ” 

1' 03” 

93, 

17th, 

“ with the fuze,” 

with regard to the fuze. 

96, 

1st, 

“ segmented,” 

segmental. 

108, 

31st, 

“Thourenin,” 

Thouvenin. 



in. 

in. 

138, 

25th, 

“0.72,” 

0.75. 

168, 

14 th, 

“ percussion,” 

percussive. 

173, 

4th, 

“ Origin and anomalies 

,” Origin of anomalies. 

181, 

24th, 

“ probably,” 

properly. 

217, 

27 th, 


(omit) “ and.” 

222, 

24th, 

“ 1475,” 

1500. 

230, 

20th, 

“ effected,” 

affected. 

232, 

16th, 

“ does,” 

do. 

241, 

3d, 

“5libs ” 

5 lib. 

250, 

5th, 

(< o » 

0° 

U 

16th, 

“ as,” 

for. 

261, 

21st, 

“ short 30-Pdr.,” 

short 30-Pdrs. 

266, 

25th, 

“ 66,” 

46. 

2S1, 

23d, 

“ship Minerva, * 

practice ship Minerva. 

287, 

16th, 

“ by order,” 

by the order. 

311, 

11th, 

“ without,” 

with. 

319, 

27th, 

“The 10-in. shell-gun,” A 10-in. shell-gun. 

326, 

1st, 

“ Petropaulvoski,” 

Petropaulski. 

327, 

3d, 

“ miles,” 

mile. 

345, 

25th, 

“affect,” 

affected. 

370, 

2d of Xote, 


(omit) “ though bulkier.* 

374, 

21st, 

“1855,” 

1S54. 

378, 

16th, 

“ Kershon,” 

Kherson. 

395, 

6th, 

“ action,” 

actions. 

407, 

10th, 

“ indistinctive,” 

indistinct. 

410, 

8th, 

“inefficient,” 

insufficient. 







































































































































y 

/ 


SHELLS 


By Transfer 

JAN 3 1917 


AND 


SHELL-GUNS. 


BY 


<<0 




J. A. D AH LOREN, 

\K 

COMMANDER IN CHARGE OF EXPERIMENTAL ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT 

NAVY YARD, WASHINGTON. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

KING & BAIRD. 

LONDON: 


TRUBNER & CO., 60, PATERNOSTER ROW. 

*4 F 

1857. 


\ 


> > > 



VF35-3 

• H iz 

\8sr 


Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year One thousand eight 
hundred and fifty-seven, by 


J. A. DAHLGREN, 

In the Clerk’s Office of the District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. 







WITHDRAWN 

1 .19 n 

pogud u»ftAnr 



RECEIVED, 

l( NOV 14 1J02 

\ v 

\^>S* )|VG D . ^ 





T 0 


CAPTAIN A. H. FOOTE, U. S. N. 


COMMANDING U. S. SHIP PORTSMOUTH, 


THIS WORK 

IS INSCRIBED BY THE WRITER IN MEMORY OF 

$ x x z n b $ Ij x p 

THAT BEGAN AS MESSMATES, 

AND HAS CONTINUED 

THROUGH THE VICISSITUDES 

OF 


MA NY YEAR S. 







“if the navy be indeed the “right arm 

“ OF DEFENCE,” AS IS SO OFTEN REPEATED, IT MAY, 
“WITH GREAT FORCE, BE ADDED, THAT HER GUNS 
“ AND ORDNANCE APPLIANCES ARE THE MAIN 
“ SINEWS AND ARTERIES, THE NEGLECT OF WHICH 
“WOULD SOON RENDER IT FEEBLE AND PALSIED.” 
Annual Report of Hon. J. C. Dobbin , 

Secretary of the Navy. 


CONTENTS. 




Page 

Introductory Notice,. 1 

I. — Dimensions and Ranges ofU. S. Navy Cannon. 

Armament of U. S. ships established in 1845.—Modified 
in 1853. — New Batteries, 1855-56. — Armament of 
Steamers.—Dimensions of U. S. Cannon.—Projectiles. 

•—Ranges of 32-pdrs. of 27 cwt -, 32 cwt -, 42 cwt -, and 57 cwt \ 

—8-inch Shell-guns.—Remarks,. 23 

II. —Mode of obtaining Ranges. 

Orders given in 1848 to fit the U. S Navy Cannon with 
elevating sights.—Compelled to execute the ranges on 
water. — Instruments recpiired. — Plane-table selected 
and adapted to the purpose.—Description of new Ali¬ 
dade and mode of use.—Sample of results.—Triangu¬ 
lation of the Anacostia to obtain stations for the 
Plane-table.—Measurement of Base.— Series of tri¬ 
angles.—Details of practice.—Projectiles.—Elevating 
Quadrant.—Sample of record,. 39 

III. —Dimensions, Weights, &c., of Shells. 

Constituents of the Shell which affect its projectile and 

explosive properties—typified by the French 22 cent * 
and English 8-inch.—Concentricity and excentricity, 
the latter not desirable—but unavoidable.—Rotatory 
movement first noticed by Robins.—Irregularities pro¬ 
duced thereby.—Historical sketch of progress made 
in ascertaining its cause.—Explained by excentricity. 






8 


CONTENTS. 


—Mode of action.—Use of it opposed by Paixlians.— 
Full exposition and experiment by Col. Bormann.— 
Examined by Paixlians, who advocates the use of it. 
—Experiments in' England.—Sir Howard Douglas not 
favorable to the use of excentric projectiles.—Experi¬ 
ments in the United States,—Commonly received doc¬ 
trine of the operation of excentricity on the projectile 
movement.—The presence of excentricity exhibited by 
floating in mercury.—On what conditions its quality 
is dependent—ill effects on the trajectory—by what 
means best controlled — compensating mass—prefer¬ 
able distribution thereof—illustrated by experiment.— 
Solid shot liable to effects of excentricity — practical 
illustration.—Conclusion.—Kifle motion—the only use¬ 
ful form of rotatory movement.—Rifles—not of re¬ 
cent origin. — Principles and advantages expounded 
by Robins in 1745.—not understood or followed.— 
Round ball used.— Difficulties that prevented the 
adoption of Rifles.—Removed by Delvigne, who in¬ 
vented the “ carabine a tige .”—Conical ball—had been 
used in the United States.—Rifle cannon.—Waliren- 
dorf.—Cavalli.—Description of the Lancaster gun— 
authentic details wanting—general theory—trial of 
the gun in 1851—used in 1854 to arm the new steam 
gun-boats—results of service at Sevastopol and else¬ 
where unfavorable.—Ranges.—Rifled shot for smooth- 
bored cannon,. 

IY.—Fuzes. 

Fuzes—their functions—defects—description of those in 
ordinary use.—Law of combustion in Compositions— 
regularity augmented by careful manufacture.—Case 
for composition—wooden—metallic—paper.—Driving 
the composition.—Concussion Fuze.—Bormann Fuze. 
—Conditions requisite to constitute a good fuze.— 
General efficiency much lessened by failure to ignite— 
by extinction after being ignited—by premature explo¬ 
sion.—French shell practice -at Siege of Rome.— 
Experiment to test the consequences of Shells explod¬ 
ing within the Bore.—Doubts suggested by an inci¬ 
dental occurrence. — Percussion Fuzes — difficult to 


63 



CONTENTS. 


9 


attain with spherical Shells.—Exceedingly simple with 
conical projectiles.—Chances of a Shell passing entirely 
through a vessel and exploding beyond.—Incendiary 
nature of Shells,.129 

Y. —Penetration. 

Condition and incidents — equation therefor.—Penetra¬ 
tion in oak of several calibres.—Origin of anomalies in 
practice on Targets—more particularly caused by ine¬ 
qualities of resistance.—Differences between penetra¬ 
tion in Target and in Naval structures.—Thickness of 
French Ships.—Anomalies in practice upon Ships— 
due to unequal resistance of structure and to the 
shock of the Ball — complication of effect during an 
engagement. — Deductions from Target Firing.— 
Practice upon Target by the Ordnance Department 
of Washington Navy Yard.—Perforation—effect on 
Fuzes.—Concussion.—Ricochet.—Remarks,.173 


YI. —Shot and Shells Compared. 

Difference in the operation of Shot and Shells—illus¬ 
trated by incidents of battle and of experimental prac¬ 
tice.—Introduction and progress of Shell-guns in the 
Naval Service.— Discrepant opinions regarding the 
extent to which it is proper to adopt the Shell sys¬ 
tem on ship-board.—Yiew of the question between 
Shot and Shells of like weight—illustrated by a case 
from practice.—Opinions of authorities.—Shot and 
Shell-guns in service compared ; uncharged Shells not 
to be used.—Long 32-pdr. and 8-inch of 63 cwt -; respec¬ 
tive accuracy, penetration and power.—Canon Obusier 
of 22 cent \—Pivot-guns; 10-inch of 86 cwt - unsuitable,... .205 

YII.— Composition of Batteries. 

Armament of Ships in the United States, France and 
England, based on a Unit-calibre, with a proportion of 
Shell-guns.—French organization — English—Ameri¬ 
can.—Unit-calibre practically the same in all—first 
adopted by France in 1829.—Evils of various calibres 
— some remedy had become unavoidable — not at- 




tained by the new system—which is still complicated, 
and sacrificed the best calibre in the Line-of-battle- 
ships of two Navies. — Uniformity of calibre vio¬ 
lated by the introduction of Shell-guns—the number 
of which was at first small—gradually increased in 
the English Ships—and in those of the United States. 
Broadsides of English—French—and United States’ 
Ships compared.—Batteries of Steamers—reduced to 
a low scale by the Side-wheel.—Introduction of the 
Screw, and restoration of the Broadside,.259 

VIII.— Incidents of the War. 

At Sinope—Odessa—Bomarsund—P^etropaulski—Sevas¬ 
topol—Sveaborg and Kinburn—with Remarks,.295 


Notes. 

Rifled Cannon.—Concussion Fuzes.—Composition of 
Batteries.—English Mortars in the Baltic.—Floating 
Batteries.—13 in - gun,. 


423 





PREFATORY. 




Some of the conclusions readied in the course of the 
following remarks, are so much at variance with long 
cherished views, that it would be unreasonable to 
suppose they will pass without comment and rigid 
scrutiny—which I am persuaded they will be found 
to endure when tried by the standard of principles to 
which all must yield assent. 

The results cited in support are few; but they rep¬ 
resent a large number from practice, executed with 
scrupulous care, and, in the course of an experience 
extending over some ten years with cannon of every 
denomination, from a boat 12-pdr. to pivot-cannon of 
seven tons, I have seen nothing to shake my faith in 
the soundness of the particular opinions referred to. 

I shall abstain from entering upon any discussion of 
the general theory of Naval Ordnance, because my 
peculiar notions in this respect are now passing a 
practical ordeal which, if fully and properly con¬ 
ducted, will be more conclusive than the most elaborate 
argument. 

Indeed, whatever I might urge in their behalf must 
necessarily be of far less force than the following 



12 


PREFATORY. 


emphatic sanction from the highest Naval authority of 
our country. 

“The cautious and sound judgment of the late 
“ Commodore Morris approved the new ordnance.” 

“ After investigation, I unhesitatingly sustained the 
“ recommendation to fit out the new frigates with their 
“present formidable battery.” 

Apart, however, from all considerations of a per¬ 
sonal nature, the Annual Report of the Hon. Secretary 
of the Navy embodies so much of general interest in 
regard to ordnance, which is treated in a masterly 
manner, that I should hardly be excused by the Navy 
for quoting no more than might be gratifying to my¬ 
self. Wherefore the entire passages allotted to this 
subject will be given here. 

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAYY. 

Navy Department, Dec. 1, 185G. 

Sir :—I have the honor to submit the annual report from this 
department, showing the duties performed by the several squad¬ 
rons, the present condition of the service, with recommendations 
of further legislation. 

****** * * * * ** 
******* ** * ** 

ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY-PRACTICE-SHIP. 

I know of no part of the service more entitled to the liberal 
patronage of the government than ordnance and practical gun¬ 
nery. If the navy be, iudeed, the “ right arm of defence,” as is 
so often repeated, it may, with great force, be added that her 
guns and ordnance appliances are the main sinews and arteries, 
the neglect of which would soon render it feeble and palsied. 
Our national ship may attract admiration for the strength and 
beauty of her model, and the graceful ease with which she glides 


PREFATORY. 


-j <■> 

io 


on the water; her men may be patterns of discipline, and her 
officers the bravest and best; yet all this will avail nought in the 
dread hour of battle, if either her guns refuse to be faithful mes¬ 
sengers, or are managed by those who are untaught in practical 
gunnery. Americans are adepts in the use of the rifle and the 
musket from their boyhood, and when thrown into the field, no 
matter how suddenly, they are skilful, and their aim is as fatal as 
that of the trained soldier. Of course, the case is very different 
in regard to the management of a cannon, weighing thousands of 
pounds, upon a disturbed sea. In the British service they have 
their gunnery practice-ship, where officers and men are trained to 
the use of cannon as thoroughly and as regularly as the soldier is 
drilled in the army. We have thus far relied upon practising at 
sea, and selecting from the crew for captains of guns those who 
may, from experience, be found best fitted. It is amazing, indeed, 
that, notwithstanding the importance of disseminating through the 
service a thorough knowledge of gunnery, no system for that pur¬ 
pose has ever been adopted. It is true that the orders of the 
Department of early date, requiring practice at sea, are now much 
respected by the officers, and executed with unusual fidelity; and 
Captain Ingraham, the Chief of the Ordnance Bureau, states 
that “ the reports from commanders of squadrons, and single 
ships, continue to show great attention on the part of the officers 
to the general preparation for battle, and to the instruction of 
the men in practical gunnery, and afford evidence that the arma¬ 
ments and ordnance equipments of our vessels are efficient and 
satisfactory;” still, I believe it is conceded by all officers that some 
system is needed to improve this part of the service. Surely no 
man-of-war should go to sea without a certainty of having a 
supply of seamen qualified, by training, for being captains of guns; 
and, in my opinion, a vast improvement would follow if none went 
to sea without an officer designated especially as the ordnance 
officer of the ship. 

An effort is now being made to initiate a system as far as it 
can be done in the absence of legislation. The Plymouth sloop- 
of-war is now at the Washington navy yard, placed under the 
command of Commander Dahlgren, and is being fitted out tho¬ 
roughly for the purpose of a “ Gunnery Practice-Ship.” A few 
officers at present, and a number of select seamen, will be assigned 
to her, and she will bear an experimental armament of heavy and 
light guns. Under proper regulations and training, the hope is 


« 


14 


PREFATORY. 


confidently indulged that this practice-ship will annually turn off 
seamen thoroughly trained to the management of heavy ordnance 
in storm and in calm, and that our men-of-war may be supplied 
with officers and men familiarized with all the appliances of these 
great engines of destruction. I commend this subject to special 
consideration and encouragement, and have no doubt that, when 
enlarged and aided by the suggestions of experience, this gunnery 
practice-ship will prove an invaluable acquisition to the service. 

The recent changes in the armament of our vessels call for a 
somewhat detailed statement from the department on that subject. 
In many of those most remarkable conflicts in which the Ame¬ 
rican navy won its proudest trophies, it is well settled that the 
superiority of the calibre of our guns contributed very much to the 
successful overpowering of the formidable adversary, 

In consideration of the comparative strength of our naval force, 
it becomes vastly important that we should call into exercise the 
inventive and suggestive genius of our countrymen; and strive 
not merely to keep pace with, but, if possible, in advance of 
others in the character of our engines of destruction in war. In 
this matter the Ordnance Bureau has not been idle. The progress 
in improving, modifying, and enlarging the guns of the service 
has been cautious and gradual, yet steady and impressive. 

The experimental establishment at the Washington navy yard 
has been for many years an admirable adjunct to the bureau. 
Having at its head an officer of a high order of intellect and inde¬ 
fatigable energy, aided by a small corps of assistants, the depart¬ 
ment has found it a shield of protection against the introduction 
of the novelties of visionary inventors. No innovation has been 
recommended until subjected to the severest tests ; yet progress, 
and an eagerness to be in the foreground of improvement, have 
been manifest. The recent adoption on the new frigates of the 
9, 10, and 11-inch shell guns to the exclusion of shot, was by no 
means inconsiderately or hastily made. 

It was suggested by Commander Dalgliren, in 1850, that he 
could “exercise a greater amount of ordnance power with a given 
weight of inetat, and with more safety to those who manage the 
gun, than any other piece then known of like weight” 

Commodore Warrington, then at the head of the Bureau of 
Ordnance, ordered the guns proposed. The proving and testing 
continued during the years of 1852, 1853, and 1854. The points 
of endurance and accuracy were specially examined. The first 


0 


PREFATORY. 


15 


gun stood 500 rounds with shell and 500 with shot, without 
bursting; and subsequently other guns were proved to the 
extreme, and endured 1G00 and 1700 rounds without bursting. 
Shells have been adopted because they are deemed preferable, not 
because of any apprehension that shot cannot be used in these 
guns with perfect security, that point being settled by actual 
experiment. This fact is said to be attributable to the circum¬ 
stance of there being thrown into the breech a very considerable 
additional weight of metal. If, therefore, it is at any time con¬ 
templated to attack the solid masonry of fortifications, several 
feet in thickness, solid shot can be used, although recent develop¬ 
ments in the late European wars will hardly encourage such 
assaults to be often undertaken. It is probably true, as alleged, 
that as solid shot are driven by a larger charge of powder their 
power thereby is proportionally greater; and that on striking a 
ship they may pass entirely through her, thus exposing her to the 
consequences of two serious breeches. These openings made by 
solid shot, however, are often easily repaired, even during an 
action ; but if a vessel is struck and penetrated by one of these 
monster shells, which carries within itself the elements of explo¬ 
sion, one can hardly conceive of the crashing of timbers and the 
havoc and destruction which must inevitably ensue. And thus the 
work of one shell would be more fatal and disastrous than that of 
many shot. 

In addition to this heavy armament, our national vessels have, 
for a few years past, been supplied with boat guns—brass pieces, 
12 and 24-pounders. They are truly formidable, and, under the 
management of trained men, are often discharged ten times in a 
minute. They are so constructed, as to be easily placed in small 
boats, which can thus enable an approach to the enemy at points 
inaccessible to the large vessel, and when landed can be managed 
with facility and fatal effect. The reports of their great service 
recently in China, very forcibly illustrate their great advantage 
as a portion of a ship’s armament. 

But I forbear to pursue this subject, leaving it in the hands 
of able ordnance officers. The cautious and sound judgment of 
the late Commodore Morris approved the new ordnance. The 
six new frigates presented at once the question of supplying 
them with the guns after the usual old model, or in accordance 
with the suggestions of our able ordnance officer, tested by 
years of much consideration. After investigation, I uuhesitat- 


16 


PREFATORY. 


ingly sustained the recommendation to fit out the new frigates 
with their present formidable battery. It is true the guns are 
very heavy, but experience and practice, and the aid of labor- 
saving inventions daily made, will render them as manageable 
as 32-pounders were twenty years ago. 

******* * * * ** 

J. 0. DOBBIN, 

Secretary of the Navy. 

To the President of the United States. 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


Explosive projectiles have been variously 
associated from time to time with the mortar, 
the howitzer and the cannon. At first they 
were thrown by hand, and the use of grenades 
is not yet entirely discontinued; then followed 
their discharge from mortars, which practice is 
referred to several periods in the early history 
of artillery, by different military writers. For 
instance:— 

1376—At Jadra, by the Venitians.— M. Meyer. 

1521— At the Siege of Mezieres.— Thiroux , 49. 

1522— At the Siege of Rhodes by the Turks.— 

Durtubie ,— Thiroux , 49. 

1534—Invented in Holland.— Paixhans , 350. 
1542—At the Siege of Bordeaux.— Thiroux , 46. 
1580—Used in Holland.— Paixhans , 350. 

There is good reason, however, to doubt 
whether the modern bomb was understood and 
used at the remote epochs thus assigned; or, if 
it be admitted that a correct idea of it was then 
entertained, there seems to be a tolerable assur¬ 
ance in the sparse and isolated occasions usually 

l 





2 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


quoted, that its construction and proper mode 
of application, were so indifferently compre¬ 
hended, as to interpose a bar to any useful 
realisation of its capabilities. 

The meaning of the meagre notices left on 
record, has been much obscured, by the fact that 
the mortar and grenade were in common use 
previous to the recognised introduction of the 
bomb; but the mortar was applied to the pro¬ 
jection of huge stone balls,* and the grenades 
were thrown by hand.f It is indeed exceedingly 
improbable, that a means of such formidable 
demonstration as the modern bomb, would have 
been abandoned or neglected at the periods 
above stated, to the extent that the exceedingly 
exceptional application of it implies, if anything 
resembling it had been, or was likely to be, 
attained: for Europe was then desolated by war, 
the defence of fortified places was at least on a 
par with the attack, and an auxiliary so pro¬ 
mising as the bomb, would certainly have been 
employed if available. 

The first well known exhibition of its powers, 
was followed by an immediate adoption of the 
bomb throughout Europe; this occurred in the 
contest maintained by the United Provinces of 
Holland, against the intrusive and oppressive 
prerogative of the Spanish Crown. The army 
of the Federation had, by reason of many con- 


* Timmerhans, p. 12. 


t Thiroux, 46, Bonaparte. 



INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


3 


curring circumstances, been brought to a high 
degree of excellence under the leadership of the 
Nassau Princes, and its condition and operations 
were regarded by the military world, as illus¬ 
trative of the most advanced state of warlike 
science in that day. 

Previous to the truce of 1609, no instance 
occurs in which the bomb was resorted to, 
though it is plain that about this time its con¬ 
struction and functions had been carefully 
studied, and the details matured. 

For in 1606, St. Julien published in Holland, 
his “ Forge de Vulcan ,” in which, among other 
matters pertaining to artillery, he notices the 
bomb, and gives various particulars concerning 
it; from this work the following table is 


quoted:— 




Calibre of 

Diameter of 

Weight of Empty 

Powder 

Mortars. 

Bombs. 

Bombs. 

Contained. 

19* in. 

19 in. 

529 lbs. Am. 

5If lbs. Am. 

131 

u 

121 

140 

16i 

8* 

81 

37f 

H 

6f 


211 

H 


It is also observable, that the work of the 
Engineer, Diego Ufano, who served in the 
Spanish army previous to the truce, insisted 
much on the advantage of mortars for projecting 
stone balls and other missiles, but does not 
include the bomb.* 


* Bonaparte. 





4 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


When the truce expired and hostilities were 
renewed, bombs were not employed by the 
Spaniards in the siege of Berg-op-Zoom, (1622,) 
nor of Breda, (1624.) Their first well authen¬ 
ticated use was by the Dutch Prince, Henry of 
Nassau, in 1624, at the siege of Grol; the results 
must have been considered highly satisfactory, 
inasmuch as a more extended application of them 
ensued at subsequent sieges, and in reducing 
the Fort of Schink, the Prince employed them 
exclusively. Their reputation now spread over 
Europe, and they were soon introduced into the 
services of other powers. 

The unwieldy weight of the mortar and its 
bomb (for some of the latter exceeded 3001bs. 
even at this early period) effectually precluded 
their available use in field operations,—to meet 
this purpose, light mortars were cast, and ac¬ 
quired the designation of howitzers. It does 
not appear, that this application of explosive 
projectiles impressed military men so decidedly 
with a sense of its merit as the bomb, and it 
consequently lingered for a long while in com¬ 
parative insignificance in some countries. In 
Germany it met with most favor,—in England 
and Holland the number of howitzers was more 
limited; in France none were cast until 1749,— 
( Thiroux , 57,— Meyer .— Timmerhans , 23, 24,)— 
and, though it is stated by some writers ( Tim - 
merhans , Thiroux ,) that the Royal ordinance of 
1732, included the 8-in. class of siege howitzers, 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


5 


this impression is not confirmed by the copy of 
the ordinance given by St. Remy. 

To Frederick, King of Prussia, the howitzer 
has been indebted for the full demonstration of 
its capacity: and the important advantages he 
frequently derived from it, caused a great in¬ 
crease of the number of such pieces in all the 
services of the Continent. 

So far as the mortar and the howitzer were 
concerned, it cannot be said that explosive pro¬ 
jectiles ever constituted a permanent part of the 
equipment of naval ordnance. The bomb, it is 
true, has been used occasionally in attacking 
fortified towns on the seaboard, but never in 
regular engagements between ship and ship. Its 
adaption to this purpose is of recent origin; and 
it is evident that the naval authorities of every 
country are more or less impressed with the im¬ 
portance of the new weapon, inasmuch as there 
is hardly an armed ship of any nation that is 
not provided with shells, and cannon cast ex¬ 
pressly of large calibre for their use. 

Should the horizontal fire of shells prove to 
be as formidable against shipping as generally 
supposed, it is difficult to conjecture what revo¬ 
lutions it may occasion in sea engagements. No 
doubt the experience of the actual conflict will 
point out improvements in the shell itself or in 
the manner of using it, and set at rest some of 
the issues that have been raised in regard to the 
merits of particular devices and systems; though 


6 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


on the whole, the long period of peaceful rela¬ 
tions that has subsisted between the great mari¬ 
time powers, has been favorable to a careful 
study and disposition of the details required to 
give effect to the naval shell; quite as much so 
as the twelve years’ truce in Holland was to the 
development of the bomb in the seventeenth 
century. 

When the bomb was first introduced, its pro¬ 
jection from the mortar was confined to high 
angles of elevation. After Marshal Vauban had 
so triumphantly vindicated, by actual trial, his 
project of ricochetting shot from them, and de¬ 
monstrated its advantages in the attack of 
fortified places, General Lafrezeliere essayed 
the application of this practice to bombs. The 
success of the experiment induced the casting 
of the first French howitzer (8-in. siege) espe¬ 
cially for the purpose, ( Paixhans , note, 386;) 
and it is probable that ricochet practice had also 
been the more common habit with the howitzer 
in other services. 

To ensure the reflection of projectiles from 
the soil, it was necessary to fire them at a much 
lower angle of elevation than usual with mortar 
practice, though the elevation was still beyond 
that used for cannon; the fire therefore was not 
what is commonly termed direct or horizontal, 
and lower charges were also employed, so that 
the shells rolled along the ground, exploding 
above its surface, and this continued to be the 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 7 

custom so long as the short howitzers of that 
time were in vogue. 

Soon, however, appears to have been suggested 
the idea of firing shells like shot, horizontally, 
or at angles not varying materially therefrom; 
and the object in view seems to have been chiefly 
to operate on shipping. A trial of the kind is 
recorded as early as 1756, at Gibraltar, and the 
idea is also suggested by Gribeauval, in his 
memoir on coast defence.* In 1795, a trial on 
a timber target was made at Toulon with 18-pdr., 
24-pdr., and 36-pdr. shells. In 1797, 24-pdr. 
shells were fired experimentally into a small 
vessel at Cherbourg. In 1798, we have the 
inquiry prosecuted on a large scale at Meudon 
by a special commission; in the course of which 
36-pdr. shells were fired at a target representing 
the section of a line-of-battle ship, at distances 
of 400 and 600 yards; 24-pdr. shells were also 
tried, and the results produced such an impres¬ 
sion on the mind of General Gassendi, who was 
a member of the commission, that he immedi¬ 
ately wrote an account of the trial to Bonaparte, 
(April, 1798.) In 1803, General Lariboissiere, 
at Strasbourg, made some practice upon a timber 
target, placed 300 yards from a 24-pdr. cannon ; 
the shells were fired at it with 61bs. charges, in 
the presence of many general officers. 

* In 1782, shells were used from the British batteries against 
the celebrated floating batteries, but they seem evidently to 
have performed a subordinate part to the hot shot. 




8 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


Meanwhile, the same object had been inci¬ 
dentally approached in England in the course of 
prosecuting another purpose. In 1774, General 
Robert Melville invented the Smasher , and some 
ordnance of this description was cast by M. 
Gascoigne, the manager of the well-known 
private foundry at Carron. The leading pur¬ 
pose of the inventor of the Smasher , was to 
tire 68-pdr. shot with a charge as low as one- 
twelfth its weight, and thus to effect a greater 
destruction in a ship’s timber by the increased 
splintering which this practice was known to 
produce,—hence the gun was called a “ Smasher .” 
The use of shells, hollow shot and carcasses, was 
also suggested by General Melville. 

The first piece of the kind was cast in 1779. 
It weighed 31 cwt ; the shot, 68 lbs.; charge, 
51 lbs.; length of bore, 48 in.; diameter, 8 
inches. There is now in the possession of 
General Melville, a small model of this gun, 
with the following inscription:— 

“ Gift of the Carron Company to Lieutenant- 
44 General Melville, inventor of the Smashers and 
44 lesser Carronades, for solid, ship, shell and car- 
44 cass shot, &c. First used against French ships 
44 in 1779.” 

Carronades of smaller calibre did not enter 
into the original plan, but were subsequently 
cast by the Carron Company, in order to adapt 
them to privateers and letters-of-marque, and 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


9 


thus create a market for the products of the 
foundry. Shells were tried from the “Smasher” 
on several occasions, particularly in 1780, at 
Languard Fort, by order of Lord Townshend, 
Master-General of the Ordnance; though in the 
following year, when General Melville himself 
experimented before the Duke of Itichmond, 
Master-General of Ordnance, he fired no shells, 
but only hollow or cored shot, seemingly to 
remove some impressions against them, in case 
solid shot of that calibre were found too heavy 
for convenient use at sea. 

It will be perceived, that the idea of General 
Melville included incidentally all the elements 
of a naval shell system. The bore of his 
“ Smasher” or 68-pdr. carronade, was of con¬ 
venient size, being of 8-in. diameter, like that 
of the shell-gun now in vogue. 

The use of shells entered into the first design 
and was made the subject of experiment, but was 
considered by the inventor, and by the officers 
of the navy generally, as a subordinate feature 
in the plan, and far from important. The promi¬ 
nent idea of projecting balls of a maximum 
volume with a minimum velocity, overrode and 
excluded every other consideration.' This of 
itself was manifestly as great an error as the 
minima masses and maxima velocities of the 
long gun system, to which the carronade was 
thus directly opposed, and the consequence was, 


10 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


that it gradually fell into disrepute, and, after a 
varying reputation of fifty years, has been 
abandoned. 

The redeeming trait in the project of General 
Melville, which, if properly appreciated and 
developed, might have anticipated>the Paixhans 
system by half a century, was so little thought 
of, that the suggested application of explosive 
projectiles, hardly went beyond the first essays. 
It may be supposed that this course was due to 
policy, and that the British government pur¬ 
posely ignored the shell, avoiding its develop¬ 
ment as a needless addition to a naval superiority 
already sufficiently established.* But the diffi¬ 
culty in the way of this supposition is, that the 
Admiralty accepted any part of the proposition 
at all. It would have been far easier to suppress 
the whole project in the germ, by making its 
concealment of greater interest to the inventor, 
than its prosecution, instead of adopting it in 


* “ So long as the maritime powers, with which we w r ere 
“ at war, did not innovate by improving their guns, by extending 
“ the invention of carronades, or, above all, by projecting shells 
“ horizontally from shipping; so long was it the interest of Great 
“ Britain not to set the example of any improvement in the Naval 
“ ordnance, since such improvements must eventually be adopted 
“ by other nations ; and not only would the value of our immense 
“ material be depreciated, if not forced out of use, but a proba¬ 
bility would arise that these innovations might tend to render 
“ less decisive our great advantages in nautical skill and experi- 
“ ence. Many of the defects which were known to exist, so long 
“ as they were common to all navies, operated to the advantage 
“ of Great Britain.”—( Simmons , page 2.) 



INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


11 


part and thus pointing out the course to the 
remainder. So far, however, from pursuing any 
half measures in the matter, we find that a dis¬ 
position was manifested at the first adoption of 
the carronade, to carry its application as far as 
possible. Thus in 1782, the Rainbow was armed 
entirely with such pieces, viz., 20 smashers or 
68-pdr. carronades ; 22, 42-pdrs., and 6, 32-pdrs.* * * § 
In 1796, the Glatton had smashers for the entire 
battery of her lower deck, and is said by their 
means to have beat off, with great loss, a French 
squadron of three frigates and three corvettes.f 
It happened also, that in 1782, the Cambridge, 
80, then one of Lord Howe’s fleet, was pro¬ 
vided with carcasses for her two smashers , and 
fired them while engaging the combined fleet, 
then endeavoring to prevent the English from 
relieving Gibraltar. J The shell itself must also 
have been furnished to some of the English 
ships; for in 1799 they were fired from the 
44 smashers ” of the Tigre , 74, into the French 
storming columns at Acre.§ In the course of the 
same operations, the Theseus , 74, suffered most 
severely from an accidental explosion of some of 


* This vessel caused the French Frigate Hebe (18-pdrs.) to 

surrender at the first broadside, Sept., 1782 .—Allen I., 347. 

f Allen, 431. X (Ekin’s Naval Battles.) 

§ “ Two 68-pdrs. mounted in two djerms lying in the mole, 
“ under the direction of Mr James Bray, carpenter of the Tigre , 
threw shells into the centre of the enemy’s column with destruc- 
“ live effect .”—[Allen page 509.) 



12 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


her own shells ;* but these are said to have been 
taken from a French prize. 

It is certain too, that when the war com¬ 
menced with the French Republic, the asserted 
supremacy of England on the seas, had not been 
so fully established as afterwards by the victories 
of Trafalgar or the Nile; and it was far from 
being foreshadowed by the indecisive combat of 
June, 1794. There seems to be no ground for 
the belief, considering the great stake supposed 
to be at issue, and the general feelings which 
imbittered the contest, that the Admiralty 
would have been content or justified, to Crown 
or Country, in waiving any advantage that might 
occur from resorting to improvements in offen¬ 
sive means. Moreover, it could not have escaped 
their vigilant observation, that the French were 


* “ The Theseus , on the 14th of May, at 9 h. 30 min. A. M., dis- 
“ covered the squadron of Commodore Perrfee, off Cesarea, and was 
“ about to make sail in chase, when a dreadful explosion of twenty 
“ 36-pdr. and fifty 18-pdr. shells took place on the poop of the 
“ Theseus. Captain Miller was killed by a splinter ; the school- 
“ master, two midshipmen, 24 seamen, and 3 marines killed, and 47 
“ persons wounded, including a lieutenant and midshipman, the mas- 
“ ter, lieutenant of marines, the surgeon, chaplain and carpenter; 
“ making a total of 78 killed and wounded. The whole of the 
“ poop and the after part of the quarter-deck, were blown to 
“ pieces, and the booms shattered. Eight of the main-deck beams 
“ were broken, and all the ward-room bulkheads and windows 
“ destroyed ; but the fire was subdued by the exertions of Lieu- 
“ tenants Thomas England and Summers. In the disabled state 
“ of the Theseus, it was a matter of gratulation that the French 
“ Squadron did not attack her.”— (Allen, 511-12.) 



INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


13 


prosecuting this very inquiry, and that it be¬ 
hoved them to be first on the track. 

Be this as it may, it is undeniable that the 
idea of using shells as a naval means, did not 
receive from the carronade, that development 
and expansion which could warrant its being 
considered as a system; and so little attention 
did its early exhibition attract, that it is difficult 
to trace out the few cases in which it was par¬ 
tially resorted to in service, or for experiment. 
It was, at best, little more than a vague concep¬ 
tion; its formidable powers unrealized, unnoticed, 
were doomed to lie dormant for nearly half a 
century after the carronade was invented, and 
only attracted the attention of the naval world 
when the system, in which it was designed to 
enact an insignificant part, was falling into 
disuse. 

For more than the third of a century the idea 
of firing shells horizontally, had been entertained 
by some of the most prominent artillerists of the 
day, and it had been sufficiently tested to prove 
that a means of offence was at disposal which, 
for naval purposes, was more destructive, than 
any other known. The experiments in France 
on targets at Toulon, Meudon, Strasbourg and 
on a small vessel at Cherbourg; in England in 

1798, and in actual service by that power in 

1799, (at Acre,) were most conclusive of the 
capacity of shells, and of the practicability of 
using them. 


14 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


But these elements of a mighty agent thus 
revealed were without consequence, without im¬ 
pression on the naval world; for they were 
uncombined, and needed the workings of a 
master spirit to evoke the terrible energies of 
which they were capable. 

We believe the claim to this distinction is, 
by common consent, awarded to General Paix- 
hans, and the present naval shell system is 
everywhere admitted to derive its origin from 
that eminent artillerist. 

The sole object of this system is, the hori¬ 
zontal projection of shells from the batteries of 
ships ; and the idea is not only closely interwoven 
into the whole texture of the proposition, as 
elaborated in the publications made by Paixhans 
in 1821, ’22, and ’24; but it is also stated par¬ 
ticularly, and in order that this fact may have 
its due weight, the words of the author will be 
quoted: 

“Of all the improvements tending to increase 
“ the effects of present naval ordnance, that 
“ which will give incomparably the greatest 
“ power, will be the disuse of solid shot, and 
u the substitution of hollow shot loaded with 
“ powder so as to explode.” (Page 26.) 

Page 78. “And we shall not only make it 
“ appear how shells of heavy calibres, such as 
“ 48 and 80 may be fired with effect far superior 
“ to 18, 24 and 36-pdr. shells, but we shall de- 
“ monstrate that far from being limited even to 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


15 


“ this powerful fire, the effects of sea artillery 
“ may at once be increased (by firing with power 
“ and accuracy, like ordinary cannon-shot, the 
“largest bombs, of such calibres as 150 and 
“ 200,) to a degree of intensity not anticipated 
“ and which will be decisive ; to which we shall 
“ add some improvements that relate to increas- 
“ ing the destructive effects of the bombs them- 
“ selves.” 

It is not intended to assert that to Paixhans 
is due the discovery or invention of each or of 
any of the numerous details that constitute the 
system; but his is the merit of assembling and 
judiciously arranging the scattered elements into 
one whole, so that the adaption of the shell to a 
new field of action became, not only practicable, 
but we may say unavoidable. 

“ Nous n’avons done rien invente, rien innove, 
“ et presque rien chang6; nous avons seulement 
“ reuni des elemens epars, auxquels il suffisait 
“ de donner, avec un peu d’attention, la grandeur 
“ et les proportions convenables, pour atteindre 
“ le but important que nous nous etions propose.” 
(Page 230.) 

It was not a mere suggestion that shells might 
he fired directly like shot, but the means of in¬ 
stant execution were furnished with a critical 
minuteness very rare in a plan as comprehensive; 
so that it only remained to follow the various 
conditions prescribed, in order to develop at once 
the power of the agent in question. 


16 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


To the singularly complete manner in which 
the task was accomplished, and the universal 
acceptance which it received from the principal 
naval authorities of the world, may be attributed 
the uncommon uniformity which appeared in the 
“ Nouvelle Arme ,” whether used by one power or 
another. Wherever introduced on shipboard, 
the shell-gun was recognisable, by its peculiar 
form and straight muzzle, from every other piece 
in the battery,—and, being the only evidence of 
the new system’s constituting part of a ship’s 
force that could not be kept from view, but stood 
out prominently, so as to attract the attention 
even of the casual observer, it was natural that 
it should come to be used to designate the system 
of which it was so conspicuous a part; and hence 
the prevalence of the phrase “Paixhans cjunP 
But from being merely a brief and convenient 
expression for the essential element, it finally 
came to be considered as embodying the main 
purpose of the inventor, when, so far from having 
any proper claim to this consideration, the pe¬ 
culiarities that distinguished it from other guns 
are not even necessary to the development of the 
power itself, but only a commodious form for its 
advantageous application. It is by no means 
indispensable to horizontal shell firing that the 
precise contour or class of gun prescribed by 
General Paixhans should be followed. On the 
contrary, shells may be, and are used from every 
class of guns mounted in ships of war; the very 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 17 

external peculiarities that distinguish the origi¬ 
nal shell-gun, have been discarded in the later 
ordnance of the kind made for the French navy, 
(22 cent - of 1842 and 27 cent ;) and with even more 
important departures in those made for the United 
States navy, (8-in. of 55 cwt - and of 63 cw \) and for 
the British navy, (8-in. of 65 cwt ). It is certain 
that the important characteristics of the pieces, 
proposed by General Paixhans, were not the 
offspring of mere caprice, anxious to impress 
upon a design patent evidence of invention 
by differing from all else of the kind; on the 
contrary, they were dictated by mature expe¬ 
rience, and the soundest judgment, as affording 
the relative proportion of metal, and the interior 
construction best adapted to develop the power 
of the system proposed. It is true, that material 
differences have been made, as already stated, 
in the pieces designed especially for shell service 
in the navies of Great Britain and the United 
States; but it remains to be seen whether the 
changes are for the better or worse, and it is 
certain that one of the ablest English writers* on 
ordnance of the present day states very de¬ 
cidedly his preference for the canon-obusier of 
80, to the English 8-inch, as we shall have 
occasion to notice more at length presently. 

Being after all but an accessory to another 
purpose, these pieces do in nowise conflict with 


* Simmons. 

2 



18 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


the claims of any other artillerist to a peculiar 
form of gun. The interest of those whose names 
are associated with carronades, the Congreve gun, 
or Colombiad, are not therefore abated by the 
fact, that to complete and perfect his general 
plan, General Paixhans deemed it requisite to 
economise the metal of pieces for throwing 
shells, by a certain distribution, so as to ensure 
the facility of having the projectiles as large as 
possible. With the former, the use of shot was 
contemplated partly or entirely, and their pro¬ 
portions therefore necessarily differed from those 
of pieces which were solely for shells. 

From the very natural interpretation of the 
common phrase, 44 Paixhans gun” identifying the 
name of the author of the system with a subor¬ 
dinate feature only accessory to the main design, 
some misapprehension of the true principle of 
the 44 New Arm ” has arisen, which time will no 
doubt correct. 

We are also inclined to believe, that by ac¬ 
cepting too literally the English rendering of the 
term 44 boulet creux ,” an intention has been at¬ 
tributed to Paixhans of using uncharged shells, 
for which no warrant can be found in any part 
of his system as promulgated by himself. A 
writer, whose 44 Ideas on Heavy Ordnance ” are 
justly recognised as embodying most valuable 
views, thus expresses himself in this matter: 

44 Col. Paixhans at first, with much discretion, 
44 proposed that his guns should project hollow 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


19 


“shot; he evidently feared to shock long-estab- 
“ lished prejudices, by at once proposing charged 
“ shells. 11 (77.) In the very first announcement of 
his project which Paixhans made to the public, 
(Nouvelle Force Maritime , 1821,) he applies the 
term houlet creux to the projectile in question, 
but he distinctly states that this hollow shot is 
to be “ charge cle poudre et d'artifice” (21 ;) on 
the next page the word hollow shot again oc¬ 
curs ; hut these are to be “ bien faits avec de 
charges de poudre ;” and at 78, the hollow shot 
are to he “ charges ;” and we are not aware of a 
single passage in any of the writings of Paixhans 
which, directly or by inference, favors the suppo¬ 
sition that his boidet creux were intended to 
be uncharged. So of other French authorities. 
Colonel Charpentier, for instance, expresses 
clearly in what sense he understands houlet 
creux to be generally accepted: 

(147.) “And to avoid all confusion by the 
“ denominations holloiv shot (houlet creux) and 
“ howitzer shells, the first of these will be applied 
“ to the hollow projectiles specially designed for 
“ the Navy, and the latter to the hollow projec- 
“ tiles common to the land and sea services.” 

(164.) “ The advantages of hollow projectiles 
“ are now too generally conceded to require any 
“ demonstration. By these fragments, dispersed 
“ in every direction,” &c., &c. The land service 
“ use howitzer shells, the Navy uses “ hollow 
“ shot,” (“ houlet creux.”) 


20 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


(303.) “ The service charges for hollow projec- 
44 tiles are thus regulated,” &c., &c. 

Then follows the classification into bombs for 
mortars, and hollow shot ( 4t boulets creux”) for 
the guns, &c., &c. 

Again, in the Aide Memoire Navale, the term 
translated 44 hollow shot” occurs thus: 

Page 66. 44 Les boulets creux ont un trou de 
44 charge par lequel on introduit la charge quand 
44 les projectiles sont ensabotes.” 

Pages 67, 68. Tables of boulets pleins and 
boulets creux; the latter for cannon, canons- 
obusiers, and carronades. 

Page 270. Charging of the 44 boulets creux.” 

In experimenting on the project of Paixhans, 
(1824) “ boulets creux” were subjected to com¬ 
parison, but it is distinctly stated that they were 
loaded; and the application of the term by the 
committee seems to have been designed for the 
shells of ordinary cannon, 24-pdrs., 36-pdrs., &c. 

It appears, therefore, that by the term—trans¬ 
lated literally— 44 hollow shot,” it was not intended 
to convey the idea of an uncharged shell. 

As to the use of hollow shot uncharged, it 
may be remarked, that Captain Simmons has set 
that fully at rest; indeed, it would be difficult to 
controvert his argument against the use of hollow 
shot, or, to speak more plainly, uncharged shells, 
in lieu of solid shot. And, even admitting that 
peculiar circumstances might confer an advan¬ 
tage of any kind upon the hollow projectile, it 


INTRODUCTORY NOTICE. 


21 


seems unaccountable that the cavity should not 
be filled with powder, and thus a greater power 
conferred, in nowise prejudicial to the supposed 
merits of the shell when unloaded. 

The use of hollow shot was the obvious defect 
of the carronade system, and so well confirmed 
by experience, as to lead to the projectiles being 
discarded. The substitution of solid shot was 
afterwards found inconvenient in pieces of insuf¬ 
ficient inertia, and led to the final disuse of the 
carronade itself. 

In the recent Regulations of the U. S. Navy, 
there is no such projectile recognised as “ hollow 
shot.’ 7 
















* ■ 






















































































I. 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES OF U. S. NAYY CANNON. 

Armaments of U. S. Ships established in 1845.—Modified in 1853. 
—New Batteries, 1855-56.—Armament of Steamers.—Dimen¬ 
sions of U. S. Cannon.—Projectiles.—Ranges of 32-pdrs. of 
27 c ' vt \ 32 cwt -, 42 cwt -, and 57 cwt \—8-inch Shell-Guns.—Remarks. 

The ships of the U. S. Navy are armed with 
32-pdrs. and 8-in. shell-gnns of different classes, 
as determined by a Board of Captains convened 
in 1845. 

By this Regulation there were established six 
descriptions of 32-pdrs., classed according to their 
weight, viz.: of 57 cwt> , (or long gun,) of 51 cwt -, 
46 cwt -, 42 cwt *, 32 cwt- , and 27 cwL ; and two classes 
of 8-in. shell-guns—63 cwt and 55 cwt * 

The first-class frigates carry 32-pdrs. of 57 cwt , 
and four 8-in. of 63 cwt - on the gun-deck, with 
32-pdrs. of 32 cwt *, four 8-in. of 55 cwt- , and 
two 32-pdrs. of 51 cwt * (for chase,) on the spar- 
deck. One or two of the heaviest ships have 
32-pdrs. of 42 cwt - on the spar-deck. The 
32-pdr. of 46 cwt - was only designed for a few 
frigates of inferior rate. 

Sloops of war are armed according to their 


24 - 


dimensions AND RANGES 


size: the largest with 32-pdrs. of 42 cwt and 8-in. 
of 63 cwt> ; the next with 32-pdrs. of 32 cwt , and 
8-in. of 55 cwt -, and the smallest with 32-pdrs. 
of 27 cwt . 

In 1853, a Bureau Regulation, approved by 
the Navy Department, excluded the 32 of 51 cwt , 
and 8-in. of 55 cwt - from the Armaments of 
Frigates, and directed that ten 8-inch of 63 cwt - 
should be carried and collected in one division 
on the gun-deck. 

Line-of-battle ships have their gun-decks, 
whether two or three, and their spar-decks, 
armed respectively like those of frigates. 

Since January, 1856, some of the ships have 
been armed in another manner, and the batteries 
of the recent screw frigates are composed of new 
ordnance, differing in calibre and construction 
from the guns previously used. No account of 
them has yet been published by authority. 

The pivot-guns of the U. S. Navy are the 
64-pdr. and the 10-in. shell-gun of 86 cwt ‘. 

The 64-pdr. differs in no material particular 
from the English 68-pdr., except that the U. S. 
gun has a bore of eight inches, and the British 
gun has a ball very nearly of the same dimen¬ 
sions, the latter is, consequently, about one- 
tenth of an inch larger than the American and 
proportionately heavier. 

The largest steamers carry the 64-pdr., and 
some of the inferior classes the 10-in. shell gnu. 
The new Razee Corvettes, Constellation and 


OF U. S. NAVY CANNON. 


25 


Macedonian, have one of the latter on the fore¬ 
castle and stern. 

The largest steamers have the 8-in shell-gun of 
63 cwt in broadside, and those of inferior class 
the 8-in. of 55 cwt \ 

The U. S. Naval shell-guns are of two patterns. 
The 10-in. of 86 cwt , and the 8-in. of 63 cwt * 
cast previously to 1851, follow the form pre¬ 
scribed by Paixhans; they will be easily recog¬ 
nised by the straight muzzle common to the 
French canon-obusier of 22 cent , and have no 
sight masses; they are not turned on the 
exterior, consequently retain the outer crust, 
which gives them a rough appearance. 

In 1851, some new 8-in. shell-guns of 63 cwt 
were cast, of the same length of bore as the 
other patterns, but following the external form 
of other recent Navy cannon. They are turned, 
have sight masses, a bell muzzle, and a stouter 
knob. 

The 8-in. of 55 cwt was not introduced until 
after 1845. It resembles the new 8-in. of 63 cwt - 
in external shape. 


26 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES 


* 

DIMENSIONS, &c., OF SHOT AND SHELL GUNS OF U. S. NAYY. 

(From Regulations of Bureau of Ordnance , 1852.) 


Class. 

Weight in 
cwts. 

Date. 

Length extreme 
from muzzle 
to rear of B. 
Plate. 

Bore. 

Charges. 

Weight of 

Length. 

Diam. 

Dist. 

Ord. 

Mean 

Shot. 

Loaded 

Shell. 

, 



inch. 

inch. 

inch. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

lbs. 

| 

27 

1846 

76.6 

68.4 

6.40 

4 

4 

3 

32* 

26i 

\ 

32 

1846 

84.0 

75.10 

H 

4£ 

4i 

4 

ii 

ii 

32-Pdr. / 

42 

1847 

101.2 

92.05 

ii 

6 

6 

4 

ii 

ii 

) 

46 

1846 

107.44 

97.2 

ii 

7 

7 

5 

ii 

ii 

1 

51 

1846 

113.4 

104.0 

a 

8 

7 

5 

ii 

ii 

\ 

57 

1846 

117.6 

107.9 

a 

9 

8 

6 

ii 

ii 

f 

55 

1846 

105.7 

95.4 

8.00 

7 

7 

6 


51i 

8-inch. \ 

63 

1841 

111.5 

102.0 

ii 

9 

8 

6 


ii 

\ 

63 

1851 

112.01 

100.3 

ii 

9 

8 

6 


ii 

10-inch. 

86 

1841 

117.0 

106.0 

10.00 

10 

9 

8 


106 

64-Pdr. 

105 

I 

1849 

137.0 

124.2 

8.00 

16 

12 

8 

63£ 

51£ 


The “length extreme from muzzle to rear of 
breech platef in the fourth column in this table, 
gives the real length of gun, excluding the po- 
milion, which is a mere appendage. The length 
generally given is measured from the base ring 
to the face of the muzzle, which does not include 
a very material portion of the metal necessary 
to the structure of the piece, and may also vary 
considerably in different cannon. 

The difference between the two dimensions, 
length of gun as given here and length of bore, 
furnishes a very important item, viz.: the thick¬ 
ness of metal rearward of the charge . This is 
not always to be had by the ordinary tables 
of dimensions. 

































OF U. S. NAVY CANNON. 


27 


PROJECTILES. 

By Regulation, shot and shells which do not 
vary more than two-hundredths of an inch,* 
more or less, from the prescribed diameter of 
any calibre, are received. 

In the practice for range, shot and shells 
were selected, not more than one-hundredth of 
an inch in excess or otherwise; hence it is 
probable that they represented the mean of a 
large number with tolerable correctness. 

The average weight of 32-pdr. shot is 32| lbs., 
and of 64-pdr. shot 63f lbs. 

The average weight of 110 8-inch shells thus 
chosen from several thousand cast for service 
was found to be 50.03 lbs; while the average 
weight of 4,134 shells of the same description, 
inspected by me for the general service, averaged 
49.8 lbs. The content of powder is about 1.85 lb. 

The weight of 10-inch shells averaged 102 
lbs., and the content of powder is about 4 lbs. 


* Until 1852, three-hundredths were permitted. 



28 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES 


RANGES OF U. S. NAVAL CANNON. 

By Lieut. J. A. Dahlgren. 

These were reported by the order of the Bu¬ 
reau of Ordnance, and published in the General 
Instructions issued by its authority for the use 
of the Navy, 1852. 

The ricochet, obtained with the ranges, is now 
added. 


OF U. S. NAVY CANNON. 


29 


RANGES OF SHOT 

FROM THE 

32-PtZr. of 27 cwt . 


Mounted on Spar-decks of 3d class Sloops-of-war.—Bore of 
Gun, seven feet above water.—Charge 4 lbs. 


Elevation. 

Flash to 1st graze. 

1st 

Graze 

2d 

s on the \ 

3d 

vater. 

4th 

5th 

Extreme 
roll of ball 

No. of rounds. 

[ No. of rounds 

forming the 

Mean. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

P. B. 

// 

0.7 

250 






4 

4 









[2100 



10 

1.8 

545 

969 

1298 

1530 

1700 

- 

to 

5 

5 









.2500 



2° 

2.6 

800 

1249 

1547 





10 

9 

3° 

3.7 

1047 

not t 

aken 




10 

7 

4° 

4.5 

1278 

1536 

1657 




10 

8 

5° 

5.4 

1469 

none 





10 

8 

60 

6.3 

1637 

none 





10 

9 











































30 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES 


RANGES OF SHOT 

FROM THE 


32 -Pdr. of 32 act. 

Mounted on Spar-decks of 2d class Sloops-of-war.—Bore of 
Gem, seven and a half feet above water.—Charge 4^ lbs. 


Elevation. 

Flash to 1st graze. 

1st 

Grazes 

2d 

on the 

3d 

water. 

4th 

5th 

Extreme 

Roll 

of Ball. 

Number of rounds. 

Number of rounds 

forming the Mean. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

P. B. 


287 

708 

1256 





10 

1° 


581 

979 






9 

90 


857 







9 

3° 


1140 

1564 

1759 





10 

4° 


1398 

1446 






9 

5° 


1598 







I 10 


Mounted on Spar-decks of First-class Frigates. 
Bore of Gun, fifteen and a third feet above the water. 

Charge, 4^ lbs. 


P. B. 

// 

1.10 

366 

846 

not taken 

10 

2.03 

655 

1159 

1501 


2° 

2.88 

929 

1398 

1687 


3° 

3.91 

1152 

1545 

1713 

1794 

40 

4.91 

1385 





1894 

1573 


10 

<< 

u 

u 

u 


10 

10 

10 

9 

6 











































































OF U. S. NAVY CANNON 


31 


RANGES OF SHOT 

FROM THE 

32 -Pd?\ of 42 cxjot. 

Mounted on Spar-decks of First class Sloops-of-war.—Bore of 
Gun, eight and a third feet above water.—Charge 5 lb? 


Charge 6 lbs. 


P. B. 


313 

1° 

1.8 

672 

2° 

2.9 

988 

3° 

4.1 

1274 

4° 

5.0 

1505 

50 

6.0 

1756 


731 

1143 

not 

1705 

1643 


1040 

1458 

taken 

1875 

1717 


no ricochet. 


sank 

2010 


5 

10 

10 

10 

10 

10 


P 

.£ 

c3 

3 

Flash to 1st graze. 

Grazes on the water. 

Extreme 
Roll 
of Ball. 

Number of rounds. 

Number of rounds 

forming the Mean. 

1st 

2d 

3d 

4th 

5th 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

P. B. 

// 

299 

701 

1041 




5 

4 








f 1900 



lo 

1.76 

616 

1061 

1349 

1599 

1771 

-< to 

10 

10 








( 2600 



2° 

2.8 

913 

1436 

1681 




10 

8 

3° 

3.9 

1194 

1581 

1770 

1875 

1932 


10 

10 

4° 

4.8 

1420 

not taken. 



10 

9 

5° 

5.8 

1651 

not taken. 



10 

8 


5 

10 

10 

9 

9 

10 























































32 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES 


RANGES OF SHOT 

FROM THE 

32 -Pdr. of 57 cwt. 

Mounted on Gun-decks of Frigates.—Bore of Gun, nine feet 

above water.—Charge, 9 lbs. 


d 

o 

N 

c3 

H 

bO 

U1 

i—i 

o 

o 



C3 

rd 

O 

3 

a 

S 


P. B. 

n 

357 

1 ° 

2.2 

770 

2° 

3.4 

1154 

3° 

4.3 

1449 

40 

5.3 

1708 

50 

6.6 

1932 

60 

7.7 

2144 

10O 

10.7 

2731 

1° 

2.4 

759 

2° 


1073 

3° 

4.4 

1353 


Grazes on the water. 


1st 


Yds. 


2d 


Yds. 

782 

1310 

1638 

1792 


3d 4th 


Yds. Yds. 


1622 1930 
1928 


1962 




no ricochet, 
no ricochet. 


5th 


Yds. 


2060 


sank 

1819 


•••••• 


Charge, 7 lbs. 


1588 


1740 


•••••• 


>••••• 


*•••••« 


5 

10 

5 


Extreme 
Boll 
of Ball. 

Yds. 

Number of rounds. 

Number of rounds 

forming the Mean. 


3400 




to 

6 

5 

1 

3600 





33 

33 


[2400 



■< 

to 

8 

8 


2700 





10 

8 


(1750 



■< 

to 

10 

10 


(I960 



• 

»••••••• 

10 

9 

• 

»••••••• 

10 

7 


10 






















































OF U. S. NAVY CANNON 


33 


RANGES OF SHELLS (Excentric) 

*» TV 1 ^'T V 

FROM THE 

8-m. of 55 ciot. 


Mounted on Spar-decks of Sloops-of-War.—Bore of Gun, seven 
and a-half feet above water.—Charge, 7 lbs. 


10 

50 

8 ° 


Charge, 8 lbs. 


602 

1712 

2308 


1053 

1827 


1855 


5 

5 

5 


5 

5 

4 


Elevation. 

Time of Flight. 

Grazes on the water. 

Extreme 
Roll 
of Ball. 

Number 

of 

Rounds 

Number of rounds 
formiug the Mean. 

Explo¬ 

sion. 

1st 

2d 

3d 

4t,h 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds 

Yds. 

Yds. 

P. B. 

• • • 

283 

not t 

aken. 

•••**» 

»•••••• 

10 

10 


lo 


579 

1054 




12 

10 










10" fuse. 

2° 


869 

1517 

1815 



10 

9 

2050 

3° 


1148 

1732 

2015 



10 

10 

2002 

40 


1413 

1847 

1965 



10 

9 

5° 


1657 

1754 




10 

8 


6 ° 


1866 

no 

ricoch 

et. 


12 

11 


8 ° 


2315 

no 

ricochet. 


10 

8 


10° 

• • • 

2600 

no ricochet. 


6 

6 



3 



































































34 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES 


RANGES OF SHELLS 

FROM THE 

8 -in. of 6 3 cwt. 


Mounted on Main decks of Frigates.—Bore of Gun, nine feet 
above the water.—Charge, 9 lbs. 


Elevation. 

Flash to 1 st graze. 

Grazes on the water. 

Extreme 
Roll 
of Ball. 

Number of rounds. 

Number of rounds 
forming the Mean. 

Remarks. 

1 st 

2 d 

3 d 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

P. B. 

// 

332 

735 

960 


7 

6 

« 

1° 

1.89 

662 

1138 


3416 

10 

8 

5 sec. fuzes. 

2° 

3.07 

966 

1650 


••••••••a 

10 

8 

1200 1 . 









to I'V 

3° 

4.34 

1264 

1820 

2031 


10 

10 

1500 j 

4° 

5.32 

1540 

not taken 


10 

9 


5° 

6.32 

1769 

1915 


1938 

10 

10 




































OF U. S. NAVY CANNON. 


35 


RANGES OF SHELLS 

FROM THE 

10-m. of 86 civf. 

Bore of Gun, seven and three-quarter feet above water. 

Charge, 10 lbs. 


Elevation. 

Time. 

Grazes on the water. 

Extreme 
Roll 
of Ball. 

Number 

of 

Rounds. 

Number 
of rounds 
forming 
ihe Mean 

1st 

2d 

3d 

4th 

5th 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

P. B 
10 

20 

3° 

4° 

50 























































5" 5 

1533 





5 

4 




i 


The practice of this gun was discontinued by order of the Chief 
of Bureau, who decided not to use it any longer in the U. S. ships. 
A new and heavier X-inch shell-gun has since been introduced. 








































36 


DIMENSIONS AND RANGES 


The character of the ricochet depends on 
the elevation of the gun and on the condition 
of the water at the time. The most favorable 
circumstances under which it occurs, are where 
the angle is least at which the ball strikes the 
water and the surface of the water perfectly 
smooth. The shot or shell will then roll 3000 
to 3,500 yards, rising but little above the sur¬ 
face,—never as high as the hull of a frigate. 
At first the bounds are of considerable extent 
—perhaps 350 to 400 yards between the first 
and second grazes—they diminish gradually, so 
as to leave intervals not exceeding 50 yards as 
they approach the end of the range, and finally 
roll along the top of the water as if ploughing 
it. Long before this, however, they are apt to 
curve off to the right or left from the true direc¬ 
tion, so as to make an extreme deviation often 
amounting to 100 or 200 yards. 

The extreme roll is soon affected by the eleva¬ 
tion of the piece or the roughness of the water, 
and likewise the character of the ricochet — for 
the ball bounds high just as one or the other 
of these is increased—and the seaman must be 
governed accordingly; if at the time he cannot 
spare any force of the ball, the practice should 
be direct—if he can, he may fire direct or on 
ricochet — much judgment and care should be 
exercised in deciding on this. 

It was noticed in one instance, while firing 
in a calm with smooth water, that the length of 


OF U. S. NAVY CANNON. 


37 


the first bound was not quite 400 yards—the 
ball sweeping close to the surface. A slight 
disturbance of the water increased it to nearly 
600 yards, and the wind rising considerably, 
made it nearly 800 yards. With this increase 
the extreme roll fell off and the ball rose higher 
and higher, at most perhaps more than 50 feet, 
which would have made the ricochet firing 
entirely useless. 

The ricochet of the larger and heavier pro¬ 
jectiles, is always superior to that of the smaller 
calibres, and the direction is also less affected 
by the wind. 

In all cases, except with the long 32-pdr. (and 
its full charge) the shot and shells are seen dis¬ 
tinctly in the air for a mile at least from the 
gun—provided the observer is placed near the 
line of fire. 
























































■ lit'" i 

' 

’ 




























































































II. 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


Orders given in 1848 to fit the U. S. Naval cannon with elevating 
sights.—Compelled to execute the ranges on water.—Instru¬ 
ments required.—Plane-table selected and adapted to the 
purpose.—Description of new Alidade and mode of use—Sample 
of results.—Triangulation of the Anacostia to obtain stations 
for the Plane-table.—Measurement of Base.—Series of triangles. 
— Details of practice. — Projectiles. — Elevating quadrant — 
Sample of record. 


Cannon of every class used in the U. S. Navy 
were represented at the Battery, and their ranges 
on the water ascertained by means of Plane- 
tables placed along the shore. 

The Bureau of Ordnance having determined 
to equip all the cannon of the Navy with sights, 
the duty of carrying out its views in this par¬ 
ticular was devolved upon me in 1848. 

The first information indispensable to pro¬ 
ceeding with the graduation of the tangent 
scales was, however, wanting. No ranges had 
been obtained of any of the classes of 32-pdrs. 
introduced by the Board of 1845, and none 
could be procured, even of the long 32-pdrs., 
that were sufficiently reliable for the purpose 
in view. 


40 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


The preliminary operation therefore, involved 
a much more arduous and tedious operation 
than that indicated by the expressed wishes 
of the Bureau; particularly as it was obvious 
that the ordinary method of obtaining ranges 
by measurement on land, was not practicable 
at this place. For the shores of the stream 
were so winding, that in few places could a 
direct line be had extending as far as half a 
mile. And even then, gun practice on the 
beach or near it would have alarmed, perhaps 
endangered the people who inhabited the banks 
of the stream, or who frequented the wharves 
in small river craft. 

There was no alternative but to attempt exe¬ 
cuting the ranges on the water, for which the 
width of the stream, and other circumstances, 
offered some facilities. 

But to do this it would be necessary:— 

1st. To select some instrument which was 
sufficiently accurate and ready of use. 

2nd. To triangulate the shores of the river. 

The jet thrown up by a ball in grazing the 
water, though of brief duration, is yet suscep¬ 
tible of being made the subject of observation. 

This has been done sometimes by placing 
buoys at regular intervals along the line of fire, 
with observers at suitable locations, who, by 
estimating the distance of the jet from the 
nearest buoy, could thereby approximate the 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


41 


range. The obvious uncertainty of such a pro¬ 
cess made it unsuitable for the present purpose. 

In 1843, Major Wade used a contrivance for 
angular measurements of the lateral deviations 
of shot and shells. But this was not suited to 
the means here at disposal, nor to the object in 
view. 

Similar objections existed to the Sextant or 
Circle. All such instruments required a skilful 
observer, and even then were necessarily limited 
to the observation of a single graze, inasmuch 
as it was always necessary to read off one obser¬ 
vation before taking another, and hence it be¬ 
came impracticable in this way for one person 
to note the rapidly succeeding grazes of a ball 
in ricochet,—which is of too much interest in 
naval firing to be neglected. 

There is also a manifest difficulty in ob¬ 
serving with a reflecting instrument upon an 
object of such transient duration as the jet of 
water; and this of itself would probably con¬ 
stitute the most serious objections to using a 
Sextant or Circle, if time, trouble, or expense 
were of the least consideration. 

Angular measurement also involved the sub¬ 
sequent calculation or projection of the work. 

Having then no observers qualified to make 
angular measurements, or to arrange the results 
subsequently, and the amount of work being 
manifestly beyond the physical power of one 


42 MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


individual, it was necessary to contrive some 
appliance that was sufficiently accurate in opera¬ 
tion, convenient in yielding its results, and 
admitting of use by any person of intelligence 
and readiness. 

It seemed that the ordinary Plane-table might 
be made to meet these conditions, by adapting 
to it a convenient Alidade; that used for sighting 
objects in field work being obviously unsuitable, 
inasmuch as it was not constructed for quick 
movement, and therefore could not be aligned 
with the necessary rapidity upon an object so 
transient as the jet of water thrown up by a shot. 
The scope permitted by the field of a telescope, 
appeared to be also too limited to afford the 
view sufficient to include the variations in dis¬ 
tance to which shot are liable, even when fired 
at the same angle of elevation. 

It only remained to remedy these defects by 
substituting a proper Alidade, and it then ap¬ 
peared that the Plane-table would offer a reason¬ 
able prospect of successfully accomplishing the 
object in view. In the first place, a person 
of ordinary readiness and perception could be 
taught to use it with facility and accuracy. 
Then the direction once taken, was already pro¬ 
jected on the table, could be ascertained at a 
convenient season subsequently, and verified if 
necessary; with some practice the observation 
could also be repeated instantly, so as to follow 
the successive grazes made in bounding. 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


43 


The new Alidade may he described as follows: 

The flat metallic ruler, resting and moving 
on the surface of the paper, carries upon it a 
light, upright column, at the head of which is 
another ruler having a vertical movement only; 
its extreme points are fitted with raised sights 
(a notch and a point) which collimate with the 
bevelled edge of the lower ruler. At the side 
of the lower ruler, and about mid-length, is an 
extension of the metal perforated to receive the 
head of a pin, the centre of which is to coin¬ 
cide with the bevelled edge of this horizontal 
ruler. 

Near one of the corners of the Plane-table, a 
small brass plate is countersunk in the wood 
and tapped, so as to receive a pin about half 
an inch long and screw-cut, having a milled 
head, above which is a continuation of the pin 
two-tenths of an inch in length, turned perfectly 
smooth so as to permit the lower ruler to pivot 
about it as a centre. 

A point along the shore, the distance of which 
from the Battery has been ascertained, is selected, 
so that a line drawn from it towards the place 
where the first grazes are expected to occur, will 
be at right angles to the line of fire, or nearly 
so; and while preparation is being made at the 
Battery for practice, the observer is sent with a 
Plane-table to this station. 

The table is adjusted with the small metal 
plate over the stake that marks the station, 


44 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


levelled, and the screws made to bear as firmly 
as possible. The observer places his Alidade 
on the pivot pin, sights carefully on a given 
point at the Battery, and marks on the paper 
affixed to the table, the direction assigned by 
the bevelled edge of the ruler; each of the 
stakes planted in the line are noted in the 
same way, and the observer then makes known 
that he is ready. 

On the nearest end of the ruler is screwed 
a pin with a suitable head for the fingers of 
one hand, for the purpose of giving the direc¬ 
tion. On the farthest end is a thin slide 
carrying a small lever with a keen cutting 
point, which is depressed by the action of a 
spring forcibly enough to make an incision on 
the paper; the slide is moved to a convenient 
distance on the ruler, and clamped there by 
screws. 

When the cannon has been loaded and pro¬ 
perly directed, a preparatory signal is made at 
the Battery by hoisting a large white ball, 
made distinct by being displayed against a 
black ground; seeing this, the observer brings 
round the Alidade to the expected direction of 
the first graze, extends his unemployed hand 
and presses the lever so as to raise the cutting 
edge above the paper. The ball is lowered 
and the gun fired. The instant the jet takes 
place, the sights of the Alidade are aligned 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


45 


upon it, and the cutting point of the lever 
suffered to make an incision in the paper. 

A Plane-table is placed rearward of the gun 
on a prolongation of the line of fire, and by it 
the deviation of the ball from the line of fire 
is determined. 

The efforts of the person at the Plane-table 
in the rear to ascertain the deviation at the 
first graze, were frequently rendered unavailing 
by the intervening smoke. But as the line of 
sight from the table for range intersects the 
line of fire nearly at right angles, the devia¬ 
tions of the projectiles from the line is not 
sufficient to cause any appreciable error in 
estimating the distance from the Battery on 
the assumed line of fire. 

The failure, therefore, in this respect, only 
involved the loss of the lateral deviations, 
which was remedied subsequently, so far as 
regarded the more important distances, by the 
practice at screens through which the shot were 
fired. 

As these deviations were small proportionally 
to the variations in range, an attempt was made 
to measure them by means of a Micrometer fitted 
to a telescope, the fixed wire being adjusted to 
the line of fire, and the movement of another 
wire being made to depart from it, right or left, 
as might be necessary. The faintest smoke, how¬ 
ever, even when not entirely impervious to the 
naked eye, obscured the lenses completely. 


46 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


If it had been possible to place a table in the 
line of fire beyond the range of shot, the devia¬ 
tions could have been noted without fail; but 
the locality put this out of the question. 

Very little elementary information is required 
to perceive that the line connecting the Battery 
and the station, is a base from which is deter¬ 
mined the position of a given point, in the 
present case a column of water, and that the 
projection of this base on any scale will enable 
one to ascertain, in terms of that scale, the dis¬ 
tances of the jet from either end of the base; 
that from the Battery being the one in question. 

When the work has been completed, the table 
is returned to the office, and a projection made 
of the line of fire from the base formed by the 
station and Battery; in doing which, the pin 
used for the Alidade is unscrewed and another 
substituted which has no head, and screws with 
the upper surface to a level with the paper; on 
this the centre is shown by a point. The various 
stakes are laid down on the line by means of the 
directions assigned them from the station occu¬ 
pied, and the distances from the Battery thus 
determined, serve to verify the accuracy of the 
observer, they having been previously ascertained 
by the Theodolite. 

The grazes are then transferred to the line, 
and their respective distances read off by a scale, 
the bevelled edge of which is divided into 
yards. 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 47 


The scale found most convenient on a table 
of ordinary dimensions is Hence, one 

inch=200 feet, and 1.5 in.=100 yards; the 
lowest subdivision=2 yds., but the eye readily 
estimates to half a yard. The beam-compass 
used for projecting, reads by the vernier to the 
hundredth of an inch, and may be estimated to 
one-fourth of this quantity. 

The accuracy which the Plane-table, thus 
arranged, is capable of, may be exemplified by 
the following determination of grazes from dif¬ 
ferent bases, one being on each side of the 
stream:— 


Chambered 32 -pdr. (32 cwt.) 


June 1st. 


D 

A 

yards. 

yards. 

535 

532 

539 

538 

555 

556 

570 

573 

516 

517 

519 

517 

545 

546 

519 

519 

584 

585 

563 

564 

544.5 

544.7 


July 6 th. 


B 

G 

yards. 

yards. 

1082 

1083 

1073 

1074 

1076 

1074 

1097 

1097 

1159 

1157 

1098 

1097 

1093 

1091 

1058 

1057 

1069 

1069 

1176 

1178 

1098.1 

1097. 7 





48 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


The difference between the means is alto¬ 
gether immaterial, and that occurring in indi¬ 
vidual cases may be properly attributable to the 
character of the object, which is not always very 
clearly defined. 

The employment of more complex instruments 
with a view to closer determinations, would 
involve the necessity of a more highly instructed 
order of observers, and the results would pro¬ 
bably afford no compensation for the trouble. 

The arrangement of the Plane-table as de¬ 
scribed, places its adjustment and use within 
the scope of any one of intelligence and precise 
habits. The observations recorded in this report 
were made by persons employed in the mechan¬ 
ical department of the Ordnance Workshops, 
and initiated with a slight preparatory training. 
As a knowledge of the Plane-table was not 
within the line of their vocation, it could not be 
expected that they should have been conversant 
with the rationale by which the results were to 
be obtained from its application; but it is certain 
that in its employment, they manifested a degree 
of dexterity which it would be difficult to excel. 
In one case, seventeen grazes in ricochet were 
taken in succession at one table. 

The results are deduced so readily, that it has 
rarely happened in any case, that the operations 
were not recorded on the same day on which 
they were made; and this with slight exception 
was the work of one person. 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


49 


In October, 1847, a Plane- table was placed at 
a convenient point along the shore, while Mr. 
Clapham, then Gunner, fired a series of shot 
from 32-pdrs. of 32 cwt - and 27 cwt -. The results 
were sufficient to justify the statement to the 
Bureau that the project was feasible, and ar¬ 
rangements were made for triangulating the 
shores of the stream, so as to fix with precision 
the distances between the Battery and the points 
that were to constitute the several bases for the 
Plane-table. 

Triangulation of the Anacostia or Eastern 
Branch of the Potomac .—This small river enters 
the Potomac in a south-westerly direction, a short 
distance below Washington. Its southern shore 
is hilly and much wooded ; the northern shore 
is cleared, and many dwellings and stores are 
scattered along it; a bluff, but not very high 
bank, skirts the edge of the shore, along which 
winds the channel, varying in width, but never 
exceeding 200 yards. 

From the left shore, at the distance of about 
1000 yards from the Battery, juts out Poplar 
Point; beyond which, and distant some two 
miles is Giesbery Point, marking the junction 
with the Potomac. At the Point opposite is the 
U. S. Arsenal, about a mile and a-quarter from 
the Battery; the view of it partly hidden by a 
long narrow and uninhabited tongue of land, 
jutting out from the right or northern shore, 

4 


50 MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


about one mile from the Battery, and known as 
Buzzard Point. 

The entire distance to the Virginia shore 
from the Battery, is less than four miles, afford¬ 
ing range for guns of any calibre. The water 
is so shoal from the channel along the northern 
shore, across the whole width of the stream, that 
the long grass from the bottom extends to the 
surface and makes it very laborious to force a 
boat through it, even where the depth of water 
is sufficient, which in many places it is not at 
low tide. No interruption, therefore, is experi¬ 
enced from the passage of steamboats and river 
craft up and down the Anacostia; though it is 
frequently deemed prudent to delay firing when 
vessels going down the Potomac are near the 
direction of the cannon, as they are then about 
two miles distant and within the roll of heavy 
shot or shells fired at very low angles on smooth 
water. The light depth on these extensive flats 
is convenient, because it admits of planting on 
them stakes, to which are attached screens for 
practice. 

The only delineations of the shores which 
could be had, furnished nothing but the outline 
and the positions of a few prominent objects: 
they were therefore not available for the present 
purpose, and it became indispensable to measure 
a Base, and to determine the points by a series 
of triangles. 

After a hasty reconnoissance, the longest line 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


51 


convenient to the river was selected by Lieut. 
Blunt on the southern shore, and a suitable base 
of verification subsequently obtained in the Navy 
Yard. 

The site of the principal base was not of the 
best description, lying partly across a low marshy 
piece of soil which gave much trouble; the re¬ 
mainder was on cultivated ground, and along 
a smooth beach overflowed at high water. 

On the 25th of April, the measurement of 
this principal base was begun and contined on 
parts of the 26th, 27th and 28th, as the weather 
and state of the tide admitted. The remeasure¬ 
ment took place on April 29th and May 1st. 

Many unfavorable circumstances interposed, 
but nevertheless the difference between the two 
measurements did not quite equal one foot. 
In one instance a bar was knocked over, and 
in the remeasurement, fractions of bars were 
allowed, which should have been avoided as so 
many sources of error. 


First measurement, 

Remeasurement, 

Difference, 

Mean, 


2567 .474 feet. 

2568 .466 “ 
.992 “ 

2567 .970 46 


The base of verification was measured on 
the 22d of April; this lay in the Navy Yard 
and nearly east and west; the east end but a 
few feet from the ship house; the west end 
near an old gun on the wharf, and both ends 


52 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


in line with Station D., the ground nearly level, 
firm and unobstructed. The first measurement 
gave 1010.227 feet, the remeasurement 1010.197, 
the difference about one third of an inch. 

The main series consisted of five triangles 
well conditioned. The angular measurements 
were made with a theodolite, (Gambey,) belong¬ 
ing to the Coast Survey, for the loan of which 
I am indebted to the politeness of Professor 
Bache. 

This operation resulted sufficiently well for 
the purpose in view; inasmuch as the base 
of verification proves to be: 

By calculation from principal base, 1010.325 feet. 
By two measurements, 1010.212 “ 

leaving a difference of one inch and thirty-six 
hundredths. 

The Gambey theodolite being required in the 
Coast Survey, the angles of the secondary points 
connecting with the main series were measured 
by a small theodolite of the old English con¬ 
struction, reading no less than 30 sec. 

As might be expected, it gave but indifferent 
angles, though by frequent repetitions the errors 
in them were reduced sufficiently for the object 
in view 

The measurements of the bases were made by 
a simple and speedy process. Two wrought iron 
tubes, purchased for rocket cases, were put on 
a lathe, and the ends turned with accuracy to 










D M9ClelUi.Ti.cl Sc . 



















MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


53 


certain lengths, intended to be ten feet and 
fourteen feet respectively, though on close ex¬ 
amination they proved to he slightly in excess. 
The tubes were of the best metal, two inches 
exterior diameter and one tenth of an inch thick, 
without any perceptible flexure. 

Each tube was supported by two stands, that 
permitted it to have a vertical movement, and 
was thus made horizontal by means of the level 
placed on the surface planed for that purpose. 

The alignment was preserved by sighting 
through the tubes in both directions upon the 
pegs that marked the base. The whole arrange¬ 
ment was of the simplest character. 

-+» - 

MAIN SERIES. 

Base —2567.970 feet. 

O'" " 

Buzzard Point, 53 18 14.0 7.8 

Base North 60 48 17.75 11.5 

Base South, 65 53 47.0 -f-18".75 40.7 

Buzzard Point-Base N. 2923.5 
Buzzard Point-Base S. 2795.8 



0 

/ 

n 

// 

D. 

54 

18 

29 

27.6 

Buzzard Point, 

46 

04 

57 

55.6 

Base North, 

79 

36 

38.25 

+4".25 36.8 


I).—Buzzard Point, 3540.6 

—Base North, 2592.9 




54 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES 



o 

/ 

// 


// 

Yer. Base West, 

62 

44 

11.25 


04.3 

D. 

63 

17 

47.5 


40.5 

Base North, 

53 

58 

22.25 

+21".0 

15.2 

Yer. Base W—D. 

2359.1 





—Base N. 

2605.9 






0 

/ 

// 


n 

A. 

65 

23 

09 


7.6 

Base North, 

70 

24 

41.75 


40.2 

Yer. Base AVest, 

44 

12 

13.75 

+ 4". 5 

12.2 


A.—Base N. 1998.4 

—Y er. Base W est, 2700.4 



o 

/ 

n 

// 

Yer. Base East, 

85 

03 

35.62 

28.6 

A. 

21 

53 

12.75 

05.7 

Yer. Base AVest, 

Yer. Base East—A. 
—Yer. Base AVest, 

73 

2592.9 

1010.325 

03 

32.75 

+2F.12 25.7 


Verification base deduced by triangulation 
from Base, 

By two measurements, (mean,) 
Difference, 


1010.325 feet. 
1010.212 “ 
1.360 inch. 


SECONDARY POINTS. 


B. 

Buzzard Point, 

North Base, 

B.—Buzzard Point, 
—Base N. 


o > » 

94 15 32 


43 55 01 
41 49 27 

1954.9 

2033.4 







MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES 


55 



0 

/ 

// 



B. 

90 

34 

26 



D. 

51 

38 

23 



Base North, 

37 

47 

11 



B.—D. 

1588.8 





—Base North, 

2033.3 






o 

/ 

// 


/ 

Battery Port, No. 4, 

56 

35 

45 


35 

Base North, 

60 

58 

55 


59 

D. 

62 

24 

52 

—28" 

25 

Battery,—Base N. 

2752.9 





—D. 

273 6.1 






o 

/ 

// 



A. 

41 

00 

16 

.5 


Battery, 

100 

28 

20 



D. 

38 

31 

09 

—14".5 


A.—Battery, 

2578.1 





—D. 

4070.6 






o 

/ 

n 



B. 

47 

57 

54 



Battery, 

33 

15 

54 



Base North, 

98 

46 

06 

—6" 


B.—Battery, 

3663.1 





—Base N, 

2033.0 






o 

/ 

// 



F. 

58 

24 

30 



Battery, 

46 

58 

12 



Base North 

74 

37 

30 

+12" 


F.—Battery, 

3116.2 





—Base N. 

2362.5 






n 

54 

04 

01 

// 

12 

25 

14 

// 

56 

56 

08 

n 

26 

08 

26 







56 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES 



o 

t 

n 

n 

G. 

31 

44 

30 

40 

Battery, 

29 

04 

44 

53 

Base North, 

119 

10 

18 —28" 

27 

G.—Battery, 

4568.6 




—Base N. 

2543.2 






0 

/ 

// 

n 

H. 

24 

31 

24 

30 

Battery, 

24 

00 

57 

03 

Base North, 

131 

27 

21 —18" 

27 

H.—Battery, 

4970.4 




—Base N. 

2699.4 






o 

/ 

// 

// 

I. 

37 

42 

35 

34 

Base North, 

109 

52 

48 

48 

Battery, 

32 

24 

39 +02" 

38 

I.—Base North, 

2412.3 




—Battery, 

4232.5 






o 

f 

n 

// 

Buzzard, 

36 

19 

12 

08 

I. 

131 

35 

42 

38 

Battery, 

12 

05 

18 +12" 

14 

Buzzard—I. 

1496.4 




—Battery, 

5344.4 






o 

/ 

// 

tl 

O. 

31 

43 

36 

28 

Buzzard, 

121 

38 

18 

10 

D. 

26 

38 

30 +24" 

22 


0.—Buzzard, 
—D. 


3019.0 

5732.7 






MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


57 



o 

/ 

// 



p. 

32 

05 

30 


34 

0. 

133 

41 

48 


52 

Buzzard, 

14 

12 

30 

—12" 

34 

P.—0. 

1394.9 





—Buzzard, 

4108.4 






o 

/ 

// 


// 

R. 

34 

56 

12 


07 

0. 

112 

36 

39 


34 

Buzzard, 

32 

27 

24 

4-15" 

19 

R.—0. 

2829.2 





—Buzzard, 

4866.9 






o 

r 

// 


n 

R. 

53 

06 

42 


38 

P. 

108 

38 

36 


32 

Buzzard, 

18 

14 

54 

4-12' 

50 

R.—P. 

1608.4 





—Buzzard, 

4867.3 






The practice was only executed when the 
atmosphere was perfectly calm. 





58 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


In order to reduce to the least possible limit 
the variations in range due to differences in 
diameters of projectiles, the shells for practice 
were selected from a large stock, so as to vary 
but one-hundredth of an inch from the correct 
diameter, leaving the extreme differences two- 
hundredths of an inch. They were then carefully 
weighed, rejecting all that departed considerably 
from the mean weight, as well as those that were 
not smooth and spherical. Shells which had no 
excentric masses, were floated in mercury, and 
those only used which were similar in the 
relative position of the heaviest spot to the 
fuze-hole. 

The projectiles thus selected were arranged in 
the order of weight, and when a sufficient num¬ 
ber was obtained to furnish successive sets of 
ten, the practice commenced with the shell of 
highest or least weight, taking the others in 
order. 

Like care was given to the size, quality and 
weights of sabots and straps; the shell being 
fixed so as to have the fuze-hole, if excentric, 
and the heaviest spot, if concentric, exactly at 
an angle of 45°. 

The shells were never loaded, save in a few 
cases of special practice, as the fragments might 
be dangerous to persons at some distance ashore 
or on the water—a few ounces of powder sufficed 
to blow out the fuze without breaking: the shell, 
and the remainder of the cavity was filled with 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


59 


rice, so as to approach very nearly to the weight 
of the loaded shell as usual in service. 

Primer .—The service primer and perforated 
hammer were generally used on guns of all 
calibres. 

The Elevation , was obtained by a quadrant 
made especially for this purpose. 

Its principle of construction is simple. It 
consists of a steel bar about four feet in length: 
at the end of it is an arc, (12 inches radius,) the 
index of which hears a spirit level. Outside of 
this is a smaller level, and inside a bar of 12 
inches length, but at right angles to the main 
bar. 

The bar is placed on the lower side of the 
bore, and entered into the gun until the cross 
bar coincides with the muzzle face. 

The cross level is adjusted to the inferior 
surface of the main bar, the principal level to 
zero on the arc. 

The exactness with which the new Navy Ord¬ 
nance are manufactured, ensures the desired 
means so far as the gun is concerned, and no 
pains were spared to have the elevating instru¬ 
ment executed in the best possible manner. 

The first which was made, failed to answer the 
purpose. The principal bar was of brass, and 
unable to support the arc and its appliances; a 
flexure in it was soon indicated by the standard 
bar. The divisions of the arc being on silver, 
were quickly rendered undistinguishable by the 


60 MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


fumes of the powder during practice, so that it 
became impossible to verify the position of the 
index after a few rounds,—the motion of the 
tangent screw was imperfect, &c. 

Another one, therefore, became indispensable 
and was made by Mr. Wiirdemann. As might 
be expected from the attainments of this artist, 
its character is in all respects of the highest 
order. The arc is divided (on platina) into 5', 
and sub-divided by the vernier to 5". The cen¬ 
tering, clamping, tangent movement, interior sur¬ 
face of level, and adjustment of level, graduation, 
&c., &c., are, in all respects, equal to those of 
the best instruments for angular measurements 
of like radius. 

Previous to the commencement of the practice 
on any one day, the quadrant is laid on a stand¬ 
ard bar, the cross level adjusted to the inferior 
surface of the main bar and the index level to 
zero. 

In practice the main bar rests on the lower 
side of the bore, the cross bar coinciding with 
the muzzle face. The bubble of the cross level 
is brought to its place by gently turning the bar 
around in the gun, which is then raised or de¬ 
pressed until the index level indicates the proper 
elevation. 


MODE OF OBTAINING RANGES. 


61 


[A leaf from the Record.) 

PRACTICE WITH 8-INCH OF 55 CWT. 
Screen (10 feet by 20 feet) at 550 yards. 
ELEVATION, 1°. 

Regulation Shells, (Gauges=7.84 in. x 7.86 in.,) 5 sec. Fuzes. 

Dupont’s powder; Charge, 7 lbs.—Calm, until the 10th round, 
when the breeze came up from south-west.— Average height of 
Axis of Gun above the water, 8 feet.—Average recoil on a level 
platform, 15£ feet. 


Rounds. 

1st graze. 

2d graze. 

Whole 
No. of 
grazes. 

Perfo 

Above 

water. 

rations on Screen. 

Center line. 

Remarks. 

Right. 

Left. 

Yds. 

Yds. 





Feet. 

Feet. 

Feet. 


1 

587 

1073 

7 

3.6 


8.1 


2 

604 

1157 

9 

4.9 

1.4 



3 

551 

1090 

10 



5.7 


4 

547 

997 

12 





5 

593 

1051 

6 





6 

584 

1028 

12 

3.5 

• •••••• 

8.4 


7 

*513 

963 

12 

3.2 



Expl’d prematurely.*! 

8 

581 

1026 

13 



6.8 


9 

586 

1070 

15 

3.6 

2.8 


Not seen. 

10 

571 

1011 

11 

2.4 

5.2 



11 

*701 

1170 

12 




Expl’d prematurely.* 

12 1 

585 

1040 

10 1 

3.8 

4.4 


No powder. 


Each shell weighed exactly 50.13 lbs. A charge of 0.19 lb. of 
powder was used to show the action of the fuze without breaking 
the shell; the rest of the cavity was filled with rice. The powder, 
rice, fuze and strap of each shell weighed 2.77 lbs., so that the total 
weight of each shell was 52.9 lbs. The fuze acted duly except in 
Nos. 7 and 11, both of which took effect at about 200 or 300 yards, 
and necessarily affected the flight of the shell. No. 9 was not 
seen. The exact distance where the charges of the shells ex¬ 
ploded, could not be determined, the view from the Plane Table 
being obstructed by a point of land. 

* For which reason the ranges are not received . 

















































































































* 









































III. 


DIMENSIONS, WEIGHTS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


Constituents of the shell which affect its projectile and explosive 
properties—typified by the French 22 cent - and English 8-in.— 
Concentricity and excentricity, the latter not desirable—but 
unavoidable.—Rotatory movement first noticed by Robins.— 
Irregularities produced thereby.—Historical sketch of progress 
made in ascertaining its cause.—Explained by excentricity.— 
Mode of action.—Use of it opposed by Paixhans.—Full exposi¬ 
tion and experiment by Col. Bormann.—Examined by Paixhans, 
who advocates the use of it.—-Experiments in England.—Sir 
Howard Douglas not favorable to the use of excentric projec¬ 
tiles.—Experiments in the United States.—Commonly received 
doctrine of the operation of excentricity on the projectile move¬ 
ment.—The presence of excentricity exhibited by floating in 
mercury. — On what conditions its quality is dependent—ill 
effects on the trajectory — by what means best controlled.— 
Compensating mass—preferable distribution thereof—illus¬ 
trated by experiment.—Solid shot liable to effects of excen¬ 
tricity—practical illustration.—Conclusion.—Rifle motion—the 
only useful form of rotatory movement.—Rifles—not of recent 
origin. — Principles and advantages expounded by Robins in 
1745—not understood or followed. — Round ball used.—Dif¬ 
ficulties that prevented the adoption of rifles.—Removed by 
Delvigne, who invented the “ carabine a tige .”—Conical ball— 
had been used in the United States.—Rifle cannon.—Wahren- 
dorf. — Cavalli—description of the Lancaster gun — authentic 
details wanting—general theory—trial of the gun in 1851—used 
in 1854 to arm the new steam gun-boats—results of service 
at Sevastopol and elsewhere unfavorable. — Ranges. — Rifled 
shot for smooth-bored cannon. 

The shell intended for direct or horizontal 
tiring from cannon, resembles that commonly 


64 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

used for mortars and howitzers in having three 
components:— 

— The hollow iron globe from which it 
derives its appellation; 

— The charge of powder contained therein; 

— The fuze, by means of which the flame from 
the charge of the gun is received and carried in 
proper time to the charge of the shell. 

The character of the projectile will vary with 
the relations that exist between the iron shell 
and its charge. If the former be very thick, 
the density of the projectile is increased, and 
with this, its accuracy, range, and power of 
penetration; but the charge is proportionally 
diminished, and thus the distinctive element 
of the shell is more or less reduced. On the 
other hand, by increasing the cavity of the shell, 
so that it shall contain a greater charge, the 
explosive power is proportionally augmented, 
hut the weight of the shell is diminished, and 
with it the important qualities of accuracy, range, 
and penetration. 

The French and English shells of 8-inch and 
22 cent exemplify the two modes of proceeding, 
and probably to the utmost extent to which it 
would be advisable to carry either. The 8-inch 
could not be made heavier without manifest pre¬ 
judice to its explosive power; the 22 cent * could 
not be made to contain a greater charge without 
the sacrifice of accuracy and penetration in a' 
most injurious degree. 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


65 


The English shell extends its effects to a 
greater distance,—hut the French shell is more 
powerful within the range of which it is capable, 
and it has yet to be satisfactorily proven that 
the English shell can exercise decisive effect 
beyond this range. 

It is to be borne in mind that in both services 
the batteries are so constituted by regulation, 
that the shell-guns only serve as auxiliaries to 
those which are designed as the principal force. 
They are few in number and are associated 
with guns assumed to be, whether they are or 
not, of far greater effect at distant ranges. On 
this account, the French shell may appear to 
be better adapted to its purpose, inasmuch as 
it does not seem advisable to sacrifice any of 
its peculiar power at decisive distances, in order 
to perform a feeble and uncertain part at the 
extreme ranges which are usually considered as 
only preliminary to an assured issue, and are 
designed to be reached bv the ordnance to which 
the shell-guns are subordinated. 

The number of the shell-guns admitted by 
regulation into the English and French batteries 
is, however, so limited, compared to the number 
of 32-pdrs., that their relative peculiarities will 
not be very prominently exhibited; and the dis¬ 
parity that may exist between different descrip¬ 
tions of shell-guns will nearly disappear in the 
general effect of the broadside. It would seem 

from the opinion of Captain Sir Thomas Ilast- 

5 


66 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


ings, that this is the view taken of the matter 
by the English authorities.* 

Whether the 8-in. shell-gun (of 65 cwt ) be 
inferior or not to the long 32-pdr., and how far 
such consideration should qualify the develop¬ 
ment of its power, will be examined in another 
place; it is certainly far less powerful than the 
heavy 64 or 68-pdrs., and when associated with 
such ordnance, its shell should have the fullest 
extent of the explosive capacity. 

It may he a matter of reasonable curiosity to 
inquire into the effect which would be pro¬ 
duced by modifying the English system after 
the French, or the French after the English,— 
adhering in each case to the weights adopted 
for their shell-guns respectively, viz., 63 cwt - 
(7,280 lbs.) for the 8-inch shell-gun, and 3,614 
(7,968 lbs.) for the 22 cenL 

Preserving the bores as they are, the weight 
of the English shell would be decreased by 
assimilating its proportions to that of the French, 
and the content of powder increased, but without 
equalling that of the French shell; while its 


* Inquiry by committee of Parliament.—Examination of Sir 

Thomas Hastings, the naval member of the Board of Ordnance. 

5026. “ At this moment, in vessels of the same class in Admiral 
“ Baudin’s fleet and Sir W. Parker’s fleet (May 1849) in the 
“ Mediterranean, the armament is as nearly equal as maybe? 
“ Yes." 

5028. “ But, generally speaking, the French fleet is armed with 
“ guns of equal calibre and hollow shot ? Yes, they may he taken 
“ as equal powers." 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


67 


previous advantages in regard to force and accu¬ 
racy, would be sacrificed, one or both, with any 
arrangement of charge. 

On the other hand, to preserve the present 
diameter of the French shell, and increase its 
thickness proportionally to that of the English 
shell, would add materially to the weight of the 
projectile, and might necessitate a reduction of 
the charge; thus enfeebling the force and pene¬ 
tration considerably, which are already low 
enough, and with a positive loss also in the 
explosive quality. 

It is manifest, therefore, that it would not be 
advisable to make the shell of either nation 
conform to the proportions of the other, sup¬ 
posing the ordnance to remain unaltered. 

Again, if the English shell-gun were bored 
out so as to receive a French shell, the charge 
appropriated to fire the latter from the 22 ceut< 
must be reduced yet more, because of the in¬ 
ferior weight of the English piece; hence less 
accuracy and force: indeed, such an operation 
would merely transform the 8-inch of 65 cwt - 
into an inferior class of the 22 cent> . 

If the metal of the English gun were so dis¬ 
posed as to preserve the present weight of the 
English shell, (51 lbs.) and this shell con¬ 
structed on the French proportions,—the result 
is quite as obvious as in the foregoing. Such 
a shell must be inferior to the French in its 
content of powder, and also inferior to the 


68 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SIIELLS. 

present 8-in. in force and accuracy; because its 
greater surface encounters more resistance from 
the air, while there would be no greater mo¬ 
mentum to overcome it. 

It is palpable, therefore, that no gain and 
positive loss would accrue to the English shell- 
power, as compared with the French, by modi¬ 
fying it after the French in any manner what¬ 
ever. And the same applies to any modification 
of the French shell alone, after the system of 
the English. 

But the 22 cent shell-gun might be bored so 
as to admit a shell similar in its proportions to 
the English, which would be relatively superior 
to the English shell in the ratio that the French 
gun is heavier than the English gun, thus: 

Weight. Content of powder. 

English shell, 51 lbs. 2^ lbs. 

French, modified, 55| lbs. 2f lbs. 

Whether the advantage that would result 
from such an arrangement would be of import¬ 
ance, will depend on the application of the 
pieces. So long as they are made to perform 
a very subordinate part in the force of the 
broadside, it might be that no difference of 
moment would result. 

But, if the number of shell-guns in the batte¬ 
ries were largely increased; or circumstances 
should bring them into operation where the 
peculiar powers of each kind would tell dis- 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


69 


tinctly, particularly in deliberate fire, far or 
near, with shell-guns only; then there is no 
doubt that the occasion would make manifest 
the differences that have been indicated as due 
to the respective powers of one kind of shell 
or another. 

In the solution of this problem, the navy of 
the United States is quite as much interested 
as the English, because our own 8-inch shell-gun 
and shell, differ in no material particular from 
the English. 

This may be said with certainty,—at its own 
range, which includes most of the distances 
where action is admitted to be decisive, the 
French shell is clearly more powerful than the 
8-inch. 

At greater distances, the advantage of the 
8-inch begins; and whether this can really be 
made effective at such ranges, may need the 
experience of actual conflict to determine the 
general opinion. 


Having decided on the weight of shell which 
is deemed most suitable for a given calibre, its 
formation next becomes the subject of conside¬ 
ration. 

When Paixhans proposed his plan of a naval 
shell-armament, he strongly insisted that pre¬ 
ference was due to concentric shells; the practice 
of the principal maritime powers has since con- 



70 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


formed thereto, and continues to do so, with the 
exception of our own service, which, for some 
years past has used shells decidedly excentric. 

Since the general exposition of the shell 
system by Paixhans, in 1825, the effects of 
excentricity have been carefully examined by 
intelligent officers in many countries. 

On scrutinizing the experiments made in 
England, France, Belgium, and the United 
States, their results and the opinions thence 
derived, there does not appear any sound reason 
for relinquishing the views most generally enter¬ 
tained with regard to concentric and excentric 
shells. 

No one can doubt that the former being 
necessarily homogeneous, are subject to less 
irregularity of motion while passing through 
the air, than those which, by construction, are 
unequally dense. 

The chief difficulty lies, however, in not being 
able to obtain shells in which the metal is of 
equal thickness, and therefore equally disposed 
about the centre of figure. 

It may appear at first sight that a condition 
of this nature would be easy of attainment; but 
experience teaches another lesson, and one evi¬ 
dence thereof will be perceived in the fact, that 
in no country is the founder expected to attain 
the exact thickness at all parts, but has certain 
allowances made him for failure to do so; and if 
he does not exceed these the shells are received. 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


71 


For instance,—by our Regulations, 8-in. shells 
should be 1.5 in. thick at all parts, except about 
the fuze hole,—but when shells are to be re¬ 
ceived for service, such as are not less than 
1.45 in., and not more than 1.55 in. at any part, 
cannot be rejected,—that is, there may be a 
difference between opposite sides amounting to 
one-tenth of an inch, or one-fifteenth of the 
entire thickness. The effect of this is more 
injurious than might be supposed, because such 
differences are seldom due to mere inequalities 
of the interior surface, but commonly to the dis¬ 
placement of the core by which the cavity is 
formed, arising from an error of original adjust¬ 
ment, or from being disturbed subsequently, by 
the entrance of the fluid metal in casting. This 
is manifested by the excess and defect of oppo¬ 
site sides, and as a consequence, a lunular 
segment, having the diameter of the shell for 
its base, is abstracted from one side of the shell 
and added to the other. 

The French Regulations allow a departure of 
0.07 in. more or less from the prescribed thick¬ 
ness of the 8-in. shell, and in that respect seem 
to recognise a greater claim for indulgence to 
errors of the founder. 

So long then as it is impracticable to avoid 
differences in the dimensions of the shells which 
render them excentric, there is no occasion to 
make an issue in regard to the preference that 
may be due to excentric or concentric shells. 


72 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

For if the latter cannot be had, the practical 
question only concerns the best mode of dealing 
with the defect that must he encountered in all 
shells. 

This will be best understood by stating the 
effects that want of homogeneity is admitted to 
exert on the trajectory; which statement may 
he properly preceded by a brief notice of the 
manner in which the current doctrine, concern¬ 
ing this property, has been initiated and finally 
established. 

About 1737, Mr. Robins observed great irregu¬ 
larities in the flight of halls, which were not to 
be accounted for by the known action of either 
of the forces, recognised by theory and experi¬ 
ment to influence the formation of their trajec¬ 
tory:—the propelling power, gravitation, or the 
resistance of the atmosphere. To the latter he 
himself had first assigned its proper value, so 
far as the purposes of artillery were concerned, 
by proving conclusively that the resistance was 
much increased beyond the ratio due to the 
squares of the velocities, when the velocity was 
equal to that commonly imparted to cannon 
shot. This determined the true configuration 
of the trajectory; but Mr. Robins was not slow 
in perceiving that the direct resistance of the 
air could not explain the surprising deviations 
which occurred with every variety of ball, 
whether fired from the musket or the cannon. 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


73 


Tracing the phenomenon experimentally through 
its several phases, he was at no loss to attribute 
the result to its exact cause; and pronounced 
these deflections from the assigned direction, to 
be due to the oblique action of the resisting 
medium on the surface of the ball, arising from 
its rotatory movement. 

No suspicion, however, seems to have been 
entertained at that time, of the serious defects 
in homogeneity to which the material of cannon 
balls was liable; and Mr. Robins had no oppor¬ 
tunity previous to his untimely decease, to prose¬ 
cute his researches to their full conclusion, which 
would have undoubtedly led so able and critical 
an observer to realize the extent of this defect 
and its connection with the rotatory movement; 
a result only reached a century after he laid bare 
the true source of the inaccuracy in question. 

Wherefore, he considered the sphere to be 
homogeneous, and that the rotation occurring 
about one of its axes was produced by the col¬ 
lision with some part of the bore in passing out. 

In 1745, the labors of Mr. Robins were com¬ 
plimented by the attention of one of the ablest 
analysts in Europe, (Euler,) who translated his 
tracts and discussed the several topics therein 
presented. He differed from Mr. Robins, how¬ 
ever, in the opinion that the rotatory movement 
of projectiles was the cause of their deviation, 
and thought on the contrary that it would have 


74 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


the effect of counteracting such deviations as 
might arise from a want of sphericity. — ( M\ 
Meyer , 1745, 20.) 

In 1771, the conclusions of Mr. Robins re¬ 
ceived remarkable verification from some practice 
for general purposes, executed at La Fere with 
a 24-pdr. The elevation was 25°, and a board 
was placed 32 feet from the muzzle to show 
the primitive direction of the shot; the results 
were:— 


Perforation in Board 
at 32 feet. 

1. § in. to the right. 

2. j in. to the left. 

3. 1 in. to the left. 


Range. 

3765 yds. 
3848 “ 
4072 “ 


Deviations 

230 yds. to the left. 
38 “ to the right. 
230 “ to the right. 


Anomalies so marked were only to be ex¬ 
plained by the theory of rotatory movement, 
as expounded by Robins; but it does not seem 
that his solution, if known to the parties en¬ 
gaged, was admitted to be sufficient to account 
for the phenomenon so distinctly present. 

In 1783, Lombard published his translation 
of Robins, with the annotations of Euler, and 
his own. He is said* to have agreed with 
Robins in regard to the cause of deviations, 
and explained those at La Fere by the hypo¬ 
thesis of the rotation produced by the final 
collision with the bore. 

In 1789, Captain Luther, of the Saxon Artil- 


* M. Meyer. 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


75 


lery, indicated clearly the existence of excen- 
tricity in shells, and suggested the means of 
ascertaining its extent. He advised the classi¬ 
fication of shells and bombs according to the 
angle formed by the axis through the fuze-hole 
and that through the centre of gravity,—so that 
the centre of gravity might be similarly placed 
in the bore of the gun, preferring a position 
in its axis for the purpose. By this device, he 
expected to obtain more uniform ranges, par¬ 
ticularly in vertical fire. This is probably the 
first instance in which any consequence was 
attached to the excentricity of projectiles, if 
indeed it was known or considered at all. And 
curiously enough, Captain Luther thus touched 
directly the predominating cause of the rotatory 
movement, and its ill effects on the accuracy of 
cannon; but he seems to have been utterly 
unconscious that the excentricity produced any 
such movement. 

In 1796 a comparison by eprouvette was 
instituted at La Fere, between the Champy and 
ordinary gunpowder, under the direction of M.M. 
Pelletier and Borda, and General Abeville. The 
irregular flight of the balls was thus noticed in 
their Report. 

u The great deviation of the projectiles induced 
“ the suspicion that it was not always due to 
“ errors in pointing, and to their final collision 
“ with the bore in leaving it. General Abeville 
46 assured himself of the facts by the proofs in 


76 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


“ 1771, and repeated them in 1796, while com- 
“ paring the angular and round powder. He 
“placed a small piece of board 18 inches square 
“ and 6 inches thick parallel to the muzzle-face of 
“ the piece and about 20 feet distant—the axis 
“ of the bore being directed at the middle of the 
“ board, the perforation made in it determined 
“ the direction of the shot; from which its place 
“ of fall showed that it sometimes deviated as 
“ much as 8°,—and this could not be attributed 
“ to the wind, towards which the deviation often 
“ occurred. It was thought that it might be 
“ caused by the rotatory movement of the ball at 
“ leaving the gun, but it is difficult to believe 
“ that this alone could occasion the deviation.” 

“ Whatever may be the cause of this lateral 
“ aberration, it can also act upwards or down- 
“ wards, produce much difference in the ranges, 
“ and occasion great errors in estimating the 
“ velocity of the balls by the distance at which 
“they fall.”— (Aide Mem., 1801, p. 698.) 

In 1797 the Treatise of Lombard on the move¬ 
ment of projectiles, was published by his son. 
Throughout this work I cannot say that the term 
rotatory movement occurs once, and the force it 
represents, appears to be entirely unnoticed. 
This is singular, when it is considered that the 
doctrine of Robins was well known to Lombard, 
because he had translated and annotated the 
work wherein it was so particularly set forth and 
demonstrated, and is said to have approved the 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 77 

views of Robins in opposition to Euler, who did 
not. Nor does Lombard even notice the in¬ 
creased ratio of resistance, which Robins also 
proved incontestably, but proceeds on the doc¬ 
trine of its being proportional to the \/ as enun¬ 
ciated by the illustrious Newton. Such an 
omission is the more remarkable, inasmuch as, 
the method of computing the initial velocity from 
the ranges by Lombard, must depend entirely 
upon a correct estimation of the effects of the 
resisting medium in retarding and varying the 
course of the ball.* 

We can only understand this seeming incon¬ 
sistency by supposing that Lombard admitted 
the theory, but attached no material value to it 
in practice. The observations made on the 
eprouvette results in 1796 (just cited) would no 
doubt have had their influence, but Lombard 
must have died before they were made known. 

In 1798, the effects of excentricity on the ac¬ 
curacy were so far admitted, as to become the 
subject of scrutiny in Hanover. In the practice 
then executed, it appeared from firing a large 
number of howitzer shells, that the irregularities 
of those which were excentric, were double and 
treble those of the concentric.—( Paixhan-s , 191.) 

In 1801, the Aide Memoire of that year pub¬ 
lished in detail the trials made at La Lere in 
1796 with that part of the Report relating to the 


* See Didion, who says that such errors were actually incurred. 




78 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

deviation, which has been just cited, and it is 
commented on in the following terms:— 

“ How is it possible to know from these trials 
“ that the halls deviated 8° \ Nothing is said 
“ of the part of the hoard which was struck, and 
“ that alone is of consequence—for if the ball, 
“ while in the gun (supposed to be a 12-pdr.), 
“ strikes one side of the bore so as to graze the 
“ opposite side in going out, it is clear from the 
“simplest idea of geometry (2:1:: 240 : 120) 
“ that it will pass 10° from the middle of the 
“ hoard and therefore will not touch it. If to 
“ this deflective force is added that which must 
“ result from the gas operating obliquely on the 
“ rear of the ball as it goes out, and in the same 
“ sense, it will not be surprising that though 
“ the piece were well pointed, the hall should 
“ be carried very much out of the line of aim.”* 
—[Aide Memoire , 1801, p. 698.) 

In 1803, the French Military Committee ob¬ 
serve in their report:— 

“ Reinforced howitzer shells have greater 
“ranges than those which are not reinforced.” 
They do “ not deviate more”—“ a result for 
“ which we are unable to account.” 

Paixhans (in 1849, however,) remarks on 
these phrases:—“In that lengthy paper these 


* This would now appear to have been a very summary criti¬ 
cism, and was obviously too hasty, as the conclusions were by no 
means warranted by the premises. 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


79 


“ effects are referred to with surprise, and are 
“ variously explained; but principally by the 
“ collision with the bore, which is considered as 
“ the chief cause; or rather, no principle is 
“ distinctly assigned, nor any application of it 
44 made. Nevertheless, one important thing was 
44 then seen, (I know not if it were the first 
44 time,) and Colonel Clement was of opinion 
44 that irregularities in extent of range, should 
44 be attributed to the same cause as the lateral 
44 deviations.”—( Paixhans , Const. Mill. p. 241.) 

In 1808, Colonel Clement executed some ex¬ 
periments at Pavia, in the course of which he 
did not overlook this subject:— 

44 He fixed a strong oak plank at a short dis- 
44 tance from an 8-pdr., its surface being slightly 
44 inclined to the axis of the gun, and in such a 
44 manner that the left side of the ball could not 
44 fail to encounter the plank and to produce a 
44 reflection to the right. To be certain of which, 
44 a sheet of paper was placed beyond the plank 
44 and these arrangements being made, the can- 
44 non was fired three times; each time the ball, 
44 after beginning to deviate a little to the right, 
44 fell very considerably to the left.”—( Montgery , 
1828. 

44 In the work published this year, Colonel 
44 Clement examines the experiments of 1803, and 
44 says:”—The 44 extent and uniformity of range, 
44 obtained with howitzer shells, is in proportion 
44 to the distance of the centre of gravity from 


80 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

44 the centre of figure.”—But he did not indi- 
“ cate what the respective positions, in the gun, 
44 of these centres should be.”—( Paixhans , Const . 
Mil 241. 

In 1822, General Paixhans published his justly 
celebrated exposition of the Nouvelle Arme; in 
which he traced with a masterly hand the details 
of the system that in a few years was to work a 
total revolution in naval armament. In treating 
the question of excentricity and concentricity, he 
says, page 141:— 

“ The interior form of shells and bombs has 
44 undergone many variations, yet there is but 
44 one form which can be reasonably admitted, 
44 and that is exactly spheric and concentric with 
44 the exterior sphere, without reinforce;—the 
44 thickness everywhere equal and the centre of 
44 gravity in the centre of figure. Every princi- 
44 pie of theory, every well-executed experiment, 
44 and every conclusion based on enlightened 
44 examination, accord so perfectly on this point, 
44 that it would be superfluous to enter upon the 
44 proof.” 

In 1828, Captain Montgery, of the French 
Navy, in his Regies de Pointage , noticed the rota¬ 
tory movement of projectiles as the cause of 
deviation; but considers it to arise from the col¬ 
lision of a concentric projectile with the bore, 
and abstains from all mention of excentricity 
as a partial or principal agent. He quotes the 
experiments of Colonel Clement at Pavia. 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 81 

The important problem was now verging to 
its solution. It is difficult to know with any 
exactness by whom, when, or how it was initi¬ 
ated and prosecuted. The customary mystery 
which is purposely thrown about the discovery 
of some real or imaginary improvement in things 
of this nature, presents an obstacle to the infor¬ 
mation sought, and in this country the difficulty 
is increased by the exceeding scarcity of profes¬ 
sional works on such subjects. 

It is stated, however, on good authority ,* that 
in 1833, certain officers of the Belgian Artillery 
were led to some slight experiments in conse¬ 
quence, it is said, of hints received from the 
Saxon service. What these were, we are not 
informed; but the whole question must have 
been so apparent from the premises to the con¬ 
clusion, that it is only to be wondered at that 
any hint had been required for a long time 
antecedent to the period spoken of. 

In 1837, Colonel Bormann submitted to the 
Belgian government a project in relation to the 
excentricity of projectiles and to the manner in 
which it might be made useful, at least so far 
as Shrapnel were concerned. A full investiga¬ 
tion followed in 1838, at Brasschaet, on which 
occasion it would seem the whole question in 
regard to cause, effect and application must have 
received an intelligent and thorough treatment; 


* Colonel Bormann. 
6 



82 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

as even the brief abstracts, made public by 
Colonel Bormann, suffice to explain the pheno¬ 
mena which, till that time, most certainly were 
not known by many, if known at all; of which 
we have confirmation in the statements of an 
eminent artillerist, ( Paixhans , Const. Militaire.) 
He says that,—“In 1838, the cause of devia- 
“ tions and the means of avoiding them, were 
“ so little known among us, that M. Poisson, 
“ Examiner of Artillery, and a savant of the 
“ highest order, thus expresses himself in an 
“elaborate memorandum: — 4 The equation of 
44 the movements of a projectile are so compli- 
44 cated, that it is impossible to obtain from them 
44 the approximate values of the unknown quan- 
44 tities, with sufficient simplicity to be of any 
44 utility.’ He was obliged to confine himself to 
44 cases of very trifling deviation; while, practi- 
44 cally, and especially with shells, they are often 
44 very great. And with regard to the distance 
44 of the centre of gravity from the centre of 
44 figure, his theory did not assign an important 
44 influence; whilst in reality, this influence is 
44 decisive, as we shall see. In fine, he pro- 
44 duced nothing which materially advanced the 
44 theory, nor any thing that was practically 
44 useful.” 

The knowledge of these results having reached 
General Paixhans, he conducted a series of prac¬ 
tice in order to satisfy himself in relation to the 
remarkable conclusions thus in course of develop- 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


83 


ment, more especially with reference to heavy 
calibres. And thus he seems to have been led to 
an entire change of opinion in regard to the 
effects of excentricity, as may be seen by the fol¬ 
lowing remarks, extracted from his Constitution 
Militaire :— 

“ There is in the excentricity of spherical 
“projectiles, a peculiarity which formerly was a 
“ source of deviation and irregularity in range, 
“ and which now may be made a means of accu- 
“ racy, and of increasing or decreasing the range 
“ at pleasure. 

“ The theory of deviation, difficult, arduous 
“ and incomprehensible as it has been, even for 
“ Savants , is thus by these experiments rendered 
“ perfectly simple and certain.” 

In 1843, Major Wade made some experiments 
at Boston with Excentric shot and shells,—the 
result of which accorded with the views now 
generally entertained in respect to the conse¬ 
quences of excentricity on the flight of pro¬ 
jectiles. 

In 1848, when the practice for Range was 
begun at this place, the shells used in the Navy 
were purposely made very excentric; and as 
there seemed urgent reasons for examining the 
effects of this property more thoroughly than had 
been done when it was adopted, the practice for 
this purpose was included among the earliest 
operations of the New Battery. Concentric and 
Excentric shells, in series of ten at each degree 


84 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

of elevation, were fired, and the results laid be¬ 
fore Commodore Warrington at the earliest date. 
They were included in the first of my Reports 
printed by his order. 

In 1850, 1851, and 1852, at the request of Sir 
Howard Douglas, a course of firing was executed 
at Portsmouth and Shoeburyness in order to verify 
the statements in regard to excentricity, which 
must at the same time have become pretty gene¬ 
rally known from the practice in Belgium and 
elsewhere. 

Excentric projectiles were fired from 32-pdrs. 
and 8-in. shell-guns, 68-pdrs. and 10-in. guns,* 
and the results were in all respects confirmatory 
of those obtained in other countries. In view 
of which Sir Howard Douglas expresses his con¬ 
tinued preference for the concentric and homo¬ 
geneous projectile, (168.) 

This then is the view that presents itself of 
the devious and uncertain manner in which this 
interesting question forced its way to the light, 
so far as I have been able to pursue it by means 
of the scanty materials at my disposal. Its treat¬ 
ment through so long a lapse of time, may excite 
reasonable surprise when the importance now 
attached to it, and the seeming difficulty of 
avoiding the final conclusion, are considered. 
Sometimes contested, at other times neglected, 


* A gun of this calibre, weighing 116 cwt - burst at the 54th 
round, charge 16 lbs.—elevation, 32°—Range 5860 yards. 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


85 


and never, until recently, fully comprehended or 
appreciated in its proper connection; yet of 
itself was it the principal deteriorating influence 
that rendered artillery practice the merest acci¬ 
dent, and set at defiance all attempts to raise 
gunnery beyond the repute of sheer handicraft. 
Not a shot left the cannon that did not offer 
some instance of strange irregularity, equally 
puzzling to the operator and prejudicial to the 
character of his work. 

All this may be attributed either to ignorance 
of the doctrines of Mr. Robins, or to disbelief 
on the part of those who were cognizant that it 
embodied an operative principle. 

We see that General Paixhans bears witness 
to the little knowledge generally professed in 
regard to the subject, so late as 1838, and from 
his position, and high reputation as an artil¬ 
lerist, we could have no better authority. 

The doctrine commonly received (and con¬ 
firmed by experiment) in relation to excen- 
tricity, and its consequences upon the trajectory 
of cannon balls, may be briefly summed, thus:— 

When the centre of gravity does not coincide 
with the centre of the sphere, a revolving motion 
is created around the centre of gravity, the direc¬ 
tion of which depends on the position that the 
centre of gravity has to the centre of the sphere. 

This rotation, during the flight of the projec¬ 
tile, occasions a greater resistance on one side 
of the hemisphere which is in front, than on the 


86 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


other; because on the former the progressive 
and rotatory movement concur, and on the other 
they are in opposition. 

Hence the projectile is made to incline from 
its direct course by the greater pressure which it 
sustains on one side; and the aberration thus 
produced will be in the prolongation of the plane 
passing through the axis of the bore and centre 
of gravity, and will occur on the same side of 
the trajectory as the centre of gravity occupies 
with respect to the axis of bore. 

So that, if the centre of gravity be in the 
vertical plane, the deflection from the normal 
trajectory will be vertical and upwards, or down¬ 
wards, accordingly as the centre of gravity is in 
the upper or lower hemisphere. If above, the 
range will be increased; if below, decreased, by 
the very conditions of the case and without 
lateral deviation. 

If the centre of gravity lie in the horizontal 
plane, the deflection will be entirely lateral, and 
right or left as the centre of gravity may lie. 

If the centre of gravity occupy some position 
between the vertical and horizontal planes, as it 
commonly does, then the aberration will be 
partly vertical and partly lateral. 

It does not appear that the location of the 
centre of gravity in the anterior or posterior 
hemisphere, materially affects its operation, if 
the angle with the vertical axis be similar; ex¬ 
cept that there is a slight increase of range when 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


87 


the centre of gravity is in the posterior hemi¬ 
sphere and in the axis of the bore. 

In general, the effect of the rotation on the 
trajectory, may be briefly represented thus: De¬ 
parting with any given displacement of the 
centre of gravity upwards, and adhering to the 
vertical axis, the range will be augmented to the 
greatest extent that the .excentricity is capable 
of, and without effect laterally. Turning the 
ball in the bore, it will be found that the range 
will decrease as the centre of gravity is moved 
downward, whether in one plane or another, 
until it reaches the lowest part of the sphere, 
when the range will be least,—the lateral devia¬ 
tion will increase with the change of position 
from the plane of projection, until it reaches the 
axis of that plane, when it attains the maximum. 

When the centre of gravity lies in the axis of 
the bore, its effect is trifling, and the trajectory 
nearly corresponds with that of the concentric 
projectile. 

The extent of the divergence from the normal 
trajectory will be controlled by the position of 
the centre of gravity,—by its distance from the 
centre of form, and by the celerity of rotation;— 
the quantity of unequal resistance on the surface 
of the ball depending on all of these. 

The facts already cited in regard to the inex¬ 
actness of dimensions, will convey a fair idea of 
the excentricity to which the best made shells 
are liable; and its consequences upon the equili- 


88 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


bration may be very readily seen by floating a 
number of shells, taken promiscuously from a lot 
intended for service. For this purpose, the shell 
must be closed perfectly at the fuze-hole, and 
placed in mercury, when it will at once com¬ 
mence an oscillating movement, and finally rest 
with the axis through the centre of gravity in a 
vertical position, the pole of which is determined 
by suspending a small disc with its lower surface 
horizontal and tangential to the surface of the 
shell; the disc being coated with paint, allow it 
to come in contact with the culminating point 
of the shell, and to make a mark which will indi¬ 
cate the pole of the axis in question, sufficiently 
near for practical purposes. 

In a number of shells it will be found that 
this spot will occupy every variety of position on 
the surface of the sphere. The extent of the 
excentric force may be made to appear by the 
character of the vibrations produced when the 
floating shell is put in motion; or if desirable, 
it may be measured with some precision. 

The variations which the operator will expe¬ 
rience in the position of the centre of gravity, 
with reference to a fixed point, the fuze-hole for 
instance, and in the amount of the excentric 
force, will enable him to appreciate the irregular 
effects that must thence be produced upon the 
flight of the shell, if this cause be allowed to act 
uncontrolled. As the fuze must have one posi¬ 
tion when the shell is in the gun, that of the 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


89 


centre of gravity will be constantly variable,— 
np or clown, right or left, as may be, and its 
consequences to the accuracy of fire, will corres¬ 
pond thereto; sometimes increasing the range, 
or decreasing it,—at other times producing 
lateral deviation,—but generally affecting both 
range and direction. 

If it were possible to place the shell, thus 
made, in the gun so that its centre of gravity 
should have one fixed position, these erratic 
features of accidental excentricity might be 
remedied. 

But it is not possible; because the fuze of the 
shell requires this condition indispensably, and 
for its proper ignition must be placed in the 
upper quarter of the outer hemisphere. This 
affords the disturbing element fair opportunity 
for a full exercise of its powers, and must 
necessarily operate most prejudicially on the 
flight of the shells. 

Thus we conclude that the effect of excen¬ 
tricity depends:— 

1st. On the distance of the centre of gravity 
from the centre of sphere. 

2d. On its position. 

3d. On the celerity of the direct movement. 

Now these being all variable in extent and 
in combination, must produce a corresponding 
effect on the results; and in a very extensive 
series of practice, it could hardly be expected 
that this obtrusive and troublesome element 


90 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


could furnish an instance of approach to simi¬ 
larity in the combined action of its components. 

Its ill effects are neutralized to some extent 
by:— 

1st. Refusing all projectiles that vary unu¬ 
sually from the ordinary amount of 
excentricity. 

2d. Controlling the position uniformly. 

3d. Carefully avoiding causes likely to vary 
the velocity. 

There is but one of these conditions, how¬ 
ever, that can be eliminated entirely, viz: varia¬ 
tion in position. The other two will continue 
to exert more or less of their mischievous influ¬ 
ence, because they cannot he removed entirely, 
but only limited in their extent; within which, 
differences will still continue to occur. 

It is, therefore, unreasonable to assert that 
any benefit to precision can be derived from 
this property as it exists, so far as uniformity 
of movement is concerned; because we see that 
its unequal intensity must necessarily he pro¬ 
ductive of irregularity in flight, and this is 
confirmed by experience as well as by theory. 
For we know that if a projectile were only 
acted upon by the propelling force, by gravity 
and by the resistance of the air, its trajectory 
would unquestionably lie in a given plane and 
its configuration be uniform. But irregularities 
occur in the best practice, which are not ac¬ 
counted for by variations in elevation, or direc- 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


91 


tion, or force of projection, and must be due 
to some other cause,— that , all experiment indi¬ 
cates to be the oblique action of the resisting 
medium, produced by variable excentricity. 

Again, the effect of the excentricity will also 
be consistent with itself,—that is, as the differ¬ 
ences between the excentric and normal trajec¬ 
tories increase, so will increase the differences 
between the individual excentric trajectories,— 
in other words, the inaccuracy of fire. 

As no advantage, but evident loss of precision 
must then be incurred by the presence of this 
inconstant force, so far as the effect of its own 
movement is operative, it remains to ascertain 
whether any compensation is derived from the 
superior directness of its trajectory. 

As the extent of the excentric trajectory can 
be made greater than the normal trajectory,— 
other conditions being alike,—it is naturally 
inferable that this arises from less inflection of 
the curve,—and we know that such would con¬ 
duce to accuracy. 

But we also know that excentric projectiles 
are indued with no greater power for range 
or penetration than the concentric. The mean 
initial velocities are alike,—their weights are 
alike,—the surfaces presented by them to the 
resisting medium are alike; the assigned angle 
of flight alike. Wherefore, the greater extent 
of the range can only be owing to the well re¬ 
cognised effect of the excentric force, by which 


92 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


the trajectory is incurvatecl upwards in conse¬ 
quence of the oblique resistance. 

If so, then the claim of advantage due to 
greater directness of the trajectory is disposed 
of summarily, because it is not rendered more 
direct but is absolutely more incurvated. 

Moreover, the augmented ranges thus pro¬ 
duced, are obtained partly by elevation of the 
gun, partly by the subsequent elevation of the 
trajectory—and it hardly seems judicious to 
make use of two agencies to effect an end when 
one of them—and that the more reliable and 
controllable—will answer the purpose, unless 
indeed it were impossible to elevate the gun as 
much as might be required. 

It will he observed that it is not designed 
to treat this question in a purely speculative 
manner, by discussing whether shells uniformly 
excentric are to be preferred to those which are 
perfectly concentric; but to regard the practical 
issue, which is, that no care of fabrication can 
produce either one or the other of these projec¬ 
tiles. All are more or less deficient in homo¬ 
geneity, and the evil is, that they are unequally 
so; wherefore, as the ill effects of this fault 
increase with the extent of the excentricity, it 
seems advisable to have as little excentricity as 
possible. 

The limit is determined, so far as shells are 
concerned, by the ability of the founder to ap¬ 
proximate exactness in the figure, and concen- 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 93 

tricity of the sphere and its cavity, with equal 
density of the metal; and the extent to which 
it is permitted to depart from the exact dimen¬ 
sions assigned, indicates what has been found 
practicable with regard to accuracy of dimen¬ 
sions. 

The excentricity then, being reduced to its 
minimum, there remains to consider the practi¬ 
cability of controlling its direction; otherwise, 
as already shown, it is liable when existing acci¬ 
dentally, to act in every sense and frequently in 
opposite senses, from which must follow the full 
extent of anomaly that the excentricity is capa¬ 
ble of. 

But it is not practicable to place the accidental 
centre of gravity uniformly in the gun—for as 
its relative position with the fuze is variable, 
the consequence would be that the latter would 
often be turned down, or towards the charge, and 
thus lessen the chance of ignition or incur the 
risk of bursting the shell in the gun. 

It only remains therefore to counterpoise the 
accidental excentricity (arising from unequal 
thickness of the shell or unequal density) by 
reinforcing the metal at some part so as to deter¬ 
mine the centre of gravity on that side of the 
centre of form, using, however, no more metal 
than is sufficient for the purpose; to which may 
be applied the term compensating mass , to distin¬ 
guish it from the accidental excentricity, and that 
used on the supposition that it is beneficial. 


94 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


The question that will concern those inte¬ 
rested, will he to ascertain which alternative is 
preferable. 

By means of the compensating mass, is had 
the least possible excentricity that is compatible 
with uniformity of operation in direction ; the 
lateral deviations may he nearly annulled, and 
those of extent may be reduced to a minimum, 
by having the irregularities of like sign. With 
the accidental excentricity, the positive departure 
of any one hall from the normal trajectory is 
less; but the disagreement of a number of tra¬ 
jectories among themselves is greater, because 
they may occur on different sides of the normal 
trajectory. 

Supposing then that the centre of gravity, as 
determined by a compensating mass, is to be 
controlled; it will be admitted without question 
that it should lie in the plane of projection, in 
order to avoid lateral aberrations. But where 
in this plane 1 

If above, the range is increased; if below, it is 
decreased; though, it is claimed by some, with 
greater regularity in the flight of the projectile. 

But when the centre of gravity is to be in¬ 
clined with respect to the vertical plane, then 
the certainty of retaining it in the plane of pro¬ 
jection is assuredly lost. For the sabot pre¬ 
viously fixes the one, but the loader fixes the 
other at the time, and under the most unfavor¬ 
able circumstances. 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


95 


In experimental practice with well trained 
men, more time is needed for this purpose than 
for any other in preparing the gun; and even 
when the shell is entered properly, it is observed 
that it turns in being pushed to its place, and a 
ladle is commonly used to correct the error. In 
the haste and excitement of action is it possible 
to accomplish any such thing'? If not, then is 
the range not only lessened, but the lateral de¬ 
flections are augmented to the full measure of 
the excentric force. When the shell is strapped 
to its sabot, so as to have the centre of gravity in 
the axis of the bore, then there is no difficulty 
whatever in regard to its position—for it is pos¬ 
sible to have but one, whether the firing be slow 
or rapid. 

The foregoing remarks may be illustrated by 
the following extracts from the notes of practice. 

In arranging the armament for the new Screw 
Frigates, it became necessary to review each of 
its elements in detail. 

The shells first cast for the guns designed to 
constitute their batteries, were taken from a 
number that were intended to be of equal thick¬ 
nesses. Notwithstanding great care was used 
in selecting them, more than would be possible 
for general service, the practice with them was 
unsatisfactory, and the irregularities in flight 
greater than might have been reasonably antici¬ 
pated. 

Shells were then cast with an interior seg- 


96 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


merited mass, the dimensions of which were 
ascertained to be just sufficient to overcome the 
usual defect in concentricity, and to determine 
the weightiest part of the shell in one direction. 

Its amount was about of the empty con¬ 
centric shell. 

To ascertain its effects, a series of practice was 
executed very carefully at a screen, distant 1300 
yards from the Battery, the shells being placed 
with the centre of gravity in several positions: 
first, inward—then in the vertical plane at 90° 
upward and downward, and at 45° inward.* 

The mode of proceeding conformed to that 
customary at the Experimental Battery, as the 
following sample shows: 


* To complete this, series were to have been fired at 45° up¬ 
ward and outward, &c.; but the demands of other duty pre¬ 
vented it. 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


97 


NEW SHELL-GUN. 

Shells filled with rice, and strapped to the sabot so that the 
heavy point was in the axis of bore, and nearest the charge. 
Screen, 20 feet high and 40 feet long, at 1300 yards. 

Cloudy and perfectly calm—water smooth. 

Bore of gun above water, 7 feet .10. Initial velocity of pow¬ 
der, 1571. 

Charge 10 lbs. 



Grazes on the water. 

Time 

of 

Flight. 

Perforation on Screen. 

1st. 

2nd. 

3rd. 

4th. 

Above 

water. 

Right. 

Left. 

No. 

Yds. 

Yds. 

Yds 

Yds. 

t/ 

Feet. 

Feet. 

Feet. 

1 

1255 

1701 

1022 

2056 

4.3 

10.4 

12.9 


2 

1363 

1723 

1879 

2056 

4.6 

16.14 

Centre. 

3 

1331 

1788 

1979 

2127 

4.4 

8.3 


19.25 

4 

1327 

1736 

1934 

2117 

4.3 

7.74 


14.50 

5 

1344 

1876 

2132 

2366 

4.5 

12 58 

5.25 


6 

1274 

1655 

1820 

1961 

4.2 

7.56 

0.25 


7 

1309 

1757 

1972 

2269 

4.5 

3.58 

4.70 


8 

1307 

1766 

1964 

2144 

4.5 

3.4 

8.80 


9 

1361 

1815 

1989 

2140 

4.6 

17.54 


19.30 

10 

1382 

1765 

1930 

2089 

4.5 

Mis s 

ed. 



1325 

1758 

1952 

2133 

4.44 





As the screen was maintained constantly at 
one distance, 1300 yards, the elevation required 
to reach it, necessarily varied with the position 
of the compensating mass. For convenience in 
comparison the ranges are reduced by interpola¬ 
tion to a common angle. 

7 



















































98 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


Gentre of Gravity in Vertical Plane. 

Yards. 

Culminating point, 

90° up. 

1415 

Opposite, 

90° down. 

1264 

In plane of projection, 

inwards. 

1329 


45° up and in. 

1360 


The anomalies are no greater than are una¬ 
voidable in cannon practice, and seem sufficiently 
consistent to warrant the conclusions that have 
been deduced in the previous remarks. 

The greatest range occurred when the centre 
of gravity was directly above the centre of figure, 
and the least when directly below it, the differ¬ 
ence being about 150 yards. The normal trajec¬ 
tory, or that of a concentric shell, was very fairly 
represented when the centre of gravity lay in 
the axis of the bore, and its extent was about 
the mean of the two extremes; being 75 yards 
less than the range produced by the maximum 
effort of the excentric force, equal in this case 
to about one-quarter of a degree of the arc. 

The differences between the normal and eccen¬ 
tric trajectories will increase and decrease with 
the range, but not proportionally with its extent 
—on the contrary, the increase of this difference 
is in a much higher ratio. 

Hence, as the scope of fire is extended, a 
much greater elevation of the gun would be 
needed in order to make the concentric shell 
reach as far as the excentric. But the inaccu¬ 
racies of the latter would increase also. Where¬ 
fore, it is clearly more preferable to adhere to 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


99 


the elevation of the hore to produce range, than 
to combine with it the uncertain effects of the 
excentric force. And it is believed no difficulty 
will he found to interpose practically, because 
with broadside guns, the port need not be in¬ 
conveniently large that will permit them all the 
elevation that is required for the full scope of 
their effective fire. The pivot guns are unre¬ 
stricted by any port, and are capable of greater 
elevations than can ever be useful. 

The range is increased very slightly when the 
centre of gravity, being in the axis of bore, is 
nearest the charge of the gun. 

The results of this practice, and of other cali¬ 
bres, do not seem to establish that the dispersions 
of the several trajectories of a series, are less in 
one position of the centre of gravity than another; 
it is true the differences are not so great in some 
cases as in others, but they are within the limits 
commonly observed, and do not warrant any de¬ 
cided opinion; nor would they be material even 
if confirmed by subsequent experiment. Colonel 
Bormann is of opinion that the variations in the 
trajectories of a number of balls, are less when 
the centre of gravity is directly below the cen¬ 
tre of form. It may be so, but it will require 
a more precise and extended practice, and a 
higher development of the excentric force than 
that obtained by the compensating mass, to put 
the question beyond doubt. 


100 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


The preceding remarks have reference espe¬ 
cially to shells, but it need hardly be observed 
that they are also applicable to solid balls. 

In these, the displacement of the centre of 
gravity can only be owing to unequal density of 
the iron; while in shells it is chiefly due to the 
unequal quantities disposed about the centre of 
form, by variations in the thickness of the shell. 

Many excellent authorities have admitted the 
operation attributed to excentricity, but assert 
that it is inadequate to any practical effect upon 
the direction of shot. There is reason for a dif¬ 
ferent opinion, as will appear from the following 
practice, the object of which was to indicate the 
importance of all possible care in service. 

Two series of 32-pdr. shot were fired. One 
set was taken promiscuously from a heap in¬ 
spected for service, and another set selected 
carefully for experimental practice. In the one, 
the extreme variations of size amounted to six- 
hundredths of an inch in the diameters, and 
those of weight corresponded thereto. In the 
other set the extreme variations in diameter 
were limited to two-hundredths of an inch, and 
the weights were uniform. The service shot 
were rolled into the gun and a gromet wad 
placed over them. The experimental shot were 
saboted so as to have the axis, through the cen¬ 
tres of figure and gravity, in one position:— 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS 


101 


EXPERIMENTAL BATTERY, Sept. 18,1850. 
U. S. Naval 32-pdr. o/42 cw L —Oharge 5 lbs. 

Elevation 3°. 


First 10 rounds, perfectly calm—second, light air W. S. W., 

slight ripple. 


Selected Shot—Gauges = 

6 in *.24 X 6 .26. 

Service Shot—Gauges = 6 in 

■.22 X 6 in -.28. 

No. of 

Round. 

Wgt. of Shot, 
lhs. 

1st graze. 

Yds. 

No of 

Round. 

Wgt. of Shot. 

1st graze. 
Yds. 

3 

32.43 

1141 

19 

32.78 

1095 

7 

.44 

— 16 

1157 

15 

.90 

— 14 

1109 

18 

.47 

-24 

1181 

10 

33.00 

- 30 

1139 

1 

.43 

1185 _ 4 

2 

32.43 

1143~ 4 

9 

.45 

—13 

1198 

8 

.80 

— 10 

1153 

20 

.47 

1203~ 5 

6 

.64 

1160~ 7 

12 

.46 

1206 _ 3 

13 

.84 

- 38 

1198 

5 

.44 

— 9 

1215 

4 

.79 

— 23 

1221 

14 

.45 

—13 

1228 

17 

.53 

- 23 

1244 

16 

.44 

1234~ 6 

11 

.77 

— 17 

1261 


32.45 

—93 

1195 


32.75 

— 166 

1172 


Mean Range =1195.=1172 

Sura of Differences = 93.= 166 

Mean of do. = 10.3.= 18.4 

Mean time of Flight = 3 sec, .9.= 3 sec, .9 














102 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


EXPERIMENTAL BATTERY, Sept. 24,1850. 
U. S. Naval 32 -pdr. of 42 CW L —Charge bibs. 

Elevation 4°. 


Very light variable airs from W. S. W.—Water smooth. 


Selected Shot—Saboted—Gauges Service Shot—Gauges = 6 in -.22 X 6 in -.28. 

= 6 iD *.24 X 6 in *.26. 


No. of 
Round. 

Wgt. of Shot, 
lbs. 

1st graze. 

Yds. 

No. of 

Round. 

Wgt. of Shot, 
lbs. 

1st graze- 
Yds. 

3 

32.43 

1352 

11 

32.71 

1338 

9 

.42 

1358~ 6 

10 

.61 

- 41 

1379 

16 

.43 

— 19 

1377 

4 

.66 

1387~ * 

7 

.42 

— 56 

1433 

2 

.62 

— 13 

1400 

1 

.43 

1442~ 9 

17 

.54 

— 19 

1419 

18 

.43 

1446~~ 4 

13 

.57 

1426~ 7 

12 

.43 

1454~ ' 

19 

.34 

- 29 

1455 

20 

.43 

1455~ 1 

8 

.75 

— 55 

1510 

14 

.43 

1460~ 5 

6 

.11 

1513~ 3 

5 

.42 

— 35 

1495 

15 

.36 

— 95 

1608 


32.43 

—143 

1427 


32.53 

—270 

1444 

Mean Range 

= 1427. 



1444 


Sum of Differences = 143.= 270 


Mean of do. = 15.9..,.= 30 

Mean time of Flight = 4 stc -.81.= 4 ,ec -.98 














DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 103 

The mean ranges do not differ considerably,— 
for all practical purposes they are equal,—hut 
the irregularities of the service firing are reduced 
one-lialf by the precautions used in experimental 
practice, which are by no means difficult of ordi¬ 
nary application.—Are the advantages worth the 
trouble in service! 

It is true that other causes may and do affect 
the uniformity of flight in projectiles, though in 
an inferior degree to the excentricity. 

T bus, in consequence of the difference between 
the diameters of the bore and the shot, the latter 
does not move directly along the bore, but is 
reflected from one side to the other when driven 
out by the charge. Its final direction, therefore, 
on leaving the gun, will depend on that which 
it receives by the last collision of the bore. If 
this occur on the upper side of the bore, the tra¬ 
jectory will be less elevated than the inclination 
of the bore,—if on the lower side, the angle of 
flight will he greater. 

This cause will generally be found in the same 
sense, but not always,—in which case the anoma¬ 
lies in range, due thereto, will be greater,—for 
their extreme differences will then be constituted 
by the sum and not by the difference of the indi¬ 
vidual deviations. 

In the results of practice at Gavre, (1830 to 
1838,) particular care was taken to note the 
error due to collision with the bore, as one of 
the principal objects of the practice was to de- 


104 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


duce the initial velocities from the range by 
Lombard’s method, of which this was an indis¬ 
pensable datum. 


GENERAL CONCLUSIONS. 

1st. It is desirable that a shell should con¬ 
tain the greatest possible quantity of powder; 
but in the proportion that this capacity is ex¬ 
tended, the accuracy and penetrating force of 
the shell is lessened. 

2nd. These conflicting conditions must be 
harmonised according to the part which the 
shell-guns are designed to fulfil,—whether they 
are to be the principal or auxiliary power of 
the Battery. 

3d. Excentricity is capable of giving to the 
projectile a higher than the normal trajectory, 
the assigned elevation being alike. But its 
unequal intensity produces important variations 
in the several trajectories of a series of rounds, 
even when the action of the excentric force is 
uniform in direction; therefore, the accuracy is 
proportionally affected; while equal range with 
greater accuracy is attainable by means of a con¬ 
centric projectile, and an inconsiderably greater 
elevation of the given trajectory. 

4th. There is also an assured inability to con¬ 
trol the direction of the excentric action, when 




DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


105 


so used as to augment the range, arising from 
difficulties in loading the gun; from hence occur 
increased lateral aberrations, and also greater 
variations in range. 

5th. Concentricity, therefore, is desirable for 
all shells. 

6th. The unavoidable imperfections of fabri¬ 
cation render this unattainable,—and it is only 
practicable within certain limits,—which, how¬ 
ever, are still capable, if left to act uncontrolled, 
of exerting very injurious influences on the 
accuracy of fire. 

7th. This suggests the use of a compensating 
mass, by which the accidental and irregular ex- 
centricity can be counterpoised wherever it may 
be in the shell, and the centre of gravity deter¬ 
mined in a given position with regard to the 
axis of the shell, that is to coincide with the 
axis of the bore. 

8th. The excentricity thus produced should 
never be greater than is absolutely indispensable 
to counteract that which is entailed by the de¬ 
fects in the process of making the shells. And 
for convenience in practice, as well as for other 
reasons, it is preferable to place the shell so that 
its axis passing through the centre of gravity 
and centre of form, should be coincident w T ith 
the axis of bore; or rather parallel to it, inas¬ 
much as the centre of the shell is lower than the 
axis of bore by the amount of windage. 


106 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


THE RIFLE. 

The rotatory movement then is the cause of 
the great irregularity in the course of projectiles, 
—to which there is but a single exception, that 
is, when the axis of rotation coincides, or nearly 
so, with the line of flight. In this case the 
several parts of the foremost hemisphere are 
presented successively to the resisting medium, 
and the irregularities of density in the mass are 
thus compensated. 

But the difficulty exists in the seeming impos¬ 
sibility of establishing this motion with a projec¬ 
tile fired from a smooth-bored gun; for the axis 
about which the ball is to revolve, lies in the 
direction of the impulse, and is parallel to the 
surface by means of which the rotation is to be 
engendered. The common and well known solu¬ 
tion of this problem is obtained by cutting spiral 
channels into the surface of the bore, forming in 
effect the female threads of a screw, the num¬ 
ber, pitch and depth of which, are determined 
variously. 

When the material of the ball is sufficiently 
plastic, there is no difficulty in forcing portions 
of its surface to enter into the grooves, so that 
when moved by the gasses of the charge, the ball 
is compelled to take the direction of the spiral 
and thus the desired circumvolution is attained 
during the flight of the projectile. 


t 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 107 


Rifles have been in use for a long time, and 
according to M. Meyer, one is extant, made in 
1600. Still we must not confound the discovery 
with the general use of the weapon. 

It is known, however, that this means of ob¬ 
viating the effects of rotatory movement, was 
applied long before the nature of the difficulty 
which it remedied was itself dreamed of or ap¬ 
prehended. 

Mr. Robins established at once its existence 
and the true principle of the rifle. The surpris¬ 
ing neglect which seemed to attend his labors, 
was in nothing more conspicuous than in the 
history of this weapon. The rotation of the ball 
upon a given axis, and the invariable presenta¬ 
tion to the resistance of the atmosphere of the 
surface originally placed in that direction, would 
seem to indicate beyond the possibility of miscon¬ 
ception, the advantage that was to be obtained 
from it. And yet it is only in our own time that 
the round ball has given way, in the rifle, to the 
conical or elongated shot. The great merit of 
the arm was consequently of little account, be¬ 
cause the resistance experienced by the round 
ball from the atmosphere, was nearly the same, 
whether fired from one piece or another; while 
with like charges, there was a certain decrease 
of initial velocity, from the friction in the rifle. 
Rut with the conical or even elongated shot, the 
surface of the transverse section was decreased, 
while the weight remained,—therefore there was 


108 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


less resistance to overcome with the same power; 
the trajectory less inflected at equal distances, 
and the capacity for greater ranges obtained. 

Now that the teachings of the master are un¬ 
derstood and applied, it seems incredible that 
such a blunder should so long have been tole¬ 
rated; while the cause of its correction is in 
keeping with the whole proceeding. 

The use of the rifle had been well understood 
in this country and abroad for a long while ; but 
the time and skill required in loading it pro¬ 
perly, and even then not rapidly, had interfered 
with its introduction among troops of the line, 
and it was restricted to the hardy hunters of all 
countries who found their subsistence among the 
forests and the mountains, and whose natural 
intelligences were sharpened to the greatest de¬ 
gree by daily exercise and necessity. 

In 1829, Delvigne undertook to remove the 
obstacles to its more general use, and to bring 
the manipulation of the arm within the capacity 
of the personnel of the line. 

He used a round ball, which was to lodge 
upon the edge of a chamber, and then be flat¬ 
tened by the rammer, so that the equatorial 
section should be extended and compelled, as the 
ball issues from its seat, to enter portions of its 
surface into the grooves,—thus receiving the 
motion due to their inclination. Some difficul¬ 
ties in the process were noticed, to remedy 
which, Thourenin proposed to use a small stem 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 109 


projecting from the breech-plug into the bore, 
around which the powder was to fall, and upon 
its end the ball should rest, as on an anvil, so as 
to be flattened out by the rammer as before. 
But the presentation of only part of the lower 
hemisphere of the ball to the charge was unfa¬ 
vorable to its full action. Wherefore Delvigne 
proposed to make the base of the ball flat and to 
develop the metal upon it in the form of a 
cone,—hence the conical or elongated shot. 

In this indirect manner and by the compul¬ 
sory process of a mere detail, was the rifle 
musket brought to perform in Europe the part 
which had been so clearly explained almost a 
century before by Mr. Bobins, and illustrated by 
his oblong ball. 

The conclusion thus reached, seemed to pro¬ 
ceed as directly from the primary conditions of 
the case, as the plainest demonstration of Euclid. 
And now that whole armies are to wield the 
rifled musket with its conical shot, and the 
tremendous powers of the weapon have been 
made manifest on the battle-field, one is sur¬ 
prised at the time which was permitted to elapse 
ere the demonstrations of the able experimenter 
were understood, upon whose mind the import¬ 
ance of the rifle was so deeply graven, as to 
evoke the following memorable expressions of 
his convictions:— 

u I shall therefore close this paper with predicting 
“ that whatever States shall thoroughly comprehend 


/ 


110 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

44 the nature and advantages of rifled barrel pieces , 
“ and , having facilitated and completed their con - 
<4 struction, shall introduce into their armies their 
“ general use , with a dexterity in the management 
(i of them; they will by this means acquire a supe - 
“ riority , which will almost equal any thing that 
“ has been done at any time by the particular excel- 
“ lence of any one hind of ar ms ; and will perhaps 
“ fall but little short of the wonderful effects which 
“ histories relate to have been formerly produced by 
“ the first inventors of fire arms.” 

(Read before the Royal Society, 1746.) 

How fully the prediction has been fulfilled in 
the fierce conflicts in the Crimea, is yet fresh in 
the common remembrance. And our own War 
Department recognises the conclusiveness of the 
prevailing opinion, in the following sentences of 
the Annual Deport to the President:— 

“ Although our experiments have been con- 
44 fined to our service rifle, and are yet in- 
“ complete, they confirm the great superiority 
66 claimed for this invention abroad. They show 
44 that the new weapon, while it can be handled 
44 as readily as the ordinary musket, is at least 
44 equally effective at three times the distance, 
44 and the foreign experiments indicate a still 
44 greater superiority of the new arms. These 
44 results render it almost certain that smooth- 
44 bored arms will be superseded as a military 
44 weapon.” * * 44 In anticipation of an in- 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. Ill 

“ creased, if not exclusive use of rifle arms by 
“ the regular army,”—&c., &c. 

(Report of Secretary of War, Dec. 4, 1854.) 

But it would be doing less than justice to our 
own country to omit noticing the prior use of 
the conical ball in the United States, by some of 
our riflemen, who intuitively perceived the real 
result, and approached it directly and intelli¬ 
gently. 

The sample in my possession is said to date 
from 1827—it is 0.67 inch in diameter at the 
butt, 1.27 inch long, and weighs 1^ ounces.* 

So far, the rifled small arm alone has been 
referred to; but it is very plain that the prin¬ 
ciple of its construction has application to all 
sizes of projectiles, and would therefore be 


* In the Report of a Committee of Officers sent by the English 
Board of Ordnance to the United States “for the purpose of 
“ inspecting the different gun factories in that country, and pur- 
“ chasing such machinery and models as may be necessary for the 
“proposed gun factory at Enfield,”—it is stated that—“The fine 
“rifles used in the United States very much surpass in accu- 
“ racy the Minie and other rifle muskets of Europe,”—&c., &c. 

One of the Board witnessed a rifle shooting match at Fort 
Plain, in which one of the marksmen made “a string (the sum 
“of distances from the centre) of 20 shots which measured 32^ 
“inches,” (averaging l-§ in \) distance 220 yards. “This was 
“considered a good ‘string/ as the weather was windy and 
“ unfavorable.” 

The same officer was shown a “string” of 10 shots fired at 
220 yards, measuring only 7f inches (averaging 0 in \775.) 
“This is supposed to be the best string on record, and was 
“made with a telescopic sight.”-— R port to House of Common 
July 10, 1855. 



112 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

/ 

used for the heaviest ordnance as well as for 
the smallest. Contemporaneous attempts so to 
adapt it have not been wanting; but they are 
so isolated in point of time and connection, as 
to be open to question even more than those 
which mark the course of proceeding with the 
musket. 

The first persevering and rational efforts to 
apply the rifle principle to cannon, were initi¬ 
ated some twenty years since,—and the names 
of Wahrendorff, Cavalli, Lancaster and others, 
are identified with ingenious contrivances to 
overcome the difficulties, of no ordinary char¬ 
acter, that beset the question. 

The guns of Cavalli and Wahrendorff receive 
the charge at the breech, which mode of load¬ 
ing a gun has always been considered exceed¬ 
ingly objectionable; and so far as the scanty 
information goes that has reached here, it does 
not appear that these gentlemen can be said to 
have been successful in removing the common 
scruples that are entertained to all arrange¬ 
ments touching the solidity of cannon about 
the charge. 

The gun of Mr. Lancaster has, however, 
attained a celebrity which will not permit its 
being passed by briefly, though the last reports 
that came to us, affirm its entire failure in 
service. 

In the form best known and hitherto used, 
(though not restricted to any one calibre,) this 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 113 


gun weighs 95 cwt - (10640 lbs.) The peculiarity 
of its bore may be explained by supposing it to 
be perforated cylindrically to a diameter of 8 
inches, in which two spiral channels or grooves 
are cut, commencing in the vertical axis and 
proceeding along the bore to the bottom, with 
a turn of one-fourth the circle, so that they 
terminate at the bottom in the horizontal axis 
—the helix is not regular but inclines very 
gradually from the position of the shot, and 
increases as it advances to the muzzle, being 
what is termed “ an increasing twist.” 

Now if the rectangular corners of the grooves 
be chamfered away gradually at the muzzle, and 
the metal be removed with a regular diminu¬ 
tion, until the horizontal axis is attained where 
the diameter of the bore is to remain as it origin¬ 
ally was, the transverse section of the bore will 
be made elliptical; and by continuing the cham¬ 
fer of the corners along the whole length of the 
groove, the bore will acquire an elliptical helix, 
the major and minor axis of which will have 
the fourth of an entire revolution, increasing 
gradually from the bottom of the bore to the 
muzzle. 

Supposing that a projectile were so made that 
its transverse section was elliptical and accorded 
exactly with the ellipse of the bore, then it is 
evident that when inserted in the bore, and 
pushed to the bottom, its greater and lesser 

axis must continue to conform to those of the 

8 


114 DIMENSIONS. ETC., OF SHELLS. 


bore respectively, and therefore will be com¬ 
pelled to perform one-fourth of a revolution in 
passing to the place where it is to rest. So 
likewise, when propelled by the discharge, it 
can only escape from the gun by following the 
helix of the bore, and in this way receives a 
rifle as well as a direct motion. 

Thus the transition from the common chan¬ 
nelled groove to an elliptically bored gun, seems 
to be readily suggested, and yet it has only been 
resorted to quite recently. 

It is also certain that Mr. Lancaster’s name 
has been universally connected with the idea. 
A writer in the iV. Y. Herald , (Mr. A. Jones,) 
claims, however, priority of invention, and cor¬ 
roborates his claim by referring to certain pro¬ 
positions made by him to the U. S. government 
in 1842. If this be correct, and Mr. Lancaster 
cannot go beyond that year, there can be no 
doubt that the original design belongs to Mr. 
Jones. 

But it is also true that Mr. Jones could never 
have established the merits of his contrivance, 
or made it useful with the form of ball which 
he originally devised, and has not yet proposed 
to modify. This was spheroidal, and would prac¬ 
tically be of no more effect than a round ball 
fired from a rifle, inasmuch as the uniform pre¬ 
sentation of one surface by the rotatory motion 
around the line of flight, was not connected 
with additional weight of ball which alone it 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 115 

permitted,—therefore, the increased momentum 
was lost that would have given more capacity 
to overcome the atmospheric resistance, and pro¬ 
duced greater accuracy and greater range, by 
means of a less incurvated trajectory. 

Mr. Lancaster fell into no such error, but 
keeping the very object of the rifled motion 
directly in view, made use of an elongated ball, 
elliptical in its transverse section, and nearly 
conical in the plane of projection. Indeed, it 
would be difficult to understand how he could 
have done otherwise with the lights of the time 
before him. 

The information that has transpired with re¬ 
gard to this gun, is too limited and imperfect 
to furnish the data from which alone it is pos¬ 
sible to reason correctly to a conclusion. 

Still it may be, that with such as we have, 
some idea can be conveyed of the expectations 
that are to be properly entertained in regard to 
the gun. 

The value of any piece of ordnance will 
depend on the accuracy, power, and general 
efficiency which it is properly capable of exer¬ 
cising. 

1st. Accuracy is derivable from the uniformity 
of axial motion, inevitably incidental to all mili¬ 
tary projectiles of whatever shape, and from the 
configuration of the trajectory. 

The data upon which any admissible process 
of reasoning could be based, with regard to the 


116 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

axial motion of the Lancaster projectile, are 
entirely wanting in the precision absolutely in¬ 
dispensable to the purpose—hence the propriety 
of postponing all remarks on that part of the 
subject. 

In regard to the configuration of the trajec¬ 
tory, it may be said that the transverse section of 
the elongated ball is nearly equal to that of the 
round ball; therefore, equal atmospheric resist¬ 
ance is to be overcome by both balls—but it is 
overcome more easily by the elongated ball, be¬ 
cause of the more favorable development of its 
anterior surface and of its greater weight, or 
\ more than that-of the round ball.) 

If then the velocities at leaving the gun were 
alike for both balls, the elongated ball, as it pro¬ 
ceeds in its course, must lose less speed by 
reason of the opposition it encounters—therefore 
it will retain a higher velocity than the round 
ball. 

But the initial velocity of the Lancaster shot, 
or shell, is less than that of the round ball, be¬ 
cause the charge is less proportionally. It would 
be less, even if the charges were alike, because 
of the greater weight to be moved. 

Hence it follows that, in the first part of the 
trajectory, the Lancaster moves with much less 
celerity than the round shot of like calibre— 
therefore in equal times it does not attain equal 
distance; for the power of gravity is acting on 
both projectiles, so that the Lancaster intersects 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 117 


the common plane sooner than the round, and its 
range thereby determined, is obviously less than 
that of the round shot. To make the range of 
the Lancaster equal, it must have a more ele¬ 
vated trajectory, so that the time required to 
attain the given point may be equal to that re¬ 
quired to gravitate to the required plane. Hence 
its trajectory is more inflected than that of the 
round shot, and a corresponding diminution of 
accuracy ensues. 

But the elongated ball experiences less dimi¬ 
nution of speed than the round ball, and there¬ 
fore as the range increases the disadvantage of 
the elongated in regard to the curve of its trajec¬ 
tory is lessened. 

Next, the rate of the elongated ball becomes 
positively greater than that of the round ball, 
and at last sufficiently so to make the time of 
flight equal. After this, the elongated ball ex¬ 
ceeds the round shot in range, and continues to 
do so in an accelerated ratio. 

Now so far as the relative accuracy of the two 
projectiles depends on the directness of the tra¬ 
jectory, the round ball will have the advantage 
at the lower elevations, the elongated at the 
higher, and the respective initial velocities of 
each will determine the distance where the latter 
begins to acquire the superiority, which will of 
course indicate the value of this superiority; for 
if it do not occur within distances where prac¬ 
tice is efficient, it is useless. 


118 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


When the Cavalli gun was tried with the long 
32-pdr. it was found that at 5° .the ranges were 
equal; wherefore the better configuration of the 
trajectory would be of little service, because its 
advantages could hardly be said to be decided 
within the limits of certain practice. 

Considering the weight of the Lancaster shell 
and the charge used, there is reason to suppose 
that the question of precision at available ranges, 
will depend mainly on the uniformity of the 
axial motion which, as before stated, cannot be 
usefully treated at this time for the want of data. 


Power. 

On this point there can be no doubt, that the 
Lancaster shell is much superior to the round 
projectile. For it not only has greater penetra¬ 
tive force from the greater momentum, even 
with its lower charge, but its content of powder 
is also greater. 

But we think, that in defining the general 
power of a cannon, that which it is capable of 
exercising to a desirable extent, is understood. 
It is ascertained that a piece of 95 cwt is capable 
of discharging a 64-pdr. shot with the necessary 
force, and of continuing to do so through a 
course of firing sufficient for all naval purposes. 
Is it known that the same weight of metal will 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 119 


endure as well the strain of the Lancaster pro¬ 
jectile fired with a proper charge'? 

When a mass of metal is to be projected from 
a cannon, there is no form which yields more 
readily to the propelling impulse, than the 
spherical. Strictly it has but one point of con¬ 
tact with the bore, and when driven by the 
charge will rather roll than slide along the 
bore. 

When the shot is elongated, it is in contact 
with the bore at more points than one,—it 
cannot roll, it must slide out. The friction is 
thereby increased even if the weights of projec¬ 
tile were alike; but as the elongated ball is 
also heavier, there is a farther addition to this 
obstacle. 

The effort of the powder is of course to drive 
the projectile directly out of the gun, but the 
effect of the helical arrangement is to turn the 
shell, and thus, to a certain extent, it conflicts 
with the direct movement, which is enormous. 

Here then are unmistakeable evidences that 
the strength of the gun is tasked in a far higher 
degree by the Lancaster than by the 64-pdr. shot, 
though the latter is driven by a considerably 
higher charge. 

And the question is, whether the piece is 
equal to what is required of it by the new pro¬ 
jectile. If it is, then it is certain that it may he 
also made to drive a larger and heavier round 
shot than the 64-pdr., so that the 95 cwt - of metal 


120 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


is either overtasked by the Lancaster projectile, 
or it is capable of developing a higher power 
with round shot; and the comparison now insti¬ 
tuted is faulty, because it fails to convey a 
correct expression of the power which the weight 
of gun is capable of in both cases. 

This is a practical question, and only to be 
arrived at by a course of proof. 

It would be gratifying to have the power of 
adding the results of authentic and well con¬ 
ducted experiment, so as to place beyond doubt 
the practical value of the Lancaster cannon in re¬ 
gard to accuracy and power. But circumstances 
do not permit this, and it is therefore a matter of 
necessity to refer to the best evidence that can 
be obtained, which is that given by Sir Howard 
Douglas in his recent edition of “ Naval Gun¬ 
nery.” This is authentic; indeed from the rank 
and opportunities of the writer it may be re¬ 
garded as semi-official; but it is not sufficiently 
in detail, nor as precise, as would be desired. 

The first public trial of the Lancaster cannon 
was made at Shoeburyness, August 7th, 1851. 

On this occasion the peculiar mode of rifling 
seems to have failed in the only instance that the 
shell remained whole, as its range was indiffer¬ 
ent and its motion very irregular. 

The excessive nature of the strain, even with 
charges of 5 lbs. and 10 lbs. was manifested by 
the breaking into atoms of six shells out of 
seven that were fired. 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 121 


In December, 1852, the trials were repeated, 
and with much better results. Seven rounds 
were tired with 10 lbs. and 12 lbs., and no shell 
broke—a range of 5600 yards was obtained at 
17°. The deviations were inconsiderable. Sir 
Howard Douglas calls the shells spheroidal, or 
oval, and as the weights are not given, there is 
some doubt as to the meaning of the designations 
used. It is not certain, therefore, whether they 
were of the ordinary conical form or not. 

It happened, however, that at the 8th round 
the shell stuck in the gun, and the practice 
seems to have ended. 

So far as the information goes, the success 
attained in this instance should seem to have 
induced a prosecution of the experiment; but it 
does not appear that any action was had on the 
subject by the government, until August, 1854. 
And the circumstances of that time strongly 
point to the probability, that other reasons than 
those arising from a conviction of the general 
efficiency of the gun, led to the trials made. It 
had then been recognised plainly by the Naval 
Commanders of the Allies, that an attack by sea 
on Cronstadt would inevitably endanger their 
fleets, and certainly end in the destruction of 
many ships without the least possible advantage. 
It had even been thought necessary to land a 
corps, and reduce by a land attack the compar- 
tively weak fortress of Bomarsund. The Lan¬ 
caster held out the hope of battering the enemy’s 


122 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


works at distances far beyond the reach of the 
highest calibres of the common description. The 
alleged possession of these qualities would there¬ 
fore naturally suggest the experiment,*—for the 
exigency was great, and the government could 
not but be deeply conscious of the responsi¬ 
bility inseparable from their position. Where¬ 
fore, even well founded technical objections 
might well be made to give way to the urgency 
of the occasion. We have no knowledge what¬ 
ever, that such was the case, but suggest its 
probability. 

Be that as it may, in August, 1854, practice 
with the Lancaster was executed, and accord¬ 
ing to the public prints, with much success, as 
44 in no instance did the shells fall wide or short 
44 of the target.” But Sir Howard Douglas 
says;— 44 The greatest range obtained on that 
“ occasion, was only 4500 yards’]* (shells 88 lbs.) 
46 —a charge of 12 lbs. instead of 16 lbs, having 
44 been used, from some distrust, we believe, of 
44 the strength of the gun to resist the full charge, 
44 and likewise to reduce the impulsive force, 
“which might otherwise have broken the shell; 
44 but notwithstanding this diminution of charge, 
44 one of the shells broke soon after it left the 


* “ Since that an attack on Sveaborg has become easier. We 
“ have now Lancaster guns,” <£rc. f &c. 

Admiral Napier to the London Times , 1855. 
t The Times says 5600 yards. 



DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 123 


“ gun. Though none of the shot fell wide or 
“ short of the target at the long range, none fell 
“ very near it. These experiments, not having 
“ been made, however, for the ordinary purposes 
“ of practice, but for particular objects which 
“ are not disclosed, the powers of the gun and 
“ the quality of the practice, must be judged by 
“ the above results.” 

Some of the gun-boats that were to carry the 
Lancasters were now far advanced in their readi¬ 
ness for service; so much so, that by the 23d of 
August, 1854, one of them (the Arrow) was in 
condition to make a trial upon the rock called 
the “Needles.” It is to be supposed that the 
authorities, political or naval, had been measur¬ 
ably satisfied with the capacity of the cannon 
they were about to employ as a means to sur¬ 
mount some of the difficulties before them, 
because the practice took place in presence of 
the queen and other notables of the kingdom. 
The distance was 4000 yards and six shells were 
fired. There does not appear to be much dif¬ 
ference of opinion as to the results. The power 
for extensive range was fully maintained, but 
there was no approach to precision, and the 
firing was wild. However, the vessel had con¬ 
siderable motion, and as the gun was pointed 
over the broadside, it became impossible to dis¬ 
tinguish the error of the piece from that of aim. 

Two shells were broken in the gun, though 
they had been made of wrought iron. 


124 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


Soon afterwards the Arrow took her departure 
for the Black Sea, and some of the Lancasters 
were also forwarded for general purposes. 

Their application in actual service gave rise 
to a variety of statements from the correspond¬ 
ents of the press, and differing so widely that it 
is difficult to understand that they were speak¬ 
ing of one and the same operation. 

One writer says, “ Its success ” (of the Lan¬ 
caster) “ has exceeded the most sanguine expec- 
“ tations, and there is no doubt, that had we 
“ more of them we might, in a fortnight, destroy 
“ the whole town, shipping and fortifications of 
“ Sevastopol, without the loss of a man on our 
“ side,” The correspondent of the Times says:— 
66 The Arrow has been trying her long range 
“ shot and shell with indifferent success. The 
“ range indeed is enormous, but the flight seems 
“ to he wide and inaccurate.” 

Some of the Lancasters were mounted in the 
land batteries, and took part in the general open¬ 
ing of October 17th, upon the Russian works. 
The effect is again variously stated by witnesses. 
According to the correspondent of the Morning 
Herald , it was most prodigious. “A battery of 
“ 20 or 30 such guns would destroy Sevastopol 
“in a week.” But the writer for the Times 
says:—“ The Lancaster guns made bad practice 
“ and one burst.” The Illustrated News has it, 
that “ The Lancaster one-gun battery did not, 
“ however, share in the general success. It 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 125 

“ never succeeded in striking the line-of-battle- 
“ ship 4 Twelve ApostlesJ which was the special 
“ aim of its tire.” 

— 44 The Lancaster gun was left to fire at the 
“ shipping, which it merely annoyed without 
“ doing serious damage.” 

From such discrepant impressions of the same 
occurrence, it would be impossible to reach any 
satisfactory conclusion with regard to the per¬ 
formance of the gun on the occasion named, 
much less of its general capabilities. 

From Sir Howard Douglas, however, we ob¬ 
tain some facts that are reliable. 

He cites the practice at Bomarsund to de¬ 
monstrate the inaccuracy of the Lancaster, say¬ 
ing:— “The Lancaster shells, of which such 
“ high expectations were entertained, failed sig- 
“ nally in precision of fire, even at 480 yards.” 

The character of the gun for safety has been 
much damaged by the fact that one burst unex¬ 
pectedly in England and two in the trenches at 
Sevastopol. At Shoeburyness the piece was a 
68-pdr. charged with 12lbs. and a shell; when 
ruptured, 44 the fragments were thrown to con- 
44 siderable distances, but happily no one was 
44 injured, the firing party having from some dis- 
44 trust of the gun’s strength, been placed under 
44 cover; had it been otherwise, a fatal catas- 
44 trophe must have ensued, as in the bursting 
44 of the guns at Malta and Gibraltar.” 

At Sevastopol it is said that one which burst, 


126 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 


killed four men and dismounted a 68-pdr. 
near it. 

The action of the authorities in withdrawing 
the Lancaster from service, is conclusive as to 
the judgment of those who should be the most 
competent to decide. This measure, and his 
own general convictions, are thus stated by Sir 
Howard Douglas:— 

“ The withdrawal of the Lancaster elliptical- 
44 bored guns from the Pelter , gun-boat, at 
44 Portsmouth, and from the despatch gun-boats 
“ Arroiv and Beagle , at Sevastopol, and the 
“judicious order to arm all the new gun-boats 
44 with the 68-pdr. of 95 cwt , are necessary conse- 
44 quences of the very unfavorable reports which 
44 were made of those guns at Bomarsund, as 
44 being deficient in precision and not to be de- 
44 pended on, corroborated as these reports have 
44 been from very high authority on the spot, of 
44 the very bad practice made by the Lancaster 
44 guns at 1300 yards at Sevastopol in the land 
44 batteries, and the fact that two of them burst. 

— 44 Though executed at enormous cost, and 
44 equipped with their peculiar shells, they have 
44 failed to accomplish on service the special 
44 purpose for which they were designed. They 
44 cannot, as has been proved, resist the charge 
44 (16 lbs.) nor stand the high elevation (18°) 
44 necessary to produce the vaunted range of 
44 5600 yards; they are proved to be defective 
44 in precision in distant firing, and even at 


DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 127 


“ short ranges; and they have been withdrawn 
“ from the despatch and other gun-boats. 

— “No other uses that can be made of that 
“ particular gun, whether it be to fire spherical 
“ shot from its elliptically spiral bore, or, with 
66 its own projectiles to bombard towns, can 
“ redeem it from the verdict which men of 
“ science in general pronounce, c that they have 
“ failed in the great objects for which expressly 
“ they were made.’ ” 

The accuracy in firing upon the works at Se¬ 
vastopol, attested by some witnesses and ascribed 
by them to the Lancaster, were fully within the 
competency of the common 68-pdr. placed near it. 

The ranges of which the Lancaster is found to 
be capable are thus stated:— 


Lancaster 68-Pdr. of 92 cwt . 

Spheroidal Shell, (weight not given.) 


Elevation. 

2 ° 

50 

1QO 

15° 

17° 


Charges oflOlbs. 

Deviation. 


1st graze. 

1340 yds. 
2290 “ 
3540 “ 
4400 “ 
5600 “ 




Charges of 12 lbs. 


15° 

4400 yds. — 

50 

15° 

4800 “ 10 

— 


Round Shot and 12 lbs. Charges. 


150 

3200 yds. 50 

— 

150 

3350 “ 2 

— 


128 DIMENSIONS, ETC., OF SHELLS. 

♦ 

Attempts have also been made to dispense 
with rifling the bore, and to procure the rota¬ 
tory movement by channelling the surfaces of 
elongated projectiles. Also, to dispense even 
with this, and consequently with the rifle mo¬ 
tion, entirely, — substituting therefor certain 
peculiar forms which were supposed to have 
the power of preserving the apex of the shot 
or shell foremost. Numerous devices of this 
description have been submitted by inventors, 
and have been ordered to be tried by me, with¬ 
out success in any one instance. 

The detailed accounts of these operations 
would no doubt be of interest, but I have 
already occupied more space with the subject 
than was at first contemplated, and must there¬ 
fore postpone a more extended notice of these 
contrivances. 

I may say, however, in conclusion, that the 
failure of these projectiles or of the Lancaster 
gun, is not to be considered as finally determin¬ 
ing the interesting question of imparting the 
rifle movement to the shot or shells of heavy 
ordnance. Other efforts have been made which, 
though not so well known, promise to afford 
better results. 

Certain it is, that much attention has been 
given to the subject, and very extensive trials 
executed; but the results that have been pub¬ 
lished, are not in a shape sufficiently authentic 
to be quoted. 


IV. 

FUZES. 

Fuzes—their functions—defects—description of those in ordinary 
use.—Law of Combustion in Compositions.—regularity aug¬ 
mented by careful manufacture.— Case for Composition — 
wooden—metallic—paper.—Driving the composition.—Concus¬ 
sion Fuze.—Bormann Fuze.—Conditions requisite to constitute 
a good Fuze.—General efficiency much lessened by failure to 
ignite—by extinction after being ignited—by premature explo¬ 
sion.—French shell practice at siege of Rome.—Experiment to 
test the consequences of shells exploding within the bore— 
Doubts suggested by an incidental occurrence—Percussion 
Fuzes—difficult to attain with spherical shells.—Exceedingly 
simple with conical projectiles.—Chances of a shell passing 
entirely through a vessel and exploding beyond.—Incendiary 
nature of shells. 

The important function of this minute detail, 
has made it the subject of much comment by 
almost all writers who have treated of practice 
with explosive projectiles. It is indeed an essen¬ 
tial element of the shell—quite as much so as 
the powder that is to be exploded, or the iron 
case that encloses it; and very much more dif¬ 
ficult to arrange satisfactorily. 

The office of the fuze is to receive the flame 
from the charge of the gun—to retain it during 
the flight of the projectile to the object, and to 
communicate it in due season to the charge in 
the shell. 

The difficulty of satisfying these requirements, 

9 


130 


FUZES. 


is very evident, and the common experience 
abounds in instances where the shell has failed 
of effect, because one or the other of the prime 
conditions of the fuze has been inoperative. 
Sometimes the flame has not been received by 
it, or if received, has been transmitted prema¬ 
turely or too slowly. So that the shell did not 
hurst at all, or it burst before reaching the ob¬ 
ject, or after passing through it. 

The want of success in these respects from 
carelessness or lack of skill in the fabrication 
of the fuze, or the use of the shell, has brought 
more discredit on shell practice than is properly 
chargeable to it; and has led to much refined 
speculation and waste of ingenuity in the en¬ 
deavor to remedy the evil by substitutes of 
innumerable variety. 

Most of these have been utterly profitless. 
Very few have endured the first practical tests, 
and fewer can be said to hold out any promise 
of advantage even if successful. Among the 
former may be mentioned the Concussion Fuze, 
the Percussion Shell, and the Bormann Fuze. 

The first is the ordinary fuze, with certain 
appendages designed to determine the explo¬ 
sion upon impact. 

The Bormann Fuze performs similar func¬ 
tions as that ordinarily employed, and by similar 
means; but the development of its composition 
reposes on a much better principle, and is con 
sequently much more regular in combustion. 


FUZES. 


131 


The Percussion Fuze apparatus has nothing 
in common with either of these fuzes, in the 
manner of igniting the charge of the shell. It 
has no communication with the flame of the 
cannon’s charge, and is unaffected by it,—nor 
is there any ignition to be produced until the 
shell comes into collision with its object. As 
a consequence, (if true to its purpose,) it avoids 
many of the difficulties that interfere with other 
fuzes, though practically it is found subject to 
others which are even more troublesome to deal 
with. 


The common fuze, 

Depends for its action upon a cylindric column 
of inflammable composition, by which the flame 
is to be received, retained, and communicated to 
the charge of the shell. This composition is 
about as hard as slate, and is enclosed in a case 
of wood or metal, firm enough to endure the 
rude shock of firing, and so made as to prevent 
all access to the inflammable matter, save that 
which is designed. 

The case is secured in the shell by driving, 
or by a screw thread, so that one end of the 
composition lies even with the exterior surface 
of the shell, and is exposed to the flame of the 
charge in the gun, the other end being within 
amidst the charge of the shell. 




132 


FUZES. 


The current of flame which envelopes the 
shell on firing the gun, ignites the exterior end 
of the composition, and its layers are consumed 
successively, the combustion being prevented 
from passing down externally and lengthwise of 
the column, by the close contact of its case. 

As the surface of the shell is variously pre¬ 
sented to the action of the flame from the 
charge of the cannon, it is desirable that the 
exterior end of the fuze should be so placed as 
to receive it most advantageously. This may 
not be upon the inner hemisphere of the shell, 
because the entire force of the charge which is 
to give it motion, is exerted there, and the fuze 
would be thus exposed to the danger of instant 
destruction. The fuze is therefore turned out¬ 
wards, and, by common consent, never below the 
plane of the axis of bore, as the current of flame 
from the cannon has its first issue through the 
space left above between the projectile and the 
bore, (windage,) and consequently the upper por¬ 
tion of the exterior hemisphere is more favor¬ 
ably exposed to it .than the lower. 

The length of the fuze is made to depend 
upon circumstances, (which will be stated in 
detail elsewhere); sometimes it extends across 
the cavity of the shell, sometimes it is so short 
as to be included entirely in the thickness of 
the shell. Those now used in England, and the 
United States, may project into the cavity, but 
never extend across it. 


FUZES. 


133 


Compositions. 

All compositions for fuzes are based upon the 
combination of nitre with sulphur and charcoal. 
Necessity has varied the proportions of the in¬ 
gredients, but those commonly used for gun¬ 
powder are unquestionably the best, and the 
action of the fuze is prejudiced according to 
the extent of the departure therefrom. The 
gas evolved from the fuze made of gunpowder, 
issues with the greatest intensity, and is there¬ 
fore more capable of resisting the ingress of 
particles of water, wood, or earth; hence the 
chances of extinction are diminished, and the 
common powder thereby furnishes the very best 
material for fuze composition. 

The combustion of nitrous combinations is 
well known to depend upon the state in which 
they exist. When firmly solidified, the course 
of the combustion is comparatively moderate, 
and is perceptibly progressive, though, in a pul- 
verous or granular form, it becomes so rapid as 
to seem instantaneous, and explosion ensues. 
Then, if common powder be compressed into a 
case of l or i of an inch in diameter, so that 
the flame can only consume it in the transverse 
section, a lapse of 2^ seconds will occur in the 
burning of one inch, while a like quantity, in 
its granular state, will explode instantly upon 
ignition. 


134 


FUZES. 


The rapidity of the combustion in a given 
mass is, however, proportional to the surface 
exposed; and, therefore, if the flame is per¬ 
mitted to extend itself to other surfaces of the 
mass, the consumption will be more rapid; and 
the intensity of the gas greater. Hence we 
have the principle of the rocket. But it may 
so extend itself as to resemble explosion in vio¬ 
lence—as in the priming tube—when a minute 
perforation is carried through the whole length. 

From this source, spring all the difficulties in 
regard to premature operation of the fuzes; for 
the existence of the least crevice in the mass of 
composition, in any direction, allows the flame 
to extend itself, hastens the consumption of the 
fuze, and therefore its action, so that the shell 
may be exploded before reaching its destina¬ 
tion, to the total loss of its effects. 

The excellence of the combination as it exists 
in gunpowder, has been made to yield to other 
conditions that seemed imperative. Thus the 
necessity of adapting the duration of the fuze, 
in some measure, to the immediate purpose in 
view, and the danger or impracticability of mak¬ 
ing the adjustment at the instant, has led to the 
arrangement of fuzes into classes, longer or 
shorter, as may be. 

From this followed the necessity of other com¬ 
binations, modifying the celerity of the combus¬ 
tion more or less. For which purpose, the usual 
practice has been either to obtain the composi- 



FUZES. 


135 


tion by using gunpowder as a basis and adding 
to it a portion of the other ingredients, or else 
to make the desired combination entirely from 
the original elements. The defects of manipu¬ 
lation are soon perceivable in both of these 
modes of operation—for the character of the 
combination will depend on the purity of the 
ingredients, their proportion, trituration and 
mixture, and will vary just as these conditions 
are complied with. It is not difficult to obtain 
the proper quality of ingredients, nor to propor¬ 
tion them correctly; but the pulverizing, and 
blending them by manipulation, is notoriously 
imperfect, and affects both the uniformity and 
the extent of the duration. Every person who 
has had experience in such matters is aware of 
the tedious, vexatious, and uncertain results that 
are incurred in this way. The quantity of com¬ 
position mixed at one time can never be consid¬ 
erable, because it is but mere dust, and absorbs 
the moisture of the atmosphere very readily. 
At every repetition of the preparation it is found 
that the duration of the fuzes varies more or less 
from the proper standard, and then follows the 
unsatisfactory expedient of adding one ingre¬ 
dient or another, until the wished for duration 
is obtained. 

It is desirable therefore to have the composi¬ 
tion prepared at the mills, and granulated like 
common powder—in which form it is not more 
liable to deteriorate than gunpowder, and can be 


136 


FUZES. 


preserved for a long time without the possibility 
of alteration. Hence the proportions once fixed, 
the duration is established, with the least trouble 
to the pyrotechnist. The regularity of such com¬ 
position is also greater. The effects of precision 
in the pulverizing and incorporating the mate¬ 
rials, is shown by the following:—Certain pro¬ 
portions of Nitre, Sulphur, and Charcoal, were 
prepared at the Laboratory, and also at the mills 
of one of the best powder makers. From each 
of these was driven a number of Fuzes, which, 
when tried, resulted thus: 

Nitre — 79.55. Sulphur = 15.91. Charcoal — 4.54. 

Length = lj in -. Diameter = 0.34 in -. 

Condensed with a pressure of 2000 lbs. on the driver. 

Laboratory. Powder Mills. 

Duration = ^seconds. 9 seconds. 

Variation extreme = gi seconds. i* seconds. 

This seems to make any argument needless, in 
regard to the expediency of perfecting the me¬ 
chanical process. 


FUZES. 


137 


Fuze case. 

This appliance serves the double purpose of 
confining the ignition to the surface intended, 
and also of properly securing the column of 
composition in the shell. 

The most ancient expedient of the kind, was a 
wooden tube bored out to a suitable diameter 
for the reception of the composition. At the 
siege of Dole in 1632, when bombs began to 
be used as a permanent element of artillery, the 
fuzes were thus described by a military author 
of the period:— 

“ When these shells were filled with ordinary 
“ powder, a wooden fuze or tube was inserted 
“ through a hole above, entering as far as the 
“ centre of the powder, and projecting outside 
“ three or four inches; its bore was charged with 
“ powder, sulphur, and charcoal, driven hard so 
“as to burn slowly: and in order that the fire 
“ should not communicate before the proper 
“ time, these tubes were very carefully luted and 
“ pitched about the fuze-hole of the bombs.” 

(Le passe et Vavenir de VArtillerie, 234.) 

How little improvement has been made in 
this small essential, will be readily seen by every 
one acquainted with modern fuzes,—an account 
of which is now about to be given. 


138 


FUZES. 


Wooden tubes or cases for fuzes. 

The material for this purpose should be of a 
tough nature, not easily riven, nor affected by 
atmospheric changes. 

The French “ Aide Memoire Navale” men¬ 
tions the Elm only: Colonel Charpentier,—Elm 
—Walnut—Ash—and Linden. 

Captain de Brettes assigns the following value 
to several kinds, in order: Linden, Alder, Birch, 
Plane-tree, Elm, Walnut, and Ash. 

The English use Beech, which also has been 
the custom of our service. The Gum too may 
be very suitable. 

The wood intended for Fuze Cases, should 
always be roughed out nearly to the proper size, 
and left to season,—then trimmed to dimensions, 
bored, and put aside to season fully. 

All such as are knotty or manifest any other 
imperfection, must be rejected as entirely unfit 
for the purpose. 

The dimensions of the finished wooden tube 
or case are, l. in 25 in diameter at the head— 
0. in 67 at the inner end; the bore 0. in 25, 
not passing the entire length of the case, but 
stopping 0. in -72 short of its small end, so as 
to leave it solid at that part, and measurably to 
obviate the danger of splitting. A globular 
cavity or cup is left for priming the outer ex- 


FUZES. 


139 


tremity of the composition. The length of the 
case is to be sufficient to extend from the outer 
surface of the shell to the opposite side of the 
cavity, after being cut off smoothly outside. The 
flame issues into the shell by a perforation pass¬ 
ing transversely through the inner end of the 
fuze. 

It will be perceived, that in 1632, it was usual 
to allow the fuze to project 3 or 4 inches outside 
of the shell, and not to extend inside entirely 
across the cavity—which is just the reverse of 
the present practice. But so far as construction 
is concerned, there is no apparent difference in 
any important particular, between the venerable 
relic of Dole, and the most recent wooden fuzes. 

. So that no improvement can be said to have 
been made from that period in the principle of 
the appliance, nor even in the detail, until Paix- 
hans had broken in upon the heavy slumbers of 
routine, and succeeded in bringing into use 
something better than the old fixture just as it 
had been handed down, covered by the dust of 
ages, and respectable for its antiquity, if for 
nothing else. 


140 


FUZES. 


Metallic fuzes. 

In the “ NouveJJe Arme Maritime ,” where the 
distinguished artillerist recounts the details by 
which he may be said to have created the Naval 
shell-system, will be found the description of the 
substitute which he proposes for the wooden 
cases. This is metallic and, like the other, to 
extend across the cavity, but it is to be screwed, 
not driven in. 

In the United States and England, wooden 
cases have, for some years, given way to the 
metallic. They are made of the toughest gun 
metal (nine parts of copper and one of tin, no 
zinc whatever)—are screwed into the shell, and 
sometimes enter into the cavity, but without 
extending across it. 

The position of the fuze varies—being either 
in the axis of the bore, or upwards at an angle 
of 45°, and always outward. 

But the wooden case obviously requires to be 
placed in the axis of the bore; for as the shock 
of displacement occurs in that direction, it is 
exerted obliquely upon the case when at an 
angle of 45°, and would break it or cause it to 
yield sufficiently to dislocate the composition 
and injure its action. This is avoided when 
the direction of the case corresponds with the 
axis of bore; and the wooden case being' long 


FUZES. 


141 


enough to extend across the cavity, and re¬ 
ceive support from the opposite side, cannot be 
forced in. 

The metallic case may be used in either posi¬ 
tion—if in the axis of the bore, it is secured 
against being driven into the shell when the gun 
is fired, by the screw threads assisted by a stout 
fiange or shoulder at the outer end. If inclined 
upwards, it cannot be bent much, provided the 
tube is of sufficient stoutness, and does not. pro¬ 
ject much into the cavity of the shell. Where¬ 
fore the long case of Paixhans, though metallic, 
is not to be recommended when the fuze is to be 
inclined to the axis of the bore; for though less 
liable to damage than if of wood, yet as already 
stated, the least crevice or fissure is fatal to the 
regular action of the combustion, and no very 
material distortion of the case might suffice to 
do this mischief. 

The length of the U. S. Fuzes corresponds 
with the thickness of the 8-inch shell at the 
fuze-hole, and they are therefore supported along 
their entire length. 

The English cases vary in length. 


142 


FUZES. 


Paper cases. 

These are sometimes used in metallic cases 
to prevent the contact of the composition there¬ 
with; for the decided affinity between the nitre 
and sulphur of the latter, and the bronze, is 
quickly developed by the moisture of the sea 
air, to the detriment and final destruction of 
the composition,—and this cause is rendered 
still more active in steamers, by the escape of 
the hot and moist vapor from the machine, which 
pervades every part of the vessel; so that, with¬ 
out extraordinary care, all kinds of laboratory 
stores are liable to speedy deterioration in such 
ships, as I have had occasion to notice in those 
returned from service. 

When the metal case is immediately in con¬ 
tact with the composition, the moisture that may 
reach the fuze is absorbed by the composition 
and damages it—then follows the action of the 
acids upon the metal, and ends in the eventual 
ruin of the fuze, sooner or later. 

The paper case is a more ready absorbent of 
moisture than the composition,—and so long as 
the quantity that may be present is not beyond 
its capacity, the composition does not suffer. So 
that this part of the difficulty is remedied in a 
degree, while the contact of the composition 
with the metal, and its consequences, are abso- 


FUZES. 


143 


lutely prevented by interposing the paper case 
between them. 

The paper case is also useful when the charges 
of the piece used are proportionally low, and 
the first movement of the shell is not so violent 
as to need full precautions against its action. 
Thus, in mortar practice, it is the custom of 
our land service to drive a short wooden case 
into the bomb and insert the paper case with 
the composition just before firing. So with our 
light boat howitzers,—which gives the means 
of using such a time of fuze as may be deemed 
suitable to the distance of the object, and each 
shell or shrapnel is provided with five fuzes of 
1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 seconds respectively, put up in 
a water-proof package. 


Some care is required in selecting paper for 
making cases; it should be stout, the texture 
even (and rather open so as to permit the cement 
to permeate) and the surface slightly rough, but 
not coarse, in order to favor the adherence of 
the surfaces. 

The cement is made of a refined glue, known 
as 44 bonnet-glue,” used rather thin, and kept 
warm in a suitable vessel. 

The paper is cut into slips having one end 
square, the other tapered to a point,—the work¬ 
man uses a steel cylinder 2J to 3 inches long 
and 0.34 of an inch in diameter, around which 



144 


FUZES. 


he rolls a paper slip upon a smooth board, be¬ 
ginning with the square end and applying the 
cement throughout wherever the surfaces are 
brought together,—the gradual diminution of 
the other end of the paper produces the re¬ 
quired taper on the exterior of the case. The 
edges of each fold remain, however, and are 
smoothed down with a sand-paper rasp when 
the case is dry. 

If one of these cases is cut in any part, the 
several layers of paper are not perceptible, but 
appear as if resolved into a perfectly firm and 
homogeneous material. 

The finished case is one-tenth of an inch 
thick at the upper or larger end, and half a 
tenth thick at the lower or smaller end. 


Driving the fuze composition. 

It is customary to pulverize the grained mate¬ 
rial before using it,—but this is by no means 
indispensable when a mechanical power is em¬ 
ployed. 

The composition may be driven by hand, or 
by a monkey, or by a machine. 

The mallet and drift have been in use until 
recently, and will probably continue to be the 
common resort for driving fuzes on shipboard, 
when the exigencies of service may render it 
necessary. 



FUZES. 


145 


The monkey is said to be used in some of 
the European laboratories. 

In the Ordnance Department of the Navy, a 
screw-press, contrived by Mr. Goell, has been 
employed since 1846. It is a most ingenious 
and convenient machine, doing all the work 
now required of it and capable of much more. 

The driving shaft moves vertically through a 
wrought iron tube, on the exterior of which 
is a strong square thread. 

A nut works upon this, by means of a large 
disc attached to it of sufficient diameter to create 
the requisite power, and upon the upper side of 
this disc is established a set of levers. 

If the material is to be driven into paper or 
wooden cases, it is necessary to secure them first 
in a steel mould, which is made to adjust so 
closely to the exterior of the cases, as to sustain 
them against the pressure applied in condensing 
the composition. If driven directly into metal 
cases, it is only required to have sockets on the 
plate of the machine, which shall present the 
tube fairly to the direction of the force. 

Two or more of these moulds, or sockets, are 
placed around the edge of the circular plate 
carried upon the lower part of the frame, and 
revolving so as to bring the moulds in turn to 
the drift. 

The workman pours in a ladleful of pul¬ 
verized gunpowder, or composition, as the case 

may be, and enters the drift (which is of the 

10 


146 


FUZES. 


same diameter as the forming mandril) moving 
round the lower plate, so as to bring the drift 
under the driving shaft of the machine; the 
positions being determined by a spring and 
catch working into a notch in the edge of the 
plate. 

The boy now gives the disc a quick whirl by 
the handles, and the driving shaft descends on 
the drift—he sustains the movement, and in¬ 
creases the pressure until the sound of the bell 
notifies him that the lever has risen and the 
action of the machine has ceased. He then 
reverses the motion of the disc, and raises the 
shaft sufficiently to allow the workman to re¬ 
volve the lower plate and bring in place another 
mould, which has meanwhile been charged with 
a ladleful of composition. In this way the ope¬ 
ration proceeds until the column of condensed 
composition is rather longer than required. 

The power usually applied is about 2200lbs.; 
with a double mould a man and boy can drive 
120 fuzes in a day. 

In this way the powder or composition is 
solidified until its densitv is doubled, and it 
becomes as hard as stone. 

When driven by hand, a mallet of about 
8 0Z8, is used, and each charge is struck blows 
in quick succession, which produces a condensa¬ 
tion about equal to that of the Goell Fuze Press 
with a force of 1900 lbs. 

Each charge should be so regulated that its 


FUZES. 


147 


height, when condensed by pressure, or driving, 
should not exceed its diameter, and in general 
a greater equality is obtained when the layers 
are of less height. 

The paper cases are removed from the driv¬ 
ing mould and placed in another of the exact 
length required; the projecting portion of their 
fuzes is then cut off evenly with a very sharp 
knife. 

The composition or gunpowder, thus com¬ 
pressed, is quite hard, and its specific gravity, 
as obtained in the ordinary process of the lab¬ 
oratory, is rather more than double that of gun¬ 
powder in the grain. 


Priming. 

It has always been customary to prime fuzes. 
Those of wood have a cavity at the head, as 
already stated, and the composition being driven 
fair with the lower part of this cavity, the cup 
is charged with a paste of mealed powder and 
spirits of wine, or tincture of camphor, among 
which is interspersed a few threads of quick 
match. The same priming is applied to com¬ 
position driven in metal or wood, only that they 
have no cavity, and a part of the tube is left 
unfilled in order to receive the paste. 

There is good reason to believe that the 



148 


FUZES. 


priming of fuzes by paste or any other mate¬ 
rial, is wholly needless, and that the composi¬ 
tion will ignite quite as well as the priming, 
—a striking evidence of this is found in the 
Bormann Fuze. When cut for use, the very 
minute surface of four-hundredths of a square 
inch of hard driven composition, is presented 
to the flame of the gun; and yet, in a very 
large number that I have fired from light guns, 
the failures to ignite are much fewer than the 
best primed fuzes freshly prepared. Originally, 
the inventor made use of a central priming, but 
it proves to be unnecessary, and has been dis¬ 
pensed with. The objection to priming of any 
kind is its exceeding susceptibility of moisture, 
and its destruction by dampness, which would 
not affect the smooth, hard surface of the com¬ 
position. 

The inner end of the fuze may be left open 
to transmit its blaze to the charge of the shell; 
or it may be closed, and transversal holes drilled 
near the lower end of the case. When the latter 
practice is followed, the advantage is gained of 
being able to support the fuze case against the 
opposite side of the cavity, and preventing its 
being forced in. But whether the case is thus 
sustained, or is merely secured at the fuze hole, 
the closing of its end prevents the displacement 
of the column of composition, which probably is 
of more frequent occurrence than with the case 
itself. 


FUZES. 


149 


The fuzes of the English Navy, as described 
by Sir Howard Douglas, (271,) have the metal¬ 
lic case with a screw cap, and the composition 
is driven in without the intervention of a paper 
case. 

They have three times :—2 seconds—7^ se¬ 
conds—and 20 seconds; of 1^, 3 and 4 inches 
in length, and designed for the distances of 
600, 1800, and beyond 1800 yards, respectively. 
The first and last are driven with composition; 
the other (7^ seconds) with mealed powder. 

The French, if we may judge from their Aide 
Memoire, only use the wooden fuze, and it may 
be presumed that the opinion given by an able 
writer* on the subject, is probably that of the 
authorities who direct such matters in the 
French service, viz:— 

“ The fragility of wooden fuzes which, in long 
“ cannon especially, are liable to be broken by 
“ the collision of the projectile with the bore, 
“ their rapid decay at sea, the deterioration of 
“ the composition, which it is difficult to pre- 
“ serve from moisture, notwithstanding the care 
“ taken against atmospheric influences, have 
“ caused efforts to be made to substitute metal- 
“ lie fuzes for wooden fuzes screwed into the 
“ eye of the shell. But the metals being ready 
“ conductors of caloric, it is to be feared that 
“fuzes so made would absorb it from the com- 


* Charpentier, Colonel of Marine Artillery. 


[ 



150 


FUZES. 


“ bustion, so as to increase the chances of extinc¬ 
tion to the fuzes in tiring; while wood being 
“ on the contrary an indifferent conductor, car- 
“ bonizing even at red heat, can in collision 
“rekindle the extinguished composition with a 
“ spark. This property in metals of conducting 
“ caloric freely, may also make it to be appre- 
“ hended, that the extremity of the metallic fuze 
“ in contact with the charge of the shell, may be 
“ so heated as to fire it and produce explosion 
“before the shell has attained its object. For 
“ these reasons we do not hesitate in giving a 
“preference to wooden fuzes with such defects, 
“over those of metal.” 


Concussion fuze. 

Is the ordinary Fuze just described, with some 
arrangement by which the flame of the fuze is 
made to have access to the charge of the shell 
upon collision with the object. 

Its sole purpose has reference, consequently, 
to the probability of the shell passing entirely 
through an object before the explosion, which 
may occur afterwards, and therefore be ineffec¬ 
tive. This is generally apprehended at very 
short distances, when the velocity of the shell 
has not been materially diminished. 

The possibility of such an occurrence cannot 



FUZES. 


151 


be doubted, and it would be judicious to guard 
against it, if no other quality of the fuze were to 
be prejudiced thereby; but all the devices that 
have yet come under my notice in the official 
examinations of various inventions, were compli¬ 
cated to a most objectionable degree, and proved 
exceedingly uncertain in their operation; for 
they increased the failures of the fuzes very 
frequently. 


Bormann fuze. 

The use of this excellent and ingenious fuze 
has, so far, been confined to the shells and 
shrapnel of light artillery. What objections 
may arise to its use in heavy calibres, has not 
yet been ascertained by actual practice, though 
its great regularity and convenience, may well 
render it exceedingly desirable for the Navy. 

Its peculiar excellence consists in the driving 
of the whole mass of the composition by a single 
pressure, and its disposition in such wise that, 
the combustion occurs not with the stratification 
of the mass, but transversely to it: whilst in the 
ordinary fuzes, the solidification and the process 
of combustion are just the reverse,—that is, the 
column is composed of a number of layers, soli¬ 
dified successively by an equal pressure, but as 
the inferior layers have, beside the pressure ap- 



152 


FUZES. 


plied to them, to bear that of the superincum¬ 
bent layers, it follows that the mass is not homo¬ 
geneous, but increases in density with the infe¬ 
rior position of the layers. 

The regularity of the Bormann fuze in burn¬ 
ing, is very great, more so than that of any other 
kind which I have seen. 

As the use of this fuze has hitherto been con¬ 
fined to shrapnel, its detailed description and 
use will be found in the revised Memorandum 
on that subject.* 


General considerations. 

A glance at the conditions required to con¬ 
stitute a good fuze, will serve as a standard 
whereby to estimate the relative values of those 
described, or of others which may be devised. 

1st. The fuze must ignite with certainty. 

2d. It must be able to sustain ignition against 
the action of particles of earth, water, 
or wood, that may be obtruded upon 
it. 

3d. It must not act before reaching its object. 

4th. The duration should be nearly uniform. 

It is almost impossible that any species of fuze 
should be absolutely perfect, so that it only re¬ 
mains to choose such as may be least imperfect. 


* See 2d Edition—1856. 




FUZES. 


153 


1st. The failure to ignite. 

When suitable opportunities for observation 
occur, it is noticed that in firing a number of 
shells, many do not explode, and when examined, 
no trace of ignition can be detected upon the 
fuzes. 

It seems hardly credible that material of the 
least combustibility can escape ignition when 
exposed in the usual way on the surface of a 
shell, which is enveloped by the fierce and 
searching flame that rushes over the projectile 
at the firing of the charge in the gun. If then 
there is a failure to ignite, it must be supposed 
either that the fuze has been deprived of its 
combustibility, or has not been properly pre¬ 
sented to the flame. So long as it is placed in 
the upper hemisphere of the shell, it is difficult 
to conceive that the latter cause should exert 
any agency in this matter, and we are therefore 
unavoidably compelled to look to some defect 
in the fuze itself. 

Some believe that the composition is made 
difficult of ignition by the nature of the surface 
produced, when the hard composition is pared 
off smoothly to proper length, by a keen cutting 
edge—others think the surface presented is too 
small; accordingly it is customary to complete 
the exterior end of the composition with a paste 


154 


FUZES. 


of pulverin and alcohol, interwoven with delicate 
fibres of quick match,—and to give all conve¬ 
nient superficial extent to this priming. 

It is noticed, however, as already said, that 
no fuze is more free from failure of ignition than 
the Bormann fuze; and in this the flame 
always operates on the hard composition, and 
the surface exposed is of the least possible ex¬ 
tent—far less than customary in fuzes of any 
other description. And so sure is it recognised 
to be of combustion, that the priming chamber, 
originally devised to meet objections, has been 
suppressed. 

Thus the necessity of enlarging the orifice, as 
well as the use of priming, are evidently invali¬ 
dated by the experience with the Bormann fuze 
—and strong objection exists to the use of these 
devices, because the priming is far more suscepti¬ 
ble of moisture than the hard composition, and 
is ruined by it at once. Nor is it certain that 
the strong current of flame does not often brush 
off the dry and dusty priming as it lies loosely 
on the head of the fuze, whilst the enlargement 
of the external orifice, offers a greater facility to 
the ingress of particles of extraneous matter, and 
therefore endangers the combustion. 

The benefits of these devices being therefore 
very doubtful, and their defects very certain, it 
seems advisable to avoid both. 

The failure of the composition to ignite, is 
probably due to the same cause which unfits the 


FUZES. 


155 


priming for its purpose,—the absorption of mois¬ 
ture. Every one who has been within the vi¬ 
cinity of the Ocean is familiar with the all per¬ 
vading nature of its atmosphere, and when we 
consider the influences that are developed by it, 
and co-operate with it in the deterioraton of 
every subs.tance that is presented to such action, 
it is not surprising that compositions which, con¬ 
tain so ready an absorbent as charcoal, and are 
injured by the least dampness, should often be 
reached, notwithstanding every precaution. Still 
it has not been found difficult to exclude atmo¬ 
spheric influences in sailing ships, judging from 
the condition of the fuzes returned from service, 
as well as by the results of shell-firing at sea. 
Very different is the case in steamers, where 
ordinary precautions are by no means effective, 
and all kinds of laboratory stores are frequently 
returned irreparably damaged. 


2d. Extinction of the fuze after having been 

IGNITED. 

This may be expected to occur frequently 
when the shell ricochets on soil or water, or 
enters the object fired at. If this be timber, 
every external orifice of the shell is found closely 
packed with the minutest fibres of wood, so 
firmly solidified that a sharp tool and consider¬ 
able force is needed to. remove the substance. 



156 


FUZES. 


When shells do not explode, it is impossible 
to know whether the fuze has failed to ignite, or 
has been extinguished subsequently, unless the 
shell be recovered and examined; and even then 
the indications do not always serve. 

An idea of the general result is obtainable, 
however, from practice executed with particular 
reference to the question. 

Thus, if a number of shells be fired at such 
elevations that the time of flight considerably 
exceeds the duration of the fuze, it is inferable 
that the fuzes of the shells which did not ex¬ 
plode, failed to ignite. If the shells be rico- 
chetted and the number of failures be increased, 
it is usual to consider the difference as due to 
the action of particles from the surface impinged 
on. And finally, if the shells be lodged in any 
object, the full extent of failure from all causes^ 
is supposed to be reached. 

The English experience with their own fuzes 
may be thus abridged from the statements of Sir 
Howard Douglas. 

In 1838, 86 shells were fired experimentally 
at the Prince George , distant 1200 yards—80 
struck, and of these, 38 did not explode. 

In the ricochet practice at Southsea, 1838— 
32 shells were fired, of which only 5 burst. 

In connection with these facts, Sir Howard 
Douglas remarks;— 

“ It is found that four fuzes out of five are 
“ extinguished on striking the water, and about 


FUZES. 


157 


“one in three on striking a ship; if the shell 
“ strike with the fuze end forward, which is ge- 
“ nerally the case, it is found that the timber 
“ by its resistance, forces itself into and effec- 
“ tually plugs the fuze.” (281.) 

And at p. 245—“ The chances of extinction 
“by water are 4 to 5,—by the object, 1 to 3.” 

In the Excellent's Tables, it is noted,—“ Rico- 
“ chet ranges are not given for shells, because 
“ the present fuzes are always extinguished when 
“ so used.” 

This is rather discouraging, and it is recom¬ 
mended to our officers to note the results of their 
own practice, in order to ascertain how far they 
will compare with those given by Sir Howard 
Douglas; which, though executed so long since, 
appear to be intended to represent an existing 
state of things not materially improved since the 
date of the practice given. 

It may be observed, that nothing seems more 
fatal to the combustion of all kinds of fuzes, 
than particles of sand; it is therefore of import¬ 
ance to avoid ricochet on such a soil; water is 
not so detrimental, but its effects are well- 
marked. 

Whether the non-performance of fuzes be 
due to their failure to ignite, or to subsequent 
extinction, it will be found that those made 
from gunpowder are the most sure against both 
causes. Wherefore, as a general rule, when it 
is possible to choose, the preference ought always 


158 


FUZES. 


to be given to such; their combustion is more 
perfect, never expending itself in the ejection 
of little globules of burning matter which mark 
the predominance of sulphur, and in detaching 
themselves, weaken the force of the combustion 
—nor is there an unnecessary loss of material 
from residuary deposit. The gases are evolved 
with the most energy, and therefore repel most 
successfully the obtrusive matter which is sure 
to extinguish the combustion, if once in contact 
with the ignited surface,—for be it observed, 
that well constituted compositions cannot be 
extinguished merely by occlusion from the at¬ 
mosphere. 


3d. Premature explosion. 

This may be caused by the increase of the 
ignited surface of the composition resulting 
from cracks in the case, or in the composition 
itself, or by interstices between the case and 
the composition,—and in proportion to the ex¬ 
tent of this cause, so will be the increased 
celerity of the combustion. The composition 
may be consumed instantly, or, perhaps, at no 
greater rate than will suffice to carry the shell 
near to the object. 

W ooden cases are alone liable to be cracked, 
and this may be due to want of proper support 




FUZES. 


159 


to the case in driving, or to the subsequent 
operation of atmospheric influences; this defect 
constitutes the strongest objection to the use of 
such material. 

Crevices may occur in the composition from 
some defect in the tools or in the mode of using 
them, or they may be created by the bending of 
the case in the shock of first movement, and the 
consequent separation of the layers of the compo¬ 
sition from each other, or from the case itself. 

It may also happen that the displacement of 
the shell by the charge of the gun, will force in 
the column of composition, or the case with it. 
This would of course cause the shell to explode 
very quickly,—and to this class of accidents, all 
fuzes are liable, whether their cases be of wood 
or metal. 

The shell may be defective in thickness or 
quality of metal, and be crushed by the force of 
the charge, when the explosion will be caused 
in or near the gun. Sir Howard Douglas is of 
the opinion that the bursting near the muzzle 
should be attributed to the detonating qualities 
of the powder in the shell.—(320.) 

It is manifest that the premature explosion of 
shells is far more detrimental to their efficiency 
than the failure to explode at all; for in the 
one case, there is a total loss of any effect what¬ 
ever, with some risk of disadvantage to one’s 
own gun if the shell burst in the bore; or to 
the people if it occur near the muzzle,—while 


160 


FUZES. 


in the other case, the shell may at least per¬ 
forate and be as serviceable as a shot, if it fail 
as a shell. 

In the practice upon the Prince George , already 
cited, it seems that there was only one case of 
premature explosion, to thirty-eight failures to 
explode. 

But in the official account of the engineer and 
artillery operations at the seige of Rome, in 1849, 
it is noticeable that the French fuzes were very 
subject to this defect; and the consequences were 
proportionally injurious, as the following state¬ 
ments show:— 

—“June 14,” (Note.) — “Nearly all of the 
“fuzes of the shells burst before the projec- 
“ tiles reached the object. This bad quality of 
“ the fuzes and the weakness of the carriages, 
“rendered the 22 cent - howitzers nearly useless 
“ during the seige of Rome. 

“ The defects of fabrication of the fuzes were 
“ not confined in their consequences to the fire 
“ of the howitzers. The mortars also lost a large 
“ quantity of the projectiles, which sometimes 
“ burst over the heads of our workmen, making 
“it necessary either to suspend the fire, or to 
“ change its direction. 

“ These fuzes were furnished partly from the 
arsenal at Antibes, and partly by the navy. 

— “June 23d.—The mortar battery had so 
“arranged its fire, as to throw shells at night 
“ into bastion 8. But some of them having burst 


FUZES. 


161 


“ above the trenches, and their splinters hav- 
“ ing reached our workmen, the fire was sus- 
“ pended at the request of the commanding 
“ engineer,” &c. 

The character of the fuzes here spoken of, are 
not mentioned; but it is believed that the cases 
were of wood, while those of the English were 
metallic. 

It cannot be supposed that the French would 
have permitted such results to arise from any 
neglect to secure the best means at disposal; for 
the check received in the initial operations 
from the Roman Republicans, who repulsed the 
French avant cjuarde and rudely threw it back 
upon Civita Vecchia , was not likely to lead to any 
further exhibition of excessive confidence by 
using means inferior to the best; while the po¬ 
litical circumstances which brought about the 
siege of Rome, might be expected to induce the 
criticism of the motive, as well as the execution 
of the measure. 

Moreover the publication of the details seems 
to have been entirely voluntary, having been 
consented to by the Minister of War, at the re¬ 
quest of the Commanders of Artillery and Engi¬ 
neers,—From which we infer that the operation 
generally was to be considered as a frank and fair 
exposition of the condition of the two arms.* 


* Si6ge de Rome, 1849. Journal des operations de l’artillerie 
et de Genie publie avec l’autorization de Ministre de la Guerre. 

11 




162 


FUZES. 


Doubts having arisen in regard to the danger 
of splitting the chase of shell-guns by the acci¬ 
dental explosion of shells therein, some trials 
were made upon a piece of ordnance, that are 
not without interest. 

A shell was put in, having a Bormann fuze 
cut close to the communication with its maga¬ 
zine ; the gun was fired, and this was repeated 
twice. In each case the shell was found without 
the least evidence of having exploded. 

The gun was loaded with the fourth shell 
filled with powder, (6 lbs.), without any fuze, 
and the fuze-liole open, so that some of the pow¬ 
der escaped from the shell like a train,—the 
gun was fired and the operation repeated after¬ 
wards. In both cases but one report was dis 
tinguishable, and about a dozen fragments were 
seen following the general direction of the gun, 
but spreading out considerably in their flight, 
the extent of which was nearly a mile. None of 
them flew laterally, and there were no marks 
perceivable on the bore of the gun. 

Not long afterwards the same gun was loaded 
in the same way, except that it had the reduced 
charge of 5 lbs. instead of 15 lbs. In this case 
two reports were heard,—perfectly distinct and 
yet in most rapid succession. The fragments of 
the shell flew laterally as well as directly, and 
some even inclined about 45° rearward, showing 
that the shell must have burst outside of the 
muzzle of the gun. 


FUZES. 


163 


The vicinity of some houses made it dangerous 
to proceed farther at this time. 

It is seen in the first place that, though the 
fuze was cut so as to allow free access of the 
flame to the magazine of the fuze, yet that the 
shell lodged in the sand hank, and the powder 
in the shell was not ignited. 

2d. That two shells, without fuzes, exploded 
in the bore, leaving no indications of the part of 
the bore where this occurred. Hence we are re¬ 
stricted to the supposition that it occurred near 
the original position of the shell in the bore, and 
therefore in the thickest part of the gun. 

3d. When the charge was so small as to im¬ 
part a very low velocity to the shell, much lower 
indeed than would probably be used in service, 
the explosion of the shell, also without a fuze, 
occurred plainly outside of the bore. The charge 
of the shell was fully exposed to the current of 
flame, and the shell must have moved not less 
than a dozen feet before the combustion of the 
powder in the shell had sufficiently proceeded to 
develope the explosive tension of the gases. 

The lapse of time between the sound of the 
two explosions was perfectly distinct to myself, 
and to others who were near; but it was clearly 
impossible to do more than to recognise the 
interval,—its appreciation was impossible. 

It is known that the construction of the Bor- 
mann fuzes was such, that by cutting them close 
to the magazine no composition intervened be- 


164 


FUZES. 


tween the flame of the gun and the grained 
powder in the fuze. It is also known that the 
powder in the shell was not exploded, — the 
traces of combustion appeared in one fuze, but 
the others were totally destroyed by the impact, 
so that it is impossible to say certainly that they 
had been ignited, and then extinguished—it is 
only supposable from the general certainty of 
this fuze. 

The explosion of a single shell beyond the 
muzzle in the manner described, is suggestive 
of doubts in regard to the common notion that 
fuzes are capable of exploding the shells in the 
bore of the gun. For there is an intervening 
substance—that of the fuze—through which the 
flame must travel, or which must be displaced; 
and however quickly this may done, it can 
hardly be assumed to be equal in celerity to the 
explosion of powder exposed to the action of the 
flame under any circumstances; which in one 
case certainly has been known to be less rapid 
than the movement of the projectile. That 
shells are broken in the gun is an incident of 
common experience, but it remains to be ascer¬ 
tained with precision if this is to be ascribed to 
the premature action of the fuze, or to some 
other causes,—such as its being crushed by the 
shock. Sir Howard Douglas, it has been stated, 
considers the accident due to the detonating- 
property of the charge of powder in the shell. 


FUZES. 


165 


4th. Irregularity of duration. 

The consequences of this defect are various. 
In the case of shrapnel it is nearly fatal to its 
efficiency, as noted in another Memorandum on 
that subject.* With heavy ordnance it is of less 
consequence, though it may often produce a like 
result, and have the same consequences as pre¬ 
mature explosion. Still, as a general rule, this 
is not to be apprehended; and with the neces¬ 
sary care in fabricating and preserving fuzes, it 
is probable that, unless the variations in dura¬ 
tion are unreasonable, they need not have any 
important effect on the general practice. 

Percussion fuzes. 

In view of the progress that has been made 
in every branch of human industry, it may seem 
singular that so important an appliance as the 
fuze should not have advanced beyond the primi¬ 
tive article used in the earlier epochs of explo¬ 
sive projectiles. 

The serious difficulties that beset the question 
have just been enumerated. Fuzes fail to ignite; 
or they may be extinguished after ignition; or 
act too soon, or very irregularly. The use of a 
detonating agent seemed to present the means 
of avoiding these insuperable difficulties,! for 


* Boat Armament, 2d edition, f Sir Howard Douglas, page 298. 




166 


FUZES. 


it proposed to create the flame only when needed 
at the instant of impact, and its action upon the 
charge of the shell was to follow instantly upon 
its own development. 

The ingenuity of inventors was precipitated 
upon the solution of the problem at its first 
suggestion. 

But upon the very threshold of inquiry, it 
was evident that, if the new fuze avoided the 
difficulties of the old, it was not free from others 
of a different and quite as difficult a character. 

The essential requirements of a good percus¬ 
sion shell were:— 

1st. The detonating agent was to yield in¬ 
stantly to the concussion produced by collision 
with the object. 

2nd. But it must resist the shock given to the 
projectile when displaced by the effort of the 
charge; and this was known to be enormous. 

3rd. Having survived this danger, it must 
still be proof against the consequences of im¬ 
pact with the material of any surface on which 
it might ricochet, accidentally or designedly. 

It was evidently not easy to satisfy conditions 
so conflicting and delicate in their nature, par¬ 
ticularly as they probably varied in degree with 
each round which was fired, and that in a man¬ 
ner quite beyond all conjecture. 

Moreover, it was not merely to procure a shell 
that would ordinarily perform its functions in 


FUZES. 


167 


this way, hut it must also do so with more cer¬ 
tainty than those which were commonly used. 

In the English Navy the name of Captain 
Moorsom appears most prominently in con¬ 
nection with this subject; but so far as any 
judgment can be formed from what is known 
positively, it does not appear that his inven¬ 
tion has been perfected so as to supersede the 
common shell, or even to get beyond its experi¬ 
mental application. 

Sir Howard Douglas states that in course of 
practice with the Moorsom shells upon the York, 
(1853,) it was noticed that they frequently failed 
to act even when new. Several 8-inch shells 
struck or passed through and did not act. One 
of them pierced the side and struck the other 
without exploding; and many of the Moorsom 
fuzes were picked up entire, among the splin¬ 
ters and fragments. (318.) 

Sir Howard Douglas, however, says that the 
problem is prosecuting with every “ prospect of 
success.” 

The French percussion shell is the contrivance 
of Captain Billette; but nothing is known pub¬ 
licly of its qualities, and it is believed that only 
a small portion are furnished for service, which 
is not very favorable to its character. 

The embarrassments that beset the efforts to 
realize an efficient percussion shell of the ordi¬ 
nary spherical form, soon gave another direction 


168 


FUZES. 


to the labors of the parties interested. The 
problem was very evidently most simple and 
obvious of solution, if it were possible to have 
the projectile present a given part to the im¬ 
pact ; but to do this, it was requisite to change 
its form from spherical to conical, and as we have 
already seen, this was found to be only a shift¬ 
ing of the labor from one field to another; with 
as little success too, notwithstanding the in¬ 
creased advantages that would result from this 
mode of attaining the object—for, with the 
conoidal projectile, came greater power and 
enormous range, as well as the simplest percus¬ 
sion mechanism. 

So far, this interesting question has proved to 
be a perfect riddle to ordnance men, leading 
them frequently into fanciful speculations as 
wide of probable fulfilment as the search for 
the philosopher’s stone, or the squaring of the 
circle, or the North-West Passage. 

And when some future (Edipus shall grasp 
the problem in all its bearings, it will remain 
to determine the comparative efficiency of the 
percussion and the common fuze, or as Sir How¬ 
ard Douglas styles them, time-fuzes. 

We know that the action of shells is reo-u- 

o 

lated by the extent of their penetration. When 
the explosion encounters equal resistance on all 
sides, its action also is equally distributed; but 
when its penetration is less than sufficient for 
this purpose, the explosion naturally finds egress 


FUZES. 


169 


in the direction where it encounters least re¬ 
sistance. 

Now, the legitimate tendency of the time- 
fuze is never premature ; on the contrary, the 
objection usually offered is, that it may not 
act promptly enough, and as a consequence, at 
short distances, it may pass through both sides 
before the fuze causes the explosion. To this, 
the supposed nature of the percussion fuze is 
not liable. But whenever the distance is in¬ 
creased, so that the probability of perforating 
the entire mass of the enemy no longer exists, 
then the shell fitted with a time-fuze has the 
opportunity to make its full lodgment before 
the explosion occurs; under like circumstances, 
what will be the comparative action of the shell 
which is exploded by the collision'? Certainly, 
if it explode before full lodgment, so will the 
effect be proportionally lost, and the explosion 
expend itself in blowing off portions of the outer 
surface, whether the distance of the object be 
more or less. 

It will then be to determine whether the ex¬ 
plosion of the charge in the shell, does or does 
not occur so instantly, that the penetration is 
necessarily superficial. 

Sir Howard Douglas is of the opinion, that 
“ the shell cannot be lodged in the wood, if the 
“ percussion apparatus performs its function.” 
(p. 250.) 

If so, then it is useless to proceed with any 


170 


FUZES. 


farther attempts to obtain a good percussion 
shell. But it does not appear from any pub¬ 
lished facts, that this has been satisfactorily 
demonstrated, or even investigated; and from a 
few isolated results, there is reason to believe 
in the propriety of considering it an open ques¬ 
tion. 

No little concern is properly entertained in 
regard to the apparent liability of shells to pass 
through the side of an opponent before the fuze 
can cause explosion, the effect of which is then 
expended uselessly; and this evil seems to be¬ 
come very serious at short distances, when the 
projectile occupies hardly more than a second in 
its transit. 

It will be remembered that the advantage 
claimed as inherent in the percussion and con¬ 
cussion fuzes, is immunity from this accident. 

But there is reason to believe from observa¬ 
tion, that the United States fuzes, and others of 
similar description, are liable to be dislocated 
by the shock of impact, and thus made to ex¬ 
plode the charge of the shell almost instantly 
after penetration. 

Should it prove true that a liability to this 
accident is of frequent occurrence, the presumed 
want of effect from dilatory explosion, would be 
removed to a considerable extent, and one serious 
objection to the common fuze be obviated. 

There is reason to apprehend that the alleged 
failure of shells to explode, is not always to be 


V 


FUZES. 


171 


charged to the defects of the fuze; there are 
well authenticated instances where shells have 
been recovered, and on examination the caps 
were found in place over the fuze, thereby very 
fully preventing the access of the flame and the 
ignition of the composition. 

It is well therefore to warn the seamen fully 
on this point, so that the projectiles may have 
an opportunity of taking effect, and their defects 
not be magnified unduly. 

Experience has already made manifest the 
incendiary properties of shells, in the frequent 
occurrence of conflagrations when they have 
been used. In this tendency, the common fuze 
necessarily participates to some extent; for the 
escape of an intense though small stream of 
flame is not to be disregarded when gunpowder 
or any very combustible material is at hand, as 
even its presence may suffice to produce the most 
disastrous results. 

It is evident that the tendency of the percus¬ 
sion and concussion fuzes is to operate upon 
the first sufficiently solid material struck by the 
shell; therefore, their explosive and incendiary 
capacities, however great, will seldom or ever 
be exerted upon magazines, shell-rooms, engines 
or interior parts of the ship, because the sides 
and other intervening materials must determine 
the explosion invariably upon themselves. 










' 

. 

















Y. 

PENETRATION. 


Condition and incidents—equation therefor.—Penetration in oak 
of several calibres.—Origin and anomalies in practice on tar¬ 
gets—more particularly caused by inequalities of resistance.— 
Differences between penetration in target and in naval struc¬ 
tures.—Thicknesses of French ships.—Anomalies in practice 
upon ships—due to unequal resistance of structure and to the 
shock of the ball—complication of effect during an engagement. 
Deductions from target firing.—Practice upon target by the 
Ordnance Department of Washington Navy Yard.—Perfora¬ 
tion—effect on fuzes.—Concussion.—Ricochet.—Remarks. 


The depth to which a projectile fired from a 
cannon can be made to enter into any substance, 
will depend on the force of the ball; upon the 
manner in which the surface struck is presented 
to the trajectory, the character of the substance, 
and its disposition. 

The force of the blow proceeds from the 
weight, volume, and velocity of the shot or 
shell. They constitute its momentum or power 
to overcome resistance,—first, of the air through 
which it must pass to reach the object, and 
then of the object itself. 

The relative momenta of projectiles on strik¬ 
ing, may be considered as proportional to their 


174 


PENETRATION. 


initial momenta when their weight and volume 
are similar, but not otherwise. On the contrary, 
a larger projectile may be inferior to another in 
its initial momentum, and yet retain a greater 
degree of power at a distance, for the following 
reasons:— 

First . The resistance of the air to the ball is 
proportional to its volume in the ratio of the 
diameter ?. 

On the other hand, the power of the ball to 
overcome this resistance lies in its weight and 
its velocity. 

The weight of the ball increases with its 
diameter?,—consequently in a higher ratio than 
its surface,—and hence the larger the ball the 
greater is the increase of the means of overcom¬ 
ing the resistance of the air. 

Therefore, in horizontal tire, the larger ball 
moving with a certain velocity encounters less 
resistance proportionally than a smaller ball mov¬ 
ing with the same or even a somewhat higher 
velocity, and derives from its greater weight 
more power to overcome it; consequently, will 
retain a greater proportion of its momentum, at 
equal distances, than the other. Moreover, the 
resistance of the air increases in a higer ratio 
than the increase of the velocity. Hence a ball 
moving at a certain rate, loses more of its velo¬ 
city than a ball of like kind moving at a lower 
rate. 


PENETRATION. 


175 


Thus, if an 18-pdr. be fired with an initial 
velocity of 1600 feet per second, and a 32-pdr. 
with an initial velocity of 900 feet per second, 
their initial momentum will be equal, (28,800) ; 
but as they proceed, the velocity of the 18-pdr., 
and consequently its momentum, will decrease 
far more rapidly. 

When the specific weights of projectiles are 
unequal, there is a corresponding disproportion 
in one element of power, while the resistance still 
remains proportional to their volumes. Where¬ 
fore, shells being hollow, are of inferior density 
and liable to this disadvantage. 

These general laws were most clearly defined 
by Robins about a century since, but the dif¬ 
ficulty of determining the exact ratio of the 
resistance to the different velocities, has inter¬ 
fered with their useful application. 

They are now so far understood as to permit 
deductions of some reliability to be made from 
established facts; so that the average penetra¬ 
tion of shot or shells into a homogeneous mass 
of wood, can be computed with tolerable pre¬ 
cision at all practicable distances. 

The experiments executed at Gavre, and at 
Metz, by the orders of the French government, 
furnish the most satisfactory data that are to 
be had at this time, for a general hypothesis 
regarding the penetrations of projectiles into the 
solid material commonly used for ship building. 


176 


PENETRATION. 


The formulas, as finally revised, are given 
thus:— 

V 


Uz= 




r 


z = 2.306 a. d. log. (1 + — 5 ) 

The dependence that may be placed upon 
these expressions will appear from a comparison 
of the results they give, with those which are 
observed to occur in practice. For which pur¬ 
pose, we cite the following, as strictly in point, 
from the experimental practice at this place. 

The target, placed in front of the battery of x 
this department, is made of sound and seasoned 
white oak, well connected with wooden treenails 
and other fastenings, none being of iron except 
a few to bind up the extreme ends; the distance 
is 1299 yards. 

In this were lodged one 32-pdr. shot and two 
8-inch shells, fired from the U. S. long 32-pdr. 
(57 cwt ) and the 8-inch of 55 cwt . 

The depths to which these projectiles entered, 
and those obtained by computation, compare 
thus:— 


Class of Gun. CLge. of Gun. Projectile. 

32-pdr. of 57 cwt * 9 lb3 - Shot 

8-inch of 55 cwt - 7 lbs - Shell 


Penetration at 1300 yds. 
Computed. Actual. 

21K13 21 in -.0 

16^.16 15 in -.58 



PENETRATION. 


177 


It is certainly no small merit to have ap¬ 
proached so closely to the truth at nearly 1300 
yards, from facts noted at less than 100 yards. 

It was observed, however, that the earlier 
formula exhibited a tendency to represent the 
penetration in excess. Later results, obtained in 
France, induced a correction of this, and it will 
be observed that those obtained here indicate 
that this amendation might have been carried 
somewhat farther by the revised formula. The 
difference is, perhaps, of little practical import¬ 
ance, nor are the cases of penetration obtained 
here as numerous as might be wished for the 
purpose of additional correction: hut they were 
executed with the utmost exactness, and have 
the advantage of determining the depth of per¬ 
foration at a very much greater distance than 
any heretofore given of equal authenticity; 
thereby affording a wider basis for the computa¬ 
tion, and very considerably reducing the extent 
to which it has been necessary to depart from 
this base, in order to estimate the value of dis¬ 
tant penetrations. 

For these reasons, I have preferred, in the fol¬ 
lowing table, to amend slightly the empirical 
co-efficient,—using 2.2456 in lieu of 2.306. 


12 


178 


PENETRATION. 


PENETRATION 

IN A MASS OF SEASONED WHITE OAK, 

Of Shot and Shells fired from U. S. Navy Ordnance. 


GUN. 

Charge. 

Projec¬ 

tile. 

Initial 

V elocity. 

Penetration &c. 

500y ds - 

loooy 118 - 

1500> ds - 

2000y ds - 

lbs. 

Feet. 

Inches. 

Inches. 

Inches. 

Inches. 

18-pdr. long 

6 

Shot. 

1720 

28.9 

17.9 

11.0 

6.9 

24-pdr. do. 

8 

do. 

1720 

33.5 

21.8 

14.1 

9.3 

32-pdr. of 32 cwt - 

4i 

do. 

1250 

26.4 

18.5 

12.7 

8.8 

32-pdr. of 42 cwt - 

6 

do. 

1450 

32.0 

22.0 

15.0 

10.3 

32-pdr. long. 

9 

do. 

1700 

38.7 

26.5 

18.2 

12.5 

42-pdr. 

10* 

do. 

1620 

41.7 

29.7 

21.1 

15.1 

64-pdr. 

16 

do. 

1620 

49.9 

37.3 

27.9 

20.8 

Sinch 0 f 55cwt. 

7 

Shell. 

1350 

29.2 

20.2 

14.0 

9.7 

Sinch of 63cwt. 

9 

do. 

1500 

33.2 

23.0 

15.9 

11.0 

10 inch of gflcwt. 

10 

do. 

1160 

32.1 

24.2 

18.2 

13.7 


The quantities thus assigned are to be consi¬ 
dered as representing only the mean penetration 
of balls, in firing a series of them into a target; 
from these averages the individual results may 
be expected to depart more or less, proportion¬ 
ally to the care which is used, and the success 
attained, in avoiding the causes of these varia¬ 
tions. These may he attributed to differences in 
the force of the projectiles upon striking the ob¬ 
ject, and to difference of resistance encountered 
by them respectively. Dissimilarity in weight 

























PENETRATION. 


179 


and size of ball,—in strength and action of the 
powder—in the texture of the material, &c., will 
all contribute in a greater or less degree, to the 
seemingly singular discrepancies of perforation 
which are noticeable, even in the best conducted 
experimental practice. 

The great irregularities that exist in the 
constituent elements of projectile movement, 
make their influence, unfortunately, too sensible 
to the least observant spectator of gun practice. 
Among these may be reckoned, 

1st. Inaccuracy in size of Ball .—This is limited 
as regards exterior dimension, by the regulation 
which forbids the reception of all shot or shells 
if they exceed or fall short of the given diameter 
more than two hundredths of an inch. So that 
two balls may differ from each other as much as 
four hundredths of an inch, but no more. 

2d. Inaccuracies of Weight ,—which in shot are 
due to variableness in the density of the metal 
itself, and to cavities that are produced in the 
casting of the shot, and therefore influence the 
general density of the projectile itself. 

The limit imposed by regulation upon this 
error, has reference to deficiencies only, which 
must not extend beyond -^tn or y^-th of the 
weight of the ball, acccording to its calibre and 
kind* 


* Though it would be advisable to restrict it in the excess also, 
because this may arise from very hard iron, which is unsuitable, as 
well as from very dense iron, which is a good quality. 




180 


PENETRATION. 


But in shells, the inexactness of weight is 
more likely to arise from errors in thickness, 
and to he considerably greater than in shot; so 
much so indeed, that it is very difficult to select 
a single series of shells of like weight, unless the 
lot be very large. 

3d. The propelling power is liable to very pal¬ 
pable variations in its intensity, which will be 
observed, not only in the powder made by differ¬ 
ent establishments, but even in that made at one 
mill. 

In 1854, a contract for navy powder was dis¬ 
tributed among three manufactories. In the 
course of examination after delivery, the Ballis¬ 
tic Pendulum gave the following indications of 
strength:— 

In. Telocity per second 

No. 1. = 1613 feet. 

“ 2. = 1554 “ 

“ 3. = 1546 “ 

The initial velocity of powder from barrels of 
one lot, made at the same mill, were:— 

No. of barrel = 172 16 405 419 19 155 175 
In. Velocity = 1538 1568 1573 1552 1562 1554 1531 

The consequences of these variations in size 
and weight of ball, and force of powder, are de¬ 
veloped upon the surface exposed to the action 
of the charge, and to the resistance of the air— 
the quantity of gases that escape over the ball 
when the charge is ignited—upon the capacity of 


PENETRATION. 


181 


the ball to overcome the resistance it encounters, 
and the amount of velocity it receives. 

Some of these are exhibited at the initial 
movement of the ball, being reduced during 
flight so as to become inconsiderable at colli¬ 
sion with the object, — others are permanent 
and more marked in their influence. 

With such dissimilarity in these elements, and 
in their combination, it follows that there must 
be corresponding differences in the projectile 
movement of shot and shells, and in the force 
with which they strike an object. 

But the most influential cause of diversity in 
penetration obtained by experimental practice, 
will most probably be found in the unequal re¬ 
sistance of the substance struck by the balls: 
for differences in the texture of wood are almost 
unavoidable, arising either from inherent causes, 
or from the mode and extent of the seasoning pro¬ 
cess. So that between the inequalities of move¬ 
ment in the projectiles, and of the resistance 
they encounter, it is reasonable to expect consid¬ 
erable anomalies in the results of the best target 
practice: all that can probably be exacted is, that 
the variations due to these and other causes, 
shall be kept within the least practicable limits. 

In proportion, however, to the extent of the 
variations, must the individual results be re¬ 
peated, in order to reach a reliable mean. Such 
data can then be conveniently associated, and 
will furnish the means for comparing the perfora 


182 


PENETRATION. 


lions made by projectiles of different calibres, and 
also of like calibre driven by different charges. 
The comparative value of ordnance will thus be 
ascertained with considerable precision, and we 
shall know how far one piece exceeds another in 
respect to penetration, and whether the excess 
amounts to a practical advantage or not. 

The purpose then, of target practice, is merely 
to determine the comparative penetration of balls; 
and for this it is absolutely indispensable, in 
order to decide upon the power of ordnance that 
shall be used in armaments. 

But the results thus obtained, by no means 
represent the penetration and effects of shot 
and shells on ships, because the latter differ so 
widely from the target in nature of material, 
and in character of the structure. 

The one is intended to present a homogeneous 
mass of the same substance, while the material 
of the ship varies in its kind and in structure, 
being composed of different species of wood, such 
as white or live oak for the frame—white oak, 
or yellow pine for the planking: then there is a 
variety of iron and copper fastenings so distri¬ 
buted, that a shot can hardly miss one or more. 

The character of the structure also produces 
great irregularities in the resistances to be en¬ 
countered. In one place occur intervals between 
the frames; just by, the side is solidly made up 
of frame and plank; in another place are heavy 
knees, or the deck itself: while at bow and stern, 


PENETRATION. 


183 


the massive assemblage of material is of prodi¬ 
gious strength. Moreover, the thicknesses of the 
side, from outer to inner surface, vary most 
materially, as will be seen by the following 
authentic dimensions of French ships:— 

THICKNESSES. 

Of the sides of French Ships of War , of all Rates. 


(From the Aide Memoire Navale.) 




THICKNESS, 

At lower port sills of 

At 

CLASSES OF VESSELS. 

Spar 

deck. 

U pper 
deck. 

Main 

deck. 

Lower 

deck. 

Water 

line. 

Orlop 

iJeck. 


' 1st Rate 

ins. 

18.12 

ins. 

20.48 

ins. 

23.23 

ins. 

31.11 

ins. 

32.29 

ins. 

33.87 

Line of Battle 
Ships. 

2d “ 

18.12 


22.84 

30.72 

31.90 

33.47 

3d " 

17.33 


21.27 

28.75 

29.93 

31.11 


4th “ 

17.33 


20.09 

26.39 

26.58 

27.37 


r 1st Class 

1693 



23.63 

24.81 

25.60 

Frigates. -{ 2d <l 

15.75 



21.66 

22.84 

23.63 

[3d « 

14.57 



18.51 

20.09 

21.27 

Corvettes, (a gaillards) 

13.39 


• • • • • 

16.54 

16.93 

18.90 

Brigs of 20 guns 


13.78 




13.78 

15.75 


With such variant capacity for resistance, it 
will be perceived that the effects of artillery upon 
ships must be exceedingly unequal, and alto¬ 
gether different from those produced by the same 
projectiles upon solid targets. 

The following results from a well known au¬ 
thority, will serve to illustrate this view of the 
matter. 




































184 


PENETRATION. 


In the practice upon a hulk (Prince George, 
1838) as given in his Naval Gunnery by Sir 
Howard Douglas, it is stated that:— 

“Several 18-pdr. shot with charges of 6 lbs. of 
“ powder, penetrated to depths varying from 21 
“to 33 inches, according to the state of the 
“ wood, and there stuck.”— 

—“ With charges of 8 lbs., the 32-pdr. shot pene- 
“ trated to depths varying from 22 to 48 
“ inches.”— 

—“The depth penetrated is expressed by the 
“ sum of the distances in solid wood, which the 
“ shot passed through or deeply furrowed.”— 

It is manifest at a glance, that the variations 
of projectile force are altogether inadequate to 
account for the excessive differences in penetra¬ 
tion, and which consequently must be due to the 
unequal resistance of the substance pierced by 
the balls. 

If the tables recording the results of experi¬ 
mental practice are consulted, it is found that 
they furnish little data for supposing that 18-pdr. 
shot would be capable of perforating a hull in 
this manner. 

Thus at 1200 yards, the tables given by Sir 
Howard Douglas tell us that an 18-pdr. shot 
will enter about 15 inches into white oak. But 
when fired into the hulk of the Prince George , the 
same kind of balls perforated 21 inches at the 
least, and even so far as 33 inches in some cases. 

The tables give about 19 inches as the penetra- 


PENETRATION. 


185 


ting force of the 32-pdr. shot (6 lbs. of powder,) 
while they never entered less than 22 inches into 
the hulk, and sometimes as much as 48 inches. 

The statements quoted do not leave us at 
liberty to suppose, that any part of the extent of 
the perforation was lacking in solidity; for it is 
said that, “ the depth penetrated is expressed by 
“ the sum of the distances in solid wood which 
“ the shot passed through or deeply furrowed.” 

However, as the penetration is said to vary 
with the state of the wood, it is inferable that 
some of it was unsound, and hence the excessive 
perforations. 

But it appears that in one instance, where the 
wood was sound and solid , a 32-pdr. shot entered 
39 inches, and what is more singular, this was 
accomplished with a charge of 6 lbs of powder, 
when two other 32-pdr. shot, driven with charges 
of 8 lbs., penetrated only 22 inches and 25 inches. 

There is no doubt that the discrepancies here 
noted, and others of like nature, have been much 
exaggerated by subjecting old hulls like this to 
practice, which are not only decayed, but by 
their construction, so much inferior in strength 
to modern built ships, as to furnish results 
which, so far from throwing light on the ques¬ 
tion, only confuse and obscure it. 

Still there would be found, as already observed, 
very material differences between the penetra¬ 
tion of projectiles into a solid target, and the 
structure of a ship, however sound its substance. 


186 


PENETRATION. 


For the passage of a projectile through the 
wood is not always effected by the actual divi¬ 
sion of the substance. The concussion due to 
its momentum is frequently a powerful adjunct 
in accomplishing what the penetration alone 
could not have performed. 

This is illustrated by a result that will be 
described subsequently, where it will be per¬ 
ceived that the actual division of the fibres by 
a large projectile was traceable for 20 inches, 
which, with an indentation on the remaining 
substance, somewhat less than an inch in depth, 
coincided nearly with the computed penetration 
—(20 in -.7). 

The timber not pierced by the ball was about 
9 inches thick, and this was fairly broken asun¬ 
der, leaving little doubt, in connection with other 
results of a similar nature upon the same target, 
that the entire transit of the shell through it 
could not have been accomplished wholly by 
the penetration. 

Now, though we are not furnished with an 
account of the manner in which the material of 
the hulk (Prince George) was traversed by the 
shot fired, yet it is probable, that the incongrui¬ 
ties just noted, may be explained in part by sup¬ 
posing that the path of one ball may have lain 
through a greater variety of parts not mutually 
sustained; and thus the projectiles had a more 
favorable opportunity for exerting its concussive 
power, by breaking through the farther surfaces, 


PENETRATION. 


187 


than another hall whose force was expended on 
more solid material, and was limited in its 
course to mere penetration. 

It is well, therefore, to remember, that the 
penetration of balls in a naval structure, as 
usually stated, includes the crushing out of the 
farther surfaces of planking, frames, &c., as well 
as the initial perforation by actual division of 
the substance; and its effects are generally ex¬ 
perienced, in action, to he more destructive to 
the personal than that of shot. 

Thus the probable effects of artillery on ships, 
require no little patience and ingenuity to re¬ 
solve, even when the practice is conducted 
experimentally, and therefore with power to 
determine many of the conditions under which 
it shall occur: but in action, these are not only 
beyond control, but most frequently beyond con¬ 
jecture, and the results are liable to the whole 
possible combination of effects, due to unequal 
force and to unequal resistance. 

The penetration given in the tables, usually 
supposes the flight of the ball to be direct; 
whereas in action, a large number of shot rico¬ 
chet, and are thus liable to a serious diminution 
of force in striking the object—varying with the 
condition of the water and the curve of the tra¬ 
jectory. It is true that this mode of practice 
is preferable to direct fire when the water is 
smooth, and the gun level or but slightly ele¬ 
vated; the ball then loses but little force, the 


188 


PENETRATION. 


lateral deviations are inconsiderable, within effec¬ 
tive range, and it sweeps closely to the surface of 
the water, rendering the practice more sure and 
much to he recommended. But when the sur¬ 
face is rough, the hall hounds high, on ricochet, 
and is also liable to he deflected from its direc¬ 
tion, losing more or less force according to the 
resistance encountered at the reflecting surface, 
which can be approximately estimated by the 
elevation of the bound. 

The same result is produced by increasing the 
elevation of the gun, which may be observed by 
the effect on the final roll of the shot; diminishing 
with every degree of elevation, until at 5° or6° it 
ceases, ordinarily, to rise at all from the water. 

In general, direct firing, when the object is 
not near, implies the inapplicability of ricochet 
practice by reason of the unfavorable condition 
of the water; therefore, the accidental ricochet, 
under such circumstances, detracts more or less 
from the force of the ball. 

Again, the penetration of the tables assumes 
the surface of the object to be placed rectangu¬ 
larly to the direction of the line of fire; while 
in actual combat this will be an unfrequent 
occurrence; for the opposing ships will be in 
constant motion in order to obtain or to pre¬ 
serve certain advantages of position, or to pre¬ 
vent the attainment of them by the other party, 
—tacking and wearing, shifting the course, forg¬ 
ing ahead or dropping astern: consequently the 




PENETRATION. 


189 


hulls, in the great majority of cases, will he pre¬ 
sented more or less obliquely to the direction of 
fire, and the effort of the ball will be unfavorably 
exerted on the tough and elastic fibres of the 
oak, in proportion to the inclination of the sur¬ 
face with the direction of the ball’s flight, and 
when this angle is reduced to 15°, the ball 
glances entirely. 

This same cause increases the thickness of the 
material which shot are obliged to perforate, in 
order to pass through a ship’s side, the least 
thickness being found along the line drawn per¬ 
pendicularly through a given mass whose exterior 
and interior surfaces are parallel. 

It may be observed that the invariable conse¬ 
quence of both these incidents to naval actions, 
is to lessen the force of the ball and to create a 
greater resistance to it. Wherefore, the fire 
of a battery from a ship while engaged, must 
ordinarily produce much less effect upon an 
opponent, than those assigned by experimental 
practice conducted in the usual manner upon 
hulks, supposing that in all else the conditions 
are similar and equal. 

From this cursory view of the subject it will 
be perceived, that the general law of penetration 
by shot or by shells into homogeneous masses of 
white oak, and woods of similar toughness of 
fibre, is sufficiently well ascertained to supply all 
the necessary data for determining the capacity 
of different ordnance to overcome the resistance 


190 


PENETRATION. 


of such materials: but, that the effect of artil¬ 
lery on ships-of-war can scarcely be estimated 
properly from any practice yet executed; as the 
hulls employed for the purpose have been so 
dissimilar in structure and inferior in material 
to those that are to be the objects of fire in 
naval actions, as to afford no means of judging 
at what distances the heavier calibres could be 
relied on as decisive. Indeed, one might be led 
astray in this respect, even as to the 4 capacity of 
the cannon best known and commonly used,—for 
the practice on the Prince George would certainly 
lead to the belief that the 32-pdr. was capable 
of producing decisive results very much beyond 
what is well established to be its limit. 

From this lack of proper information, the most 
conflicting opinions are current among profes¬ 
sional men, and eminent authorities abroad dis¬ 
agree widely as to the fitness of certain classes 
of ordnance; some preferring the heavier calibres 
as more powerful, while others are content luith 
a lower calibre , because they deem it of sufficient 
capacity to be decisive at all practicable distances , 
and more convenient in use. 

We believe that the proper conclusion proceeds 
so plainly from the premises, as not to require 
absolute demonstration; but the fact that officers 
of great experience entertain different opinions, 
renders its full investigation indispensable. 

Each proposed advance in naval calibre has 
been the subject of serious discussion and delay. 



PENETRATION. 


191 


The 18-pdr. only gave way to the 24-pdr. after 
the events of battle had removed the doubts of 
the most sceptical—the impulse, however, was 
sufficient to carry us and others even to the long 
32-pdr. for frigates, and long 42-pdrs. for line-of- 
battle-ships. But then its influence terminated, 
and for awhile there was a tendency to reaction, 
so far, that in the heaviest ships the long 42-pdrs. 
and 36-pdrs. gave way to 32-pdrs. and 30-pdrs. 

We consider that the target practice is quite 
sufficient to decide which is the preferable gun 
in regard to accuracy and penetration; and we 
infer thence, that the gun which has these quali¬ 
ties in the highest cleg: je, is the most fit for 
naval purposes , so long as it is convenient of 
management. Also, that its superiority extends 
to greater distances, in proportion to its greater 
accuracy and penetration. 

The circumstances of action may so far dimin¬ 
ish the accuracy of fire as to make a reduction 
of distance requisite in order to ensure a result 
within a reasonable time. But other calibres 
will be affected by like causes; so that whatever 
may be the effective distance of the heavier gun, 
whether 500 yards or 2000 yards, that of the 
lower calibre will be less. 

It is of importance, therefore, to he able to 
form some idea of the distances where an effec¬ 
tive fire can be maintained, and thus to judge 
of the general value of different batteries under 
the various circumstances of wind, weather, dis- 


192 


PENETRATION. 


tance, &c., and the capacity of a ship’s company 
to give it effect. 

It would he very gratifying to be able to offer 
any material contribution to the much needed 
information in regard to penetration, but the 
means at disposal have not permitted this, be¬ 
yond the few facts that are given in the follow¬ 
ing pages. 


The target is of solid and sound white oak 
fairly seasoned. It is formed of three series of 
squared timber; the two outside layers placed 
horizontally, the middle series vertically,—each 
series measuring 10 inches through, making the 
total thickness of the target 30 inches. The 
timbers are well fastened together by treenails, 
and clamped by stout perpendicular battens at 
the ends, and in the middle, firmly bound to¬ 
gether by iron bolts, which are the only metal 
fastenings in the target. 

Its dimensions are, 30 feet long, 10 feet high, 
and 30 inches thick. 

The distance from the Battery, ascertained by 
triangulation, is 1299 yards. 

It stands in the river upon a firm foundation 
of stout logs, placed on the bottom of the stream. 



PENETRATION. 


193 


On the top of the target are four upright poles 
to spread a screen of the same size as the target. 


U. S. Navy 32-Pdr. of 57 cwt . 

Charge, 9 lbs. Shot, o2~ lbs. Elevation, 2° 35'. 

The shot took effect about 8J feet above foot 
of target, and 5| feet to the right of line of aim, 
drawn vertically on the middle of target. 

On examination, the entrance of the shot into 
the wood was indicated by a circular indentation 
nearly equal to its size, within which the surface 
was crushed, and, towards the centre, broken into 
small fragments packed so closely into the narrow 
aperture, that it required some force to introduce 
the sounding wire as far as the shot. 

The penetration was ascertained to be 21 
inches. There was no appearance on the rear 
surface that the shock of the blow had injured 
the layer of timber not penetrated by the ball, 
and the wood immediately contiguous to the 
outer orifice presented no appearance of being 
split or injured by the entrance of the shot. 


13 



194 


PENETRATION. 


U. S. Navy 8 in - of 55 cwt Charge 7 11 ’ 3, 

Service Shells , (filled with Rice to make up weight 
of Powder charge ,) 51± lbs ' Fuzes ,, 15 seconds - 

Weather clear, wind light and gradually increasing to a mode¬ 
rate breeze—direction adverse—from left at about 45° to line 
of fire. 

From flash 


No. of Round. 

Elevation. 

Range. 

1st graze. 

1 

3°40' 

Struck. 


2 

3°40' 

1285 

4.8 Passed to left of target. 

3 

3°45' 

1377 

co ( Cut off head of 2d screen pole. 20 feet 
l above oot of target and 5 feet to left. 

4 

3°42£ 

1341 

4.8 Passed to left of target. 

5 

do. 

Struck. 

— 

6 

do. 

do. 

— 


Observations at Battery during the practice. 

No. 1. No jet of water seen, nor other indica¬ 
tions of effect of shell. 

No. 2. Missed—The jet of water was seen 
close to the left of target. 

No. 3. The screen was seen to droop, but no 
perforation was perceptible, and the 
jet of water appeared behind the 
target.* 

No. 4. Missed—jet seen to left of target. 

No. 5. No jet—sound of the shell on striking 
heard distinctly,—the impression also 
visible near head of target. 

No. 6. Splashed the water slightly in front of 
target, hut did not make a decided jet. 

* The shell cut off the head of the second pole 20 feet above 
the water. 









PENETRATION. 


195 


Remarks. 

No. 1.—The shell had entered at the juncture 
of two timbers, low down at the left corner of 
the target, about two feet above the water and 
feet from the end, or 13^ feet from the line 
of aim. 

Its entrance was shown by the shattered con¬ 
dition of the surface, not exceeding in extent, 
however, the diameter of the projectile. From 
this spot issued some longitudinal fissures of one 
and two feet in length. At first, some force was 
necessary to insert the sounding wire, so as to 
feel the shell, which was not visible, the perfora¬ 
tion being packed with small fragments; but 
these became loose in a few days and many fell 
out, so that a small portion of the projectile was 
to be seen. 

On cutting out the shell, with the contiguous 
wood, it was found to have passed through the 
outer timber (10 inches) by dividing the fibres 
and violently forcing aside those which had been 
thus severed, leaving them to spring back and 
close behind it. 

It had not perforated the second layer of tim¬ 
ber, but had compressed the wood so as to make 
a bed or indent of about 3f inches in depth. 
The particular beam of this set which it struck, 
had been split with the grain to some extent in 
more than one place, and with a portion of the 


196 


PENETRATION. 


rear layer which yielded to the blow, was forced 
back, so as to be separated from the front timbers 
for about 1| inches. 

No. 5,—struck at the junction of two timbers, 
about 2| feet to left of line of aim, and 8| feet 
above water. 

Its penetration was 16^ inches, including the 
starting of the timbers by the blow, (about \ an 
inch.) 

The appearance of the orifice, and the condi¬ 
tion of the perforation, were exactly similar to 
those of No. 1. 

No. 6,—struck about \\ feet to the right of 
line of aim, and feet above the water. 

The entire penetration was 13 J inches, includ¬ 
ing the starting of the timber by the blow 
(about | of an inch.) 

The appearance of the orifice and perforation, 
resembled those of Nos. 1 and 5. 

The diminished penetration was occasioned by 
the shell having first struck an upright timber, 
belonging to the foundation and standing in 
front some two feet above lower edge of target, 
—this was shivered to pieces as far as the sur¬ 
face of the water. 

Notwithstanding the care taken to fasten the 
parts of the target firmly together, it will be per¬ 
ceived that the layers of timber were always 
separated more or less by the final effort of the 
concussion. 

As there is no doubt that the thickness of 


PENETRATION. 


197 


wood penetrated by the shell, would have been 
greater if the timbers had not yielded and sepa¬ 
rated, some increase of the actual measurement 
of perforation is proper. What this should be, 
it is difficult to say; but from other results it is 
probable, that the distance from the exterior sur¬ 
face to the bed of the shell is not far from the 
truth. The penetration of No. 6 is rejected, 
because of striking the pile in front. 


Condition of projectiles, &c. 

The shells were such as are commonly used in 
the United States Navy, and had an excentric 
mass about the fuze-hole, placed in the gun as 
usual; that is, in the plane of projection and 
upwards, about 45° from the vertical. 

No. 1 —was found with its mass in the plane 
of projection, but downwards and outwards, about 
20° from the vertical. 

No. 5—had the axis of the excentric mass 
horizontal, and directly in front. 

No. 6—had the axis of the mass horizontal, 
and directly to the rear. 

The metal fuze stocks of Nos. 1 and 6, were 
readily unscrewed; but that of No. 5 had sus¬ 
tained more pressure, and rather more on one 
side of its face than the other: wherefore, some 
force was needed with the wrench to start the 




198 


PENETRATION. 


stock at first; but once turned, there was no 
farther difficulty. 

The operation of all the apparatus appeared 
regular and satisfactory; the combustion of the 
composition was complete, as shown by the 
charred surface of the material in contact with 
it, and by other indications; leaving no doubt 
that the shell would have exploded, had it been 
charged with powder in lieu of rice. 

The severity of the test to which the fuze of 
Xo. 5 was exposed, is worthy of particular note. 
As already stated, the shell was found embedded 
in the wood, with the fuze directly to the front, 
and it must have received the full force of the 
impact. The metal stock was not, however, ma¬ 
terially disturbed by this enormous shock; the 
fibre of the wood had been forced into every 
recess and aperture on the face of the stock, 
and packed there so firmly as to resemble a solid 
mass, only removable by a sharp steel point. 
In so doing, the fibre came out in the most 
attenuated threads. The gas from the burning 
composition seems to have effected its way 
through this obstacle, for immediately around 
a small orifice in the woody mass was deposited 
a whitish residuum, (sulphate of potash.) 

There was not the least evidence that the final 
concussion of the shells had done injury to the 
substance of the target in front of, and un¬ 
pierced by them. 



Penetration in Oat Targ 




Ex p e rime ntuZ Battery. 

































































































PENETRATION. 


199 


New U. S. Nayy Shell-gun for Broadside. 

Shells , (filled with rice to maize up weight of powder 
charge ,) Concentric and Plugged—no Fuzes. 


Very light airs—water smooth. 


No. 

Range. 

Remarks. 

1 . 


Struck direct. 

2. 


Ricochetted over. 

3. 

1326 

Grazed edge of target. 

4. 

1286 

Struck on ricochet. 

5. 

1296 

Struck on ricochet. 


No. 1,—struck direct, 5 feet to the left of the 
middle line, (or line of tire,) and about 7|- feet 
above the foot of target. It pierced the first and 
second series of timber, each 10 inches thick, and 
broke asunder the rearmost timber just at the 
place of impact, forcing the right end outwards 
16 or 18 inches,—the other part, being sustained 
by the rear brace; was not moved; but its outer¬ 
most half was split off, making a large splinter, 
six feet long, which was driven at least 20 yards. 

The shell dropped down and lodged on some 
plank placed behind the target. # 

No. 2,—fell 49 yards short, and, by means of a 
glass, I saw it pass over the top of the target— 
the screen was not spread. 

No. 3,—struck direct, 5J feet above foot of 
target, grazing the right edge, so as to score 


* Upon close examination, its shape was found to be unaltered. 





200 


PENETRATION. 


the timber-encls with about half of its diameter. 
With the glass, I saw the shell and the splinters 
that flew off. The shell struck the water 27 
yards beyond the target, and bounded 70 yards 
further, when it sank. 

No. 4,—fell about 55 yards short, and rising 
from the water, struck the left side of the target 
feet from the middle line and four feet above 
the foot; it penetrated 14 inches. 

No. 5,—fell short 3 yards, and, in rising from 
the water, lodged in the right face of the target 
about 10 inches above its foot; it penetrated 16 
inches. 

The first shell struck at the junction of two 
layers, the lower of which included most of its 
diameter,—it then passed through one of the 
second series, perforating it completely and start¬ 
ing it, with an adjoining timber on each side, 
from the first series, making a separation of one 
or two inches; having descended with the course 
of the trajectory, it encountered a single rear 
timber, indenting it slightly and breaking it out 
as already described. 

The external appearance of the orifice made by 
this shell, resembled those of the 8 in - shells al¬ 
ready described; being closed by the resilient 
fibres and small closely packed fragments de¬ 
tached from them. 

The effect of ricochet, at the distance of 1200 
or 1300 yards, upon a projectile of this size, is 
exhibited upon the two subsequent shells,—the 


PENETRATION. 


201 


force of impact being thereby so much impaired, 
as to diminish the penetration one-tliird, and 
one-fifth. Hence, there was not only a greater 
unperforated thickness to resist the shock, but 
the shock itself was also lessened. 

And yet, notwithstanding these unfavorable 
circumstances, the power of the concussion was 
manifested by the transverse cracking of the 
timbers that arrested the shells, which was visible 
on their outer and farther surface directly before 
the ball. So that, while the 32-pdr. shot, with a 
higher remaining velocity, was unable to produce 
any perceptible effect on the 9 or 10 inches of 
timber in front of it, the larger shells broke 
through an equal thickness, and even when their 
velocity had been diminished by ricochet, were 
able to fracture, though not to force aside, 14 to 
16 inches of the same material. The 8 in - shells, 
however, though larger than the 32-pdr. shot, 
could not effect a like result. 

Hence it appears, that the capacity for superior 
penetration does not always represent the powers 
of different calibres,—the effects of volume and 
remaining momentum in approaching the limit 
of penetration, are to be taken into consideration. 

The breaking out of further surfaces cannot 
fail to exercise the greatest influence when naval 
structures are the objects of fire,—as the resist¬ 
ance of a much greater amount of material may 
thus be overcome, and with very disastrous 
effects to the personal. Of course the aggregate 


202 


PENETRATION. 


thicknesses of wood traversed by the ball, do not 
then express the penetrating power of the shot 
but will generally exceed it; and to this, pro¬ 
bably, is owing the anomalies already noted be¬ 
tween the results of practice upon ships and 
upon the solid wood of targets. 

The operation of the first shell embodies a rare 
illustration of the effect, which has been so often 
defined as the greatest derivable from any given 
projectile: that is, the force was just sufficient to 
take it through the substance , and was then so 
absolutely expended, that the shell rolled down 
the rear surface of the target. 

Had the target been composed of a number of 
small parts like the side of a ship, instead of 
heavy masses of solid oak, it may readily be con¬ 
ceived that the quantity of splinters dispersed in 
every direction would have been very destructive. 

When we reflect that the chief damage from 
shot to the personal of a ship, is produced by this 
splintering of the interior surfaces; that the abso¬ 
lute penetration of the ball is required to produce 
any splinters at all; and even then, that the 
quantity and size of the fragments depend so 
much on the character of the material,—we are 
naturally led to the idea of increasing the stout¬ 
ness of naval structures as far as may be com¬ 
patible with other requirements—so that the 
penetration of shot may be avoided as far as pos¬ 
sible; or when it occurs, the effects may be 
lessened by the use of the softer and less fibrous 


PENETRATION. 


203 


materials for inner lining, through which halls 
make a clean perforation without detaching many 
fragments, instead of the woods, whose tough and 
hard fibres produce the greatest amount and size 
of these destructive agents. 

The value of a stout side and suitable material, 
cannot he too highly appreciated; and, judging 
from the dimensions just referred to, the French 
ships seem to he well provided in one of these 
respects. Our own builders should not lose sight 
of the matter. 

It may be observed, in concluding this part of 
the subject, that when a shell lodges, its explo¬ 
sive effect is not independent of the penetration , 
but is determined by its extent; while on the 
contrary, if the shot remains in the wood, it is 
harmless. If the shell, however, pass through 
the object, it will do it no less damage than a 
shot, and may cause further mischief inboard by 
explosion. 




















































































































VI. 

SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


Difference in the operation of Shot and Shells—illustrated by inci¬ 
dents of battle and of experimental practice.—Introduction 
and progress of Shell-guns in the Naval service.—Discrepant 
opinions regarding the extent to which it is proper to adopt the 
shell system on ship-board.—View of the question between shot 
and shells of like weight; illustrated by a case from practice.— 
Opinions of authorities.—Shot and Shell-guns in service com¬ 
pared ; uncharged shells not to be used.—Long 32-pdr. and 
8-in. of 63 cwt *; respective accuracy, penetration and power.— 
Canon Obusier, of 22 cent -—Pivot-guns; 10-in. of 86 cwt - unsuitable. 


There is no similarity in the action which 
shot and shells are designed to exert on timber. 

The shot is to pierce and separate the wood 
by the force of penetration alone, crushing and 
rending the fibres, tearing asunder the several 
parts bolted together, and driving off splinters 
large and small with great violence from the 
further surface. 

The shell is intended to explode while lodged 
in the mass of the ship, disuniting its structure, 
and driving out more or less of the material in 
fragments. 

The perforation made in wood by shot varies 
with the nature of the wood, its thickness, mode 
of combination, the size and velocity of projec¬ 
tile, &c. 

In masses of the tough and seasoned substance 


206 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

of white oak, such as used in large ships-of-war, 
the orifice is commonly very much less than the 
shot,—for the fibres of the wood yield momen¬ 
tarily to the projectile, and spring back, leaving 
a fissure of no great size, around which the exte¬ 
rior texture of the wood appears to be bruised 
and crushed to an extent very little larger than 
the diameter of the shot,—and the comminuted 
particles of wood are found to be packed so 
firmly into the fissure that, when the shot 
lodges, its course is only to be traced by a wire 
of moderate thickness. 

The greater damage to the timber is seen on 
the furthest surface where the shot has its egress. 
This is much shattered and splintered, with fear¬ 
ful effects to the men—the dimensions of the 
fragments depending on the size and velocity of 
the shot. The effect is generally recognized to 
be greatest where the force of the shot is but 
little more than sufficient to pass through, as 
already exemplified in the course of these re¬ 
marks.* 

But if the shot does not perforate entirely, it 
is plain that it will injure neither material nor 
men. And this frequently happens, in the course 
of naval encounters, from the great diminution 
that occurs in the force of the shot and the in¬ 
creased resistance of the object; the velocity of 
the former being liable to rapid abatement from 


* See “ Penetration,” page 200. 




SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 207 


the opposition of the atmosphere, or collision 
with the water, so as to he deprived of a fourth, 
a third, or even a half of its initial velocity at 
moderate distances; while the nature of the re¬ 
sistance and its extent are much augmented by 
the oblique presentation of the surface struck. 

The operation of shot is also liable to further 
limitation, even when the ship is pierced at the 
water-line or below it; for the entrance of the 
water is so far prevented by the smallness of the 
orifice and the particles of wood which fill it, 
that full opportunity is generally afforded to 
remedy the evil and counteract the damage by 
plugging the hole. 

Considering then how many shot would be 
unable to pierce the object, or fail of full effect 
at a vital part; and that very many do not strike 
at all, it may well he supposed that a great num¬ 
ber of shot would be required to sink a large 
and well built ship-of-war, and that as a general 
rule, the surrender would oftener be effected by 
the destruction of men, masts, spars, gun-car¬ 
riages, &c. 

Certainly it is only in this way that the dura¬ 
tion of actions, and the disproportioned effect 
on ships of protracted firing with heavy cannon, 
can be explained. It is of rare occurrence that 
large frigates or line-of-battle ships have been 
sunk even in the most desperate encounters,— 
and the amount of battering which such vessels 


208 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


have endured from 18-pdrs., 24-pdrs., and even 
32-pdrs., is surprising and almost incredible. 

At Trafalgar, this remark was more than usu¬ 
ally well illustrated; because of the great number 
of ships engaged, their close approach,—for they 
frequently touched each other, — at times the 
combination of several ships upon one, and the 
smoothness of the water which, unruffled by 
wind, was only affected by a long undulating 
swell. The ship of Lord Nelson, in bearing 
down, received a few single shot at about three- 
fourths of a mile from the French line,* and, in 
leading the weather column, presented a pro¬ 
minent mark to the enemy. As she slowly 
approached at a rate not exceeding a knot and 
a half per hour, the firing increased, and when 
about 500 or 600 yards from the combined fleet, 
it is stated that 200 pieces of heavy artillery 
were playing upon her unanswered.*f* In this 
manner forty minutes elapsed between the firing 
of the first shot and the passage of the Victory 
close under the stern of the Bucentaur , at which 
instant Nelson’s battery was opened,—the first 
broadside being delivered when the ships were 
nearly touching,—and it is said to have made 
the Bucentaur heel two or three strakes.J The 


* Allen , De la Graviire , &c. 
t De la Gravi'ere. 

% Allen. The same effect is said to have been noticed when the 
Spanish ship Santa Anna fired into the Royal Sovereign.—[Life of 
Collingwood, 178.) 



SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 209 


other ships of the English line, ranging in the 
wake of their leaders, received and returned 
entire discharges of the batteries in like manner. 
In this way for three hours was the contest 
maintained; and many cases occurred where sin¬ 
gle ships were exposed for a considerable while 
to the fire of several. Thus the Btlleisle is said 
to have been assailed for at least an hour by 
three French ships, AcJiUle , Aigle and Neptune. 
The conflict was almost in the style of a general 
melee , and in it were mingled 60 of the largest 
ships in the world, engaged from one till four 
o’clock in furious strife, delivering their broad¬ 
sides at distances so short, and at marks so large, 
that very few shot ought to have missed; and 
yet, not a single ship was sunk in the action,* 
and though horribly battered, hut one went 
down in the gale that ensued about 36 hours 
afterwards. 

In the battle of 1st June, 1794, Captain Col- 
lingwood (afterwards Admiral) states in a letter 
to a friend, that “ the ship we were to engage 
44 was two a-head of the French Admiral, so that 
44 we had to go through his fire and that of two 
44 ships next him, and received all their broad- 
44 sides two or three times before we fired a gun.” 
* * 44 We got very near, and then began such a 
44 fire—” * * 44 "We left off in admirable good 


* Simmons asserts this of every battle during the whole war. 
(Page 70.) 


14 



210 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

44 plight, having sustained less loss than could be 
44 expected, considering the tire we had so long 
44 on us. We had nine men killed, and twenty- 
44 two with severe wounds, a few others slightly 
44 hurt; our masts, &c., all in their places, though 
44 much wounded.” # * — 44 and this, altogether, 
44 has been the hardest action that has been 
44 fought in our time, or perhaps ever. It did 
44 not last very severely much more than two 
44 hours,” &c* 

Another instance may be cited, in this connec¬ 
tion, that occurred a few years previously to 
the battle of Trafalgar, and the number of shot 
expended by one vessel has been stated. In 
1800, the French line-of-battle ship, Gillaume 
Tell , was attacked by the British ships, Foudroy- 
ant , 74, the Lion, 64, and Penelope frigate. The 
Foudroyant ranged up alongside about six o’clock 
in the morning, approaching the French ship so 
closely that her spare anchor just escaped catch¬ 
ing in the mizzen rigging of the Gdlaume Tell. 
The action was continued closely until 8 h - 20', 
A. M., when the Gillaume Tell struck; it is stated 
that the Foudroyant expended:— 

1200 32-pdr. shot, 

1240 24-pdr. shot, 

118 18-pdr. shot, 

200 12-pdr. shot,— 

being a total of 2758f shot tired at a very short 


* Life of Collingwood, pp. 29—31. f Charnock’s Life of Nelson. 



SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 211 


distance, besides those discharged from the bat¬ 
teries ol the Lion and the Penelope. Yet the 
Gillaume Tell was not sunk, nor so much injured 
as to be incapable of service soon afterwards in 
the British Navy.* 

In 1827, a combined Fleet of English, French, 
and Russian ships, anchored alongside a line of 
Turkish and Egyptian ships, and as a consequence 
under the circumstances , a battle ensued. Some 
of the incidents led to a court martial upon one 
of the English Captains, in the course of which, 
some evidence was given that is of interest to the 
present question. 

Captain Smith deposed that, 66 the Genoa , 74, of 
“ which ship he was 1st Lieutenant, was brought 
44 parallel and her whole starboard broadside bore 
44 on her opponent with complete effect. She 
44 did not diverge from this position for above two 
44 hours. They were close to the enemy, the 
44 whites of whose eyes they could see as plainly 
44 as he could see those of the honorable Court.” 

— 44 The Genoa continued in action with the 
44 Turk about three hours and a half; she did not 
44 diverge from the parallel position for above two 
“ hours. By the evidence before the court mar- 
44 tial, it appears that the Genoa expended 7089 Ibs> 
44 of powder, and the Albion 11092 lbs \ It is 
44 asserted that the Albion expended 52 tons of 
44 round shot; if the expenditure of the Genoa 


* Charnock’s Life of Nelson. 




212 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


* 4 was in the same proportion, she must have dis- 
“ charged more than 30 tons of round shot; 
u enough to open 65 feet of breach in the ram- 
“ parts of Badajoz, at a range of six or seven 
“ hundred yards.” (Simmons.) 

This battle, it must he remembered, was fought 
under circumstances most favorable to delibera¬ 
tion, accuracy, and effect—the combined fleet 
was permitted undisturbed to take its position 
close to the Turkish line; the water was smooth, 
and the ships were anchored, so that there was 
ample time and opportunity for preparation; the 
men at the guns were undisturbed by manoeuvres 
of any kind; the distance within point blank, 
and the marks large;—the practice of an experi¬ 
mental battery should not have been better; and 
yet, by the quotations of Captain Simmons from 
the evidence given before a court martial, it is 
obvious that the operation of the shot was as 
usual only made decisive by the use of an im¬ 
mense number of them. Captain Simmons says, 
“the Genoa must have discharged- 30 tons of 
u iron,” which would make at least 2000 shot, if 
they are assumed to average 32 lbs ‘. 

The prime purpose of the shell, as already 
stated, is to lodge and explode in the object, 
such as the side or contiguous material of the 
ship,—the lower masts,—or in the magazine, 
shell-room, or steam machinery. 

The structure of vessels is known to be far 
more seriously damaged in this way than by the 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 213 


penetration of shot; for instead of the imperfect 
and nearly closed orifice of the shot, a large 
quantity of timber is blown out from the sur¬ 
face, or if the shell is of considerable size, and 
its lodgment fairly effected in the side, it may 
blow the side through and produce a breach in 
it of some size. 

The following cases of such effect are cited 
from the well-known experiments executed in 
France some 30 years since, by order of the 
French government, in order to test the alleged 
effects of the shell system of General Paixhans. 
They afford a fair idea of the consequences 
produced by shells properly embedded in a 
ship’s side. 

The practice was made on the Pacificateur , 
an old 80 gun ship, in the presence of a num¬ 
ber of intelligent naval officers and savans:— 

— 44 With the charges of 4| lb % and at the 
46 same distance (640 yards) a shell lodged in 
44 the side between two ports and burst there, 
44 tearing asunder the frames, the outer and 
44 inner planking, and making a breach several 
44 feet in height and width, so shattered, that 
44 those present all thought the injury would 
44 have endangered the vessel had it occurred 
44 near the water-line.” 

(54)~ 44 At 850 yards,” the proces verbal says, 
44 a shell struck the ship about 3 feet above the 
44 water and its explosion forced out a plank 
44 end, making an opening nearly three feet 


214 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

44 square. Moreover, two strakes of plank below 
44 this hole and one strake above it, were, for 
44 20 feet, started and separated from the frame 
44 more than 5 inches at the place of explosion, 
44 and more than 2 inches near the scarfs,—a 
44 like injury at the water-line would have caused 
44 the instant sinking of the ship.”-— 

— 44 At 1280 yards, a shell entered the side 
44 and burst there, breaking two of the ship’s 
44 frames, the clamps, two outer and two inner 
* 4 planks, leaving a large hole of more than two 
44 superficial feet.—The knee of the nearest beam 
44 was broken into three pieces, one of which 
44 was thrown to the middle of the ship.”— 

(55)— 44 A bomb fired at 1070 yards, after 
44 striking the water, lodged in the hull between 
44 two of the lower deck ports; its explosion 
44 drove out an entire plank from port to port, 
44 two-thirds of a second, started a third plank 
k * along its whole length and broke part of a 
44 perfectly sound frame; taking effect also with- 
44 in, it displaced three ends of inner planks, and 
44 the gun-bolts and rings of the next port.”— 
These represent the greatest effect upon a 
ship which a shell can exert by its explosion, 
having been so embedded as to encounter a 
resistance nearly equal on all sides; wherefore, 
the explosion acting in every direction drove 
out the timber laterally and inwardly as well 
as outwardly, so as to breach the side entirely 
through. 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 215 


But we must be careful not to fall into the 
grievous error of supposing, that these examples 
illustrate the ordinary operation of shells—far 
from it:—they are instances of maximum or pos- 
sible eflect, even in the course of well conducted 
experiments, and are to be expected only in the 
ratio due to a given number of shells tired under 
like circumstances. It is by the ‘presentation of 
similar occasional results , instead of the general 
effect, that the value of particular projects is ex¬ 
aggerated far beyond their proper standard ', and- 
a fictitious reputation acquired which melts away 
before the severe tests of actual service, to the 
disappointment of all who have been thus de¬ 
luded. 

The advantages of shells over shot, where 
ships are concerned, is sufficiently great to need 
no more than a fair statement. 

In proportion as the shell fails to imbed itself 
where its action will be greatest upon the ma¬ 
terial it enters, so will the effect be diminished. 
For the explosion then takes the direction where 
the resistance is least, which, if the penetration 
is less than it should be, will always be found 
towards the orifice made by the passage of the 
shell, forming a kind of crater, the bottom of 
which is the bed of the shell. An instance of 
an explosion of this kind is noted at page 226, as 
having occurred in the practice at the Experi¬ 
mental Battery; the penetration was not quite 
sufficient to permit the shell to breach the target 


216 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


through, but as the content of powder was larger, 
it was adequate to a decisive effect, if the object 
had been a ship; for the whole structure was 
violently shaken, and the rear timbers, not blown 
off, were forced asunder several inches, so as to 
open fair passage to the water. 

As the penetration decreases, the explosive 
action of the shell is still farther diminished, 
so that when it merely enters no farther than 
necessary to its remaining in the wood, the 
effect must be superficial. Hence, the explo¬ 
sive poicer of projectiles is not independent of 
their penetration. The liability to diminished 
penetration increases necessarily with the dis¬ 
tance or with other circumstances that may be 
unfavorable to the impact,—even when the force 
would otherwise be sufficient,—such as the obli¬ 
quity of the surface struck, &c. 

Again, if the shell pass entirely through the 
nearest side of the ship, it will operate upon 
it precisely as a shot would. The explosion 
may then occur subsequently after lodgment in 
the opposite side, in which case the action will 
be according to the penetration as already de¬ 
scribed, breaching the side or merely blowing 
inward; or the explosion may take place in the 
open quarters of the ship among the men,— 
or, even more disastrously, below amidst the 
steam machinery, or magazines. Liability to 
such consequences will of course occur at the 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 217 


shorter distances, when the velocity of the shell 
has not been materially reduced. 

But the common apprehension in regard to 
the utter failure of the explosive effect, by 
reason of perforating both sides before the fuze 
can act, appears to be more imaginary than 
real, especially when the huge masses of heavy 
ships are the object of fire. 


The earlier practice rather contemplated the 
association of the shell with the shot in de¬ 
veloping the power of Naval Batteries; and 
it was natural that the agency of a well tried 
means of offense, should not yield too readily 
to an innovation which, however promising in 
the hands of the experimenter, had not yet 
been subjected to the sure test of battle. 

But it is now 30 years since shells have 
been admitted on shipboard as part of the 
established naval armament. 

In discussing this question it may be premised, 
that all reasoning necessarily falls short of abso¬ 
lute demonstration, from the want of sufficient 
data. It has also been much complicated by 
existing circumstances,—for most nations have 
felt the necessity of turning to some account the 
enormous stock of ordnance and ordnance stores 
which have accumulated from time to time, and 
thus lessening measurably the immense expense 



218 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

entailed by changes of any description. This 
consideration must always exert a great influ¬ 
ence where the quantity of cannon in service is 
very large, because the expense of changes is 
then exceedingly burdensome. Thus when it 
was decided to reorganize the British naval 
armament, in 1839, it was stated in evidence 
to a committee of the House of Commons, that, 
as a consequence of this measure, 11,413 cannon 
and carronades were rendered obsolete; to sup¬ 
ply the place of which, only in part, an expen¬ 
diture of more than one million of dollars had 
been incurred.* 

It is preferable, however, to divest the subject 
of this and all other extraneous elements arising 
out of the nature of existing armaments or cali¬ 
bres ; inasmuch as they have been predetermined 
by considerations entirely foreign to the present 
inquiry, and must therefore lead to conclusions 
more or less erroneous. 

In 1824, the ability and perseverance with 
which Colonel Paixhans had, through a series 
of years, devoted himself to systematizing and 
improving the Nouvelle Arme , was rewarded by 
witnessing its introduction into the French navy 
at the recommendation of a board of officers 
appointed by the government. 

This measure did not fail to attract the at¬ 
tention of the British government to the subject, 


* £239,000. 



SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


219 


and extensive trials were made to test the new 
weapon and its most advisable adaptation to sea- 
service. Shell-guns were soon found in many or 
most of their ships. 

In 1837, the French, by general regulation, 
established the shell-gun as an element of all 
naval batteries, and, in 1839, the English go¬ 
vernment did likewise. 

The one being a consequence of the other, 
as since admitted in official documents—a re¬ 
port of a committee to Parliament, in 1849, 
says:—“Your committee inquired into the cir- 
“ cumstances which led to the adoption of this 
“ new arrangement, and they have been informed 
“ that the change was not introduced into the 
“ British service until it had been adopted by 
“ foreign powers ,” dec. dec. 

In 1848, a new order added largely to the 
proportion of shell-guns in the French service, 
and it found its corresponding movement in the 
rival navy,—not, in this instance, by a similar 
regulation, but by special orders of the Admiralty 
given from time to time for one ship or another; 
so that, in 1849, as many as 76 ships had been 
or were to be (according to official documents*) 
armed with an increased number of shell-guns. 
Some vessels had an entire tier of them ( Prince 
Regent , 92, &c.); in others they constituted the 
predominating force ( Eurotas , Bargains, Ajax , 


* See “ Composition of Batteries .” 



220 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


Emerald , &c.) The extent of these exceptional 
cases will be appreciated from the fact, that the 
seventy-six ships alluded to, carry 3995 cannon, 
of which 1235 are pivot and shell-guns; while 
the whole navy of the United States, building 
and built, would number only about 2000 cannon. 

In 1841 a small number of 8-in, of 63 cwt were 
introduced into the U. S. Navy, and in 1845, 
when the armament of the service underwent 
an entire change by the introduction of the 
32-pdr. unit calibre, the number of shell-guns 
was increased, and a lighter class of 8-in. shell- 
guns (of 55 cwfc ) adopted for the spar-decks of 
Frigates and second class Sloops-of-war. 

In 1853, the light shell-guns were removed 
from all spar-decks of Frigates and Ships-of-the- 
line, in lieu of which every gun-deck battery 
was ordered to receive an entire division of ten 
shell-guns (8-in. of 63 cwt ). 

It will be perceived from this brief statement 
that, since the introduction of shell-guns, their 
number afloat has gone on steadily increasing; 
the early prejudice of the majority has yielded 
gradually to a better acquaintance with the pro¬ 
jectile,—the apprehensions of danger to those 
making a common use of them, have failed to 
be realized,—ships, men, and officers are as safe 
from terrible catastrophes as they have ever 
been,—common consent and practice admits the 
great power of the new weapon, and a vessel 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 221 

is not deemed to be completely armed which is 
without some shell-guns in her battery. 

But it is evident from the practice of the prin¬ 
cipal navies, that while the necessity of shells is 
admitted, great variety of opinion exists as to 
the extent to which it is proper or expedient 
to rely on pieces designed solely for the use of 
such projectiles. So discrepant indeed is the 
manner of infusing the new element into naval 
armaments, that it cannot fail to create a very 
natural impression, that some err in exceeding, 
or that others err in falling short of the proper 
mark. 

There must be a limit to the number of shell- 
guns in a ship’s battery, if shells are only suited 
to particular exigencies. If, on the other hand, 
they are generally useful for all purposes legiti¬ 
mately naval, then is the number of shell-guns 
too few, the policy erroneous, that would re¬ 
strict the development of this weapon to the 
performance of a subordinate part. 

This, indisputably, constitutes the most im¬ 
portant question of the day in relation to marine 
ordnance; and upon no navy is this inquiry, and 
a correct decision, more pressingly enjoined than 
our own. For it is only by a precise adaptation 
of all parts, and by special excellence, that the 
navy of the United States can compensate in 
anywise for the great disproportion of its num¬ 
bers to the end for which it was created, and 


222 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


has been maintained. The overwhelming fleets 
which such navies as those of England and 
France can put forth, will always suffice to 
avoid the evils due the weakness of individual 
ships. The navy of the United States, if not 
superior in numbers, must needs be superior in 
all else. 


Having already attempted to convey some 
idea of the generic difference between the ac¬ 
tion of shot and shells, it is well to ascertain 
as far as practicable, the relative value of the 
effect of each under like circumstances, by such 
a statement of the chief points as can be derived 
from the data at disposal. 

Supposing, then, that a piece of ordnance is 
to be constructed from a given quantity of iron 
capable of discharging a projectile of a certain 
weight, the question is to determine whether 
the projectile shall be a solid shot, or a shell. 

For the sake of illustration, let the weight of 
projectile he assumed as 51 lbs.,—the diameter, if 
a shot, would be 7 in \24,—if a shell, 7 in \85,—let 
the initial velocities due to the charge adapted 
to weight of gun, be about 1475 feet, and the 
quantity of powder contained by the shell = 2 lbs. 

The values of the shot and of the shell are to 
be decided by the respective accuracy and power 
at equal distances . 



SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 223 


Accuracy. 

The shot ancl the shell have equal weights and 
equal initial velocities—therefore equal capacity 
to overcome the resistance of the air; but the 
shell presents a greater surface to this resistance 
—therefore its velocity is impeded in a greater 
degree, and more elevation is necessary in order 
to have the shell attain the same object as the 
solid shot of like weight. The curve of the 
trajectory is increased proportionally with the 
elevation, and the angle at which a hall reaches 
the side of a ship or other vertical object, being 
also greater or less according to the elevation, 
the probabilities of striking the given surface 
are diminished with the greater inflection of 
the trajectory. 

On this account then, the 51 lbs. shell is infe¬ 
rior to the 51 lbs. shot in accuracy, as it requires 
a greater elevation to attain a given object. 

The disturbing influences of the atmosphere 
are also exerted with more effect upon the pro¬ 
jectile of an inferior density, so that its irregu¬ 
larities of motion are much increased; and here 
is another source of inferior precision on the 
part of the shell. 

Hence, the lack of density operates as a two¬ 
fold cause in rendering the accuracy of a shell 
inferior to that of a shot, the weight and initial 
velocity of the two being equal. 


224 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


Power. 

This term is here intended to mean the col¬ 
lective results produced by:— 

— The depth to which the projectile enters 
into the substance,— 

— The superficial dimension of the orifice,— 

— The extent beyond it to which the wood 
is rent, shattered, and splintered,— 

— And the effect of the shock upon the re¬ 
maining material by which its progress is finally 
arrested. 

The penetration of the shell is necessarily less 
than that of the shot, because it arrives at the 
object With an inferior velocity and momentum, 
—it also encounters greater resistance from the 
wood in the ratio of its greater surface. 

Using the formulas already cited at pages 176 
-177 to determine the effect of resistance expe¬ 
rienced by the projectiles, and their penetration 
in a mass of sound white oak, we shall have:— 




At 500 yards. 

1000 yards. 

1500 yards. 

2000 yards. 


Initial 










teloc’y. 

Veloc. 

Pene. 

Veloc. 

Pene. 

Veloc. 

Pene. 

Veloc. 

Pene. 


Feet. 

Feet. 

Ins. 

Feet. 

Ins. 

Feet. 

Ins. 

Feet. 

Ins. 

51 lbs, shot,.) 


1173 

41.1 

940 

29.9 

767 

21.7 

634 

15 8 

1500 









51 lbs. shell,.... ) 


1130 

33.2 

879 

23.0 

699 

15.9 

565 

11.0 


The dimensions of orifice made by the shell 
and shot, are 48 and 41 square inches respec- 




























SnOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 225 

tively, giving the former the advantage of super¬ 
ficial limits. 

Next for consideration is, “ The extent beyond 
“ the orifice to which the wood is rent, shattered, 
“ and splintered,” by the action of each projectile. 

This, it will be perceived, from the very nature 
of the circumstances, cannot be reached with 
exactness, even when a solid mass of wood is the 
object of practice. 

Still, the difference of effect due to impact and 
explosion, is sufficiently marked to enable one to 
form a tolerably correct idea of the consequences 
that may be expected to result from their employ¬ 
ment against ships or other massive wooden 
structures. 

An attempt has already been made to describe 
these effects, aided by the citations from the 
printed report of the first practice, ordered in 
1824 by the French government, upon an old 
. line-of-battle ship at the instance of Colonel Paix- 
hans. It would have been very desirable to assist 
the judgment further, by detailed statements in 
regard to the shot fired simultaneously with these 
shells, and by sketches illustrating the appear¬ 
ance of the holes and rents made upon the sides 
and masts of the ship, both by shot and shells: 
but the Commission seem to have considered the 
question so fully settled by what was seen and 
stated in regard to the effects of the new iceapon , 
as to abstain from saying more of the shot than, 

as their “ effects are known and their inferiority 

15 


226 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


u was evident, only three shot of 36 were 
“ fired.”—(41) 

—“ As to the effect of ordinary solid shot, it 
“ was not thought necessary to submit them again 
“ to a comparison with shells and bombs.” (56) 

In the absence of this information, which 
would have been of the highest interest, the fol¬ 
lowing instance from the practice on a solid 
target, (Experimental Department at Washing¬ 
ton) may he used to exemplify the effects of 
impact and explosion by projectiles of like 
weight. 

It is not strictly a case in point, for the projec¬ 
tiles used were larger than those assumed in the 
present statement; and though this circumstance 
might not influence the relation existing between 
the modes of action produced by shot and shells 
of like weights, there were other differences 
which would have that effect, though in no ma¬ 
terial degree and not difficult of estimation. 

While firing IX inch shells at a steamer moored 
about 550 yards distant, one of them passed 
through the very light upper works of the vessel 
and, bounding several times on the water, lodged 
in the target (white oak, 30 inches thick) distant 
1300 yards; the explosion followed almost in¬ 
stantly,—On examination, the shell appeared to 
have entered about 20 inches into sound wood 
on the extreme right, and the explosion, radia¬ 
ting from its bed, which was very distinctly indi¬ 
cated, forced out and broke off three outer tim- 







Explosion of a heavy Sliell in Oak Target. 

Sept.1852 . 


Front View 



Fold View 



Rxjttnmental BtiUety, I'S.Xarv 


D.McClelland. Sc. irashT&.C. 


















































































































































































































































shot and shells compared. 


227 


hers 12 ins - by l()’ ns - square, and shattered the 
middle timbers laterally,—in all, about twenty- 
seven cubic feet of sound wood were displaced. 
The thickness of wood impenetrated by the shell, 
was about ten inches through; this, though not 
rent or broken, was forced forward with the 
timber above and below, so as to leave a space of 
some inches between these timbers and the 
others. 

A shell of like calibre, but unloaded, was tired 
at the same target; it penetrated the timber 
about 20 inches, and breaking asunder the re¬ 
maining wood, passed entirely through the target, 
throwing off to the distance of 20 yards a 
splinter 6 feet long and 6 inches thick. 

The annexed sketch, made on the spot, exhi¬ 
bits the effect of the explosion—that of the per¬ 
foration has already been given at page 199. 

It will be remarked, that the force of the im¬ 
pact would have been greater if the iron in the 
unloaded shell had been made into a solid shot; 
as its reduced volume would then have met with 
less resistance in traversing any medium. But 
nothing was lost to the effect of the projectile on 
this account; because it had force enough to pro¬ 
duce the maximum effect which it was capable 
of by impact alone : that is, it had sufficient mo¬ 
mentum to make its way through the target and 
no more. If it had had the greater penetrative 
power due to its weight in a solid sphere, its 
division of the wood by perforation would have 



228 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

been increased, and the remaining thickness 
broken through by the shock, decreased; hence 
the shattering and splintering on the further sur¬ 
face where the ball passed out, would have been 
much less than it was. 

On the other hand, the effect of the explosion 
is represented to be less than it ought to have 
been,—because the penetration of the shell was 
diminished by passing through the light bul¬ 
warks and hatch-coamings of the steamer, as well 
as by striking the water on ricochet; therefore 
the explosive effort was more powerfully resisted 
by the greater remaining thickness of wood un¬ 
perforated, and its capacity lessened to blow 
through in that direction. 

It will also be remarked, that the shell struck 
close to the end of the target, which was there¬ 
fore the centre of explosion, and there remained 
to it but one direction where its effect could be 
manifested,—to the right, the effort was ex¬ 
pended on the air. Had the shell struck the 
middle of the target, so that the explosion might 
have operated each way on the timber, the quan¬ 
tity of wood shattered and blown off, would have 
been very much greater than it was. 

Wherefore, as the effect of the impact is here 
exhibited at its maximum, while that of the ex¬ 
plosion was diminished by accident, and, is conse¬ 
quently inadequately represented, it cannot be 
objected to the use of this case that its results 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


229 


exaggerate the relative 'power of the shell when 
compared with that of a shot of like weight. 

Recapitulating the several points noted, it ap¬ 
pears, in regard to shot and shells of like 
weight, that:— 

The shot has greater precision, which is an 
admitted advantage,— 

The shot has also greater penetration,—hut 
the shell does not require this property to the 
same extent as the shot, because the latter must 
always perforate the side entirely to operate with 
effect,—while the action of the shell will be ma¬ 
terially lessened in its explosive power, if it does 
pass through instead of lodging. 

Hence, it may be assumed that the penetra¬ 
tion of the shell is adequate to its special pur¬ 
pose at any distance where shot of like weight 
are effective; that is, if the shot pass entirely 
through, the shell may do so likewise, and ex¬ 
plode inboard: or it may lodge and work great 
destruction to the side. It has the farther advan¬ 
tage of acting in a greater or less degree at dis¬ 
tances where the shot is incapable of passing 
through the side, and consequently remains there 
harmless. 

Thus a shot of 51 lb8- with an initial velocity of 
about 1500 feet, might he expected to perforate 
a mass of white oak 30 inches thick, at a thou¬ 
sand yards 29 inches, and by its shock, to break 
through the slight remaining thickness of timber, 


230 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


splintering the surface where it passes out and 
driving the fragments before it. 

The 51 !l,s - shell would enter about 23 inches, or 
three of its own diameters, having in front of it 
a remaining thickness of wood equal to one of its 
own diameters. The explosion of the charge, 
2 b % would necessarily act with great effect, 
whether it breached through front and rear, or 
only towards the rear,—and must shatter and dis¬ 
place much wood on the outer surface, so as to 
make a very troublesome and, if near the water¬ 
line, dangerous opening. When the distance is 
less, so that the shell passes through the side, 
then the office of the shot is accomplished by it, 
with the additional advantage of exploding the 
shell inboard, or in the opposite side of the ship. 

But when the shot failed to perforate the side 
by reason of diminished force, caused by greater 
distance or by ricochetting, or on account of ob¬ 
lique impact, the shell, though effected in its 
penetration by similar causes, would still exert 
considerable effect in exploding. 

The shot, therefore, derives no advantage from 
its greater penetration, except when it passes 
through, and when the shell neither perforates 
nor explodes. 

The gist of the question then, between the 
solid shot and the charged shell, of like weights, 
rests mainly on the superior accuracy of the one, 
and the superior power of the other. 

If there he any difficulty in striking a given 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 231 


object, the shot will do so oftener than the shell; 
if not, the shot will cluster more closely about 
any desired spot. On the other hand, the power 
exerted by a single exploding shell is infinitely 
more destructive than that of many shot. 

The few historical facts already cited, are 
directly corroborative of the results of experi¬ 
ment and reasoning, in regard to the effects 
of solid shot upon massive wooden structures. 
Almost any naval action will furnish further 
evidence; showing incontestably, that ships are 
capable of successfully resisting for hours the 
continued fire of the heaviest navy cannon, 
delivered at the shortest distances. And, be¬ 
yond these distances but little decisive results 
have been obtained, or indeed anticipated: so 
that the custom of naval commanders who 
sought battle, has been to close without delay, 
frequently reserving their fire until in the de¬ 
sired position: while the avoidance of near 
action has never failed to be imputed, and con¬ 
sidered as evincing an intention to evade an 
engagement, and firing at long range has proved 
to be an useless expenditure of ammunition. 

The solution of what common experience has 
so fully taught, is found in observing the facts 
derived from experiment; where we see that 
the splinters from the inside may disable men 
and equipments, but that outside, the damage 
to the vessel is little more than contused per¬ 
forations closely filled with the shattered fibres, 


232 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


so that no inconvenience results to the hull 
except when the hole is near the water-line, 
and then a good plug will keep out most of the 
water, and the pumps throw off that which 
filters in. Hence, it is only by the continued 
repetition of shot after shot, that a ship-of-war 
is overcome, and principally through the des¬ 
truction, partial or entire, of her means of offense 
and manoeuvre,—men, guns, masts, yards, &c.; 
while the general duration of a sea-fight shows, 
that this is not readily accomplished in a short 
time. 

The action of shells is widely different. Some 
may fail to strike, some to explode; others may 
pass through and explode inside; but when lodg¬ 
ment and explosion does occur, the consequences 
are as destructive as if a number of shot were to 
strike at once about the same spot. Perhaps 
even more so,—a large portion of the side is 
destroyed and all of the appliances within reach 
more or less damaged; the breach is irreparable 
at the time, and, if at the water-line, can hardly 
do less than terminate further defense. 

Of course it is essential that this result should 
constitute the general rule of action with the 
shell, and not the exception, which will depend 
mainly on the fuze; and we think it may be 
reasonably expected that this important detail, 
when well made and carefully preserved on 
shipboard, will not often fail to perform its 
part. 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 233 


If the reader should be inclined to think that 
the case here presented overrates the value of 
the new arm , let him turn to writers of acknow¬ 
ledged authority, and he will chance on such 
expressions as the following:— 

Captain Simmons on Heavy Ordnance. 

84, 85.— 44 There is no attainable range where 
“ the effects of loaded shells will not prove 
44 highly important, if ably and judiciously em- 
44 ployed. A shell, deriving its destructive force 
44 from its explosion, is most efficient when pene- 
44 trating to that depth in the side of a ship, at 
44 which solid shot would absolutely he ineffec- 
44 tive.” 

91.— 44 The immense results which must arise 
44 from the use of shells, can with difficulty be 
44 imagined by those who have not witnessed their 
44 effect. On shore, the bursting of a shell is im- 
44 posing, but on board ship it must be infinitely 
44 more formidable.” 

110.— 44 Loaded shells are the most formidable 
44 projectiles which can be opposed to ships-of- 
44 war.” 


Sir Hoiocird Douglas. 

252.— 44 These are portentous proofs of the 
44 terrific effects, physical and moral, produced on 
44 a ship by the explosions of shells at rest within 
44 her, even though not imbedded in the mass of 
44 her sides or body; and the like effects must be 



234 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

“ expected to ensue, should an enemy’s shell be 
“ planted or lodged in the ship before the explo- 
“ sion takes place.” 

253.—“ It is this faculty of shells, by which 
“ they act as mines, that renders them most des- 
“ tractive to ships. In the experiments carried 
“on at Brest during the years 1821 and 1824, 
“at Portsmouth in 1838, and at Woolwich in 
“ 1850, the terrific effects of shell-firing on and 
“ in a ship, when the shells, having penetrated 
“ sufficiently into the timbers to lodge and ex- 
“plode there, took full effect, were strikingly 
“ exemplified.”—(See note.) 

Captain Sir T. Hastings being one of the three 
members of the British Ordnance Board, made 
use of the following most emphatic language to a 
Parliamentary commission convened for the pur¬ 
pose of inquiry into the state of the Navy. 

Alluding to information received concerning 
the adoption of shells in other Navies, and the 
necessity imposed of following the example, he 
says:— 

“ If our fleet had been brought into contact 
“ with that of the French or the Americans so 
“ armed, it is perfectly clear that we should have 
“ had no chance whatever against such an arma- 
“ rnent.”—(5000.) 


It will be perceived that, strictly speaking, the 
foregoing remarks only apply to the question as 




SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 235 


stated in the form supposed to be preferable for 
solution; that is, whether, with a given weight , 
the projectile should he a shot or a shell , and the 
gun constructed accordingly. This, however, is 
not the shape in which the problem is presented 
under the existing state of things; for the 
weights of shell-guns actually in use, seldom cor¬ 
respond with those of shot-guns, and it may he 
of interest to inquire how such differences qualify 
the relative value of the two projectiles as it 
appears in the case just assumed. 

For the gradual encroachment which the shell- 
gun has effected upon the regular establishment 
of shot-guns, and which has converted it from an 
unimportant auxiliary to a very commanding 
element of the whole battery, has excited the 
attention of Naval officers, and some diversity of 
opinion may naturally exist among them regard¬ 
ing the extent to which the shell system should 
be carried. The most eminent writers on ord¬ 
nance have also discussed the question at length; 
their opinions are necessarily of great interest, 
and as they are generally adverse to any very 
considerable extension of the shell system on 
shipboard, even as actually practised, it will be 
well to glance at their objections and examine 
briefly the reasons given therefor. 

That well-known authority, Sir Howard Dou¬ 
glas, thus states the proposition:— 

“ It is now intended to make a comparison be- 
“ tween the shell-guns and the solid shot-guns, 


236 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

44 which are at present employed in the Naval 
44 service of this country * in order to ascertain 
44 whether or not the shell-guns do really possess 
44 such qualities with respect to extent of range, 
44 accuracy of fire and penetrating force, as to 
44 warrant their application as the pivot guns of 
44 steamers: which assuredly should, with equal 
44 or inferior weight, possess those qualities in 
44 the highest degree. It is proposed at the 
44 same time to ascertain whether or not shell- 
44 guns are better adapted than others for the 
44 broadside batteries of ships, in which situations, 
44 rapid firing and extensive perforations are the 
44 essential condition of their action.” 

The comparison to he instituted is limited by 
Sir Howard Douglas to the Ordnance of the 
British Navy, but the question has an interest 
for ourselves of much wider scope, and its con¬ 
sideration will therefore be extended by includ¬ 
ing the principal broadside guns of the chief 
maritime nations. 

In pursuing the comparison, Sir Howard Dou¬ 
glas assumes the employment of hollow shot to a 
great extent in the shell-guns,—it is therefore 
proper to premise, that the present argument will 
proceed solely with reference to the use of shells 
in shell-guns,— hollow shot , never. It is indeed 
difficult to comprehend what possible purpose is 
to he effected by the adoption of hollow shot, if 
the cavity is not filled with powder so as to ob¬ 
tain the advantage of explosion. 



SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 237 


The hollow shot can act only by impact like 
the solid shot, and its efforts must of course be 
inferior whenever accuracy and penetration are 
important, because of its inferior weight rela¬ 
tively to its volume. Why then submit to the 
manifold inconveniences of an additional calibre, 
unwelcome at any time, but particularly so when 
the long sought unity had just been accom¬ 
plished, if it were not that this, and the abate¬ 
ment of power in the projectile itself, were to be 
compensated by some other quality 1 Without 
such object , the shell-guns were worse than use¬ 
less. The substitution of explosion for impact 
by employing loaded projectiles, is the end and 
object for which this new ordnance was created, 
and to fail in so applying it seems most incom¬ 
prehensible. 

It is not credible, indeed, that so palpable an 
incongruity would be tolerated in service; hut as 
it has been allowed by eminent authorities to enter 
as an element into the discussion of the relative 
merits of shot and shell-guns, and most materi¬ 
ally to influence the general conclusions, it seems 
requisite to premise the present argument with a 
distinct protest against any such absurdity. 

Simmons, in his able essay on Heavy Ord¬ 
nance, has fully set forth in detail and established 
the worthlessness of hollow shot. 

It is to he understood, therefore, that hollow 
shot, or rather uncharged shells, have no place in 
the following argument; plainly because the 


238 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


shell-gun is introduced specially to give applica¬ 
tion to explosive projectiles, and not to hollow 
shot, which is indeed nothing hut an emasculated 
shell, stripped of its peculiar power.* 

1st. Are shell-guns better adapted than shot¬ 
guns for the broadside batteries of ships, in 
which situations, rapid firing and extensive per¬ 
forations are the essential condition of their 
action % 

Keeping in view that the ordnance actually 
in use is here referred to, let us note that, by 
the established regulations of the United States 
and England, the broadsides of all gun-decks 
are armed with long 32-pdrs. and 8-inch shell- 
guns. The French use the long 30-pdr., and 
the Canon Obusier of 22 cent - for the same pur¬ 
pose. The capacities of these pieces of ordnance 
may be derived from the following elements:— 

Long 32-Pdrs. 

Weight. Bore. Shot. 

Gun. Chge. Shot. Length. Diam. Diam. Windge. 

United States 32-pdr. 57 cwt * 9^. 32$ 107.9 6.40 6.250 0.150 

British . . . 32-pdr. 56 “ 10 “ 31$ “ 107.2 6.41 6.235 0.175 

French . . . 30-pdr. 59f“ 10f“ 33f “ 104.0 6.486 6.285 0.201 


* To these remarks I may add, that the Regulations of 
the U. S. Navy no longer recognise the use of hollow shot; a por¬ 
tion of the shells are sent on ship-board bouclied only, and not 
strapped nor fuzed,—but this is because the arrangements of 
ships built before shells were introduced, are only sufficient to 
receive a portion of the shells in boxes; and the remainder are 
stowed in bulk and fitted, when required, to supply the current 
expenditure of the ship. 




SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 239 


The 30-pdr. lias tlie advantage over the 
32-pdrs., in weight of charge, and in size and 
weight of shot; but its bore is somewhat shorter, 
and the strength of French powder considerably 
less than the English or American. The United 
States gun is nearly identical with the British, 
the shot larger and heavier, the charge less, and 
the powder rather more active. But on the 
whole, there are probably no material differ¬ 
ences in the ordnance power of the pieces; cer¬ 
tainly none that are not readily removable, by 
equalizing the weights of charge and shot,—all 
of them having capabilities of endurance about 
similar, and for all practical purposes , they may 
be considered of equal poiver. 

The dimensions, &c., of the 8-inch shell-guns 


are:— 

Weight 


Bore. 


Shell. 


Gun. Chgr. 

Shell Ld. 

Length. 

Diam. 

Diam. 

in* 

W indge. 

Chge. 

United States, 9 lbs - 

51 lbs - 

loop 

n. g. in. 

7.85 

in -.15 

2 ms. 

England, . . 65 “ 10 

51* 

105J 

8.05 

7.925 

.125 

— 

France, ... 71 “ 7J 

611* 

104 

S.794 

8.674 

.12 

41 


The data furnished by practice with U. S. 
cannon will be made use of, because we are 
possessed of more certain information in re¬ 
gard to their operation. If any differences in 
this respect do exist between the 32-pdrs. and 
30-pdrs., or British and U. S. shell-guns here 
named, they are due, not to differences in the 


* If completely filled with powder. 



240 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


real capacities of tlie several pieces, but to diver¬ 
sities of opinion and practice as to the prefer¬ 
able manner of developing their best qualities. 


Range. 

The ranges of the United States long 32-pdr. 
and 8-inch shell-gun compare thus; their height 
above the water being nine feet:— 

2° 3° 4° 5° 

8-in. Shell-gun,... 970 1260 1540 1770 

32-pdr. 1170 1510 1750 1940 

So that to attain the same distances as the 
32-pdr., it will be necessary to give a greater 
elevation to the 8-in. of 63 cwt . Wherefore, with 
like elevations, the range of the 32-pdr. is greater 
than that of the 8-in. shell-gun, and would con¬ 
sequently be deemed the more accurate piece. 
We shall presently see, however, that this con¬ 
clusion would be erroneous, and that, advan¬ 
tageous as directness of flight undeniably is, it 
is not the only element necessary to precision 
in gun practice. 




SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 241 


Accuracy. 

It has no doubt been recognised that the 
51 lbs. shell used for the purpose of illustration 
in comparing shot and shells of equal weight, 
is the 8-in. shell of the U. S. Navy. 

In that comparison it was distinctly admitted 
that the 51 lbs. shell should be inferior to the 
51 lbs. shot in accuracy, but no opportunity pre¬ 
sented for making actual trials of the extent to 
which this deficiency existed. 

Satisfactory evidence in regard to accuracy is 
not wanting in the present case, as the long 
32-pdr. has been compared with the 8-in. shell- 
gun, under circumstances most favorable to a 
fair estimate of the relative precision of the two 
pieces. The utmost care was observed to have 
every detail of the practice as rigorously exact 
as possible. Each round was fired with smooth 
and spherical projectiles, selected by gauges dif¬ 
fering not more than one-hundredth of an inch, 
more or less, from the true diameter, and free 
from any important variations in weight, the 
shot having, unavoidably, the advantage in this 
respect. 

The guns were elevated by the quadrant, and 
the atmosphere was always perfectly calm. 

The results are shown by the following ex¬ 
tracts from the records:— 

16 


i 


242 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


U. S. N. 32-Pdr. of 57 cwt -. 


Charge=91bs. Elevation=2° 33'. Weather calm. 


No. Ranges 
in yds. 

1. 1383 

2. 1340 

3. 1238 

4. 1284 

5. 1342 

6. 1368 

7. 1419 

8. 1326 

9. 1363 

10. 1278 

1324 


Remarks. 


Missed, deviated to the right. 

u it tc u 

“ “ to the left. 

Deviated to the left on ricochet. 
Missed, deviated to the right. 

a it it it 

“ went over. 

Struck direct. 

« u 

“ on ricochet. 


Of the ten shot fired from 
this gun, only three struck 
the screen, one of which 
was on ricochet (10),having 
fallen 22 yards short. The 
other seven either passed 
over (7), or to the right or 
left—or they fell short and 
deviated to the right and 
left (3,4, 2,5, 6,1.) One of 
them (4) grazed the pole to 
the left of the screen. 


U. S. N. 8-inch of 63 cwt -. 


Charge=91bs. Elevation=3° 12'. Weatlier calm. 


No. Ranges 
in yds. 

1. 1383 

2. 1390 

3. 1323 

4. 1384 

5. 1374 

6. 1326 

7. 1317 

8. 1363 

9. 12S2 

10. 1428 

1357 


Remarks. 


Missed, deviated to the left. 
Struck direct. 

it u 

it a 

Missed, deviated to the right. 
Devi’ed, and struck the left pole. 
Struck direct. 

n tt 

“ on ricochet. 

Missed, went over. 



Of the ten shells from this 
piece, 5 struck direct—one 
on ricochet (9)—one devi¬ 
ated to the right (5)—two 
to the left (6,1)—and one 
passed over the screen (10.) 


So that at 1300 yards, the 8-inch shell-gun 
proved to be more accurate than the long 32-pdr. 
in the ratio of 5 to 2, or including the ricochet, 
6 to 3, and is therefore manifestly superior to it 


Relative Accuracy in in Rounds 

Screen 10 x 20 feet, distance 1300 yards. 


U. S . "N”ayy 32 pdr. of 57. 



Scale lii u*j in. 1 foot) 


1).McClelland. Sc-. 















































































SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 243 


in the capacity for striking an equal surface 
at this distance, even though the directness of 
its flight was prejudiced by an increased eleva¬ 
tion of two-thirds of a degree. At greater or 
shorter distances, it is inferable that a like rela¬ 
tion exists in the divergence of the trajectories. 

Sir Howard Douglas appears to have arrived 
at an entirely opposite conclusion, derived from 
certain practice executed on board the British 
Gunnery-ship Excellent , and cited at page 292 of 
the work on “ Naval Gunnery.” 

It seems that a target was placed at 400 yards 
from that ship, the size not given, and the long 
32-pdr. fired eleven times at it in 7 min ’ 10 sec \ A 
like number of hollow shot were fired from the 
8-in. of 6o cwt in 7 min- 40 sec \ Every one of the 
32-pdr. shot, and only four of the 8-in. struck. 

This result is considered by Sir Howard Doug¬ 
las as confirmatory of his previous opinion in 
favor of the accuracy of the long 32-pdr. But 
we believe that a scrutiny of the circumstances 
under which this practice occurred, will show 
that the conclusion is not warranted; and, in¬ 
deed, the object of the particular practice seems 
rather to have been to ascertain the extent to 
which accuracy was likely to be affected by the 
greatest possible celerity of fire. 

It will occur to any one that the rate of firing 
was extraordinarily rapid, the intervals between 
the rounds being 39 seconds for the 32-pdr. shot, 
and 42 seconds for the 8-in. hollow shot, which 


244 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

obviously rendered it impossible to point the 
guns properly,—for the intervals between each 
fire were too brief to permit the dispersion of 
the smoke, so that all view of the object was 
precluded after the first round, and even if the 
target had been plainly visible, any correction 
in the aim of the piece could not have been 
attempted. Wherefore, the general accuracy of 
the eleven fires depended in the first place on 
the proper adjustment of the gun, and afterwards 
on the exactitude with which it was adhered to 
when the object could not be seen. 

Now it would seem that these conditions were 
fully complied with as regarded the long 32-pdr., 
for the practice with it was most admirable, and 
no shot from it failed to strike the target. 

In the practice with the 8 iu - of 65 cwt , the first 
objection is to its elevation, which seems to have 
been insufficient. According to the tables of the 
Excellent , quoted by Sir Howard Douglas, the 
range of hollow shot is 330 yards from an 8 iach 
gun (charge 10 lbs ) elevated f ths of a degree;* 
while the range of shot from a long 32-pdr., 
(charge 8 lbs ) also elevated | tbs of a degree, is 20 
yards greater,! both guns being feet above 
water. 

If then the distance of the object, on the occa¬ 
sion referred to, required the 32-pdr. to be ele¬ 
vated y 8 ^ hs of a degree (which the result proves 


* Page 568. 


t Page 570. 




SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 245 


to have been the case, as every shot struck the 
mark), the 8 in - shell-gun should have had an ele¬ 
vation somewhat greater: instead of which, it 
had T ^ hs of a degree less than the 32-pdr. and, as 
might be reasonably expected, the hollow shot 
would not range as far as the 32-pdr. shot, which 
is also verified by the facts noted in the record; 
for it appears that seven of the 8 in> shells fell 
short of the target, and only four struck it, prob¬ 
ably on ricochet. 

Hence it is undeniable that this failure of the 
8 m> shells to strike, cannot properly be attributed 
to a want of accuracy in the piece, so long as there 
was such a lack of accuracy in its use; and it is 
not admissible to cite the results as proper to 
prove the comparative precision of the 32-pdr. 
and the 8 in> shell-gun. The practice certainly 
exhibits the degree of accuracy that is possible 
under the circumstances; and this was probably 
the real object. But it is impossible to accept it 
as an evidence of the relative accuracy of the two 
pieces, because we know that the 8 iu ‘ gun was 
incorrectly aimed,—and even if this objection to 
the practice had not existed, the rapidity with 
which it was executed, would have been sufficient 
to make it of slight account in the present 
question. 

Suppose the error of direction had been with 
the 32-pdr. instead of the 8 in ‘ gun, and the re¬ 
sults had varied correspondingly, would they 


246 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


have been allowable as evidence in the compa¬ 
rison between the two pieces'? 

There is good reason then to refuse the deduc¬ 
tions drawn from this practice of the Excellent, so 
far as regards the comparative accuracy of the 
32-pdr. and 8 in * shell-gun, and to assume that 
they do not in fact conflict with results which 
are shown to have been obtained under a strict 
regard to necessary conditions. 


Penetration. 

Using the formula already given for determin¬ 
ing the penetration of 32-pdr. shot and 8 m> shells, 
fired from U. S. N. cannon of those classes with the 
common charge assigned by Pegulation (9 lbs ), we 
shall have the following results,—the substance 
fired at being solid white oak,—the flight of the 
projectiles direct—and the impact perpendicular 
to the surface. 





Distance in yards. 


Charge 


500 

1000 

1500 

2000 

32-pdr. shot, 

gibs. 

38f ins * 

26p ns * 

18| iQS - 

121ins. 

8 in - shells, 

gib*. 

331 ms. 

23 ins - 

16 iDS - 

11 ins. 


From these quantities it would appear, that 
whenever the 32-pdr. shot will pass through, the 
8 in - shell will lodge sufficiently deep to approach 
its maximum effect on exploding; and this be¬ 
ing the case, it remains to choose between the 



SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 247 


perforation of the shot or the probable explosion 
of the shell, as most efficacious. The facts 
already cited to preface these remarks, certainly 
leave little room to doubt which would prove 
decisive in the least time,—besides, in firing at 
distant objects the total effect is augmented by 
the greater number of 8 in - shells which strike; 
they being so much more numerous than the 
32-pdr. shot, that even after making the usual 
deduction for failures of fuzes, the remainder 
that explode is one-third greater than the num¬ 
ber of 32-pdr. shot that strike. 

Hence it is to be inferred that the 8 inch shell is 
not only superior in indiviual effect to the 32-pdr. 
shot, but when accuracy is a condition, the repe¬ 
tition of the effect is more certain. 

If the object be so near that one can hardly 
fail to strike it, with shot or shell, the former 
avoids the loss of effect arising from inferior ac¬ 
curacy, but the latter acquires the certainty of 
perforating equally with the shot, and with the 
increased destructive power due to its greater 
mass and surface; so that it may perforate one 
or both sides and explode in either or in the 
open quarters of the ship;—acting as a shot cer¬ 
tainly, and, most probably, in the double capacity 
of shot and shell. 

It often happens, however, even in close action 
that many shot fail to traverse the side, and are 
consequently lost, particularly in a raking fire, 
when the massive assemblage of heavy timbers, 


248 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

strongly bolted at the bow and stern, oppose 
unusual resistance to the impact. Here the 
advantage of an exploding projectile will become 
apparent. 


Celerity of fire. 

The practice cited by Sir Howard Douglas is 
so conclusive on this point, that argument, or 
even additional facts are needless. On the occa¬ 
sion referred to, eleven rounds were fired from the 
long 32-pdr. in 10 se % and from the 8 in> of 65 cwt * 
in 7 m - 40 se % leaving a difference of about ^ th in 
favor of the former, which is of little real ac¬ 
count, particularly as the advantage of weight of 
projectile is obviously with the shell-gun,—for 
in the same time that the 32-pdr. discharged 
352 lbs * of shot, the 8 in> of 65 cwt> threw more than 
50 o lbs - of shell. 

To double-shot the 32-pdr. in order to increase 
both number and weight of projectile, might 
cause more loss of penetration than would be 
advisable, and certainly diminish the celerity of 
fire considerably. 


The French shell-gun (canon obusier of 80, or 
22 cent ) differs too widely from those of England 
and the United States to be classed with them in 
the foregoing remarks. 




SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 249 


GUNS. 


BORE. 


W eight. 

Diam. 

Length. 

Charge. 

lbs. 

in. 

in. 

lbs. 


giii. of 65 cwt - 

7300 

8.05 

105.27 

10 

Can. Obus. of 22 cent - 

8000 

8.79 

104.04 

7 


PROJECTILES. 

Content in 



Diam. 

Weight empty. 

Cu. In. 

Powder. 

Loaded shell. 


in. 

lbs. 


lbs. 

lbs. 

8in. Q f 65cwt. 

7.925 

48 

73 

91 

"2 

50£ 

22 cent *, or 80-pdr. 

8.674 

56f 

122 

4 

60^ 


Some differences exist in the modes of charg¬ 
ing the shell. The French use incendiary 
matter, which reduces the quantity of powder, 
while it is believed that the practice is different 
in England and the United States. 

The content of the shell is, however, the best 
measure of its explosive power, whatever be the 
nature of the charge. Hence, the capacities of 
the cavities are given with their equivalents in 
powder at the ordinary density.* 


* The English shells weigh 48 lbs - according to Sir Howard Dou¬ 
glas, and the papers reported by the Committee of the Commons. 
But their content is not so satisfactorily stated; in one place Sir 
H. Douglas says it is 2 lbs - ll ozs - (page 198, note); in another (page 
262) he cites the established allowance as 2 lbs - 4 0ZS \ The French 
Aide Memoire Navale (page 276) assigns 4| lbs - as the content in 
powder of the 22 cent - shell, and also states the usual service charge 
to be from l| lbs - to 2p bs - of powder and i lb - of incendiary compo¬ 
sition. 











250 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


The ranges obtained by these pieces, according 
to the best data at disposal, are: 

{ Practice of the "J 1° 2° 3° 4° 5° 

Excellent, by l-- - - - 

Sir h. Douglas. J 645, 1030, 1270, 1460, 1650 yards. 

° 1°30 5° 10° 

Can. Obus. 22 cent - Gavre, 372 722 1467 2213 yards. 

1°14' 2°24' 3°24' 4°30' 5°45' 

Call. Obus. 22 cent - Aide Mem. Navaie , 656, 875, 1094, 1313,1531 yds. 



1° 

2° 

3° 

4° 

5° 

gin. 

645 

1030 

1270 

1460 

1650 

22 cent * 

530 

915 

1128 

1300 

1467 


115 

115 

142 

160 

183 



£ 

i 

£ 

£ 


The inferiority of the French shell in range is 
considerable, and it is probable that this cannot 
be remedied, as the charge used is, perhaps, 
quite as much as the inertia of the gun permits. 

Again, the specific gravity of the English shell 
is about 5.4, while that of the French is 4.9. 

Both of these causes contribute to decrease the 
precision of the canon obusier, though some com¬ 
pensation may exist in other influences. 

The penetrations deduced by formulas already 
given, are,— 


Charge. 

In. velo. 

Yds. 

500 

Yds. 

1000 

Yds. 

1500 

Yds. 

2000 

lbs. 

feet. 

in. 

in. 

in. 

in. 


8 in - shell, 

10 

1584 

34.6 

23.8 

16.3 

11.3 

2 c ent. shell. 

7^ 

‘4 

1386 

29.3 

20.2 

13.9 

9.6 


































SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 251 

From these data it is inferable, generally, that 
the French shell is inferior to the English shell 
in penetration and in accuracy. But it has the 
advantage in area of perforation, in power of con¬ 
cussion, and, most decidedly, in explosive power. 

So that the ordnance value of the two projec¬ 
tiles will depend on circumstances. At moderate 
distances, where the failures to strike cannot be 
considerable, and the penetration is sufficient to 
ensure effect to the explosion, the French shell 
must be far more decisive than the English. 
But beyond, the superior accuracy of the 8 m- shell, 
and its greater depth of lodgment will compen¬ 
sate for the difference in explosive power, and 
give it the advantage. 

It is impossible, from such general facts, to 
say with any exactness where the advantage of 
one begins and the other ends. 

It is known generally, that the effect of explo¬ 
sion depends on the quantity of powder in the 
shell and on the depth of its lodgment, and there 
is no difficulty in deciding between two shells 
which have a common charge and differ in pene¬ 
tration, or which have a like penetration and 
differ in the charge. But when they vary in 
both of these prime elements, and their relative 
accuracy is also unknown, then the case becomes 
too complicated to be solved fully by means of 
any facts yet published. 


252 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


Pivot-guns. 

The other branch of the query put by Sir 
Howard Douglas, is stated thus: — “ Do the 
“shell-guns at present employed in the British 
“ naval service, really possess such qualities with 
“ respect to extent of range, accuracy of fire 
“ and penetrating force, as to warrant their ap¬ 
plication as the pivot-guns of steamers: which 
“ assuredly should, with equal or inferior weight, 
“ possess those qualities in the highest degree.” 

The only shell-gun appropriated to pivot ser¬ 
vice in the British navy is the 10-in. of 84 cwt -, 
(afterwards of 86 cwt ;) and, until very recently, 
its fac-simile (10-in. of 86 cwt ) has served a like 
purpose in the United States navy. The French, 
it is believed, have no special shell-gun for pivot. 
That of 27 cent - was so designed, hut, if ever used, 
has been laid aside; consequently their only re¬ 
maining shell-gun, that of 22 cent , must serve, if 
wanted, for pivot as well as for broadside. 

The 10-in. of 84 cwt - is the first class of shell- 
gun that was tried by the English, (1831,) 
and was their only pivot-gun until the 56-pdr. 
(Monk) and 68-pdr. (Dundas) were introduced. 
The latter seems now, from its general use, to 
be their favorite piece. 

The English practice obtained implicitly in 
the United States navy. The earliest of the large 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


253 


Steamers carried 10-in. of 86 cwt on pivots,—and 
the 68-pdr. was followed in order by the 64-pdr. 

The French have recently adopted a long 
50-pdr., avowedly for the broadside, though as 
yet its application in this way has been very 
limited. Its weight and power make it more 
suitable for pivot service, but it is not known 
to have been so authorized. 

The several details which concern the power 
of these heavy ordnance, may be stated thus:— 




Weight. 


Bore. 

Shot. 

Shi. 


Gun. 

Of Shell, 

Chge. 

Length. 

Diam. 

Diam. 

Windage. 

Chge. 



or Shot. 


in. 

in. 

in. 

in. 


10-in. U. S. N.,. 

86 cwt - 

104 lb8 - 

10 ,ba * 

106.0 

10.0 

9.85 

0.15 

41 ba. 

10-in. British,. 

84 & 86 

87 

12 

109.33 

10.0 

9.84 

0.16 

54* 

50-pdr., French,... 

Olc'vt- 

555 

175 

121.84 

7.64 

7.44 

.197 

— 

56-pdr., British,... 

CO 

55i 

16 

124.87 

7.65 

7.475 

0.175 

If* 

64-pdr., U. S. N.,.. 

105 “ 

64 

16 

124.2 

8.0 

7.85 

0.15 

2 

68-pdr., British,... 

87 “ 

67 

14 


8.12 

7.92 

0.2 

2p* 

68-pdr v “ 

95 “ 

67 

16 


8.12 

7.92 

0.2 

24* 


Note. —In all essential points the French 50-pdr. is similar to the British 
56-pdr., being immaterially lighter. 

No very rigid scrutiny is required to decide 
on the unfitness of the two 10-in. shell-guns for 
pivot service, when, as Sir Howard Douglas 
states, the greatest accuracy, force, and range 
are essential: these they are not only very de¬ 
ficient in, but are plainly inferior to the heavier 
50-pdr., 56-pdr., 64-pdr., and 68-pdr. 

The 10-in. shell is most formidable in its 
effects; far more so than any shot or shell from 


* Sir H. Douglas, (262.) 






254 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

the heavy shot-guns above named: but the 86 cwt< 
gun, appropriated to it, is deficient in the quali¬ 
ties necessary to give it accuracy and penetration 
—wherefore, it is certain to be commanded by 
the 68-pdr., &c., at all distances except the 
most moderate,—then its power will be felt to 
be far too superior to be trifled with. 

It is singular, that in copying the English 
gun, we adopted a different charge and shell, 
and in so doing, exaggerated the defects of this 
class of ordnance very materially, thus:— 

British. U. S. N. 

Charge of Gun,. 12lbs. 10lbs. 

“ of Shell,. 5£ 4 

Weight of loaded Shell,.... 87£ 104 

The shell was already quite as heavy as the 
gun could sustain, and hence, by increasing its 
weight, it became necessary to diminish the 
charge. So that a shell of 104 lbs. was to be 
propelled by 10 lbs. of powder. The conse¬ 
quence was, that a farther diminution ensued 
in the very particulars wherein the English 
10-in. gun was already deficient, viz., in accu¬ 
racy and penetration. 

The precision of the United States Navy 10-in. 
of 86 cwt is even less than its inferior calibre the 
8-in. of 63 cwt *, as will be perceived by the sketch 
ot a screen, herewith annexed, at which were 
fired 10 shells in the manner customary for ex¬ 
perimental practice:— 

















U. S.UscvylO in.of 86 cwt. Ten Shells fired 

Screen 40 x 20 feet, distance 1300 yards. 



Scale i h (n in.l foot) 


UM?ClcJ/and Sc. 



























SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 255 


10-inch Shell-gun of 86 cwt \ 


Ckarge=101bs. Elevation = 4°. Weather calm. 


No. Ranges Remarks, 

in yds. 

1. 1383 Went over and dev’d to the left. 

2. 1403 “ “ “ 

3. 1338 Struck direct. 

4. 1324 “ “ 

5. 1254 Fell short and dev’d to the right. 

6. 1365 Missed, and deviated to the left. 

7. 1343 “ “ “ 

8 . 1267 Struck on ricochet. 

9. 1368 “ direct. 

10 . 1598 Went over. 


(o/9)=1338 


Of the ten shells fired 
from this gun, only four 
struck the screen, one of 
which was on ricochet (8), 
having fallen 33 yds. short; 
hco missed the screen by 
going too high, and also by 
lateral deviation. One fell 
short and missed, by devi¬ 
ating to the right. The 
10 th went far over, 



256 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

The reason of the change in weight of projec¬ 
tile does not appear; but it is certain that the 
English shell is in all respects the most suitable 
that could be adopted for the 10 in * shell-gun of 
86 cwt ‘, and it may be said that the U. S. N. shell 
is just the reverse. 

It has been customary in the English ships 
that carried several pivot guns, to associate the 
10 in - of 86 cwt with the 68-pdr. or 56-pdr., thereby 
combining the distinctive advantages of each, and 
measurably avoiding the consequences of their 
defects; which notwithstanding the complication, 
is perhaps the best application of existing means; 
though after all, but an indifferent substitute for 
ordnance that, by their construction might unite 
in the greatest practicable degree, the qualities 
of the 68-pdr. and the 10 in * of 86 cwt \ 

The French canon obusier of 22 cont is plainly 
no match for the 10 in - of 86 cwt - under any circum¬ 
stances, and as a pivot-gun, is entirely out of the 
question for ships of war. 

This brief and desultory comment is quite as 
much as the unsettled and imperfect state of the 
pivot ordnance admits. The shell-guns used for 
that purpose by the English and Americans are 
obviously unfit for it—being neither heavy 
enough, nor of proper construction: wherefore, 
the immediate question of a preference for them, 
or the 68-pdrs. and the like, as pivot-guns, is 
readily disposed of in favor of the latter. 

But it is not therefore to be inferred, that the 


SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 


257 


shell-gun is necessarily inferior to the shot-gun 
for purposes requiring range, precision, and 
power, or in other words, for pivot service, sup¬ 
posing that the pieces are of like weight and 
their capacity properly developed. 

If, for instance, the weight in metal of the 
64-pdr. was made into a shell-gun fashioned upon 
correct principles—the relative accuracy of the 
two guns, at a distant object, may be assumed as 
75 to 90: and the probable failure of fuzes to act, 
would reduce the peculiar operation of the shell 
in the ratio of 64 to 90, that is, the explosions of 
4 bs - charges would be to the impact of 64-pdr. 
shot, in number as 2 to 3. 

But the weight of the shell,—not less than 
100 lb %—moving with the velocity imparted by an 
admissible charge, will have produced a momen¬ 
tum which is sufficient to penetrate a ship’s side 
at a distance not much short of the limit of 
effective long practice. So that the impact of 
such a projectile is a matter of consideration, and 
not to be neglected in the estimate of its power; 
consequently its superior surface and mass will 
affect correspondingly the area of orifice, power 
of concussion, &c. 


The conclusions to which this course of re¬ 
mark leads, may be briefly summed, thus:— 

17 



258 SHOT AND SHELLS COMPARED. 

1— Shells are of more effect against ships than 

shot of like weight, both being used under 
like conditions. 

2— The present long 32-pdrs. and the French 

30-pdr. are inferior to the 8 in- shell-guns in 
accuracy and power, and therefore less 
efficient for long or short ranges. 

3— The French canon-obusier of 22 ceut is more 

powerful than the 8 in- shell-guns at short 
or moderate distances; but the latter have 
the advantage at longer ranges, though 
it is not certain that decisive results are 
then obtainable. 

4— The 10 m - shell is of superior effect to the 

shot of 64 or 68-pdrs.; but the gun as¬ 
signed for its use is too light to propel it 
properly. Hence, its superiority is re¬ 
stricted to ranges much exceeded by the 
the 68-pdrs. and other guns of like cha¬ 
racter, and the use of the 10 in * of 86 cwt - as a 
pivot-gun, is not to be recommended. 



* 


YII. 

COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

Armament of ships in the United States, France and England, 
based on a Unit-calibre, with a proportion of Shell-guns.— 
French organization—English—American—Unit-calibre prac¬ 
tically the same in all.—First adopted by France in 1829.— 
Evils of various calibres—some remedy had become unavoid¬ 
able—not attained by the new system, which is still complicated, 
and sacrificed the best calibre in the line-of-battle-ships of 
two Navies.—Uniformity of calibre violated by the introduction 
of Shell-guns—the number of which was at first small—gradu¬ 
ally increased in the English ships—and in those of the United 
States.—Broadsides of English—French—and United States’ 
ships compared.—Batteries of steamers—reduced to a low scale 
by the side wheel.—Introduction of the screw, and restoration 
of the broadside. 

The remarks just concluded will be understood 
to apply to the comparative values of ordnance, 
individually considered. 

If naval batteries were restricted to a single 
description of cannon, it would be as easy to esti¬ 
mate the relative force of ships as of the pieces 
they carry. 

But the habitual practice of using a variety of 
guns for the purpose, produces so much compli¬ 
cation that it is difficult to form any reliable 
judgment of the absolute or comparative power 
of broadsides. 

The batteries of English, French, and Ameri¬ 
can ships are composed chiefly of 32-pdrs., or 
their equivalent the 30-pdr.—differing in weight 


260 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


according to the class of vessel or the order of 
the tier. With these are associated a limited 
number of 8-in. or 22 cent shell-guns. 


♦ 


French Ship-batteries. 

The changes that have been progressively 
made in these, are stated in an official docu¬ 
ment to have occurred in the years 1812, 1829, 
1837, 1848, and 1849. 

In 1812, the calibres were 36, 24, 18 and 
12-pdr. cannon and carronades. 

In 1829, it was desired to get rid of the 
inconveniences occasioned by this diversity of 
bores, and the 30-pdr. was adopted for all bat¬ 
teries, classes of different weights being used 
according to the capacity of the ship or to the 
height above water. The 80-pdr. of Paixhans 
was already known and had been tried, but the 
results were not sufficiently complete to admit 
of its being assigned a place in the prescribed 
armament of the fleet. This was, however, found 
expedient in 1837, and thus the unity of calibre 
which the French authorities so much desired, 
and had so nearly arrived at, suffered further 
interruption. The decree of 1848 increased the 
number of 22 cent> shell-guns, and that of 1849, 
introduced 50-pdr. cannon as a substitute for 
some of the former; it also suppressed the car- 
ronade. 



COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


261 


Armament of French Ships-of-War.—1848. 

FIRST RATES. 

lstf deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22 ceDt No. 1, \ 

24 long 30-pdrs.,. 32 I 

2 d deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2, ! 

26 short 30-pdrs.,. 34 > 116 guns. 

3 d deck. 34 Shell-guns of 16 cem -,. 34 l 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 16 cent , | 

12 30-pdr. carronades,. 16 / 

SECOND RATES. 

ls-2 deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1, 

24 long 30-pdrs.,. 32 \ 

2 d deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22, cent - No. 2, / 

26 short 30-pdrs.,. 34 >96 guns. 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 16 “ nt -, \ 

26 30-pdr. carronades,. 30 / 

THIRD RATE. 

lstf deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22“°*- No. 1, \ 

22 long 30-pdrs.,. 30 1 

2d deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22 cent No. 2, l 

24 short 30-pdr.,. 32 l 86 guns * 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 16 cent -, j 

20 30-pdr. carronades,. 24 / 

FOURTH RATE. 

ls£ deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1, \ 

20 long 30-pdrs.,. 28 I 

2d deck. 8 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2, ( ^ g 

22 short 30-pdrs.,. 30 ( 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 16 cent *, \ 

14 30-pdr. carronades,. 18 / 















262 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


FIRST CLASS FRIGATES. 

Gun-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1, j 

26 long 30-pdrs.,. 30 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns 16 cent -, ( ° 

26 30-pdr. carronades,. 30 ) 

SECOND CLASS FRIGATES. 

Gun-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2, j 

24 long 30-pdrs.,. 28 I 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 16 cent , / ^ ^ unS * 

18 30-pdr. carronades,. 22 ] 

THIRD CLASS FRIGATES. 

Gun-deck. 2 Shell-guns of 22 cent -, I 

24 short 30-pdrs.,. 26 ( 40 ?uns. 

Spar-deck. 4 Shell-guns of 16 cent , ( 

10 30-pdr. carronades,. 14 ) 

FIRST CLASS CORVETTE. 

Gun-deck. 2 Shell-guns of 22 cent No. 2, ) 

22 Shell-guns of 16 cent -,. 24 > 30 guns. 

Spar-deck. 6 Carronades, 18-pdr.,. 6 V 










COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


263 


(1849.) 

Decree of July 21tli , 1849, regulating the armament 

of Ships of War. 

Article 1.—The Batteries of ships herein spe¬ 
cified, shall in future be regulated as follows:— 


FIRST RATES. 

1 st deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1, 

6 50-pdrs.,*. 

22 30-pdrs., No. 1,. 

2 d deck. 6 Shell-guns of 22 cent ' No. 2,. 

28 30-pdrs., No. 2,. 

3 d deck. 34 30-pdrs., No. 3,.. 

Spar-deck. 12 30-pdrs., No. 4,.*. 

SECOND RATES. 
ls£ deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent * No. 1, 

6 50-pdrs.; 22 30-pdrs., No. 1,. 

2 d deck. 6 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2,. 

28 30-pdrs., No. 2,. 

Spar-deck. 24 30-pdrs., No. 3,. 

THIRD RATES. 

(New model.) 

1$£ deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1, 

6 50-pdrs.; 20 30-pdrs., No. 1,.... 

2 cl deck. 6 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2,. 

26 30-pdrs., No. 2,. 

Spar-deck. 20 30-pdrs. of No. 3,. 

THIRD RATES. 

(Old model , called an 86.) 

lstf deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1,. 

26 30-pdrs. No. 1,. 

2d deck. 4 Shell-guns of 22 cent -No. 2,. 

28 30-pdrs., No, 2,. 

Spar-deck. 18 30-pdrs., No. 4,. 


32 


112 guns. 


34 

34 

12 


32 ) 

v 90 guns. 
34 ( 

24 ) 


30 J 

\ 82 guns. 
32 ( 

20 ) 


30) 

( 80 guns. 
32 ( 

18 J 


* To be placed as near as possible in the centre of the Battery. 



















264 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


1st deck. 
2d deck. 
Spar-deck. 

deck. 

2d deck. 
Spar-deck. 

Gun deck. 
Spar-deck. 

Gun-deck. 

Spar-deck. 

Gun-deck. 

Spar-deck. 


FOURTH KATE. 
(New model.) 


4 Shell-guns of 22 cent No. 1,. \ 

4 50-pdrs.; 20 2$-pdrs., No. 1,. 28 / 

4 Shell-guns of 22 cent No, 2, . / 74 guns. 

26 30-pdrs., No. 2,. 30 \ 

16 30-pdrs., No. 4,. 16 ' 


FOURTH RATE. 


(Old model, called a 74.) 

4 Shell-guns of 22 ceDt - No. 1,.... 

24 36-pdrs. 

30 long 18-pdrs.,. 

12 30-pdrs., No. 4,.. 


28 f 

30 / 70 guns. 
12 ) 


FIRST CLASS FRIGATES. 

2 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1,. j 

2 50-pdrs.; 26 30-pdrs., No. 1,. 30 ; 50 guns. 

2 30-pdrs. No. 1; 18 30-pdrs. No. 3. 20 i 


RAZEES. 

2 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 1,. ) 

2 50-pdrs.; 24 30-pdrs., No. 1,. 28 \ 50 guns. 

2 30-pdrs., No. 1; 20 30-pdrs., No. 3, 22 t 


SECOND CLASS FRIGATES. 


2 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2. I 

2 50-pdrs.; 24 30-pdrs., No. 2,. 28 > 46 guns. 

2 30-pdrs., No. 1; 16 30-pdrs. No. 4, 18 \ 

















COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 265 


THIRD CLASS FRIGATES 
[New model.) 

Gun-deck. 2 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No, 2,. 

2 50-pdrs.; 22 30-pdrs., No. 2,. 

Spar-deck. 2 30-pdrs, No. 1; 12 30-pdrs., No. 4, 


[Afloat and on the Stocks.) 

Gun-deck. 2 50-pdrs.; or 2 shell-guns of 

22 cent *, No. 2 ; 24 30-pdrs., No. 2,_ 

Spar-deck. 2 30-pdrs., No. 1; 8 30-pdrs., No. 4, 


SPAR-DECK SLOOPS. 

[New model.) 

Gun-deck. 2 Shell-guns of 22 cent - No. 2,. 

2 30-pdrs., No. 2*; 14 30-pdrs., No. 3 
Spar-deck. 2 30-pdrs., No. 1,. 

CORVETTE A BATTERIE BARBETTE. 

[New model.) 

Spar-deck. 2 30-pdrs., No. 2; 14 30-pdrs., No. 3,.... 16 guns. 

FIRST CLASS BRIGS. 

[New model.) 

Spar-deck. 12 30-pdrs., No. 4,. 12 guns. 


26 ) 40 guns. 
14 


26 ) 36 guns. 

10 l 


18 

2 


20 guns. 


* These 4 pieces to be placed in the centre of the Battery. 








266 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


These regulations are directed to apply to all 
new ships and to those already built, so far as 
their construction permits, which not being prac¬ 
ticable in all cases will account for the retention 
of some of the old calibres. 

The following tables exhibit in a condensed 
form the style of Armament prescribed by the 
new Regulations: 


1848. 


No. of 22 cent - Shell-guns, 

No. of 30-pdrs, I f. ea . Vy ’ 

l Light, 


Proportion of Shell-guns, 

1849. 


No. of 22 cent - Shell-guns, 
No. of 50-pdrs., . . . 

No. of 30-pdrs. I Heavy, 
* l Light, 


Proportion of Shell-guns, 



Rate of Ship. 




Frigates. 


1st. 

2d. 

3d. 

4th. 


1st. 

2d. 

3d classs. 

16 

16 

16 

16 


4 

4 


2 

24 

24 

22 

20 


26 

24 


0 

76 

56 

48 

40 


30 

22 


38 

116 

96 

86 

76 


60 

50 


40 


i 

1 

1 


tV 

TZ 


fa 



Rate of Ship. 



F rigates 



new. 

old. new. 

old. 




1st. 

2d. 

3d. 

3d. 

4th. 

4th. 

1st. 

2d. 

3d. 

10 

10 

10 

8 

8 

4 

2 

2 

2 

6 

6 

6 

0 

4 

0 

2 

2 

2 

22 

22 

20 

26 

20 

36 

28 

2 

2 

74 

52 

46 

46 

42 

30 

18 

40 

34 

112 

90 

82 

80 

74 

70 

50 

66 

40 

A 

i 

Z 

i 

tV 

h 

tV 

fa 

fa 

l 

ZiJ 




COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 267 


English Ship-Batteries. 

Previously to the war of 1812, the long 32- 
pdr. predominated as the principal piece for the 
heaviest ships, and in frigates the long 18-pdr. 

In 1825, Colonel Munro, of the royal artillery, 
presented to the Admiralty a memorandum de¬ 
tailing his plan of naval armament. He ad¬ 
mitted but one calibre, the 32-pdr, in all batteries, 
of which there were to be different classes of 
weights, so as to adapt them to the several 
decks and rates of ships. These were the 25 cwt , 
42 RWt and 56 cwt . A commencement seems to 
have been made in 1829, by casting a number 
of 32-pdrs., weighing 25 cwt - and 48 cwt -, and was 
followed up in the next year by reaming out 
the 18 and 24-pdrs, of the Congreve and Bloom¬ 
field pattern, the weights of which were gene¬ 
rally of 33 cwt , 40 cwt * and 41 cwt . 

To what extent the regular armament was 
altered by the introduction of these pieces into 
service, does not appear; but we learn from offi¬ 
cial documents,* that in 1837, the attention of 
the British authorities was drawn to the French 
decree of that year, which made the 30-pdr. 
the calibre of the fleet, with the addition of a 
small number of the Paixhans 80-pdr. or 22 cent *, 
and that in consequence thereof, it was decided 
to reorganise the British naval batteries; which 


* Parliamentary Committee, 1849. 



268 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

was clone in 1839 by adopting the one calibre 
32-pdr. and its classes, recommended by Colonel 
Munro; adding thereto the 32-pdr. of 32 cwt ‘, 
45 cwt - and 50 cwt ,—in all, six classes. With these 
were combined the 8-in shell guns of 65 cwt and 
of 53 cw \ 

The casting of the new ordnance proceeded 
rapidly, so that in 1848 more than 8000 new and 
reamed 32-pdrs. were available, and about 1600 
shell-guns. 

These constituents, according to the British 
Aide Memoire, are arranged in the batteries as 
follows: 


Rate of Ship. 



Whole No. of guns. 
No. of 8-in shell-guns 


1st. 2d. 3d. Razees. Frigates. 

110 92 80 50 50 



10 10 12 6 4 

50 56 20 22 0 

50 26 48 22 46 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 269 


United States Ship-Batteries. 

The new ships built after the war of 1812, 
were armed as follows: 

Lower-deck. Gun-deck. Spar-deck. 

Frigates, - 32-pdrs. 42-pdrs. 

Liners, 42-pdrs. 32-pdrs. 42-pdrs. 

Forming a simple and powerful system of bat¬ 
tery,—probably the best of its day. 

In 1841, a few 8-in shell-guns (63 cwt ) were 
introduced, generally four on each gun-deck. 

In 1845, a Board, convened for the purpose, 
adopted a system having the 32-pdr. as its unit- 
calibre, and added a certain number of light 8-in. 
shell-guns on the spar-deck to those already borne 
below. 

The classes of the 32-pdrs. weighed severally 
56 cwt> , 51 cwt , 46 cwt , 42 cw \ 32 cw \ and 27 cw \ The 
shell-guns, 63 cwt and 55 cwt , being almost iden¬ 
tically the English system. 

In 1853, it was directed in future equipment, 
that the light 8-in shell-guns (55 cwt ) should be 
excluded from the spar-decks of Frigates and 
Liners, and the number of 8-in of 63 cwt - on each 
gun-deck increased, so as to form an entire di¬ 
vision of ten pieces. 

About the same time some of the older frigates 
were razeed, and received a larger complement of 
shell-guns. 

Thus it appears, that the leading principle of 



270 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


the present existing naval armaments is alike 
in the United States, England, and France. 

The main element of ordnance power is repre¬ 
sented by one calibre .— 

—And that calibre is the 32 -pdr. or its equivalent 
the 30 -pdr.) the pieces differing in weight accord¬ 
ing to the vessel, or tier of battery where they 
are to be used: and the heaviest of the classes 
are similar in the three services, so far as offensive 
capacity is concerned. 

No project has proved more attractive to naval 
men than that of having a uniform calibre 
throughout the entire fleet. It has been pro¬ 
posed from time to time without success, until 
adopted for the French navy in 1829. 

In the promptness with which the example 
was followed by England and the United States, 
may be recognised the general convictions of 
the profession in regard to the serious mischief 
inseparable from the chaos of calibres that pre¬ 
vailed, and the urgent necessity for some mea¬ 
sure that would simplify the complex economy 
of naval ordnance. 

In a three-decker might be witnessed the ex¬ 
treme phase of the evil: long 32-pdrs., 18-pdrs., 
and carronades, requiring three sizes of shot and 
four classes of full charge, with as many reduces 
as caprice might suggest. All this variety of 
supply was to be distinguished and selected in 
the magazines and shot-lockers,—circulated with 
perfect exactness in the confusion and obscurity 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 271 


of the lower passages, to a particular hatchway, 
then up to the deck where was placed the gun 
for which each charge or shot was designed: and 
this was to be accomplished not with the com¬ 
posure, deliberation and attention that the nature 
of the operation itself demanded, but amid all 
the excitement and hot haste of battle. 

The utter impossibility of avoiding mistakes, 
and the mischievous consequences resulting 
from their commission at such a time, deeply 
impressed every thinking mind with the urgent 
necessity of some reform. The officers knew 
from daily experience, that simplicity of detail 
and arrangement was not only convenient in the 
affairs of their profession, but was an element 
of efficiency when celerity and certainty were 
to be attained by the joint action of masses of 
men. It was most natural, therefore, that what¬ 
ever held out the promise of simplifying the 
complex system of batteries, should be most 
favorably received by common opinion. 

There was no novelty in the project of a 
uniform calibre: it had often been discussed, 
and was familiar to most naval men,—it may 
be said, indeed, that they were prepared at the 
time to assent to its fullest development, and 
had proper use been made of the opportunity, 
there would have been experienced no resistance 
of any importance. 

Unfortunately the remedy was but partial in its 


272 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


character, and, like all temporising measures, only 
substituted one evil for another. 

The cannon of the whole navy were to dis¬ 
charge shot of one size, and hence the service 
of the lockers became one of perfect simplicity.* 
But as the guns, though of one calibre, were to 
be of different weights, there remained all the 
diversity of charges, carriages, sponges, rammers 
and entire appliances that had previously pre¬ 
vailed, attended of course by the same troubles 
of equipment and of service. 

By way of illustration, let us note the effect 
of the new and old systems on the 
U. S. first class frigate (Baritan and class,) built 
in 1820. The guns designed for such a ship 
were long 32-pdrs and 42-pdr. carronades; by 
the regulations of 1845, these were to be re¬ 
placed by three classes of 32-pdrs, the long, 
the 51 cwt and the 32* cwt *, for which no less than 
seven different charges were prescribed by 
regulation, varying from 4 lbs - to 9 lbs- . This was 
certainly not a simplification,—it was a mere 
change in the character of the complication, 
being a choice between two sizes of shot with 
three charges on one hand, and one size of shot 
with seven charges on the other,—thereby abol¬ 
ishing the trouble at the shot locker, but in- 



* In 1821, Paixhans proposed the 36-pdr. as the unit calibre 
of the French Navy; but he too designated no less than four 
classes of ordnance for the purpose. 



COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 273 

creasing it in the magazine and the powder 
division, where by the way, it is most judicious 
to impose as little duty as possible of a respon¬ 
sible or discretionary kind,—the personal of that 
division being made up mostly of men whose 
usual vocation in a ship is not likely to give 
them any clear ideas of the importance of their 
occasional office at quarters, nor opportunities 
of improving their information in regard to it. 

The complication of equipment was undi¬ 
minished, perhaps even increased, by the new 
arrangement, for there were three different 
classes of appliance introduced with the three 
styles of 32-pdrs., in lieu of the two which 
existed previously,—and this evil, though of 
secondary importance, was still of great interest 
in many points of view. 

The readiness with which the expense and 
trouble consequent on such a radical change in 
the armament of the large navies were met, 
makes it the subject of surprise and regret that 
the reform was not accepted and carried out in 
its fullest sense—which is obviously not only 
one calibre, but one gun, for all decks and for 
all ships, to the lowest class whose dimensions 
render it admissible. 

But even a graver objection existed to the 
adoption of the new system by at least two of 
the three powers. The calibre chosen as the 
standard detracted from the force of their 

heaviest ships’ batteries. 

18 



274 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

The lower tiers of French vessels of the line 
were commonly constituted of the 36-pdr., which 
is nearly equivalent to our 42-pdr., and this 
piece necessarily made way, under the new order 
of things for the 30-pdr. It is true, that the 
force of the upper decks was improved by re¬ 
moving the 18-pdr. and 24-pdr. therefrom, and 
mounting the 30-pdrs. of corresponding weights 
in lieu of them. 

But the melioration of the upper tiers, did not 
necessarily involve a sacrifice of the power of the 
lower battery. The 36-pdrs. might have been 
retained there, and 30-pdrs. substituted for the 
18 and 24-pdrs., which would have increased 
the force of the ship and reduced the existing 
complication in a degree. 

There was substantial ground then for the 
objections of the veteran officers who were op¬ 
posed to the disuse of the 36-pdr., thus noticed 
by Col. Charpentier. 

“ Others again having witnessed the advan- 
“ tages of the 36-pdr., at a previous period, regret 
“ its abandonment, and are grieved to see it dis¬ 
placed by an inferior calibre, the power of 
“ which must be of less intensity, and they in- 
“ sist strongly on the restoration of the 36-pdr.” 
—( Charpentier , 31.) 

The English authorities are not chargeable 
with having impaired the power of their bat¬ 
teries of the line by abolishing the heaviest ord¬ 
nance, and taking a mean calibre as the unit. 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 275 

On the contrary, they actually raised the standard 
of the heavy ships, by using the heaviest calibre 
they had. It is true, that the Memorandum of 
Colonel Munro, which was submitted to the 
Admiralty (1825) before the French began to 
remodel their ordnance, (1829,) argued for the 
adoption of the 32-pdr. calibre as the unit, on 
the ground that it was invested with sufficient 
power for all naval purposes; but whether this 
was the motive with the authorities for adhering 
to that calibre or not, the true principle was 
followed in taking the heaviest denomination of 
gun as the unit, retaining the 32-pdr. below, and 
substituting it in the upper batteries for the 18 
and 24-pdrs.—thus abandoning their lighter cali¬ 
bres, while the French relinquished their com¬ 
manding piece, the 36-pdr.; and in this way the 
lines-of-battle were equalized in calibre, obvi¬ 
ously to the great advantage of the English, 
which previously were of inferior metal. 

Admitting then the necessity of a uniform 
calibre in our own service, how was the prin¬ 
ciple to be developed with reference to existing 
ordnance ? 

The settled policy of the Republic forbade all 
attempt to rival with numbers the immense fleets 
of England and France. Wherefore the only 
hope of our Navy lay in the individual excellence, 
of its ships; to assure which, it was indispensable 
to follow sound principles and carry them out 
to the least detail, omitting nothing, however 


276 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

minute, that contributed to a perfect whole. 
Experience had shown what could be effected 
in this way, even with means that seemed in¬ 
significant,—and the commanders whose proud 
distinction it had been to sustain the flag with 
honor, coming fresh from the eventful conflict 
of 1812, gave significant indications of the value 
they attached to a proper ordnance, when called 
on in 1820 to determine the armament of the 
ships that were to be added to the Navy under 
the “ Gradual Increase Act.” 

The frigates were to be armed with the long 
32-pdr. below, and the 42-pdr. carronades above. 

Ships-of-the-line had the same, with a tier of 
42-pdrs. in the lowest battery. This, if not the 
most simple armament, was certainly less com¬ 
plicated than usual, and the most powerful of 
the kind at the time of its adoption. 

The English might, without positive danger, 
disregard the advantages to be derived from a 
full compliance with a fundamental principle, 
however earnestly asserted by one of the ablest 
writers on ordnance,* for the possible inferiority of 
individual ships could be compensated by numbers. 
The French too might, if they would, sacrifice 
power in their naval batteries to some supposed 
equivalent, notwithstanding the maxims incul¬ 
cated by their distinguished artillerist ;f for the 


* Simmons on Present Armament of Navy, 1839. 
t Paishans. 



COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 211 

annihilation of her entire navy would not touch 
the source of the real power of France. But if 
these United States ivould maintain past reputa¬ 
tion and present rights , they dare not organize 
their scanty national marine on any but the 
surest foundation. 

When, therefore, it became requisite in 1845, 
to renovate our Naval system of Armament, it 
only remained to apply the general principle so 
well proved by past history. The power of the 
Batteries teas to he increased. With existing cali¬ 
bres, this was only to be done by making the 
highest, (42-pdr.) the unit—withdrawing the 
long 32-pdrs. from the second deck of Liners, 
and gun-decks of Frigates, in order to substitute 
long 42-pdrs., but somewhat fewer, so as not to 
increase the weight of the Battery. 

Now, however, the advent of a higher elemen 
of Ordnance power, overshadowing the preten¬ 
sions of the 32-pdr. and the 42-pdr. equally, 
deprives the question of any practical value: 
though its consideration is still useful as involv¬ 
ing an abstract principle which is applicable to 
all ordnance. 


278 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


Shell-guns. 

The benefits that were to accrue from the 
long-sought and so recently attained unity of 
calibre, seemed doomed by some fatality never 
to be realized in their full extent, at least with 
the 32-pdr. and 30-pdr.; for just as the mea¬ 
sures designed to give practical effect to the pro¬ 
ject were in course of execution, the shell-gun 
enforced admittance among Naval Ordnance, and 
thus marred the uniformity of the Unit Battery. 
For the authorities were equally unable to reject 
it wholly or to adopt it entirely—two calibres 
were therefore unavoidable. 

At first, and for some time subsequently, the 
number of shell-guns introduced was very limi¬ 
ted ; too much so to exert any material influence 
on the absolute or relative values of the French, 
English, or United States’ broadsides, but not to 
escape the habitual tendency to complication: for 
very soon there were two or more classes of the 
same calibre to be found in the three services. 
The French had Nos. 1, 2, and 3, of the 22 cen \ 
The English, the 8 in - of 65 cwt - and of 52 cwt \ The 
United States, the 8 in * of 63 cwt - and of 55 cwt . 

The British Regulations of 1839, had practi¬ 
cally the effect of fixing the minimum of the 
shell-power in their Naval Batteries; while 
special orders or Regulations made such addi- 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 279 

tions from time to time in particular ships or 
classes, that in 1849, only ten years after the date 
of the General Regulation, it appears from 
official sources that 76 vessels were armed with 
a greater number of shell-guns than prescribed in 
1839. 

The total force of these ships was nearly 4000 
cannon, of which about 1200 pieces (or T 3 ^ hs of 
the whole) were 8 in< shell-guns; besides 45 pivot 
68-pdrs. or 10 in ' shell-guns—being about twice 
the force of the whole U. S. Navy built or build¬ 
ing. In some of the ships the shell-guns in 
broadside were so numerous as to be constituted 
into an entire tier: in others they were divided 
among the several tiers. 

The following summary from the Report of 
the Select Committee (1849) of Parliament, ex¬ 
hibits the class of these vessels and the nature of 
their Batteries.* 


* It differs materially from the Armament of certain ships as 
given by Sir Howard Douglas—such as Ajax, Amphion, Eurotas, 
Trincomalee, Brilliant, Daedalus, &c. 



280 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


Type of the class. 


Total No. In each Ship, 

of guns 


No. of carried 8-in. 

the class, by each. 32-pdr. shell guns. Pivot guns. 


In all the Ships. 


8-in. Pivot 
32-pdrs. shell-guns. guns. 


Pique, 

7 

40 

34 

6 


238 

Amphion, 

1 

36 

30 

6 


30 

Brilliant, 

2 

20 

14 

6 


28 

Daedalus, 

1 

19 

12 

6 

1 of 10 in> 

12 

Portland, 

9 

50 

42 

8 


378 

Trincomalee 

2 

25 

14 

10 

lof 10 ,n - 

28 

Vernon, 

24 

50 

38 

12 


912 

Arrogant, 

1 

46 

32 

12 

2 of 68 

32 

Eurotas, 

4 

24 

8 

12 

f 2 of 68 1 

( 2 of 10 in - J 

t 32 

Rodney, 

3 

92 

66 

26 


198 

Albion, 

7 

90 

64 

26 


448 

Ajax, 

4 

60 

28 

26 

f 2 of 68 1 

{ 4 of 10 in - J 

[■ 112 

Euryalus, 

6 

50 

22 

28 


132 

Emerald, 

4 

60 

30 

30 


120 

Prince Regent, 1 

92 

60 

32 


60 


76 





2760 


42 — 
6 — 
12 — 
6 1 

72 — 
20 2 
288 — 
12 2 

48 16 

78 — 
182 — 

104 24 

168 — 
120 — 
32 — 


1190 45 


3995 


In 1853, some simplification of the U. S. 
Batteries was effected by abolishing the light 
8 in * guns and 32-pdrs. of 51 cwt - in the spar-deck 
battery, and increasing the 8 in ' of 63 cwt * on all 
gun-decks, so as to form an entire division there 
of 10 pieces. This materially improved the 
power of the ships. 

In France alone, where originated the leading 
measures that have so entirely remodeled Naval 
Batteries, was there shown any tendency to keep 





















COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 281 


the number of shell-guns within very limited 
bounds. A slight diminution was even effected 
to make way for a new and very heavy gun in 
broadside, (the long 50-pdr. of 10,000 lbs ), which 
nearly assimilates with the Brititsh 56-pdr. in 
calibre and character. 

The execution of this plan does not appear to 
have been carried out to any extent; not fur¬ 
ther, it is believed, than a trial of the gun in 
one or two ships; which is not surprising, con¬ 
sidering that it was to be located in broadside, 
where its powers would be cramped by the size 
of the ports, and the want of a pivot-carriage 
sensibly experienced. The reasons are not given 
for this unusual application of a piece whose 
weight and range, according to the invariable 
practice of other Navies, were exclusively fitted 
for pivot service. Its peculiar powers of match¬ 
ing the British 56-pdr., or of supplying the 
obvious deficiency in range of the 22 cent ' shell- 
gun, were plainly nullified by placing the gun in 
a port; for it is stated* by the commanderf of 
the ship Minerva , that the muzzle of the 50-pdr. 
was in contact with the upper sill at 41°, though 
the dimensions of the port had been purposely 
increased. Now the special function of such a 
piece hardly began until it reached this eleva- 


* Inquiry into the condition of the French Navy, ordered by 
the National Assembly, 1849. 
f Captain Degen&s. 




282 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


tion. It is true that the heel of the ship might 
add all that was required for the long range, if 
the gun was to windward, but in firing to lee¬ 
ward the same cause would take away even the 
limited scope allowed by the port. 

Its introduction was therefore a disadvantage 
under the circumstances , for it displaced an equal 
number of the 22 cent which, similarly situated, 
were more convenient of management and of 
greater power. Placed at the bow or stern on 
the spar-deck, its superior fire at long range 
would have been unquestioned and useful. 

The operation of the several regulations and 
special orders on the armaments of French, Eng¬ 
lish and United States ships at different periods, 
may be perceived by the following summary of 
the elements of force in the classes that repre¬ 
sent the average power in the line-of-battle, and 
also in that ship of all work, the frigate. 





































































































































284 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


Line-of-Battle- Ships. 


32-pdrs. 

No. of Shell-guns ^ ^ ^ 

guns. Date. 8 in - or 22 cent - long, medium or light. 


British, . 

92 

1839 

10 

56 

26 

U 

92 

1849 

32 

34 

26 

Q Pr. Regent, &c. 

u 

92 

1849 

26 

42 

24 

0 Rodney, &c, 

French,. 

96 

1848 

16 

24 

26 

30 







50-pdrs. 

U 

90 

1849 

10 

22 

28 

24 6 

United States, 

88 

1820 

°j 

I 32 42-pdM. 

1 34 32-pdrs. 

0 

2242-pdr. Carr. i 

^ (( 

88 

1841 

8 ! 

\ 28 42 -P drs - 
[ 30 32-pdrs. 

0 

22 

ii it 

84 

1845 

12 

60 

12 

0 

u u 

84 

1853 

20 

48 

16 

0 

Suppo’d U.S. 

84 

1845 

20 

44 42-pdrs. 

0 

2Q 42-pdr. Carr. 


Frigates, 

1st 

CLASS. 



British,. 

50 

1839 

4 


46 

• 

U 

, 50 

1849 

12 

20 

18 

0 Vernon. 

u 

50 

1849 

28 

0 

22 

0 Euryalus, 

French,. 

60 

1848 

4 

26 

0 

30 

U 

. 50 

1849 

2 

28 

18 

50-pdr*. 

2 

United States, 54 

1841 

4 

28 

0 

22 42 Carr. 

<< it 

50 

1845 

8 

30 


12 

u a 

50 

1853 

10 

24 


16 












COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES 


285 


Lin e-of-B att le-Ships. 


Broadsides. 



8>n. or 22 cen t* 32-pdrs. weight. 



No of 



Content 


Med. or 




guns. 

Date. 

Weight. 

of powder. 

Long. 

light. 


Total. 

British,.. 

92 

1839 

255 

12£lbs. 

896 

416 


1567 

ii 

92 

1849 

816 

40 “ 

544 

416 


1776 

ii 

92 

1849 

663 

32£ “ 

672 

384 


1719 

French,. 

96 

1848 

484 

32$ “ 

402 

958 


1824 

ii 

90 

1849 

303 

20* “ 

368 

long 

50-pdrs. 

871 167 

1712 

United States 

, 88 

1820 


none. 

1248 

462 


1710 

ii ii 

88 

1841 

204 

8 “ 

1068 

462 


1734 

u a 

84 

1845 

306 

12 “ 

960 

192 


1458 

a a 

84 

1853 

510 

20 “ 

768 

256 


1534 

Supposed U.S. 84 

1845 

510 

20 “ 

924 

420 


1854 


Frigates, 

1 ST 

CLASS. 





British,, -- 

50 

1839 

102 

5 lbs. 

736 

838 

ii 

50 

1849 

306 

15 

ii 

320 

288 

914 

a 

50 

1849 

714 

35 

u 

0 

352 

1066 

French,. 

60 

1848 

121 

00 

ii 

436 

503 

1060 

ii 

50 

1849 

60 

4 

u 

469 

long 

50-pdrs. 

301 56 

886 

United States, 

54 

1841 

102 

4 

a 

448 

462 

1012 

ii ii 

50 

1845 

204 

8 

a 

480 

192 

876 

ii ii 

50 

1853 

255 

10 

a 

384 

256 

895 











286 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


Such are the results arrived at by the naval 
authorities of the three countries, in regard to 
the preferable mode of developing the fullest 
ordnance power of the broadside. They con¬ 
curred in all the primary constituents save one 
—using a like calibre and its classes, associated 
with an auxiliary shell-power, of which the 
French piece alone differed in its development 
from the English and American. 

But, how variously do they combine the seve¬ 
ral elements'? 

The line-of-battle-ships referred to, are nearly of 
like size and capacity. There is a heavier class, 
the three-deckers, and also a smaller class of their 
own denomination; but these are the heaviest of 
the two-deckers, and may be assumed to repre¬ 
sent the average strength of the Line of the 
three nations. 

By the regulations of 1839, the British total 
weight of broadside is low, and the power in 
longer pieces not very full. Both of these im¬ 
perfections are well rectified in such ships as 
were affected by the special orders of 1849. 

The French 90 and 96 have a full total weight 
of broadside, but are notably deficient in the 
power of battering beyond short distances, by 
reason of the small number of pieces capable of 
this effect. 

The original United States’ battery (1820) is 
well provided with a full total weight of the 
broadside, and a great power of penetration, 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 287 


range, &c., mainly due to the tier of long 
42-pdrs. The introduction of the 8-in. guns in 
1841, detracted nothing from either of these 
qualities. But the effect of the regulations of 
1845, is singularly unfortunate, virtually emas¬ 
culating the power of the ship, in every par¬ 
ticular. The order of 1852, remedied this to 
some extent, but had the 42-pdr. been adopted 
as the unit, that order would have maintained 
our heavy two-deckers upon an equality with the 
heaviest of the English class. 

The shell power in all the ships was originally 
low, and insufficient to exercise a decided effect 
upon the general fire of the Line. The same 
may be said of the French broadside, as consti¬ 
tuted by order of 1849, while the shell power 
of the United States was much improved, and 
that of the British became quite respectable, by 
the orders issued subsequently to the General 
Regulations; particularly the Prince Regent 
class, where it is of a predominating character; 
and makes the battery more powerful than that 
of any United States or French two-decker.* 

In the first class frigates there is also consider- 


* It may be noted here, as a means of comparison with ships 
of a past date, that the Britannia, three-decker, on being laid up 
in 1806, after the battle of Trafalgar, in which she bore a part, 
returned 102 guns to store at Davenport; showing a broadside 
weight of metal equal to 1160lbs .—(Official Report to Committee 
of Parliament.) 



288 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

able diversity of combination; but the British 
Euryalus class (of which there are twenty-four 
ships) is plainly the most powerful, by reason of 
the great extension of the shell power. 

It is to be observed that these regulations 
have reference exclusively to sailing ships, in 
which the battery is confined to the broadside. 

But the application of steam to national ves¬ 
sels, imposes the necessity of resorting to a dif¬ 
ferent style of armament. 

The earliest steamers were driven by the side- 
wheel, and so continued for many years later. 
This arrangement conflicted directly with the 
system of broadside armament, both as regarded 
the number of guns and their position. 

In the first place, it was impossible to carry 
the customary proportion of pieces in a vessel of 
this description, because the steam power occu¬ 
pied so much of the space commonly allotted to 
stowing provisions and water, that the crew re¬ 
quired for a full broadside, could not be provided 
for. Therefore, it was necessary to reduce the 
number of men, and as a consequence, the num¬ 
ber of cannon; independently of which, the latter 
could not be accommodated in the broadside, be¬ 
cause the huge wheels and their fixtures not only 
covered much of its extent, but they interfered 
with the training of those guns for which there 
was room. 

But the disadvantages of the new motor did 
not end with diminishing seriously the offensive 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


289 


power of the broadside; it also offered a large 
and vulnerable surface to the numerous cannon 
of the sailing ship, so that close combat became 
almost certainly disastrous to the side-wheel 
steamer. 

Thus several conditions concurred in deter¬ 
mining the style of battery suitable for side- 
wheel steamers. 

But few pieces could be mounted, and these 
must concentrate the greatest possible power of 
offense at ranges where the broadside cannon 
would be deprived of much of their efficiency. 

Hence, the heavy ordnance of ten and twelve 
thousand pounds, (56-pdrs. 68-pdrs, &c.) and 
the pivot system by which they were alone 
manageable. 

The 10 inch - shell-gun of 84 cwt * appears to have 
been the first piece of ordnance expressly de¬ 
signed and cast in England for this purpose. 
(1831). It was carried by the smaller class of 
steamers first introduced into the British Navy, 
and subsequently by the larger side-wheel and 
screw vessels. 

In 1841, a 56-pdr. by Monk was made for the 
Navy, and in 1844 and 1845, more than 50 
pieces of the same kind. The 68-pdr. by Dun- 
das was subjected to experiment in 1841, and in 
the five years following, more than 100 guns of 
similar description were cast. These two pieces 
were long heavy cannon of 11 and 12000 lb % and 

commonly known as shot guns. 

19 


290 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

The 68-pdr. soon obtained the preference over 
the 56-pdr., and appears to be adopted at this 
time as the principal pivot-gun of the British 
Navy. 

In addition to the pivot-guns necessarily 
mounted on the spar-deck, the largest steamers 
had gun-decks, on which were mounted as many 
broadside pieces as could be carried, but by no 
means in sufficient numbers to match the arma¬ 
ment of a sailing ship of like tonnage. 

Some 20 years passed in laborious and costly 
experiment with the new motor. Its advantages 
were great in certainty and in speed, but in 
defiance of every suggestion that experience 
could furnish, and of every improvement in de¬ 
tail, it seemed utterly irreconcilable with the 
development of the full ordnance power, and even 
with the use of sails. If steam were applied, it 
was to be done to the prejudice of the offen¬ 
sive power, and of the less expensive motor,—it 
was the riddle of the day. 

The problem was at last solved as it only 
could be solved,—not by perfecting details, for it 
was not a defect of detail,—but by going back to 
the first principle of propulsion, where the diffi¬ 
culty had its origin. The cumbrous paddle was 
dispensed with, and for it was substituted the 
screw. By this means, the broadside and the 
space between decks were once more free to 
the guns along the entire length; the action of 



COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 


291 


the screw was in complete harmony with that of 
the sails; they might be used independently or 
in connection, at pleasure, and thus the restora¬ 
tion of the old and cheap motor made it conve¬ 
nient to reduce the new and costly one to the 
functions of an auxiliary. Hence, a reduction of 
the size of engine and its restriction to limits that 
did not interfere materially with the room needed 
for the crew that were to man the broadside. 
And to complete the sum of its advantages, the 
screw was hidden beneath the water, where, with 
the engine, it was not more exposed to shot than 
the magazine. 

Thus the propeller ship was not only equal to 
the sailing ship in every motive and offensive 
power possessed by the latter, but it had at dis¬ 
posal another means of movement even less vul¬ 
nerable than masts, sails, and yards. 

The final result, thus accepted, constituted 
steam as an auxiliary, and the pivot armament 
experienced a similar change in its character. 
With the side-wheel, it was the chief means of 
offense, but when the screw was introduced and 
with it the broadside was restored, the heavy 
pivot-guns were retained, though by their compa- 
limited numbers they became a subordi¬ 
nate element in the broadside. Thus the British 
91 gun ships, Nile, Algiers , and some of the screw 
frigates carry a 68-pdr. on the spar-deck. Others, 
such as the Simoon and Termagant, carry 2 of 68 


ratively 


/ 


292 COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 

and four of l() iuch , with 12 and 18 long 32-pdrs. 
in broadside,—a powerful armament, though 
liable to the objection of three calibres among 
18 and 24 guns, and by no means developing the 
power of which the metal is capable. 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 









Till. 

INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Sinope.—Odessa.—Bomarsund.—Petropaulovski.—Sevastopol.— 
The Vladimir.—Sveaborg.—Kinburn. 

The contest just terminated, is the first that 
has been waged between any great maritime 
powers since shells and steam have become ele¬ 
ments of naval warfare. As a natural conse¬ 
quence, its varied incidents will be closely 
scrutinised by professional men, in order to 
discover how far the theories and speculations 
which they advocate or oppose, may have been 
confirmed or confuted by the stern verities of 
battle. 

The story of the time, however, has yet to 
find its Napier, and this may not be shortly, 
for the actors in the eventful drama are too 
recently from its thrilling scenes to be inclined 
to the sober duties of the chronicler. 

Meanwhile, we are without any authentic 
statement save those of the official reports which, 
are mostly so scanty, as to be unintelligible if 
it were not for the brilliant sketches of the 
public correspondents, who have so graphically 
limned the general picture. 

The absence of precise technical results, is a 
serious disadvantage in the present case, when 


296 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


one feels almost compelled to refer to them 
under the persuasion that some illustration of 
the kind is indispensably necessary to any con¬ 
clusion upon the subjects which have just been 
treated of. 

In such a dilemma a European writer would 
be enabled to find some substitute in the per¬ 
sonal narrative and opinions of those around 
him which, if at times to be received with 
qualification, are yet valuable as the origin of 
the tradition that for a while will fill the place 
of history. 

Elere, remote as we are from the actors and 
the scenes, no such resource is accessible. It 
is with some misgivings, therefore, that we 
ventured on the task, hoping to have the oppor¬ 
tunity at some future day to correct unavoidable 
errors, and to obtain the technical data required. 


SINOPE. 


297 


Sinope. 


' (From Russian official account.) 

This affair (or disaster as Lord Clarendon 
terms it,) occurred near the close of 1853, and 
has been made memorable by its political rather 
than by its military consequences. 

So far as the facts can be ascertained from 
the information that is before the public, they 
appear thus:— 

War existed between Turkey and Russia, 
but without the degree of activity that indicated 
much earnestness in the parties. In November, 
a squadron of seven frigates, with some smaller 
vessels, were sent by the Turks into the Black 
Sea. The Russians allege that its object was to 
seize Souchum Kale and to aid the Caucassians, 
then in rebellion.* Whether the squadron 
succeeded in this or in any other purpose, does 
not appear.j* But while at anchor in the roads 
of Sinope, it was descried, on the 24th of No¬ 
vember, by the Russian Admiral, then cruising 
with three liners, (Marie, Tschesma , and Rotis- 
lajf,) a steamer and a brig. 


* Report of Prince Menchikoff. 

t The letter of the Emperor Napoleon to the Emperor Nicho¬ 
las, (29th January, 1854,) says :—“it matters little to us whether 
“ or not the Turks wished to convey munitions of war to the 
“ Russian territories.” The English declaration of war makes no 
mention of the battle of Sinope. 



298 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


The next day a violent gale prevented him 
from approaching the port, but he despatched 
the steamer ( Bessarabia ) to Sevastopol to an¬ 
nounce the news. 

Upon this, three liners of 120 guns, the 
Paris , Constantine and Tri Sviatitelee , were sent 
under Rear Admiral Novosilsky to Sinope to 
join Vice Admiral NachimofF. 

After the steamer left, the latter took advan¬ 
tage of a fair wind to reconnoitre Sinope. He 
made out the Turkish squadron to consist of 
seven frigates, one sloop-of-war, two corvettes, 
two steamers and two transports, anchored along 
the shore in a line conforming to its semicircular 
configuration. 

Five batteries were noticed on the land at dif¬ 
ferent points near the Turkish ships. 

On the night of the 27th, the Sevastopol divi¬ 
sion, under Novosilsky, joined that off Sinope. 

On the next day, (28th) Vice Admiral Nachi¬ 
mofF made signal that he would attack in two 
lines as soon as the wind permitted. 

On the 30th, between 9 and 10 A. M., a fair 
breeze from E. N. E. sprang up,—the Vice 
Admiral made signal to clear for action and bear 
up for the roads of Sinope. 

The ships were formed in two lines, under the 
two Admirals. In the right, were the Marie 
(flag,) Constantine and Tschesma. In the left, 
were the Paris , Tri Sviatitelee and Rotislajf two 
frigates remaining outside. 


SINOPE. 


299 


The Russian ships bore clown under all steer¬ 
ing-sails, hut the Turkish vessels were so obscured 
by the fog and rain, that they were not seen 
until about half a mile distant. 

When the Vice Admiral, in the Marie , was 
500 yards from two of the frigates (one of which 
bore the Admiral’s flag,) he anchored with a 
spring on. The Rear Admiral (in the Paris) 
and the other ships did likewise on coming into 
the positions assigned them. 

The Admiral’s anchor was scarcely down, when 
the Turkish squadron and shore batteries opened 
fire on the Russian ships, with considerable 
damage to their spars. 

This was soon returned, and with such effect, 
that in five minutes the Constantine silenced the 
battery under her guns, and blew up with shells 
the frigate near it. Soon after, the shells from 
the Paris blew up another frigate, and in an hour 
the fire of the Turkish squadron began to slacken. 
At 2 P. M. it ceased entirely. 

Three frigates, one of them the Admiral’s, 
were in flames, and the two transports were 
sunk. The Turkish part of the town was also 
on fire in two places. 

At P. M., the Russian Admiral made signal 
to cease firing. The two frigates which had 
been left outside to cut off any of the enemy 
that attempted to escape, came in towards the 
end of the action and attacked the corvette and 
sloop-of-war astern of the Rotislaff. 


300 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


About noon, three Russian steamers, ( Odessa , 
Crimea , and Chersonesus ,) under Korniloff, com¬ 
ing from Sevastopol, which they left the day 
before, descried a Turkish steamer (the Taif) off 
Cape Sinope. This vessel had escaped while the 
conflict was going on. The Odessa chased and 
opened fire, but hauled off on finding the Taif 
was the faster. 

When the steamers entered the Roads of 
Sinope, two of them were ordered to tow the 
two Liners lying under the shore batteries, and 
the other to take possession of the JDamietta. 

In the evening, the flames in the burning 
ships reached their magazines, and they blew 
up, setting fire to the town. 

Next morning, the Damietta was set on fire, 
being too much damaged to reach Sevastopol,— 
also the corvette and sloop-of-war. In the lat¬ 
ter were found the Turkish Admiral, and some 
officers and seamen, who were removed. 

The Russian ships suffered chiefly in their spars 
and rigging; the Marie t Tri-Sviatitelee , Constan¬ 
tine and Rotislaff, the most. They weighed an¬ 
chor on the 2d, the damaged ships in tow of the 
steamers; and on the 4th, the Marie , Tri-Sviati- 
telee and Constantine anchored in Sevastopol. 
The Russian loss was 34 killed and 230 wounded. 

The celebrity which attaches to this action, is 
due rather to its political than military import¬ 
ance,—for it certainly was of no great moment, 
in the issues then pending between great powers, 


SINOPE. 


301 


whether or not Russia prevented Turkey from 
furnishing the Caucassians with the supplies that 
could be carried by a small squadron; and as 
little whether Turkey lost so much of her naval 
force. 

It was a link, however, in that chain of grand 
political events that gradually drifted the prin¬ 
cipal powers into a struggle,—being the assumed 
basis whereon the Allies predicated the necessity 
of ordering their fleets into the Black Sea, for 
the avowed purpose of confining the Russian 
fleet to its harbors, and preventing its further 
aggression on the Turks. 

As a military measure, the operation is re¬ 
markable for its completeness. It is true, the 
means were most ample,—but they were also 
fully applied,—the Turkish squadron being ut¬ 
terly crushed in a short time, the batteries 
silenced, and, unfortunately, part of the town 
destroyed. 

Perhaps there is not on record another in¬ 
stance where a whole squadron of frigates was 
so nearly annihilated in so short a time, what¬ 
ever may have been the difference in force,—the 
final catastrophe being generally averted by the 
submission of the inferior party. 

So far as a judgment can be formed upon the 
leading incidents of this affair, as stated by the 
Russian Report, and hitherto not questioned by 
official statement on the other side, the plan of 
action was judicious, its execution prompt, not 


302 


INCIDENTS OF TIIE WAR. 


marred by accident or misapprehension, and the 
ships of the attacking force well handled. To 
come to an anchor with heavy ships under a press 
of sail, the view so obscured by rain and mist that 
the enemy was not seen until within some 800 or 
900 yards; clew up and anchor at good range and 
in regular order; instantly replace the springs 
shot away, and then open a well-directed fire,— 
may not be an extraordinary feat for good sea¬ 
men, but it cannot be executed by indifferent 
hands. 

On the side of the Turks, the errors were ob¬ 
vious and fatal to the entire squadron. Their 
Admiral knew well that only 42 leagues inter¬ 
vened between Sinope and the head-quarters of 
the Russian fleet, a distance so short that the 
Turkish squadron may be said to have been con- 
tinually menaced by the presence of a most supe¬ 
rior force, belonging to the nation against whom 
his Sultan had declared and was waging war at 
the time, and while his own ships were engaged 
in a hostile operation. Yet in view of this immi¬ 
nent hazard, the Turkish commander lay quietly 
and unconcernedly at his anchors, as if no dan¬ 
gers were to be apprehended. Under the cir¬ 
cumstances, a single cruiser seaward was but an 
ordinary precaution, and would have warned him 
in season of the vicinity of the Russian squadron 
on the 24th, so that some of his vessels might 
have an opportunity of escape. Such negligence 
would be incredible, if it were not in keeping 


SINOPE. 


303 


with the usual improvidence of the Turkish pro¬ 
ceedings. 

Having thus utterly disregarded the peril that 
was so near at hand, and even shut his eyes to 
its approach, the Pacha met it like a desperate 
fatalist, and, without hesitation, madly began and 
maintained a contest which was without hope or 
object, and therefore a sheer waste of life. 

The presence of the batteries probably alone 
prevented the Russians from accomplishing what 
they did, with entire impunity: for two of the 
Turkish frigates were blown up in fifteen min¬ 
utes, and it is hardly probable that the remainder, 
with no heavier metal than 24-pdrs., and much 
of it below that calibre, could have done so much 
damage in a couple of hours to six Liners, as 
to cripple four of them, and disable 264 men, 
being a greater loss than the French fleet sus¬ 
tained at Sevastopol the October folIoAving. 

It seems probable that the slackening of the 
Turkish fire, noticed as occurring after it had 
been sustained for an hour, proceeded from the 
cessation of the ships’ batteries, and that the 
works ashore continued a feeble return to the 
Russians until about 2 P. M., when they were 
entirely disabled. It will be perceived too, that 
the Russians took precautions against the renewal 
of their fire. 

We have no precise knowledge of the arma¬ 
ment of the Russian ships, though we know that 
shell-guns formed a part thereof. General Paix- 


304 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


hans, in his remarks on the action,* says, the 
Turks had none, nor any calibre heavier than 
24-pdrs., and but few of these. The shore bat¬ 
teries were weak, and armed with guns of very 
small calibre. 

It is also stated, on his authority, that the 
Turkish officers, on being asked as to the effect 
of the shells, were unanimously of the opinion 
that they caused the conflagration of most of 
the ships. 

The only Turkish frigate afloat after the action 
( Damietta ) had seventeen shot holes below water, 
and could not be got over to Sevastopol. 

The two Admirals, Nachimofff and Novosil- 
sky, with Gen. Korniloff,t received Orders. The 
Captains of the Paris , (Istomine,f) and of the 
Rotislaff, (Konznetsoff,) were made Admirals. 
The Captains of the Marie and Constantine pro¬ 
moted; also those of the two frigates and two 
steamers. The Captains of the Tri-Sviatitelee 
and of the steamer Crimea , received Orders and 
the crews were also rewarded in some way. 


* Moniteur, February 21, 1854. 

f Killed subsequently during the Siege of Sevastopol. 





ODESSA. 


305 


Odessa. 

(Odessa cannonaded by the Allied Fleets, April 22,1854 *) 

The English declaration of war reached the 
fleet at Varna on the 6 th of April,—upon which 
the steamer Furious was sent to Odessa, under a 
flag of truce, to bring off the British Consul at 
that place. Arriving there on the 8th, and near¬ 
ing the port, two blank rounds were fired, when 
the steamer stopped and sent a boat ashore with 
a flag of truce. While returning to the steamer, 
and about a mile from the shore, several shot 
were fired from the battery. 

On the 14th a demand for explanation of the 
insult to the flag of truce was sent to Odessa, 
followed by the allied fleet, which, after a passage 
of three days from Kavarna, arrived at Odessa 
on the 20th, where the answer from the Governor 
of the place was received next day, denying any 
intention of firing at the boat, and asserting 
that the Furious was in motion, approaching 
the shore, and that the shots were fired to warn 
her to keep off. On the contrary, the English 
Captain states that the wheels never turned after 
the two blank rounds were fired, and that the 
head of his vessel was seaward. 


* From general official accounts of English and French Ad 
mirals, Russian General, and letters of Correspondents. 

20 



306 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


The Admirals refused to credit the explana¬ 
tion of the Governor, re-asserted the charge of 
violating a flag of truce and demanded, before 
sunset of the 21st, the surrender of all English, 
French and Russian vessels anchored at Odessa, 
as a reparation for the insult,—otherwise they 
menaced the Governor with a resort to force. 
This letter was received about 4 P. M., of the 
21st, and was not answered by the Governor. 

The Port of Odessa is entirely artificial, and 
formed by two moles running out seaward from 
the shore, which has a direction nearly N. W. 
by N. with a very slight bend from a right line. 
The beach is low and skirts a range of bluffs, said 
to he 80 feet high. These are crowned by some 
public and private buildings, the town stretching 
still further in, and partially seen from the sea. 
Below the cliffs along the beach, are the Lazar¬ 
etto and other establishments connected with 
the trade of the place. 

The two moles jut right out from the shore, 
and have an elbow inclining to the northward; 
so that they inclose, as it were, sufficient water 
for sheltering ships from the easterly and south¬ 
east winds. The northern, called the Crown or 
Pratique Mole, is 412 yards long. At its extre¬ 
mity is the Battery No. 6, which became the 
immediate subject of attack on the 22nd. About 
1660 yards, or nearly a mile south of the Crown 
Mole, is the Quarantine Mole, which is 576 
yards long. The port can hold 300 vessels, 


ODESSA. 


307 


and the bay is extensive, with a depth of water 
quite sufficient for the largest ships. 

The military Governor, General Osten-Sacken, 
says that the sea defences consisted of six bat¬ 
teries, mounting in all 48 guns. Their positions 
are not given by him, and all that is said of them 
is, that the first is the most southwardly, and the 
sixth the most northwardly, being at the end of 
the Crown Mole or Pratique Port; also that 
the fourth and fifth were the most distant from 
the attacking vessels,—too far to act. The five 
batteries not immediately engaged, mounted G 
mortars of 96,—8 guns of 48,—22 guns of 24,— 
2 howitzers of 48, and 6 howitzers of 24,—in all 
44 pieces. The Battery No. 6, had four 24-pdr. 
howitzers. 

The attack was not to be made by the Line-of- 
battle-ships, but by the Steamers, which were to 
take position north of the Crown Mole, some 
2000 yards distant. In this way, all the batteries 
on or about the southern mole, would be thrown 
out of play, being perhaps two miles distant, a 
range beyond the effective play of the heaviest 
metal of the Russians, the 48-pdrs., while the 
howitzers and 24-pdrs. were absolutely useless. 

The nearest Battery, No. 6, having only 
24-pdrs., was not calculated to injure vessels 
2000 yards distant, while their long and heavy 
56 and 68-pdrs. and 10-inch shell-guns would tell 
powerfully. 


308 


INCIDENTS OF THE TTAR. 


Ships of the combined English and French Fleets 

PRESENT AT THE CANNONADING OF ODESSA. 


English. 

Britannia, (Flag,) .120 

Trafalgar,. 120 

Queen,.116 

Albion,. 90 

London,.... 90 

Rodney,. 90 

A gamemnon, ( screiv ,). 90 

Vengeance,. 50 

Sanspareil, (screw,) . 81 

Belleroplion,. 78 

Arethusa,. 50 

Retribution,. 28 

Terrible,. 21 

Highflyer, (screw,) . 21 

Furious,. 16 

Tiger,. 16 

Samson,. 6 


French. 

Ville de Paris, (Flag,) .120 

Valmy,.120 

Friedland,.120 

Henri IV.,.100 

Jupiter,. 90 

Bayard,. 90 

Jena,. 90 

Charlemagne,. 90 

Marengo,. 80 

Descartes,. 20 

Vauban,. 20 

Mogador,. 8 

Caton,. 4 


English .—10 Ships-of-the-Line, 1 Frigate, and 6 Steamers, = 
1117 guns. 

French .—9 Liners and 4 Steamers = 952 guns. 

































ODESSA. 


309 


The British and French ships had anchored 
about three or three and a half miles eastward 
of Odessa; the wind was fresh from S. S. W. to 
S. and S. E.,—moderate sea. 

At 5 o’clock, signal from Admirals for steamers 
to stand in. The first division of steamers, Vau- 
ban, Descartes and Tiger , led by the Samson , 
passed the southernmost batteries, keeping out 
of range of them, and steering in for a position 
off the Imperial Mole. This division was fol¬ 
lowed at 6 h ‘ 45 min - by the second division, and 
by the Screw-ships Sanspareil and Highflyer, 
ordered, however, to remain out of action for 
the present. 

At 6 h - 36 min -, the Samson , in passing the Bat¬ 
tery No. 6, on the end of the Imperial Mole, 
which was to be attacked, fired the first shot, 
and this was instantly returned, the shot going 
through the quarter-boat, and finally dropping 
on deck; distance nine to ten cables’ length.* 
Followed by the three other steamers, the Sam¬ 
son wheeled around, and in passing, again fired, 
the Russian shot hulling her repeatedly, but 
without much force. Perceiving that he was 
going near a buoy, placed by the Russians to 
mark their range, the commander of the Sam¬ 
son, and the division, edged off to a position 
where the guns of the battery would not bear 
or reach, and from thence poured in their fire 


* French,—say about 1900 to 2100 yards. 



310 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

steadily. The Vaiiban had received some hot 
shot while circling the Russian buoy, which 
ignited her side, and, being unable to suppress 
the flame, was obliged at 8 o’clock to haul out 
of action and return to the fleet for the neces¬ 
sary assistance. 

At 8 h> 15 min, ? the Arethusa frigate was ordered 
to fire at some of the southern batteries, the 
guns of which were troublesome; which she did 
under sail, and was obliged to reef while so do¬ 
ing, as the breeze freshened. 

At 9 h ' 22 min> , the second division ( Mogaclor , 
Terrible , Furious and Retribution ,) ordered into 
action,—began to fire about 10 b 30 min ', having 
anchored,—the first division also anchored. 

The efforts of these seven steamers, aided 
during the absence of the Vauban by another 
French steamer, the Gaton * were mainly directed 
to demolish the battery on the Imperial Mole, 
the resistance of which was merely passive, for 
its few pieces were altogether unequal to the 
distances preserved by the steamers; and one 
of these was dismounted in the course of the 
morning. The question, therefore, was one of 
endurance only. When a favorable opportunity 
seemed to offer, the batteries on the cliffs opened 
fire, but with little or no effect, being too distant. 

As the mole and the battery gradually gave 
way before the incessant play of shot and shells 


* Intended to act as a repeating vessel. 




ODESSA. 


311 


and the fire of the battery itself began to slacken, 
the launches of the fleet pulled to the northward 
of the mole, and commenced to throw rockets 
among the Russian shipping. At noon the Vau- 
ban returned to her station, and joined in the 
cannonading. Soon afterwards, the flames were 
seen among the vessels lying in the mole; and 
the battery at its extreme, which had been nearly 
silenced, was abandoned, having been most gal¬ 
lantly maintained for six hours under the fire of 
eight steamers, without the least power of return. 

At 12 h 45 min - the conflagration was spreading 
along the mole, and in five minutes afterwards, 
the Magazine blew up * with a tremendous 
explosion. This catastrophe terminated even 
the show of defence at the point attacked, and 
nothing now remained but to destroy at leisure 
whatever might be accessible to the shot, shells 
and rockets of the allies. Accordingly, the 
steamers approached closer to the Imperial Mole, 
by which the distance to the Southern Mole 
was lessened, and excited a renewal of the fire 
from the guns on the Southern Mole, as well as 
of the mortars on the heights,—none of which 
proved effective. 

About half past two, the Rocket Boats having 
got in too close to the northern beach, were sud¬ 
denly opened on by a battery of field guns, which 
came out from under cover. The shot fell very 


* It is said by an 8-inch shell from the Retribution. 




312 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


near them, but hurt no one, and before the aim 
could be corrected, the steamers turned their 
shells upon the field-guns and drove them off, 
setting fire to some buildings that were near. 

By 4 h - 30 min - all the Russian vessels in the mole 
were burning;— 

—And at 5, P. M., the Admirals ordered their 
vessels to retire. 


4 




The plan of operations, stated to have been 
contemplated by the allies, appears to have been 
fully carried out; and by keeping out of reach 
of the Russian metal, though within the play of 
their own heavier cannon, the object was accom¬ 
plished with the most trifling damage to the 
steamers. This became obvious to both parties 
as soon as the action was fairly entered upon. 
The Russian General says in his Bulletin:— 
“ The enemy, taking advantage of the heavy 
“ calibre of his guns, and particularly of his 
“ Paixlians of 68 and 96, kept for the most part 
“out of range.” The French Admiral in his 
official Report, says:—“The calibre of our guns 
“was larger than that of the enemy’s battery, 
“and our aim better than theirs:” — “Such a 
“ result attests the immense superiority of calibre 
“ and precision of firing from our steam frigates 
“ over those of the enemy.” 



ODESSA. 


313 


The extent of loss on both sides fully confirms 
these statements. It is also noticeable that, when 
the Samson was hulled repeatedly by uncon¬ 
sciously trespassing too near the buoy marking 
the Russian range, the shot that struck seemed 
almost spent; the one, for instance, that passed 
through the thin sides of the quarter-boat, and 
knocked off a corner of wood work,—struck a 
man without injuring him, and then dropped 
down. The hot shot that set fire to the Vau- 
ban passed through the outer plank, and, being 
able to get no farther, rolled down between the 
frames; it proved very dangerous, notwithstand¬ 
ing its want of force. All of them must have 
struck direct, as the water was too rough for a 
distant ricochet. 

It seems surprising that six hours were re¬ 
quired to beat down the mole and its battery; 
if that battery had been able to make a return 
from corresponding metal, could the steamers 
have endured that return for six hours'? 

It was a great mistake to leave undefended the 
position taken by the steamers. Four heavy 
cannon on the mole, and a few more upon 
some work ashore, north of the mole, would 
have driven the steamers out of all range very 
speedily. It may be, that this part of the Roads 
was deemed impracticable to the approach of 
war vessels of ordinary draught, as the water is 
much shoaler there than off other parts of the 
town. A passage in General Osten-Sacken’s 


314 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


“ Order of the Day,” seems to indicate such an 
expectation:—“ The hostile steamers being built 
“ of iron, and drawing very little water, were 
“ able, in spite of opposition, to round the mole 
“ and approach the bank,—one of them going 
“ toward the suburb of Perecipe, accompanied 
“by boats, from which they threw Congreve 
“ Pockets, which burned the vessels in the Pra- 
“ tique Port and the houses in the suburb.” 


BOMARSUND. 


315 


Bom arsund,* 

Is situated on the principal island of a very 
extensive cluster that occupies a commanding 
position between the waters of the Baltic and 
the Gulf of Bothnia, approaching to thirty miles 
of the Swedish coast. Its fortifications may be 
said to menace Stockholm itself, and would 
therefore be of the first importance in the event 
of hostilities between Russia and Sweden. 

In June (21st) three English steamers, under 
Captain Hall, had cannonaded the works erected 
to control the anchorage of Aland. It was late 
when they opened fire, which was continued 
vigorously until midnight, favored by the pro¬ 
tracted light of the day in those high northern 
latitudes. Though one of the steamers nearly 
exhausted her supply of shells, there is reason 
to believe that the distance was entirely too 
great (perhaps 2000 yards) for effect.*)* The 
vessels had five men wounded. 

It is probable that the warmest part of the 
affair was with a small water battery, mounting 
four field pieces, and supported by a body of 


* From an account published by General Niel, (commanding 
French Engineers,) with the concurrence of Colonel Rochebouet, 
commanding the Artillery, and sanctioned by the Minister of 
War. 

f The main-deck guns could not be used,—only the 10-inch 
and similar cannon. 



316 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Finnish riflemen. These galled the assailants 
exceedingly until finally driven away by the fire 
of the heavier guns from the steamers. 

Subsequently, the Allies deeming that these 
works were too strong to be attacked by sea 
alone,* resolved on reducing them by regular 
siege operations; and with this object, a corps 
of 10,000 French soldiers was embarked in the 
latter part of July, under General D’Hilliers. 

The forts on Bomarsund were reconnoitred on 
the 1st of August by the General, the Admirals 
Napier and Parseval, with the Generals of Engi¬ 
neers, Niel and Jones, in a small English steamer. 

The principal work commands the anchorage 
and passages immediately bordering on its site. 
It stands near the water’s edge, is very large, 
and has the form of a demi-ellipse, the larger 
axis of which measures 950 feet. It has two 
tiers of casemates, each pierced with 62 embra¬ 
sures on the curved face, which is turned sea¬ 
ward, and is 6.4 feet thick. 

The exterior facing of all the casemates is 
composed of large blocks of granite, in form 
nearly pentagonal. 

The whole masonry has been executed with 
the greatest care, and must be considered as of 
very good quality. 


* Admiral Napier, in the course of a speech at the Lord Mayor’s 
banquet, (November, 1854,) asserted that he desired, and had pro¬ 
posed to the British Government, to make the attack himself with¬ 
out the aid of the French corps. 



BOMARSUND. 


317 


The gorge, though closed, relies mainly for 
defence on three round towers placed in different 
directions, at distances of 880 and 980 yards. 
One (A) to the north, at the extreme of a small 
peninsula,—another, (B,) to the south-west, on 
an elevated site, whence it commands the re¬ 
doubt, and the ground within range. A third, 
near the water’s edge, on a point of the adjoin¬ 
ing isle of Prasto. 

The three are similar, having a diameter of 
47 feet; are well and solidly built upon the bare 
and rugged granite; are pierced with 29 case- 
mated embrasures in two tiers, and loop-holed at 
the interior spaces. 

On the 7th of August, the ships with the 
troops arrived before Bomarsund, and anchored 
just out of cannon shot; next day, a landing was 
effected without resistance at different points a 
few miles from the forts, and the investiture 
completed landward, but not seaward, as Prasto 
was unoccupied and thereby some communica¬ 
tion was still practicable. 

On the night of the 9th, the commandants of 
artillery and engineers concluded the examina¬ 
tions begun by day, and decided the western 
tower to be the key of the position, and there¬ 
fore to he reduced first. 

After some consultation among the chiefs of 
the forces, the General resolved that the French 
should establish a battery (No. 1) of four 16-pdrs. 
and four mortars at 650 yards from the west 


318 INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

tower (B), and the English another, (No. 2,) of 
four naval 32-pdrs. of 42 cwt * at 440 yards, or if 
possible at 330 yards, against the same tower. 
Should these prove insufficient, the French to 
place a third, (No. 3,) at 220 yards, armed with 
long ship 32-pdrs. 

Early on the 13th August, (4| A. M.,) No. 1 
being completed, opened conformably to the 
plan. The Russian return was good, and three 
French pieces were struck, but the battery soon 
acquired the ascendancy. At first its shot were 
broken against the granite; but this finally gave 
way. It now appeared that the English battery 
could not be brought nearer the tower than 650 
yards; wherefore, the French established No. 3, 
on the night of the 13th. 

Next morning, the guns of the tower being 
silent, and the garrison seemingly much dimin¬ 
ished, some chasseurs entered an embrasure and 
seized the commandant with 32 men, the rest of 
the garrison (140 in number) having escaped to 
the main work. 

The 16-pdrs. of No. 1, fired 350 shot in 14 
hours. In the same time the four mortars threw 
240 bombs. 

When the Russians perceived the capture of 
the western tower, they threw bombs into it 
from the other works, which hurt some men, 
and produced such quantities of splinters from 
the masonry, that the French were obliged to 
leave it; and soon after had to draw off further, 


BOMARSUND. 


319 


as the fire broke out and threatened an explo¬ 
sion. 

The capture of the west tower ensured the 
command from that quarter; but the site of the 
battery for breaching the grand redoubt, being 
taken in reverse by the north tower, (B,) the 
English battery was directed that way; and dur¬ 
ing its operation, the French were to establish 
the breaching battery, and then be assisted by 
the English battery, which, by that time, would 
have reduced the north tower. 

During the evening of this day, a few of the 
ships fired single shells deliberately at the fort, 
which were returned in like manner,—this lasted 
but a short time, and was probably without con¬ 
sequence to either party. 

On the 15th, the besiegers opened a general 
fire on the Russian works. The English battery 
upon the north tower from the three 32-pdrs. of 
42 cwt> , manned by seamen and marine artillery¬ 
men. The French from No. 4, (armed with four 
mortars and two howitzers,) playing upon the 
gorge of the principal work, also from two of 
their new style of field pieces, placed at 880 
yards,—and the ships with their heavy guns, at 
a range of 3000 yards. 

The 10-inch shell-gun of 84 cwt - had also been 
landed from the Blenheim , and placed at 1800 
yards from the fort, behind an earthen rampart, 
16 feet thick, 9 feet high and 35 feet long, 
thrown up by the seamen of the ship. The 


320 INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

Captain, (Pelham,) who took charge of the 
piece himself, opened in concert with the other 
batteries. 

The Russians replied steadily to all. The 
north tower to the English battery, with plenty 
of round and grape at the French battery, No. 4, 
which also was fired on from the gorge. The 
Blenheims 10-inch shell-gun, as well as the ships, 
had a share of shot, shell, &c., from the fort; the 
fire of the vessels was lively,* and the fort must 
have suffered seriously from it, had the distance 
not been so great: but on this account some of 
the shells fell outside of the walls, and the Rus¬ 
sians also injured the embrasures by giving the 
guns the elevation due to the range, (3000 
yards.) 

The French chasseurs meanwhile endeavored 
to quell the fire of the Finnish riflemen, which 
was proving very troublesome, as it had done 
previously to the three steamers in June. 

While the cannonade was going on, the west¬ 
ern tower, which had continued burning, blew 
up and was entirely destroyed. 

In the evening, the north tower showed a 
white flag,—a complete breach had been made 
from top to bottom, between the two embrasures, 
and would have been easily made practicable 
if widened a little at the foot. This had been 


* The French Engineer noticed particularly the great range 
and accuracy of 80 -pdr. shot from the steamer of Admiral Chads. 



BOMARSUND. 


321 


effected by 487 shot and 45 shells, fired from the 
three 32-pdrs. of 42 cwt> in eight hours, (22 rounds 
per hour each gun); the charge of gun Gibs., 
distance 950 yards. 

The skill and intrepidity of the Russian gun¬ 
ners were worthy of remark. They damaged the 
three 32-pdrs., and after the fall of the masonry, 
continued to serve their guns, though entirely 
exposed. 

The principal exterior defences of the gorge 
being now reduced, haste was made during the 
night to establish a breaching battery at 440 
yards; and Admiral Parseval occupied the isle of 
Prasto with marine infantry,—so that the place 
was now completely invested. 

On the 16th, the fire of mortars and howitzers 
was maintained continually from No. 4, and the 
chasseurs annoyed the defence considerably; but 
nevertheless many of the French soldiers were 
wounded. 

Admiral Napier, observing that the Prasto 
tower was harassing the English battery No. 2, 
ordered a squadron of steamers, Hecla , Leopard ', 
and Cocyte , under Rear Admiral Plumridge, to 
cannonade the tower; but, after the surrender, 
it appeared with no other damage than to the 
roof and guns en barbette , two of which were dis¬ 
abled,—the masonry and bomb-proofs were un¬ 
hurt, and five men killed or wounded. 

In the afternoon, the white flag was displayed 

on the fort, whither repaired the Admirals and 

21 


322 


INCIDENTS OF THE VAR. 


Generals; the French battalions entered the 
Court, and to conclude, the commander of the 
Prasto Tower, on being summoned, surrendered 
with a garrison of 140 men and 18 guns. 

The battery No. 4, in operation during the 
15th and on the 16th until the capitulation, had 
thrown 230 shells and 300 bombs from the two 
Howitzers and four Mortars, the former served 
by the land Artillery, the latter by the marine 
Artillery. 

The Governor, General Bodisco, stated that 
the surrender had been particularly brought 
about by the appearance of the breaching bat¬ 
tery, so rapidly raised in the night against the 
Gorge. On the other hand the Allies were 
struck by the preparations made for receiving the 
assault. 

All the openings looking upon the Court had 
been barricaded by timber and bags of meal, 
leaving no apertures but those for the musketry. 
Had the garrison sustained an assault, the 
French Engineer thought the assailants would 
have suffered great losses, but states that the 
Russians must have been aware of their fate , if 
the French soldiers had been compelled to carry 
the work by force. 

The number of the garrison was 2400 men. 
There were mounted in the Fort and Towers, 
116 guns, mostly 32-pdrs., and three mortars. 
78 Swedish cannon were in the park, and 7 field- 
pieces in the Court ready for service: a consider- 


BOMARSUND. 


323 


able stock of powder, projectiles, and provisions 
were on hand. The besiegers lost 85 killed and 
wounded. 

The French Engineer, General Niel, remarks 
that as the masonry of the works was not covered 
at any part by earth, it is manifest that the 
whole plan of defence was based on the supposi¬ 
tion that the large blocks of granite with which 
the exterior walls were faced, would resist the 
action of cannon. 

But the defenders of Bomarsund must have 
experienced a great disappointment, when they 
found that 16-pdr. shot and bombs were able to 
dislocate so completely the masonry of the West 
tower, and the 32-pdr. shot to breach the North 
tower at more than 950 yards. 

He remarks further, that the siege of Bomar¬ 
sund is another proof of what has always been 
admitted in France, that masonry of any quality, 
cannot withstand the effect of heavy calibres at 
good range; and the circular form, which neces¬ 
sarily tends to divergent fire, likewise gives most 
advantage to the attack. 

The next operation of the Expeditionary Corps 
would have been directed to Hango, where the 
two forts, Gustavarn and Gustaf Adolph with 
some marine batteries, command the passage 
from the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland. But 
the Russians foreseeing that these could not be 
maintained against the Allies, blew them up on 
the 27th of August, while the Admirals and Ge- 


324 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


nerals were reconnoitering the position, and thus 
terminated the only operations which were within 
the scope of the Expedition in the Baltic. 


-fr¬ 


it is stated by General Niel, the French 
Engineer, that when it was decided to destroy 
the works, the English Naval officers requested 
that six casemates should be left standing, in 
order to try the effect of shot on masonry faced 
with granite. 

A ship of the line was anchored 1000 yards 
(915 metres) from the wall of the casemates, and 
fired two hours with single shot and in volleys. 
The shot had little effect on the masonry. 

The ship then approached to 500 yards (458 
metres) and opened a well sustained fire, firing by 
broadsides from the tw T o decks: in an hour’s 
firing the walls fell in ruins. 

At this last distance, the first shot was fired 
only 24 minutes after letting go the anchor, and 
the opinions of Admiral Napier, the English 
Naval officers, and General Jones were, that a 
similar operation would not have been practicable 
under the enemy’s fire ;* the ship and her crew 
would have suffered too much. 


* In expressing this opinion, neither of these officers could 
have entertained the idea that a well disciplined ship must need 
24 minutes to open fire. 




BOMARSUND. 


325 


Sir Howard Douglas says, (376,) “The firing 
66 of the Edinburgh at 1060 yards was unsatisfac - 
“ tory . 390 shot and shells were fired from the 

“ largest and most powerful guns in the British 
“Navy, (viz:—from the Lancaster gun of 95 cwt< 
“ with an elongated shell of 100 lbs.; from 
“ 68-pdrs. of 95 cwt and 32-pdrs. of 56 cwt solid 
“shot guns; from the 10-in. shell-guns of 84 cwt ‘ 
“ with hollow shot of 84 lbs.; from 8-in. shell- 
“ guns of 65 cwt and 60 cwt % with hollow shot of 
“56 lbs.), but did little injury to the works. At 
“ 480 yards, 250 shot, shells and hollow shot 
“ were fired; a small breach was formed in the 
“ facing of the outer wall, of extremely bad 
“ masonry, and considerable damage done to the 
“ embrasures and other portions of the wall; but 
“ no decisive result was obtained,—no practicable 
“ breach formed by which the work might be 
“ assaulted; &c., &c. ” 


326 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Attack on Petropaulski, 

August 31st and September 4 fh, 1854. 

(From English accounts.) 

The statements which have reached here in 
relation to this affair, are so scanty and obscure 
as to make it difficult to obtain any precise idea 
of its details. We have, therefore, to be content 
with a mere outline of the circumstances under 
which the combat was conducted. 

Awatska bay is situated on the eastern shore 
, of the Kamskatka peninsula, and towards its 
southern extreme. It is rather a harbor than a 
bay, in the ordinary sense of the term,—being a 
spacious basin nearly circular in figure, some 10 
miles across, north and south, and rather less 
east and west, and enclosed on all sides, having 
an entrance at the S. E. angle nearly If miles 
wide and the same in length,—the shores well 
defined and the channel easily distinguished. 
This extensive harbor is encircled by lofty moun¬ 
tains, and contains within it three smaller har¬ 
bors, Tareinski on the S. W. corner,—Rakovya 
on the eastern shore, and some two miles more 
northerly on the same side, that of Petropaul¬ 
ski. The two first are quite large, while the 
last named is very small, but of convenient 
dimension, good depth of water, easy of access 


PETR (> PAULS KI 



D.WC-Ulland Sc. 


lOO 


300 

. -- " I 


No. 1 


//. 


w, 


'‘"'n, Stre 


Scale in Fathoms 























PETROPAULSKI. 


327 


and of defence. It is formed by the jutting due 
south from the main shore of a high tongue of 
land about £ of a miles long, (Signal Hill,) run¬ 
ning nearly parallel with the direction of the 
main coast opposite, and forming a little harbor 
from 500 to 600 yards in width, which is divided 
into two ports by a low spit of sand, that starts 
from the main shore and making out obliquely 
some 500 yards towards the middle of the long 
tongue of land, approaches it so closely as to 
leave a passage of but 80 yards wide, whereby 
the entrance to the upper port is effected, the 
channel varying from 5 to 9 fathoms. 

There is a sufficient depth of water in all 
parts, and the navigation is free from rocks or 
other obstructions. A small town containing 
three or four thousand people, is located at the 
head of the inner port on the slopes of the 
hills which rise from the margin of the water; 
and fishing huts are scattered along the sand spit. 

Considering the remoteness of the region, and 
the little value of the place in a military or 
commercial point of view, it was amply fortified; 
several batteries being posted on different points 
so as to command the approaches and various 
parts of the ports,—not armed with many can¬ 
non, nor very strongly constructed, but as well 
combined as the nature of the ground permitted, 
and quite sufficient to defend the place against 
an attack not conducted in full force. 

The tongue of land that encloses the port to 


328 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


the westward, and separates it from Awatska 
Bay, rises abruptly from the water into a pro¬ 
montory of considerable elevation, called Signal 
Hill , that extends northward about half a mile 
from its cape, and then terminates suddenly, 
leaving a low sandy isthmus between it and the 
continuation of the highland, (Nicholas Hill,) 
which stretches onward upon the main land, 
and still continues to border the shore of the 
bay,—both hills being covered by a thick growth 
of wood. 

The narrow pass between these ridges is the 
site of a monument erected by the Russians to 
La Perouse, and is closed by a Battery, (No. 3,) 
directly facing the bay. 

Just at the northern limit of Nicholas Hill, 
and close to the water is a Battery, (No. '7,) 
which guards the access to the rear of the town 
from a landing in that quarter. The road lead¬ 
ing thence is further protected, where it borders 
a small lake, by two inland Batteries, Nos. 5 and 
6, about a quarter of a mile S. E. of No. 7. 

Though the Battery in the pass, (No. 3,) and 
No. 7, are only some 1200 yards apart, yet the 
contour of the ground between them prevents 
their efficient co-operation, and restricts each to 
its special purpose. No. 3 is, however, com¬ 
manded by the broadsides of the ships, which 
can sweep the pass when sprung in that direc¬ 
tion, and the steep slopes on its flanks also 
afford excellent positions for musketry. 


PETROPAULSKI. 


329 


The entrance to the port is interdicted by the 
joint fire of three Batteries, No. 1 on Signal 
Cape,—No. 2 on the spit that divides the port, 
placed just where it issues from the main shore, 
—and by No. 4, entirely outside the port, on 
the borders of the bay, about 900 yards south of 
No. 2. Each of these bear upon any part of the 
outer port, and sweep well the approaches to 
it: with them concurred the broadsides of the 
Aurora, 44, and Dwina , 18, anchored in the 
inner port, close to the passage from the outer 
port, so narrow as not to exceed a hundred yards 
across,—their guns commanding, at most effec¬ 
tive range, the outer port, and looking over the 
spit well into the harbor of Awatska. 

The Allied squadron, consisting of the British 
frigates, President, 50, Pique, 40, and steamer 
Virago , 6 , under Bear Admiral Price; with the 
French frigates, Forte , and Fury dice , and the brig 
Obligado, under Bear Admiral des Pointes, left 
Honolulu on the 25th of August, and were off 
the entrance to Awatska Bay on the 28th. That 
afternoon, the Virago and brig went in with the 
Admirals to reconnoitre. Next morning, the ships 
entered Awatska Bay, and steered up for Petro- 
paulski, anchoring near the entrance to its outer 
Port. The Virago stood in near enough to ex¬ 
change shots with one of the exterior batteries, 
probably in order to test its force. 

On the 30th, the ships were under way, bear¬ 
ing in to engage, when it became known that the 


330 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


English Admiral had been fatally wounded by a 
pistol shot; the attack was therefore postponed. 

On the 31st operations were resumed by the 
squadron, which closed in to attack the batteries 
of the outer Port. According to the Russian 
plan of the affair, the ships formed in line about 
600 yards S. W. of the Battery (No. 1) on Signal 
Cape, where the broadsides of the Aurora and 
Dwina were masked by the intervening headland, 
and the fire of the most powerful work (No. 2) 
also appeared to be in a measure obstructed by 
the same obstacle. The Pique directed her guns 
upon the Cape Battery, while the President and 
Forte gave their attention to the outermost work 
(No. 4), and having soon silenced it, a party of 
seamen and marines was landed from the Virago , 
which, notwithstanding a distant fire from the 
Aurora and consort, succeeded in gaining the 
work, when they spiked the guns and broke up 
the carriages before a Russian detachment could 
come up to prevent it. The re-embarkation was 
then effected without loss. This done, the Presi¬ 
dent and Forte joined their fire to that of the 
Pique , but it was soon found that the guns of 
the Spit Battery (No. 2) were particularly annoy¬ 
ing to the Forte , which was hulled repeatedly by 
its shot. Wherefore, the two ships turned their 
broadsides that way, and after a well-maintained 
cannonade, succeeded in disabling many of the 
guns; upon which the Russians evacuated the 
work, and moved towards their ships. 


PETROPAULSKI. 


331 


Though the fire of the batteries defending the 
outer port appeared to be now quelled, yet the 
day was well advanced, and the most difficult part 
of the operation remained to be achieved. The 
pass to the inner port was less than a hundred 
yards wide, and was raked by the broadsides of 
the two ships at a very short distance,—while it 
was by no means certain that the Batteries which 
had been silenced, were so far disabled as to be 
incapable of renewing their fire at the most 
critical moment of the affair. 

The determined character of the resistance 
also indicated that no possible means would be 
neglected to make good the defence. 

Whether these or other motives predominated, 
it is certain that the Allied Commanders discon¬ 
tinued the attack in this quarter, and some days 
elapsed, probably in deliberation as to the most 
advantageous mode of renewing the operation. 
Finally, it appears to have been determined to 
silence the batteries (Nos. 1 and 2) outside on 
the Awatska shore, and to land a body of men 
to the northward and westward of the town, who 
were to descend to the rear of it, and take it as 
well as the principal battery defending it, in re¬ 
verse. Accordingly on the 4th of September, 
early in the morning, the Virago received the 
landing party, 700 strong of English and French, 
equally divided, and taking in tow the President 
and Forte , steamed in towards the batteries. The 
President cast off about 600 yards from battery 


332 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


No. 2, placed in the gorge of the high land on 
the Peninsula, and a warm fire was opened on 
both sides. The batteries aimed well, and the 
frigate received considerable damage, but in no 
great time cleared the work. The Forte had 
less difficulty with No. 1, and this being silenced, 
the Virago disembarked the men without delay. 
The course selected, led the party up a steep 
ascent, where they encountered a thick and 
tangled undergrowth, and found themselves 
exposed to a severe fire of musketry from an 
ambush which told with fatal effect. After gal¬ 
lantly sustaining an unavailing struggle and 
severe loss, a retreat became necessary, which 
was attended with much confusion. The party 
then re-embarked, and reached their ships before 
noon. 

On the 6th, the squadron weighed anchor and 
put to sea. 

It appears from the official returns, that the 
English loss in killed, wounded and missing was 
107. The French 102, making a total of 209. 

The Russian loss is said to have been of 
like amount, but this is not stated in their own 
accounts. 



































































































e ('. rrf stantim? 


Fort Constantine 

104 &. . 






0 H ,r . 

\ 

sthimm 

/»»// 




T (' r 




TLuj itati'Mattery. 




woo 

i 


2000 

_ 


DJd?Cleiland Sc. 

3 OOO Yards 


Harbor 


of 

SEVASTOPOL 

From Admiralty Chart 

18 55 . 









































SEVASTOPOL. 


333 


Naval Cannonade of Sevastopol.* 

• * • 

17^/i of October , 1854. 

The French and English works around the 
south side of Sevastopol being sufficiently ad¬ 
vanced, on the 16th of October orders were 
issued by the Generals for a general opening 
of the siege batteries, next morning at 6^ 
o’clock, upon a signal of three bombs in suc¬ 
cession from the centre of the French lines ; 
and, in order to relieve the left of the latter 
from the full play of the Russian guns, particu¬ 
larly those of the Quarantine Battery which 
enfiladed them with effect, the Admirals had 
agreed to bring in the ships and cannonade 
the southern portion of the town, the port and 
forts at the Quarantine, Alexander and Artil¬ 
lery Bay. 

As the fire of Fort Constantine would have 
more or less effect on the fleet while engaged, 
it was indispensable to include it in the gene¬ 
ral operation, and also the works on the cape 
and bluffs to the rear of it, which, in turn, 
would command the attack on Fort Constantine. 

It will thus be perceived how well connected 
was the whole system of Russian defence in 


* From official English, French, and Russian Reports, letters 
of public correspondents, &c. 



334 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


this direction—each work supported by another, 
so that no one could be singled out as the 
object of a separate attack. 

The official Reports of the French, English, 
and Russian commanders, furnish a brief ac¬ 
count of the leading incidents of the naval 
operations on that day; sufficient, perhaps, for 
all general purposes, considering that the de¬ 
sign of cannonading by sea was merely to effect 
a diversion for the land attack; but it is alto¬ 
gether wanting in those technical minutiae 
that the professional inquirer needs to elucidate 
some of the vexed questions that embarrass the 
business of the seaman, as well as the specu¬ 
lations of the student. 

In the absence of authentic data, some assist¬ 
ance is to be had in the graphic and interest¬ 
ing correspondence of the Press; with which 
means, and a due share of reasonable inference, 
we make out the following view of the case:— 

The allied force engaged, consisted of 14 
French, 10 British and 2 Turkish ships-of-the- 
line, some of which had auxiliary steam, but 
most of them were without; there was a num¬ 
ber of side-wheel steamers, of large and small 
class, to tow these. 


SEVASTOPOL. 


335 


British Division. 


Agamemnon,.., 

Guns. 

... 90 screw. 


Sanspareil,...., 

... 81 

screw. 

Guns. 

Albion,. 

... 90 


Queen,. 

... 116 

u 

Vesuvius,.. 6 

Britannia,. 

... 120 

n 

Furious,... 16 

Trafalgar,.. 

... 120 

<( 

Retribution, 28 

London,.* •*•... 

... 90 

<< 

Niger,. 14 

Vengeance,.... 

... 84 

u 

Highflyer,.. 21 

Rodney,. 

... 90 

U 

Spiteful,... 6 

Bellerophon,.... 

... 78 

U 

Cyclops,... 6 

Arethusa,. 

... 50 

n 

Triton,.... 3 

Samson,.. 

6 

side-wheel. 

— 

Terrible,. 

\ 

... 21 

1036 

106 

1142 

U 

106 




























336 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR 


French Division. 


Gun?. Horse Power. 


1. Napoleon,. 

92 screw , 960 



2. Henry IV,. 

100 


Guns, 

3. Valmy,. 

120.' 

Towed by the Descartes,.. 20 

4. Paris,. 

120 . 

U 

Primauget,. 8 

5. Jupiter,. 

90. 

u 

C. Colombo, 

6. Friedland,. 

120 . 

u 

Vauban,.... 20 

7. Marengo,. 

80 . 

« 

Labrador,.. 

8. Montebello,.... 

120 screw , 160 



9. Suffren,. 

90 . 

« 

Albatross,.. 

10. Jean Bart,. 

90 screw , 450 



11. Charlemagne,.. 

90 screw , 450 



12. Bayard,. 

90 . 

« 

Orenoque,.. 

13. Alger,. 

80 . 

u 

Magellan,... 14 

14. Marseilles,. 

80 




1362 
























SEVASTOPOL. 


337 


The measures taken on the part of the Rus¬ 
sians to close the entrance, hy sinking some of 
their heavy ships, had the additional effect of 
limiting the positions of the ships of the Allied 
squadrons, though they only contemplated an 
attack on the outer forts; and the reefs that 
lined the shores on both sides, restricted still 
further the opportunity of close approach to 
large vessels, except under disadvantages that 
left little chance of success. All this will he 
perceived from the manner in which the opera¬ 
tion was conducted, and the events of the day. 

The weather was fine, rather warm and calm, 
except when a faint air occasionally swept by 
—wherefore no sail was loosed throughout the 
fleet, and steam was relied on for placing the 
ships. Early in the morning, preparatory sig¬ 
nals for battle were displayed. Steamers were 
lashed on the port side of the line-of-battle- 
ships that were without screws, and about 10^ 
o’clock the divisions were moving in for their 
stations. 

The attack is divisible into two distinct 
parts, that by the general line, the other hy 
the detached squadron. The general line was 
formed by all the French and a majority of 
the English ships,—they steered for the en¬ 
trance of the harbor, keeping the southern 
shore aboard, close in with which, at the 
entrance of the Chersonese inlet, the Charle¬ 
magne anchored. The other ships following 

22 


i 


338 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


the Charlemagne , on approaching her, kept 
away to the northward for their positions, 
which, it seems, were not always attained 
exactly, and therefore the line w T as not formed 
with precision; hut no ill consequence seems 
to have arisen from this circumstance; none 
certainly that would have affected the result. 

The Charlemagne was about 1500 yards from 
the nearest Russian work, the Quarantine Bat¬ 
tery, and this distance was increased by each 
vessel successively; so that the French Admiral, 
whose ship was the most northwardly in the 
line of his division, was probably about 2000 
yards from the Quarantine Battery. 

Further to the northward lay the British 
Admiral’s ship, ( Britannia ,) which was nearly 
the same distance (about 2000 yards) from the 
Quarantine Battery to the south and Fort Con¬ 
stantine to the north. 

Next to the Admiral’s ship, was the Trafal¬ 
gar ,—then in order the Vengeance , Bellerophon 
and Queen . 

The line formed by the English division, in 
stretching northwardly, lay off Fort Constan¬ 
tine, as intended, and inclined shorewardly 
towards that work. So that the northernmost 
ship of the general line ( Queen) was about 1200 
yards from the fort, and rather less from the 
Telegraph Battery, behind it on the bluff. 

The two Turkish ships managed, in getting 
to their stations, to embarrass some of the Eng- 


SEVASTOPOL. 


339 


lisli ships, and would probably have done most 
good if they had kept out of action altogether. 

The first French ship, ( Charlemagne ,) was 
opened on by the Russians at long range, 
receiving several shot and shells before she 
anchored and began to return the fire, which 
was about one o’clock; at which time the 
batteries of their comrades ashore had been 
silenced: her smoke-stack and masts were dis¬ 
tinctly seen from the high ground about the 
lines, as she bore down to her station; several 
ships followed in support, and for a while, sus¬ 
tained the brunt of the fire, as some delay 
occurred before the whole line was in position 
and engaged. 

The French ships,—supposing that their can¬ 
non were entirely confined to the southern 
works,—opposed upwards of 600 pieces to the 
guns in that quarter, estimated to be about 
350 in number. 

The guns of the northern works, estimated 
at 130 pieces, were opposed by the broadsides 
of the English ships of the general line, show¬ 
ing about 300 guns in broadside. 

No authentic information is yet public in 
regard to the calibres of the Russian guns 
seaward; but the calibres of the English and 
French ordnance were of course 32 and 30-pdr., 
with a moderate number of the Canon Obusier 
of 22 cent ', and a much larger proportion of the 
8-inch shell-guns. 


340 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


The English ships had a considerable num 
her of their men ashore, serving in the Siege 
Batteries, which probably diminished their loss 
without impairing the efficacy of their tire, or 
the management of the ships, as the spar-deck 
guns only were unserved, and no sails were 
loosed, the movements being executed under 
steam. 

The detached squadron pursued an entirely 
different course from the ships of the general 
line. The latter, as already stated, got into 
position by steering along the southern shore, 
until at the desired distance from the Quaran¬ 
tine works, when they kept away northwardly in 
succession. Bear Admiral Lyons, on the con¬ 
trary, ran in for the shore to the rear of Fort 
Constantine, and edged close along it, anchor¬ 
ing as near to the works as the depth of water 
allowed. 

The vessels under his command were the 
only English screw-ships, Agamemnon , 90, and 
Sanspareil , 81, — Albion , 90, — London , 90,— 
and frigate Arethusa , towed by the steamers— 
also the side-wheel steamers Terrible and Sam¬ 
son ;— showing a total force of 200 guns in 
broadside, having a considerable number of 
8-inch shell-guns, and some heavy 56-pdrs. and 
68-pdrs. 

The Terrible , a powerful vessel of that class, 
preceded her companions, and about l h * 30 min -, 
P. M., commenced a skirmishing fire with the 


i 


SEVASTOPOL. 


341 


long 68-pdrs. at the works upon the bluffs. 
The Rear Admiral led his line, and deliberately 
steaming along the shore as close as possible, 
took post in a bight of the shoal, right off the 
retired sea face of Fort Constantine, and as 
near to it as allowed by the depth of water, 
(J less 5 fathoms, or feet.) The station 
was remarkably well chosen, probably the best 
that circumstances permitted. Further south, 
the water shoaled, and the position, moreover, 
might have proved to be more exposed to the 
guns on both sides of the entrance,—-further 
north, the fire from the works on the bluffs 
became more intense, — further in, the ship 
would probably have grounded, and further off 
would have impaired the very purpose of the 
detached squadron. 

The distance of the Agamemnon has been 
variously estimated from 600 to 900 yards,— 
it may be assumed as 750 to 800 yards. 

The Sanspareil , following the Agamemnon, 
anchored astern of her; then in order the 
London , Arethusa , and Albion , — each succes¬ 
sively augmenting the distance from Fort Con¬ 
stantine, and getting nearer to the works on 
the bluffs, to the northward of the fort; the 
London being abreast of the Telegraph Battery, 
the Albion abeam of the “ Wasp Tower,” and 
the distance of the line generally about 500 
yards from the guns of these batteries. It was 


342 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


2, P. M., before the Agamemnon fairly opened. 
The Albion about 20 minutes later. 

The action which ensued between the gene¬ 
ral line and the forts, was little more than a 
plain cannonading for some five hours, with 
scarcely an event of unusual interest. The tire 
of the ships was rapid and continuous, but 32 
and 30-pdrs, with 8-inch and 22 cent> shell-guns, 
must have lacked the force and concentration 
to damage regular works at distances of 1500 
to 2000 yards; though, about 2 h - 30 rain *, the 
Russians are said to have slackened tire, and 
the Quarantine Battery was silent; but this 
may not have been due to any serious loss, 
as they soon resumed. It is also known from 
the Russian Report, that these works suffered 
but little. 

On the other hand, the ships which formed 
the principal line, appeared to have sustained 
no material damage, in hulls or rigging, though 
some of them lost a number of men. 

The detached squadron received and inflicted 
greater damage, as would naturally be inferred 
from its position. 

The tire was vigorously maintained by both 
sides, the Agamemnon and Sanspareil battering 
the sea fronts of Constantine, which was re¬ 
turned with steadiness, but with no vital harm 
to the two ships. It was soon perceived, how¬ 
ever, that the Sanspareil was suffering from the 
guns of the works on the bluffs, which plunged 


SEVASTOPOL. 


343 


down shot and shells, in some degree raking 
the position, notwithstanding that the London, 
Albion, Arethusa and two steamers were doing 
their best to qnell this galling fire. So effec¬ 
tually was it maintained, that in an hour (3 h- 
20 mm ) the Albion was towed out, badly cut up 
in hull, men and spars, and on fire in two 
places from hot shot or shells. 

The Arethusa and London soon experienced 
similar treatment, and were towed out in but 
little better plight. 

This left the works on the bluffs free to give 
entire attention to the Agamemnon and Sans- 
pared, which were indeed already sufficiently 
occupied with Fort Constantine. 

Admiral Lyons fully perceived the danger of 
his situation, but neither he nor his second, the 
Commander of the Sanspareil , seem to have 
contemplated the relinquishment of the post. 
A request for assistance was sent to the Bellero- 
phon which lay in the general line just outside 
of the Agamemnon, some 400 or 500 yards 
further off. The Queen very opportunely ap¬ 
proached about the same time, having left her 
assigned position because incommoded by the 
Turkish ships. Sheering in towards the rem¬ 
nant of the detached squadron, so gallantly 
meeting the odds, the two new-comers took the 
stations just vacated by the damaged vessels. 

The Queen was not long engaged before she 
took fire from a hot shot, and it was necessary 


344 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


to tow her out of action. The Bellerophoii was 
more lucky, and kept her new position in aid 
of the Agamemnon and Sanspareil. But the 
Rodney , which had also stood in from the general 
line to relieve her comrades, in attempting to 
approach or pass the Agamemnon * from the 
southward, realized very unpleasantly how little 
room the Admiral had left to improve on his 
choice of position. 

The ship grounded not far from the Agamem¬ 
non in a more exposed situation to the fire of the 
Fort, suffering much damage therefrom; and 
although speedily assisted by some of the towing 
steamers, was not afloat until the action w T as 
nearly concluded. For the day was now draw¬ 
ing to a close, and the mists of the evening were 
beginning to mingle with the dense smoke that 
enveloped the battle. 

When quite dark, the ships of the fleet 
slipped or weighed, and hauled out of gun¬ 
shot. 


The siege batteries opened vigorously in ge¬ 
neral concert, at o’clock on the morning of 
the 17th of October, upon sight of the appointed 
signal, and at the same time, or very soon after, 
the ships should have engaged the Quarantine 


* So closely, it is stated by one writer, that the Agamemnon 
veered and backed astern to avoid being- fouled. 





SEVASTOPOL. 


345 


Battery on the south side, in order to relieve 
the French left from its severe enfilading fire;— 
for the French General must soon have been 
made conscious of the fact that his batteries 
were overmatched by the Russian fire, and must 
eventually be silenced, unless the expected diver¬ 
sion were effected in season by the fleet. 

It was evident that his observation was turned 
that way, for his experienced eye soon detected 
that the ships were not even in motion, and his 
journal records the brief but significant sentence, 
“ Les flottes 71 'out pas encore pm appareiller .” 
About 10 h 30 miu - A. M. after the blowing up of 
several magazines, and the dismounting of a 
number of guns, the French batteries were 
silenced, and then ceased all motive for prosecut¬ 
ing the cannonade by sea. No sufficient reason 
is given for the delay of the fleet, which vir¬ 
tually defeated the sole and important object of 
the whole Naval operation. The towing of so 
many large ships, was no doubt a slow proceed¬ 
ing ; but that must surely have been well known 
before hand, and could have been provided for 
by starting in season. The diversion might not, 
probably would not, have effected the result; 
but a simultaneous execution certainly held out 
the only prospect of success. 

Apart from this, the cannonading by the ge¬ 
neral line was quite as effective as could be 
expected. The distance varied from 1500 to 
2000 yards,—the calibres were 32-pdrs., with a 


346 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


proportion of shell-guns, and their objects of 
fire, regular fortifications of heavy masonry. 

Under these circumstances, the casemated 
portions of the Russian works were hardly to be 
disturbed, even by the most incessant fire; 
though the uncovered men and guns might be 
damaged seriously, and their operations sus¬ 
pended, for a while, which is stated by the 
Allies to have been the case, particularly with 
the Quarantine Battery, where the cannon were 
en barbette , and being the most advanced, were 
therefore the most exposed. But the fire was 
subsequently resumed, and the Russian Com¬ 
mander avers, that all of the works on the south 
side suffered but little. 

The ships in the general line appear to have 
been quite as little damaged in their hulls by 
the Russian fire from this quarter;—but some of 
them had a number of men disabled, while 
others, seemingly as much exposed, did not lose 
a man. 

The Agamemnon was very seriously mal¬ 
treated, though not to such an extent as to 
impair her power of battery or engine. She 
was on fire several times; was struck by 240 
shot or shells; and, singular to say, only lost 
29 men, while her second, just by, lost 70 
men. The Albion suffered still more, and in 
an hour was towed out, crippled and on fire in 
more than one place, with a loss of 81 men. 
The crews of the London and Arethusa fared 



SEVASTOPOL. 


347 


rather better, but the ships nearly as ill, and 
they too remained in station hut a little time 
after the Albion. The Queen was driven off 
soon after she got into her new position, in 
great danger; and the Rodney had the bare 
satisfaction of getting aground and afloat after 
experiencing some damage. 

The value of the small works on the cape 
and bluffs, was clearly defined in these re¬ 
sults ; being above the dense cloud of smoke 
that enveloped the ships and the lower forts, 
their aim was not embarrassed, while the sea¬ 
men labored under the difficulty of firing with 
an inconvenient elevation, at objects that they 
saw but seldom, and then but dimly and 
briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-battle- 
ships and a frigate were driven off very shortly 
and in great peril, and a fourth badly cut up; 
while the Agamemnon lay opposed to one of 
the heaviest sea-forts with two tiers of case¬ 
mates, and at the end of five hours came off 
with comparatively little loss. 

The fire of both ships and forts would have 
been more fatal, had it not been for the ex¬ 
traordinary accumulation of smoke, which is 
noticed in every account of the action,—par¬ 
ticularly as no ship was within point blank 
range, and more or less elevation of the guns 
was, therefore, required; the damage to some 
of the ships of the detached squadron must 
also have been much greater, had it not been 


348 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


for the timely interposition of the steamers 
which removed from action the Albion , Queen , 
London , Arethusa and Rodney , when in such 
danger that no other means seemed able to 
avert the extreme peril that threatened them. 

The frequency of conflagration in the vessels, 
due to hot shot or shells, is well worthy of 
note. 

The Agamemnon is said to have fired 2700 
shot and shells, which is an average of 60 per 
gun of the broadside. 

The killed and wounded in the Allied fleet 
are thus stated:— 


English. 


Agamemnon,. 29 

Sanspareil,. 70 

Albion,. 81 

Queen,. 8 

Britannia,. 9 

Trafalgar,.*. 2 

London,. 22 

Vengeance,. 2 

Rodney,. 2 

Bellerophon,. 19 

Arethusa,. 18 

Samson,. 3 

Terrible,. 9 

Nine steamers,. 36 


310 


French. 


Henri IV.,. 15 

Valmy,. 30 

Paris,...46 

J upiter,. 0 

Friedland,.42 

Marengo,. 0 

Montebello,. 32 

Suffren,. 4 

Jean Bart,. 2 

Charlemagne,. 37 

Bayard,. 0 

Alger,. 0 

Marseilles,. q 

Seven steamers,. 7 


215 


This damage to the personal of the fleet 
was considerable, as will appear if compared 

































SEVASTOPOL. 


349 


with the number of men killed and wounded, 
in previous naval actions. 



No. of 

Crew 

Greatest 

Average 

Ships in 

disabled. 

No. in 

per 


Line. 


one Ship. 

Ship. 

At Sea, 1st June, 1794,__ 

. 26 

922 

158 

35 

St. Vincent,.. 

. 15 

301 

81 

20 

Camperdown,. 

. 16 

825 

148 

52 

Nile,. 

. 13 

882 

197 

68 

Copenhagen,. 

. 9 

682 

220 

76 

Trafalgar,. 

. 27 

1690 

200 

63 

Algiers. 

. 6 

638 

210 

106 

Navarino,. 

. 3 

195 

76 

65 

Acre,. 

. 7 

22 

11 

3 

Sevastopol. \ Detacl,ed S( l aadron ’ 

. 4 

202 

81 

51 

[ Entire Fleet,. 

. 23 

525 

81 

23 


The naval attack of the 17th owes whatever 
interest it may possess to the spirited and bril¬ 
liant episode enacted by the detached squadron 
which, going beyond all prudential considera¬ 
tions, must have exercised a wholesome influ¬ 
ence on the public mind, as well as upon the 
officers and seamen of the fleet, although it 
may not have advanced the operations of the 
siege. Still, its Nelsonian vigor contrasted 
pleasantly with the irksome monotony that cir¬ 
cumstances seemed to have imposed on the 
routine of naval operations in the Black Sea 
and Baltic, affording an earnest of the disposi¬ 
tion and the capabilities of the fleet. It was 
boldly conceived, gallantly executed, and really 
effected more than seemed possible against a 
regular work of such strength. 
















350 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


The Vladimir. 

(Extract from the Log of the Russian Steamer Vladimir, in the 
Harbor of Sevastopol, 1854-55.) 

This vessel performed a conspicous part during 
the Siege of Sevastopol, and rendered valuable 
aid on many occasions, particularly on the 18th 
June, in assisting with other steamers to check 
the fierce assault of the French columns upon 
the Malakoff and works adjacent to the Kilen- 
balka Bay—for which a handsome acknowledg¬ 
ment was returned in the Official Reports of the 
commanding Generals. 

Other acts of gallantry and good conduct, such 
as the sudden issue of the steamer from the har¬ 
bor on the 6th December, in order to shell some 
out-lying French works, indicate enterprise and 
professional skill on the part of her commander, 
Captain Boutakoff. 

The following citations from his Journal will, 
therefore, be read with interest. 

It may be premised that the Vladimir was a 
side-wheel steamer, built in England in 1848, 
and, therefore, in all probability the ordnance 
here spoken of was of English calibre, &c. 

1854, October 17 th. 

At 7 in the morning the hostile batteries 
opened a furious fire, which was extended all 


THE VLADIMIR. 


351 


around the town. The battery situated on the 
heights of Kilenbalka, at a distance of 23 cables 
from the roads, mounted five cannon, of which 
four were directed against the Malakoff, and 
one upon the roads. The steamers Vladimir 
and Crimea , with the Line-of-battle-ship Gabriel , 
replied to it.* In order to reach the work with 
the 10-inch guns, the Vladimir was heeled to 7°, 
—the port side of the vessel being depressed: 
for which purpose the starboard paddle-box boat 
was lowered, and that on the port side left sus¬ 
pended at the davits,—the men also were kept 
on the port side that were not required at the 
guns. In this position, the 10-inch guns were 
at an angle of 22° with the horizon, the tangent 
sights being at 17|°, and their shells reached the 
battery. The tangent sight of the 68-pdr. was 
at 15^° and 15^°—the fuses, 17 seconds. 

At 11 o’clock, a 68-pdr. shot entered the side 
of the vessel near the upper cabin, and after 
striking successively several objects, fell on the 
cabin deck. 

At 11^ o’clock, a shot entered in the star¬ 
board side below the water-line; it was plugged, 
but without stopping the leakage, for the shot 
could not be got out; its progress to the hold 
had been arrested by part of the interior iron 
bracing. 

* The calibres used by the Vladimir were 68-pdrs. and 10-inch. 
The Crimea had 10-inch. The Gabriel 36-pdrs., from which shot 
only were fired. 



352 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


At half an hour past noon, the enemy’s fleet 
came in from seaward towards the batteries at 
the entrance of the harbor, and began a violent 
cannonade, which was returned from our side 
in like manner. 

At 6 in the evening, the firing ceased on both 
sides. During the day, the Vladimir fired 186 
shells and 72 shot. 

Throughout the whole night the pumps were 
kept going. 

October 18/7*. 

At 6 in the morning, the cannonade was re¬ 
sumed around the city. At 9 the leakage of the 
vessel was stopped by the divers, who worked 
under the fire of the enemy. Towards noon the 
enemy’s battery that was opposed to the Mala- 
koff and the roads, began to slacken its fire. 
The mean interval between the shot directed 
towards the latter, was 6 minutes; so that the 
guns fired about 100 rounds per day. 

At half an hour after noon, another 68-pdr. 
was mounted in the battery looking down upon 
the roads, and a fire of shells, with shot, hot 
and cold, was maintained from the two guns. 
The hot shot seldom reached us, but falling 
near the shore in the shallow water, threw up 
jets of vapor. 

At 2, P. M., a shot struck the vessel on the 
starboard side, below the water-line. The hole 
was stopped during the night by the divers, who 


THE YLADIMIR. 


353 


worked with the light of lanterns. This day the 
Vladimir threw 67 shells and 79 shot. 

October 19 th. 

At 9 in the morning, as soon as the fog had 
passed off, we opened fire on the enemy’s battery. 

At 11, A. M., a shot went through abaft the 
port wheel, and continued its flight onwards. 

At 11^, a shot cut in two a spare studding- 
sail boom near the foremast, and fell overboard. 
Several shells burst quite near the ship without 
doing any damage, chiefly because the fragments 
preserved their onward movement. Some shells 
did not reach, but fell into the water some ten 
yards off, and a tremor was perceptible in the 
submerged part of the vessel. According to the 
divers, slight dints were noticeable on the copper 
sheathing.* 

Just after noon, a shot struck the main-top. 

At 3, P. M., a shot entered the starboard bow, 
below the water-line, and remained in the wood. 
At 4.30, P. M., another shot went through the 
starboard bow. The water began to come in 


* Subsequently, (7th June, 1855,) when we were under fire the 
whole night, we had an opportunity of being satisfied, that when 
shells fell into the water, they still burst after a considerable lapse 
of time, and in each instance communicated a shock or tremor to 
the ship under water, even if they fell half a cable from us, which 
could not have been occasioned by the impact of a fragment,— 
for at that distance it seemed certain that none could have 
reached us. 


23 




I 


354 INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

there, but the divers stopped it in course of the 
night. Threw 58 shells. 

20 th of October. 

At 7, A. M., the enemy’s battery only replied 
to us with a single cannon. We were informed 
by deserters that one gun had burst, and the 
others were conveyed to another battery,—that 
the piece directed upon the roadstead was a 
Lancaster, from which round projectiles were 

fired for the want of conical.* 

At 11.30, A. M., a shot entered the ship, 
killing one man, and wounding two others. 

At 5 P. M., a shot passed through both sides 
of the vessel; we fired 30 shells and 13 shot 
during the day. 

i 

21 st of October. 

Got up steam and steered towards the bar¬ 
racks of the 4 2d equipage. 

At 11 A. M., fired five rounds by way of trial, 
at the English Battery of 22 guns, which was 
directing its fire on the Malakoff and the 3d 
Bastion: as we could not see it from the steamer 
( Vladimir), the falling of our shot was observed 
from the Hill, and the direction of the gun 
corrected thereby. 

At 5J P. M, the Vladimir was anchored 


* This was subsequently confirmed by the English journals. 



THE VLADIMIR. 


355 


abreast of Kilenbalka, by way of precaution, in 
case of a night attack on the city. 


22 d of October . 

At 6 o’clock A. M., the vessel was steered for 
the Powder Magazine of Gieorgieffsk, and an¬ 
chored near it, in order to operate against the 
English Battery. Pear Admiral Istomine sent 
word that our shells annoyed the enemy much. 
At 6 o’clock in the evening, we returned to 
Kilenbalka. 

The sketch No. 1, is intended to explain the 
means used to direct the guns against the high 
ground. In approximating the distance by the 
chart, it was evident from the tables for range, 
(calculated for horizontal distance) that the de¬ 
sired spot could not possibily be reached by any 
gun on board the Vladimir —neither of 8-in. or 
10-in., nor the 68-pdrs. Attempts were made 
with the last named, as it offered the best 
chances of annoying the enemy. The trial shots 
proved it to be impossible to reach that far, so 
long as the vessel was on an even keel. She was 
then heeled over, until the shot began to tell; 
and in this way was ascertained the number of 
degrees on the tangent sight, when its notch 
was aligned with the swell of the muzzle and 
enemy’s Battery,—which proved to be 15|°,— 
with which, the shells and hollow-shot fell 
rightly. 

After being assured by observing the mean of 




356 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


several shot, that the proper elevation was had 
for the 68-pdr., orders were given to continue 
the fire without changing the elevation. At the 
same time the heel of the vessel was increased 
for the 10-in. guns. It will be understood that 
in making trial of the 68-pdr., the entire eleva¬ 
tion had been given that the carriage admitted 
of; for which purpose the coin and bed had 
been withdrawn. Subsequently when the incli¬ 
nation of the vessel was increased, the gunners 
were obliged to replace the coin in order to 
preserve the gun at its proper elevation. 

For the 10-in. guns, it was necessary to heel 
the steamer 7°, so as to give the axis of bore 
an elevation of 22° with the horizon, (by the 
quadrant,) the angle on the tangent sight being 
then 17|°. The fuzes were of 17 seconds. 

In this way the gunners were enabled by 
means of the sight, to observe any change in the 
position of the vessel, produced by the wind or 
other causes, and thereby to adjust the heel of 
the vessel. 

The great elevation given to our guns, seems 
to have induced the English papers to suppose 
that our steamers were armed with mortars upon 
the plan of Roberts. 

In the work on Artillery, by Douglas, (page 
263), it is stated, that the deviation of hollow 
projectiles from the line of fire, is double that of 
solid shot; but nothing is said of the deviation 
at a distance of versts, (3 miles.) Our vessels 


TIIE VLADIMIR. 


357 


generally threw shells , since it teas evident shot were 
nearly harmless so far: sometimes three shells 
would strike the embrasures in succession, but 
a shell from the same gun would, soon after¬ 
wards, fall considerably to the right or left, with¬ 
out any apparent cause. The condition of the 
atmosphere was the same, the gunner had not 
been changed, nor his good will to reach the 
enemy. After many rounds the gun was low¬ 
ered J°, inasmuch as the charge was found to 
ignite with more violence as the bore became 
heated. 

A young Englishman who had been made 
prisoner (5th November) near the English Bat¬ 
tery, reports that a sentry was posted whose 
business it was to cry out, 44 Steamer,” whenever 
we fired, in order that the men might shelter 
themselves from the splinters of the shell. He 
also stated, that their Lancaster cannon was 
only loaded with spherical projectiles, the conical 
having been transferred to another battery where 
they were needed; and in fact all the shot 
that reached us were round; they were probably 
adjusted to the oval bore of the Lancaster, by a 
wooden filling. As to the accuracy of fire at 
great distances, of the Lancaster cannon as well 
as our own, (with spherical projectiles,) it may 
be affirmed there was no difference, although 
the English, being located on elevated ground 
600 feet in height, were not obliged to elevate 
their guns as much as ourselves, Often, after 


358 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


two of their shot had ranged well, dozens of 
projectiles would go over the vessel, or fall con¬ 
siderably to the right or left of it. They made 
use of one kind especially, the peculiar sound 
of which would apprise us before hand when it 
would be likely to fall on the shore without 
reaching us. Upon which the officer on duty 
would direct the men to run about the deck, to 
make the English believe that they had struck 
the vessel; which seemed to encourage them 
more than once to continue firing these projec¬ 
tiles, though they never did reach us. We 
could not succeed in ascertaining what kind 
these were. Their hot shot probably had con¬ 
siderable windage, for they also failed to reach, 
and falling into shallow water, threw up jets of 
vapor. 

The following extract of a letter from Admi¬ 
ral Istomine to the Commander of the Vladimir , 
(February 9th,) may afford some evidence of the 
efficacy of very distant firing:—“ I must again 
“ ask for the co-operation of your guns. The 
44 French have commenced a Redoubt not far 
44 from the English 5 gun Battery, &c., &c., &c. 
44 Try the long range of your heavy shells on 
44 this work.” 

As to the value of 68-pdrs. at less distances, I 
will quote the following facts:—In 1854, while 
stationary and about 25 cables length from the 
English battery, which we call Cyclops , of some 
500 shot fired from it at the steamer, (delibe- 


THE VLADIMIR. 


359 


rately, the intervals being six minutes,) only 
10 struck, (not counting some which cut the 
rigging;) that is, 2 per cent, hit the hull: while 
on the 8th of June, 1855, being nearly 18 cables 
length from the French batteries, six shot out of 
60 struck the vessel, (not including 7 which cut 
the rigging;) that is 10 per cent, hit the hull. 

The amount of penetration was nearly alike 
in both cases; though there was a marked dif¬ 
ference in this respect, between the Vladimir 
and the Gabriel , which was also at the same 
distance, the latter being pierced through and 
through below the water-line. It is true, this 
vessel was built at Nicolaief in 1839, while the 
Vladimir was built in England in 1848. 

The necessity of inclining the steamer in 
order to give sufficient elevation to the guns, 
occasioned great inconvenience. But there was 
then no chance left us for a meeting on the open 
sea, as the entrance to the harbor was blocked, 
and besides, the enemy kept several large 
steamers in readiness to act, (ever since the 
sally of the “ Vladimir ” and “ Chersonese ’ on the 
6th of December;*) wherefore, there was no 


* “ Two Russian Steamers performed a very daring exploit on 
“ the 6th of December. One was a /Steam Frigate, and the 
“ other the Vladimir, which is constantly on the move in the 
“ roadstead, and had often annoyed us with a gun of long range. 
“ At half past one on that day, the Russian frigate suddenly 
“ moved fivm its position not far from the entrance to Careening 
“ (Kilenbalka) Bay, and proceeded under full steam towards the 




360 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


longer need of carriages of little height, on 
which the centre of gravity of the gun is kept as 
near as possible to the deck. One of the Vladi¬ 
mir's officers (Mr. Konstantinoff) has contrived 
an easy method of giving great elevations to 
guns without heeling the ship; and this was 
adopted forthwith, inasmuch as, in case of put¬ 
ting to sea, the guns could be restored to their 
original situation. This was effected by wedge¬ 
like pieces of wood, placed under the carriage, 
as shown in figure 1. The inner straps, which 
include the fore-trucks, were replaced by others 
of greater length, and in this way the cannon 
might be elevated 24°, without heeling the 
vessel. 

This contrivance of Mr. Konstantinoff very 
soon proved exceedingly useful. During the 
assault of the 18th of June, the Vladimir , keep- 


“ entrance of the Roadstead. As she passed along, a rapid dis- 
“ charge of shells was made against the new English Batteries 
“ on the right, especially a square redoubt, placed so as to com- 
“ mand some of the Russian ships on the south side of the inlet, 
“ the guns of which, however, were not yet mounted. The move- 
“ ment of the Russian frigate became an object of general atten- 
“ tion to all the troops on the heights, from which a view of the 
“ Roadstead could be obtained. To the surprise of all she went 
“ past Fort Nicholas and Cape Alexander, and pursued her 
“ course boldly out to sea, attended by the Vladimir. The 
“ object was soon explained. Rounding the Quarantine Fort and 
“ harbor, she stood off beyond that part of the coast where are 
“ said to be the ruins of ancient Chersonesus, and there com- 
“ menced to throw shot and shell towards the French works, 
“ which were thus enfiladed by her guns,” &c., &e. 

Correspondence of “ London News.” 



THE VLADIMIR. 


361 


ing underway, fired with shells along the Ivilen- 
balka; and the power of giving to all the guns 
a great elevation, enabled us to reach the most 
remote reserves of the enemy. Nor was this all; 
at 1200 yards from the shore, attempts were 
made to scour the ground, to the east of Kilen- 
balka, with grape, by giving the guns an eleva¬ 
tion of 23°. Not a ball fell in the water,—on 
the contrary, the whole charge was scattered 
among the heights. 

This result determined me to get closer to the 
entrance of Kilenbalka Bay, and to open with 
grape upon the sharp-shooters that lay under 
cover along the slopes of the high ground, op¬ 
posite to the 2d bastion, and afterwards along 
the whole extent of the Kilenbalka, where the 
enemy had retired. The consequences of this 
fire will be duly appreciated when it is remem¬ 
bered that as many as 155 iron balls (each 
weighing nearly a pound,) or 800 musket balls 
are enclosed in a case of 10-inch grape. 

By continually changing position, the enemy’s 
battery was prevented from striking the Vladi¬ 
mir with shot and shells from their cannon and 
mortars, though several fragments of shells 
reached the vessel, and the jets of water from 
the falling shot wet those who stood on the 
light deck between the wheel-boxes. Thus this 
memorable morning, on which the enemy ex¬ 
pected to reap the reward of nine months’ 
toil, caused little damage to the Vladimir , con- 


362 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


sidering the violent fire directed upon the vessel 
One sailor received a contusion on the shoulder; 
another was wounded in the cheek by the 
splinter of a shell, and it was only after the 
heaviest of the firing, when the Vladimir was 
pursued by shells wherever she went or an¬ 
chored, that a seaman was mortally wounded by 
a piece of a shell, and another lost a foot. 

As to the trajectory of 68-pdr. shot, fired at 
distances of about 25 cables’ length, from a height 
of 500 or 600 feet, it is well to observe that it 
forms an angle of 25° to 30° with the water. 
For distances of 18 cables’ length, this angle 
is 22°. These have been ascertained from the 
sides of the Vladimir , excluding those cases 
where the shot, after piercing the vessel, has 
been deflected from its direction by some ob¬ 
stacle, such as knees, &c. 

GREGORY BOUTAKOFF, 

Captain in the Russian Navy , 
Commanding the Vladimir. 


SVEABORG. 


363 


Bombardment of Sveaborg,* 

By the Allied Fleet , August 9th and 10 th, 1855. 

* The harbor of Helsingfors is formed to the 
east, by the islands of Degero and Sandham,— 
to the west, by the peninsula where stands the 
city of Helsingfors, and is completed to the 
southward by a chain of small islands, which 
stretch across the opening left in that direc¬ 
tion. Midway among these, are the islands of 
East, West and Lilla-Svarto, Vargon and Gus- 
tafsvard, upon which stand the works consti¬ 
tuting the redoubtable Fortress of Sveaborg. 
Rantan and Langorn lie between these and Hels¬ 
ingfors,— Bakholmen and Kungsholmen to the 
eastward towards Sandham. All these islands are 
carefully and powerfully fortified, the batteries 
appearing from seaward as if perched one on 
the other, and the channels leading to the passes 
of the harbor between them have good depths 
of water, but are beset to some distance by 
rocky islets, reefs and hidden rocks, which, ren¬ 
der skill and caution requisite in approaching. 

The object of the operation is distinctly 
stated in the Report of the English Admiral 
to have been “limited to such destruction of 


* From official accounts by English, French and Russian com¬ 
manders. 




364 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


“ fortress and arsenal as could be accomplished 
“ by means of mortarsand it “ formed no 
66 part of the plan to attempt a general attack 
“ by the ships on the defences,” because of 
the additions made to the defences of the place, 
particularly by sea, where batteries had been 
erected “ on every advantageous position com- 
“ manding every practicable approach to the 
“ harbor of this intricate navigation.” 

The Allied fleet arrived off Helsingfors on 
the 7th of August, and on the night of that 
day, the French landed on a small rocky islet, 
about 2200 yards to the southward and westward 
of the fortress, where they commenced the erec¬ 
tion of a battery for four mortars of 27 cent ? 
(10§ inches.) 

The mortar vessels which were to perform 
the chief part in the attack, took position about 
two or two and a quarter miles from Sveaborg, 
obliquely to the general line of its batteries: 
they were anchored head and stern, with suf¬ 
ficient scope to admit of their position being 
changed as much as two cables’ length, when¬ 
ever it was found that the Russian ranges were 
adjusted to the distance. 

Some differences are noticed in the accounts 
which mention the number of mortar vessels. 
The Report of the British Admiral is silent on 
the subject. That of the French Admiral states 
it to be 16 English vessels, each carrying one 
mortar, and 5 French bomb-ketches, each carry- 


SYEABORG. 


365 


ing two mortars. The Russian Report says, 4 
vessels of peculiar construction and 16 mortar- 
boats. A correspondent of the press says there 
were 16 English mortar-vessels.* 

The gun-boats, which were to relieve the 
mortar-vessels of some of the fire from the bat¬ 
teries, had previously received additional guns 
of heavy calibre from the ships of the line; they 
were distributed in divisions, and assigned to 
different stations somewhat in advance of the 
line of mortar-vessels. Two of them, armed 
with Lancaster 68-pdrs., (Stork and Snapper ,) 
were directed upon a three-decker (Xu Russie ) 
moored so as to command the pass between 
Gustafsvard and Bakholmen. The gun-boats of 
each division were to keep continually in mo¬ 
tion about a central point; which they did 
throughout the whole operation, firing upon 
their opponents as their guns bore. No part 
of the circles thus described, is supposed to 
have approached the batteries nearer than 3000 
yards. 

The number of gun-boats does not appear 
from the Reports of the Admirals. The Rus¬ 
sians say there were 25 of them,—letters of 
public correspondents state the English gun¬ 
boats to have been 16 in number. 

The Cornwallis , Hastings and Amphion , 34, 


* According to Mr. Mallet, there were 13 mortars. See ex¬ 
tract from his notice in the Notes at the end of this volume. 




366 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


were stationed on the extreme right, to take 
every opportunity of engaging the Russian bat¬ 
teries on the island of Sandham. The Arro¬ 
gant , 47,— Cruiser , 16,—and Cossack , 20,—were 
to observe the troops posted on the island of 
Drumsio, on the extreme left of the attack, and 
some small vessels occasionally noticed in that 
direction. These were the only large ships that 
came into action,—the rest remained at anchor 
entirely out of range. 

Thus the attack was concentrated directly 
upon the centre of the line of defence, where 
stood the fortress and the batteries immediately 
contiguous, within which were the government 
arsenals with their docks and extensive depen¬ 
dencies ; while small detached squadrons ope¬ 
rated at considerable distances to the right and 
left of the mortar-vessels and gun-boats. 

On the morning of the 9th of August, about 
8 o’clock, a general fire was begun from the 
French mortars on the little Longor islet and 
the mortar-vessels at anchor,—from the gun¬ 
boats and detached squadrons manoeuvring under 
steam. 

The Russian batteries replied vigorously at 
first, and the ranges of their heavy guns ex¬ 
tended beyond the mortar-vessels, but evidently 
to so little purpose, by reason of the distance 
and the continued change of their position, as 
to he apparent to the Russian commander, who 
directed that the batteries should only fire upon 


SYEABORG. 


367 


the vessels which came within effective range 

o 

of the artillery. 

The Cornwallis and her two consorts had 
stood in towards Sandham, when the action 
commenced, to attack the south batteries on 
that island, and the five gun-boats near by. 
They opened a severe fire at a distance of 2300 
yards, and the Battery No. 3, in the centre of 
the space attacked, received a shower of projec¬ 
tiles, but replied rapidly and accurately, and 
towards noon the vessels hauled out of range.* 

On the Russian right, the Arrogant, Cruiser 
and Cossack , closed in with the island of Drum- 
sio, and opened on the troops there, at a dis¬ 
tance of 1200 yards. 

In the meantime, the mortars and heavy 
pivot-guns poured an incessant storm of shells 
on Sveaborg and all around it,—firing and des¬ 
troying every building within range, but with 
little effect on the defences, or on the powder 
magazines, which resisted to the last, except 
some old Swedish magazines on Gustafsvard, 
which proved too weak to endure the repeated 
shocks of the heavy bombs. Four lots of 
charged shells were stored there; about noon 
one of them was ignited by a bomb,—the 
others soon caught, and the whole four ex¬ 
ploded in rapid succession, exhibiting a most 


* The three vessels are stated to have fired some 3000 shot 
and shells, by volleys, into the works. 




368 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


imposing appearance. Only four men, however, 
were disabled by the occurrence. 

During the afternoon, the bombardment was 
continued with increased vigor. About 3, P. M., 
a Russian account states, the rate of firing was 
36 shots per minute; an hour or two earlier, it 
bad been only 15 to 20 per minute. The Rus- 
sie was suffering considerably,—her decks were 
penetrated by shells of great calibre, one of 
which nearly reached her magazine, and the 
ship was only saved by great exertion. 

Before sunset, the gun-boats were recalled, 
for they had grounded occasionally during the 
day ; and about 9 o’clock in the evening, the boats 
of the fieet commenced with rockets, at a range 
of some 2000 yards, thus sustaining and increas¬ 
ing the conflagration ashore. The practice was 
continued with bombs at intervals, until 2 o’clock 
on the morning of the 10th, and at daylight the 
gun-boats were ordered to go in and resume 
their fire. The positions of the mortar-vessels 
were also advanced to an easier range. 

During the whole of the 10th of August, the 
bombardment was continued as on the day be¬ 
fore, without a minute’s intermission, and fresh 
conflagrations were ensuing continually. All 
the buildings of the port, with the workshops 
and magazines, inside the fortifications of Svarto 
were in flames. About 10 in the morning, 
the deck of a gun-boat, which served as a depot 
for shells and ammunition, took fire, to the im- 


SYEABORG. 


369 


minent clanger of the Citerne battery and the 
works on Gustafsvard. It was happily extin¬ 
guished at once by the intrepid exertions of 
officers and men. The Russie had been removed 
from her exposed situation and was now out of 
range. 

About 2 h - 40 min - in the afternoon, some French 
gun-boats wishing to change position, sent boats 
to sound westwarclly, but they were repulsed by 
the fire of a Battery in Helsingfors. In the 
evening, the gun-boats were again recalled, and 
the boats of the fleets resumed the Rocket prac¬ 
tice, but with little effect,—the mortars were 
also kept in play. 

The Russians only replied when an occasion 
was offered by the approach of a boat within 
good range. 

Next morning, (the 11th,) at day-light, the 
bombardment ceased, the Admirals consider¬ 
ing that they had now inflicted all the dam¬ 
age in their power. But few buildings were 
unclestroyecl on Vargon, and those left on Svarto 
were at the extreme range, and had not been 
touched by any shells. 

The destruction of buildings private and public 
about Sveaborg, appears to have been very great. 
But the damage to fortifications, batteries, guns, 
and large magazines was insignificant: which 
seems to have been apparent from the fleet, as 
the report of the English Admiral admits the 

sea defences, in general, to be but little injured. 

24 


370 INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

The Russians lost 44 men killed and 115 
wounded, ashore; in the Russie 11 killed and 
89 wounded—in the Ezekiel, one wounded,— 
being 1 a total of 260 disabled. 

O 

The Allied loss was very trifling. In the 
English vessels, 33 men were wounded, the most 
serious of which were from the bursting of their 
own Rockets. In the skirmish with the Sand- 
ham batteries, the Cornwallis received 19 shot in 
the hull, and had 10 men wounded,—the Hast¬ 
ings, 2, and the Amphion 3. 

The expenditure of ammunition in this opera¬ 
tion was of course very considerable, but we have 
only the means of approximating the amount. 
The Russians estimate that 1000 projectiles were 
fired at Drumsio,—17000 at Sveaborg and the 
adjacent works,—3000 at Sandham: in all 
21000, of which many are supposed by the Rus¬ 
sians to have weighed 250 pounds.* A public 
correspondent says the English fired from the 
mortal vessels, 3099 13-inch bombs, and from 
the gun-boats 11200 shot and shell. The French 
fired 3000 10-inch bombs, and from the gun¬ 
boats, 6000 shot and shells,—making a total 
of 23299 shot, shells and bombs. 

The English mortars are said to have endured 
the continued firing rather indifferently. On the 


* The English 13-inch shell weighs, with its charge, 207 lbs. 
The French 27 cent - shell is much thinner, and though bulkier, 
weighs with its charge, only about 115 lbs. 



SYE ABORG. 


371 


first day, five of them exhibited large cavities in 
the bores, which were filled with an alloy of 
zinc and tin, a very temporary expedient that 
sufficed for 60 or 70 rounds. Next day, five 
more showed defects of like character, three 
hurst, and the remaining three were seemingly 
in no condition for much further service.* Un¬ 
favorable indications were also said to have been 
observed in the heavy ordnance of the gun-boats. 
What these were we are unable to say, but it 
seems altogether out of the question that good 
pieces should suffer at all from two days’ con¬ 
tinued practice. In recent proofs we have seen 
a piece weighing seven tons, stand 2000 rounds 
of shells, twice the weight of a 68-pdr. shot, 
without bursting; another of like description 
looked nearly perfect after 1000 rounds. Two 
others, weighing four tons, looked pretty well 
after 1600 and 1700 rounds. 

The fleet weighed anchor, and departed from 
Sveaborg, on the 13th of August. 


In this connection I cannot omit citing ex¬ 
tracts from a letter addressed to the Times , 
by Vice Admiral Napier, soon after the news 
reached England that Sveaborg had been bom¬ 
barded. 

—“ After the capture of Bomarsund, Svea- 


* See note at end of volume. 




372 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


“ borg was again examined, and it was the opi- 
44 ion of the French Marshal, the Admirals and 
44 myself, that we had not the proper means to at- 
44 tack so formidable a fortress (we had neither 
44 gun nor mortar-boats) and that the season of 
44 the year was too much advanced.”— 

— 44 General Jones was of opinion that by 
44 landing 5000 men on the island of Bakholmen, 

44 throwing up works, and then making a simul- 
44 taneous attack with the fleet it might be re- 
44 duced in seven or eight days. This plan was 
44 unanimously rejected. General Niel was of 
44 opinion that it might be knocked down in a 
44 couple of hours by 7 or 8 sail of the line ; 
44 but he added that it would be an operation 
44 tre-s liardi ^—that such had never been at- 
44 tempted, and it was not his province to 
44 recommend it.” 

44 These opinions were sent home, the people 
44 of England were not satisfied,” &c. &c. &c.— 

— 44 On the 26th of September, I went off 
44 Sveaborg in the Lightning , and stopped abreast 
44 of Grohara Island, about two miles south of 
44 Gustafsvard,” &c.— 44 From this position, the 
44 fortress appears like batteries perched one on 
44 the other, pointing towards the sea.” 

44 We could not get a view of the western 
44 defences, and I think General Niel, having 
44 only seen the western part of the fortifications 
44 for a short time, and at a greater distance, was 
44 rather hasty in giving an opinion that 8 or 


SVEABORG. 


373 


“10 sail of the line would lay it in ruins in 
“ two hours.” 

—“ I wrote to the Admiralty to say, if Svea- 
“ borg was attacked by a fleet alone , they would 
“ approach from southward in one line, raked 
“by 160 guns. One or two of the leading 
“ ships would anchor and occupy the batteries 
“ at Bakholmen,—the next would pass on, fire 
“ a broadside into the three-decker, and anchor, 
“ clear of her broadside, against the S. W. angle 
“ of Gustafsvard; she would be followed by the 
“ next, pouring a broadside into the three-decker, 
“ and anchoring ahead of her leader, and so on 
“ in succession, as close as the ships could lie. 
“ By this time, the three-decker would probably 
“ be sunk, and the whole western face of Svea- 
“ borg engaged.”— 

—“ A small squadron would be required to 
“ anchor south of Langorn. They would have 
“ to contend against it and two or three line-of- 
“ battle-ships and what guns were in Helsing- 
“ fors.”— 

—“ Whether this attack would succeed or not, 
“ it is impossible to say.”— 

—“ Since my report an attack has become 
“ easier.” The Admiral goes on to say he advo¬ 
cates the use of gun-boats with Lancaster guns 
and 13-inch mortars, which should produce con¬ 
flagration, and “ much evident impression on the 
“ fortress; the ships should then close up and 
“ finish the work.”— 


374 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


—“ How long this would take, I could not 
44 say, but I was quite certain the fortress would 
44 be laid in ruins, and most probably an entrance 
44 opened to the ships.”— 

— 44 Of iron floating batteries which could 
44 hardly swim, and if they could, would have 
44 been useless, for had they been placed within 
44 400 yards of Sveahorg, they would have been 
44 annihilated ; and at 800 yards, they would have 
44 done no harm.” 


The views here expressed are of great inte¬ 
rest, being derived from an examination of the 
fortress and batteries by the commanders, who 
were probably to conduct any operation that 
might be resolved on, and therefore under a 
full sense of the responsibility of the undertak¬ 
ing. No one of them seemed to doubt that the 
place could be taken, though they differed essen¬ 
tially as to the manner of accomplishing it. 

Vice Admiral Napier at first proposed (June, 
1855,) to use gun-boats, each armed with a 
single very heavy gun, and 13-inch mortars, 
established on the rocky islets that abound 
about the harbor. In the letter, partly cited 
above, this operation was to be preliminary, and 
designed to ruin the defences, upon which the 
heavy ships would close in and conclude the 
affair. 



ST EABORG. 


375 


Yet one may well be sceptical as to the power 
of vertical tire and distant cannonade from sea, 
even with the heaviest ordnance, to materially in¬ 
jure fortifications so carefully constructed as those 
of Sveaborg; when it is remembered that the 
works at Sevastopol, after sustaining an unpre¬ 
cedented concentration of tire from innumerable 
pieces of the largest calibre, displayed terrible 
energy even to the last. The artillery of the 
Redan never sent forth more murderous volleys 
than on the day which saw it pass into the 
possession of the Allies; and it is now known 
that the evacuation of the south side had been 
determined on by General Gortschakoff pre¬ 
viously to the final assault, not because the 
works were too much injured for defence, but 
on account of the great loss in men by the 
besieger’s tire, the Russians having lost 900 to 
1000 men daily for 30 days.* 

Sveaborg might, no doubt, have been sub¬ 
mitted to a tire quite as severe, from hundreds 
of mortars and heavy cannon; but the men in 
the works could have been sheltered until the 
approach of the large ships made it necessary 
to man the batteries, which had not been pos¬ 
sible at Sevastopol, because an instant would 
have sufficed to precipitate a whole army across 
the narrow space that separated the lines of 
attack and defence. Unless then the works 


* General order by Russian Commander-in-chief. 




376 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


at Sveaborg had been in a great measure crip¬ 
pled, and most of the guns rendered unser¬ 
viceable, the ships must have suffered terribly 
while coming down in single file to engage the 
batteries in the passes; and should a single ship 
have been disabled in the narrow channel, so as 
to obstruct the free way of the others following 
in close order amid the dense smoke, the con¬ 
fusion that might ensue, almost under the very 
muzzles of the Russian guns, would have been 
very disastrous,—perhaps irreparable so far as 
the prosecution of the attack was concerned. 

General Jones preferred to rely on the ships 
after an attack on the principal work by a regu¬ 
lar siege battery. 

But General Niel must have entertained a 
higher idea than usual with engineers, of the 
capacity of ships’ batteries, or a very low esti¬ 
mate of the Russian defences, to suppose that 
eight or ten sail-of-the-line could knock down 
the fortress in a couple of hours. 

The Russians themselves, who had not hesi¬ 
tated to sink a fleet in order to improve the 
defence of a point, which, however important, 
was less so than Sveaborg, seemed to be entirely 
at ease in regard to any attempt to enter, as 
they left the channel perfectly unobstructed, 
when the sinking of a single ship would have 
sealed each narrow pass. 

The Vice Admiral expresses great contempt 
for the floating batteries; but their first trial, 


SVEABORG. 


377 


which occurred soon afterwards at Kinburn, 
seems to warrant a more favorable estimate of 
their power; they might not be able to perform 
all that a sanguine advocacy promised, but they 
proved to be not altogether harmless at 800 
yards, and might not have been annihilated at 
400 yards; though their endurance of 32-pdr. 
and 18-pdr. shot at half a mile, is no evidence 
of the effect that 68-pdrs. and 10-inch shot 
would exert upon them at 400 yards, particu¬ 
larly if any portion of the fire enfiladed the 
vessels. They certainly promised to compel 
quite as much attention from the Russians, as 
the distant vertical or horizontal fire, and there¬ 
fore might assist materially in relieving the ships 
from a portion of the fire to which they were 
exposed. 


378 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Kinburn. 

(From official accounts by English and French Admirals.) 

The fleet, with some thousand troops of both 
nations on board, left Kamiesch on the 7th of 
October, for the purpose of reducing the forts 
that guard the entrance of the Estuary, into 
which flow the Boug and the Dnieper. 

The object of the expedition acquired its 
chief importance from the fact, that on the 
Boug, at no great distance from its mouth, was 
located Nicolaieff, the great depot of Russian 
naval stores and of construction, where the 
southern fleets of the empire are built: and on 
the Dnieper, not far from its embouchure, is 
Kherson, a place of considerable trade. 

Morever the loss of Nicolaieff and Kershon 
might seriously menace the communications of 
the Russian army in the Crimea, and compel 
its retreat from the peninsula without the ne¬ 
cessity of assailing in front the position it held 
on the north side of Sevastopol, said to he even 
more formidable than the works on the south 
side, which this same army had just relin¬ 
quished after a year’s siege; during which, 
every inch of ground had been contested with 
fearful loss to both sides, and finally terminated 
in an orderly retreat of 70,000 men across the 
harbor, equally admirable for the ability of de- 



Scalp 



















































































K INBURN. 


379 


Hgn and undaunted steadiness of the troops 
under most appalling circumstances. 

The Bong and the Dneiper issue into a large 
basin, formed partly by the projection of the 
main shore, partly by a long, narrow strip of 
sand beach which continues from it and takes 
a northwesterly direction, until it passes the 
promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, 
and from which it is separated by the channel 
whereby the waters of the Estuary empty into 
the Black Sea. 

The distance between the spit, or extremity of 
this tongue, and the Point of Otchakov, on the 
main shore opposite, is about two miles; but the 
water is too shoal to admit of the passage of 
large vessels of war, except in the narrow chan¬ 
nel that runs nearest to the spit and its northern 
shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works 
designed to command the entrance. They are 
three in number. Near the extreme point of 
the spit is a covered battery, built of logs, which 
are filled in and overlaid with sand,—pierced 
for 18 guns but mounting only ten. 

Advancing further along the beach is a cir¬ 
cular redoubt, connected with the spit battery 
by a covered way. This work, built of stone 
and revetted with turf, is open, and said to be 
the most substantial of the three; it has 11 can¬ 
non, and within is a furnace for heating shot. 

Further on, and where the beach has widened 
considerably, is Fort Kinburn, a square bas- 


380 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


tioned work, extending to the sea on the south, 
and to the waters of the Estuary on the north. 
It is casemated in part, though but few of these 
embrasures were armed,—its chief force being 
in the pieces en barbette , and some 9 or 10 mor¬ 
tars. The masonry, though solid, is represented 
by an eye witness not to be bomb proof, and so 
dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling 
out from the interstices, leaving the stone to 
disintegrate. The interior space was occupied 
by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly con¬ 
structed and plastered over. 

This fort is said to be armed with 60 pieces. 
The English Admiral states that all three of the 
works mounted 81 guns and mortars. The cali¬ 
bres are not given officially, but stated in private 
letters to be 18-pdr. and 32-pdr. 

The Allied force was admirably adapted to the 
operation, embracing every description of vessel 
from the largest to the smallest, and all propelled 
by steam. There were screw-liners, and like 
vessels of inferior class—side-wheel steamers, 
screw gun-boats, floating batteries, mortar-ves¬ 
sels, &c., each armed in what was considered 
the most approved manner. 

The expedition was detained at Odessa by 
adverse winds until the 14th of October, when 
it left under steam and anchored off Kinburn 
that evening, the Royal Albert just out of range 
of the main work. To prevent all accident from 
the shifting character of the sandy bottom, 


KIN BURN. 


381 


measures were taken without delay to verify the 
soundings, and mark the channel into the basin 
of the Dnieper. About midnight, four English 
gun-boats, ( Fancy , Boxer , Cracker , Clinker ,) and 
four French gun-boats ( Tirailleur , Stridente , 
Meurtriere and Mutine) dashed in under full 
steam: the Russian guns opened, but too late, 
and the last boat alone was struck without ma¬ 
terial injury. Next morning they were seen 
from the fleet, anchored N. E. of Fort Kinburn, 
and thus the communications across the basin 
were cut off. 

15th of October. Early in the morning bodies 
of English and French troops disembarked, 
landing on the beach some three miles east of 
the fort, and traced lines against any relief from 
that quarter. In the afternoon, the mortar- 
vessels supported by some steamers, took posi¬ 
tion along shore some 2500 yards from the 
eastern face of the fort, and made good practice, 
but without any notable effect on the men at the 
barbette guns, who replied to the fire. Their 
shot and shells, however, were entirely unequal 
to the extreme range, and fell in the water very 
wide of the mark. A swell coming in rendered 
the fire from the mortars uncertain, and they 
ceased. 

Soon after the mortar-vessels began, the vil¬ 
lage near the fort was perceived to be in flames, 
supposed to have been communicated by the 
Russians, in order to remove all obstructions to 


382 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


the play of their guns. The French soldiers, 
however, extinguished the fire before it ex¬ 
tended far. 

The 16th was unfavorable to any operations 
from the fleet, for the wind blew on shore, and 
produced a considerable swell. The troops occu¬ 
pied themselves in further precautions to secure 
their position; and no firing occurred from the 
fleet, though the guns of the fort were occa¬ 
sionally opened on the gun-boats that had en¬ 
tered the basin. 

The plan of attack originally contemplated by 
the Admirals is thus given by the correspondent 
of the Times. 

“No. 1. The line-of-battle ships to engage the Fort Kinburn 
and two sand batteries on the point, will anchor in about 30 feet, 
in a line extending northward from fort, bearing E., and about 
1200 yards distant from it. 

“No. 2. The four French line-of-battle ships to form the 
southern division, so that the Montebello will be the fourth ship 
from the south, and the Royal Albert , as the fifth ship, will be 
the southern ship of the English division. 

“ No. 3. The line-of-battle ships are to weigh together and form 
a line abreast, north and south, at a cable apart. The southern 
line-of-battle ship is then to steer so as to bring the south end of 
Kinburn Fort bearing E. by compass, and, to shield her from any 
danger that may not have been discovered, or from approaching 
too close to the bank to the S., she is to be preceded by two 

steamers, the-and the-, each at a cable apart, and 

in advance, on her starboard bow, and showing their soundings. 
When the south line-of-battle ship brings the south end of Kin¬ 
burn to bear E., she is to steer for it. The rest of the ships will 
then steer the same course, keeping one cable apart, and all 
anchor together in a line nearly north and south, just without the 
flag buoys that will be placed during the previous night. 




K INBURN. 


383 


“ No. 4. The nine ships will then be in position for the first five 
or six to engage Fort Kinburn at from 1200 to 1400 yards, and 
perhaps less, and the other three to take the sand batteries in 
flank and rear, at about 1000 yards. 

“No. 5. The three French floating batteries are to be placed 
on a line N. N. W. and S. S. E. of each other, to the S. W. of 
Fort Kinburn, at about 600 yards distant from it. 

“ No. 6. The mortar-vessels are to anchor in a line E. and W., 
at 2800 yards distant, with the fort bearing N. E. from the outer 
vessel of the line. 

“No. 7. The English mortar-boats to be towed by the Odin , 
on a line E. of the French. 

“No. 8. If the outer mortar-vessel brings Oczakoff telegraph 
on wfith the east end of Fort Kinburn, bearing N. 20 E. (mag¬ 
netic,) and steers for it till the Oczakoff telegraph and Odzah 
Point subtend an angle of 70 degrees, she will be about the 
requisite distance of 2800 yards from Fort Kinburn ; the rest 
can take their stations at a cable distance east of her. 

“ No. 9. The Sidon , Curagoa, Tribune , Dauniless and Terrible , 
to anchor close off the North Sand Battery on Kinburn spit, or 
when ordered, to join the squadron of gun-boats, &c., that have 
previously entered within the straits, should any large ships of 
the enemy from Nicholaieff appear for the relief of Kinburn. 

“No. 10. The disposable paddle-steamers can find good posi¬ 
tions between the line-of-battle ships for directing their fire with 
steady aim at the embrasures of the casemates or at any position 
where the enemy maintains his fire, or off the N. and N. W. ex¬ 
tremity of the Kinburn spit, to enfilade the batteries and their 
approaches. 

“No. 11. The gun-boats will attend to protect the army during 
the landing, and those not ordered to remain to cover their flank, 
to take up position between the other ships as opportunity offers, 
and by a careful attention to the plan of attack are not to fire in 
the direction of the other ships. 

“No. 12. The Admiral holds the captains responsible for their 


384 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


being no firing, unless the men can distinctly see the objects they 
are directed to fire upon. 

“ Triton and Beagle to attend St. Jean d 1 Acre . Each ship’s 
boats to land her own troops. Reserve ammunition for the 
marines to be landed with them. Spiteful and Furious , assisted 
by Triton, to land 21 cavalry horses, 7 staff horses, 27 regimental 
staff horses from No. 197, and 60 sappers, with tools, &c. 

“ The captain of each ship is to be responsible for the disem- 
barcation of his own troops and baggage.” 


It is stated tliat this plan was materially 
altered on the passage from Odessa to Kinburn, 
but in what particulars is not given,—though 
it would seem that the line-of-battle ships were 
not able to approach as near as was contemplated 
for the want of sufficient depth of water. 

During the night of the 16th, the wind 
shifted off shore, so that next morning the water 
was perfectly smooth, and the Allies lost no time 
in using the auspicious moment. 

The French floating batteries ( Devastation , 
Lave , and Tonnante ,) steamed in to make their 
first essay, anchoring some 600 or 700 yards off 
the S. E. bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9.20 
opened fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of 
which 6 were English,—by the gun-boats, 5 
French and 6 English,—and by the steamer 
Odin , 16. 

The heavy metal of the floating Batteries (said 
to be 12 50-pdrs. on the broadside of each) 
soon told on the walls of the fort, and the ver¬ 
tical fire was so good that the French Admiral 
attributed to it, in great part, the speedy sur- 


KIN B U RN. 


385 


render of the place. The gun-boats also made 
good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be 
severe on the barbette batteries. 

The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by 
this varied fire, plied their guns rapidly in 
return, directing their attention chiefly to the 
floating batteries which were nearest. 

Exactly at noon, the Admirals steamed in with 
the Royal Albert 121, Algiers 91, Agamemnon 90, 
and Princess Royal 90, with the four French 
liners, in close order, taking position in a line 
ranging N. W. and S. E., about one mile from 
the fort, in 28 feet water. 

At the same time a squadron of steam frigates,* 
under Rear Admirals Stewart and Pellion, 
dashed in through the passage to the basin, 
opening fire on the spit and central batteries in 
passing, and anchoring well inside of Fort Ni- 
cholaiev and Otchakov. The attack seaward 
was completed by the Acre , 100— Guragoa , 30— 
Tribune , 30—and Sphynx , 6—opening on the cen¬ 
tral Battery,—while the Hannibal , 91— Dauntless , 
24—and Terrible , 21, assailed that on the spit. 
To this storm of shot and shells, the Russians 
could not reply long. In the spit battery, the 
sand falling through between the logs displaced 
by the shot and shells, choked the embrasures, and 


* Valorous , 16 — Furious, 16— Sidon, 22— Leopard, 12— Gladi¬ 
ator, 4 — Firebrand, 6— Stromboli, 6— Spiteful, 6— Asmodee, Ca¬ 
cique, and Sane. 


25 





386 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


blocked up the guns. In the fort, the light 
wooden buildings were in flames at an early 
hour,—then the walls began to crumble before 
the balls which came from every quarter, front, 
flank, and rear; and as the guns were disabled 
successively, the return became feeble, until few 
were in a condition to be fired, the central re¬ 
doubt alone discharging single guns at long in¬ 
tervals. The Russian Commander, however, 
made no sign of surrender; but the Admirals, 
seeing that his fire had ceased and further de¬ 
fence was unavailing, hoisted the white flag at 
l h * 35 min - P. M., upon which the works were given 
up on honorable terms. 

The garrison consisted of about 1400 men; 
their loss is differently stated,—the French Ad¬ 
miral says 80 wounded,—another, 43 killed and 
114 wounded. 

The English suffered the least, having but 
two men wounded, besides two killed and two 
wounded in the Arrow by the bursting of her 
two 68-pdr. Lancaster guns. 

The superiority of the Allied vessels in num¬ 
ber and calibre of ordnance w r as very decided; 
they must have had at least 650 pieces in play, 
chiefly 32-pdrs. and 8-inch shell-guns, with a fair 
proportion of 68-pdrs. and mortars, besides the 
50-pdrs. of the French floating batteries. To 
which the Russians could only reply with 81 can¬ 
non and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre 
than 32-pdrs., while many were lower. The great 


KINBURN. 


387 


disparity in offensive power was not compen¬ 
sated to the works by the advantage of com¬ 
manding position,—the Russian fort and redoubt 
being upon nearly the same level with the 
ship’s batteries, and also very deficient in pro¬ 
per strength. On the other hand, the depth 
of water did not allow the Liners to approach 
nearer than one mile, and thus their fire was 
by no means so intense as it would have been 
at shorter range. 

This was the sole occasion in which the float¬ 
ing batteries had an opportunity of proving their 
endurance; which was the question of most im¬ 
portance, as no one could doubt the effect of 
long 50-pdrs. or 68-pdrs., when brought within 
a few hundred yards of masonry, and able to 
retain the steadiness indispensable to a breach¬ 
ing fire. 

No siege operation had ever embraced bat¬ 
teries of such power, for though the English had 
employed long 68-pdrs. at Sevastopol, yet the 
distance from the objects exceeded a thousand 
yards, and the concentration of fire, so far as 
any opinion can be formed from the published 
statements, was far inferior to that of the 36 
50-pdrs. in the broadsides of the three batteries 
anchored in close order. 

They were hulled repeatedly by shot,—one of 
them, (the Devastation ,) it is said, 67 times, with¬ 
out any other effect on the stout iron plates than 
to dint them, at the most one and a half inches, 


388 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


—still there were 10 men killed and wounded 
in this battery by shot and shell which entered 
the ports,—and the majority of damage to the 
French personal, (27 men,) occurred in the three 
boating batteries. 

The presence of the gun-vessels and gun¬ 
boats formed another novel feature to the ope¬ 
ration. They originated in the necessity of 
having light but well armed steamers to ope¬ 
rate in the shallow waters of the Baltic and 
Black Sea. 

The largest employed at Kinburn were the 
gun-vessels Arrow , Lynx , Beagle , Viper , Snake 
and Wrangler ,—all of the same class,—dimen¬ 
sions 165 by 26 feet,—470 tons, and 160 horse 
power,—armed with two 68-pdrs. of 95 cwt - and 
two or four 12-pdr. howitzers,—their speed con¬ 
siderable and draft light. 

The gun-boats present, such as the Fancy , 
Clinker , Grinder , Cracker , Boxer , &c., were of 
inferior dimensions, draft and armament. 

The passage of these boats under steam by 
the guns of the w T ater batteries on the spit, from 
which they could not have been further than 
900 or a thousand yards for a part of the time, 
is of great interest, though the operation was 
assisted by the obscurity of night: only one 
gun-boat was struck by shot. The next day, 
however, the Cracker went out in broad day¬ 
light, escaping unhurt the entire hre directed 
at her,—which is very suggestive of the facili- 



KIN BURN. 


389 


ties that steam may be expected to afford in 
evading the fire of batteries. 

Considering the importance of excluding an 
enemy from the basin of the Dnieper, some sur¬ 
prise may reasonably be excited at the feeble¬ 
ness of the defences which were to command 
the entrance. 

They were inferior in every respect, and 
manifestly incapable of withstanding any serious 
operation by sea or land. The main fort was 
particularly weak in design, and dilapidated— 
all of them were indifferently armed and gar 
risoned. 

A division, constituting no great part of the 
Allied fleet, proved to be able in a few hours to 
silence every gun and render the works wholly 
untenable. 

It is out of the question to suppose that the 
Russians undervalued the importance of pre¬ 
venting access to the basin, where the ships of 
an enemy could disembark and support a force 
moving upon Nicholaiev and Kherson; or that 
they over-estimated the strength of the works on 
the Spit. The explanation must be found in 
some other motive, as yet not made known. 


390 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Remarks. 

The foregoing summary comprises some notice 
of the most important operations during the 
late European war, in which naval forces par¬ 
ticipated; and though the three great maritime 
Powers were principals in the contest, and em¬ 
ployed more formidable fleets than had ever yet 
been drawn together, no instance occurred where 
battle was joined between their ships. On one 
occasion, (Sinope,) an attack was made by a 
division of Russian ships-of-the-line, upon a 
division of Turkish frigates; but the over¬ 
whelming force of the former was such as not 
to permit one to discriminate throughout the 
action between the effect of the many shot and 
of the comparatively small number of shells, 
though the latter was plainly manifest at the 
commencement, before the view became ob¬ 
scured by the smoke of the cannonade and of 
the burning ships. Nor was any aid derived 
from the use of steamers by either party during 
the action, though one or two small vessels of 
that description were present on both sides. 

We are, therefore, still without any positive 
realization of the effects which the new motor 
and new loeapon may produce in combination 
with other elements, upon the general conduct 
and result of sea-engagements; and the problem 


REMARK S. 


391 


in which professional men are anxiously inter¬ 
ested, still awaits a practical solution. 

Yet there is much to be gleaned from the 
incidents of this war, which, in the absence 
of more complete evidence, will contribute 
measurably to confirm or qualify the current 
opinions derived from the isolated facts of 
scanty experiment, and from the speculations 
to which they may have led. 

So far, nothing has occurred in the course 
of the war, calculated to abate the reasonable 
expectation of advantage from the use of 
steam as a motor for ships of war. The re¬ 
sults under fire have, on the whole, been quite 
favorable, and the resistance of large vessels 
has proved adequate to the protection of the 
Screw-Engine, and its appliances, against con¬ 
tinued firing of no ordinary character; as in 
the case of the Agamemnon and consort, which 
steamed in to 800 yards from the formidable 
batteries of Fort Constantine, anchored and lay 
there for five hours, suffering severely in hull, 
masts, spars and men, but yet able to steam 
out of action at the close of the day.* 


* It is said that a bomb “ passed through all the decks of the 
“ Charlemagne , and burst among the machinery, partially dis¬ 
abling it,” (Grivel, 31); but, from its designation, this projectile 
appears to have been thrown from a mortar, and its vertical 
descent through the decks confirms the inference. 

Ships are much less liable to be struck by the vertical fire of 
bombs, than by the horizontal practice of shot or shells from 




392 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Even the side-wheel steamers are not found 
to he as vulnerable to the fire of artillery as 
was justly apprehended from the unavoidable 
exposure of many essential portions of the ap¬ 
paratus. We see, for instance, that the Russian 
vessels, which were of this description, plied 
about the harbor of Sevastopol almost with im¬ 
punity throughout the whole siege of eleven 
months, harassing the batteries continually, at 
long range, and, when required by the exigency, 
moving within fair scope, where they operated 
with destructive effect alike on the massive 
columns or the scattered marksmen. We be¬ 
lieve, that though hulled repeatedly, their 
locomotive powers were never observed to be 
crippled in the course of this service, even to 
the very night amid the gloom of which they 
were consigned to destruction by those who 
had so well used them. 

These results are, however, so far qualified 
by circumstances, as to be unavoidably partial 
in their character. In the case of the Aga¬ 
memnon , when the distance might have been 


cannon; but when struck, may suffer more seriously from the 
former, as the strength of the decks is by no means equal to that 
of the sides, and the innermost parts of the vessel are, therefore, 
less difficult of attainment to the vertical descent of bombs. We 
have already seen, that at Sveaborg, a three-decker, (the Russie,) 
was nearly destroyed by a single bomb, which, passing through 
the decks, as in the case of the Charlemagne , exploded in dan¬ 
gerous proximity to the magazine, and would have been fatal to 
the ship but for the most timely exertion. 



REMARKS. 


393 


made decisive if the heaviest calibres had been 
employed, there is reason to believe they were 
only of the usual description—while The Rus¬ 
sian steamers were ordinarily at the extreme 
range of their own very heavy ordnance, and 
that which was brought to bear on them. 

The power of the artillery was, therefore, 
plainly reduced much below what will be ex¬ 
hibited in conflicts at sea, when such vessels 
are engaged with each other. 

Its accuracy was also seriously impaired by 
the continual movement of the steamers, to 
which Captain Boutakoff attributes his evasion 
of the storm of shot and shells that chased the 
Vladimir , when in dangerous proximity to the 
shore batteries. But this advantage must be 
reckoned as proper to the steamer under all 
circumstances, so long as the functions of the 
motor are not crippled; and its application was 
obvious in the earliest naval operations of the 
war, as may be seen by the mode of attack 
at Odessa, where the Allied steamers were kept 
moving in a circular track, at a convenient 
point of which they delivered their fire. 

This peculiarity in steam tactics is, therefore, 
to be provided against, by some corresponding 
practice with the guns; and it may be, that 
well-aimed volleys will be found more effective 
than firing by single rounds, the chances of 
striking being multiplied in ‘proportion to the 
number of pieces in the battery. 


394 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


Another prime advantage, obtained by the 
use of steam in ships-of-war, is the ability to 
attain the position desired without regard to 
the direction of the wind, or of the course, 
when forts or batteries are to be attacked. On 
such occasions, the ship is exposed to the 
deliberate and full fire of the work while ap¬ 
proaching it, without the power of making any 
effective return at the time, and this while 
threading channel-ways where dangerous ob¬ 
structions may exist that are no longer marked 
by buoys or beacons; to ground on which 
might terminate the enterprise, or cause the 
loss of the vessel. 

Steam removes much of this difficulty,—the 
conduct of the action is relieved of the trouble¬ 
some conditions imposed by the use of sails, 
—and a deal of complicated manoeuvre thus 
avoided; while the attention of the commander, 
no longer divided and distracted by such con¬ 
siderations, may be given wholly to the opera¬ 
tions of his battery and those of his antagonist. 
The services of the sail-trimmers may also be 
appropriated to the guns. If a number of ves¬ 
sels are to be brought into action, the station 
of each vessel, great or small, and the time for 
reaching it, are determinable with as much 
exactness as the movements of regiments or 
brigades; so that ships-of-war are now en¬ 
dowed with a precision of evolution, and a 
power of concentration before unknown, the 


REMARKS. 


395 


lack of which has hitherto seriously detracted 
from their proper value, and frequently been 
productive of disaster. 


The effects of shells upon ships were not by 
any means exemplified to the extent that might 
have been supposed, in the action just cited; for 
it so happened for some cause or another, that 
they were seldom employed against the Allied 
squadrons. At Sevastopol only, were vessels of 
large class subjected to a steady fire of this de¬ 
scription, and the general effect varied in no 
important respect from that which has already 
been assumed (pages 216, 232,) as probable. 
The shells were distributed over the surface of 
the ships, penetrating or lodging with every 
variety of effect; and being generally, of inferior 
calibre, they seldom, if ever, entered parts where 
their explosion would have endangered the flota¬ 
tion of the vessel, or the engine. 

At Sinope their operation was strikingly mani¬ 
fested, particularly as regards incendiary proper¬ 
ties, which proved to be most formidable. One 
frigate was fired and blown up in five minutes 
from the shells of the Constantine’s lower deck 
guns, and another shared a like fate by the 
shells from the Paris . The other ships were 
afterwards successively enveloped in flames, and 
the surviving Turkish officers, when questioned 



/ 


396 INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

on the subject at the instance of General 
Paixhans, concurred in attributing the conflagra¬ 
tion to the shells. 

On subsequent occasions, the same conse¬ 
quences were observed to attend the use of 
shells and bombs. At Odessa, the French Ad¬ 
miral states, that “ the shells of the seven 
“ frigates fell like hail on the battery of the Im- 
“ perial Port and the store-houses and vessels it 
“ contained, when symptoms of fire began to 
“ manifest themselves.” 

At Bomarsund, flames were speedily pro¬ 
duced in the South Tower by the bombs 
which the Russians threw into it as soon as 
they perceived that the French were in posses¬ 
sion. At Sevastopol, the ships were frequently 
on fire, and, though difficult under the circum¬ 
stances to determine when this might have been 
due to the hot shot, yet the incendiary action 
of the shell could at times he distinguished. At 
Sveaborg, the flames that broke out rapidly and 
in different places, and finally combined in one 
wide-spread conflagration, were created entirely 
by the bombs and shells of the ships—the 
rockets not being used until night, when the fire 
was well established. At Kinburn, the build¬ 
ings within the works were also promptly fired 
by the bombs and shells. 



REMARKS. 


397 


The practice of the Allied ships exhibits a 
marked improvement in precision and scope of 
fire, thereby promoting the concentration of the 
numerous guns in large vessels, and giving a 
value to the broadside not generally appreciated. 
In no previous engagements has the effect of 
ship’s batteries been developed, beyond point 
blank, so powerfully and with so much certainty; 
a result to be credited mainly to the elevating 
sights, and next, to an efficient percussion sys¬ 
tem which, enables the marksman to follow his 
aim instantaneously with the blow. 

But in noting the advance thus made upon 
the slovenly practice common to the ships of 
these powers in former years, it is well to know 
that further progress is possible and most de¬ 
sirable in developing the power of the broadside. 
A few facts just at hand will make this evident. 

The distance of the Agamemnon and Sanspareil 
from Fort Constantine (17tli October, 1854) was 
assumed to be about 800 yards; Lord Raglan 
states it to have been rather less. These two 
ships could bring to bear about 87 guns, and the 
firing from them probably lasted some four hours. 
There can be no doubt that it inflicted much 
damage, for the Russian Commander-in-Chief 
admits it in his official report—but not sufficient 
to impair the strength of the masonry, and far 
short of effecting a breach in it. 

At Bomarsund, the results were rather differ¬ 
ent:—Three 32-pdrs. of 42 cwt (guns of inferior 


398 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


weight) were landed from a ship’s spar-deck, and 
placed in battery at 950 yards from the North 
Tower—the masonry of good quality and 6| feet 
thick. In eight hours the wall between two 
embrasures was cut through, from top to bottom, 
offering a practicable breach, to effect which, 
487 shot and 45 shells were fired*,—being at the 
rate of one round from the battery in rather less 
than a minute, or, from each gun, one in 2§ min¬ 
utes. The Tower surrendered. 

It seems almost incredible that three pieces 
should he able to accomplish fully that which 
eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, the dis¬ 
tances from the object being alike,—particularly 
when it is considered that many of the latter 
were of greater calibre, and most of them em- 

w 

ployed much heavier charges where the calibres 
were similar. The guns of the ships, if fired at 
the same rate as those of the battery, which was 
not unusually rapid, (one round in 2f minutes,) 
would have discharged some 7700 shot and shells 
in the course of the four hours, supposing no 
interruption: a number which, if properly ap¬ 
plied, would appear from the results of the three 
guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall 
of the fort in fourteen places; whereas they did 
not effect a single breach, which is abundant 
proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either 
have been dispersed over the surface of the fort, 


* Report of General Niel, Commanding Engineers. 




REMARKS. 


399 


or else missed it altogether, and this could have 
been due only to a want of the precision which 
was attained by the battery. The constantly 
preferred complaint of motion in the ships was 
not to be urged, because on the day of cannon¬ 
ading Sevastopol, there was scarcely a breath of 
wind, and the ships were too large to be easily 
moved by the swell, unless very considerable. 
That the fort did no greater damage to the ships, 
than it received from them, proves no more than 
that its tire was quite as illy directed, and the 
calibres too low. It is said that the Agamemnon 
was struck in the hull by 240 shot and shells, 
which must have been but a small portion of 
what were tired, though sufficient to be decisive if, 
as already observed, the calibre had been heavier. 

As there was only an occasional breath of 
air to move the dense clouds of accumulating 
smoke, it is to be supposed that the impatience 
of the men to fire, rendered good aim imprac¬ 
ticable, and only increased the obstruction. But 
if the inability to see the object were a good 
reason for not hitting, it was a better reason 
for not tiring at it. Of course, it really matters 
little whether bad gunnery arises from indif¬ 
ferent means , or an indifferent use of good means , 
—the consequences are the same.* We are 

* Are we at liberty to infer, that considerations of this nature 
had some influence in suggesting the injunction contained in the 
12th Section of the General Order, directing the plan of attack 
on Kinburn, just one year later? (Page 285.) “ The Admiral 

“ holds the Captains responsible for there being no firing, unless 




400 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


not, however, prepared to admit that the fire 
from guns in a ship, if perfectly steady, should 
be so far inferior to those in a land battery, as 
not to be able to approximate the effect of the 
latter with twice or thrice the number of shot; 
and, whatever advance may have been made in 
ship firing, supposing previous practice to be 
taken as a criterion, it is very certain that a 
great deal remains to be done, if reference be 
had to what was effected by these three guns. 

But there is a limit to the scope of the best 
artillery, which cannot be exceeded with any 
good effect, even if the means of aiming were 
sufficient, and circumstances permitted their full 
use in disposing the bore of the piece with 
perfect precision and exactness. 

The following may he cited to exemplify this 
remark:— 

At 260 yards, ten shot from a long 32-pdr. 
were included in four feet square of the screen 
fired at. 

Ten shot were fired from the same gun at a 
screen distant 1300 yards,— 40 feet long by 
20 feet high,—and only three of the shot 
struck the screen.* * So that when the distance 
was increased five times, a like number of shot 
from the same gun were so much dispersed, 
that fifty times the surface would include only 

“ the men can distinctly see the objects they are directed to fire 
“ upon.” 

* Experiments from Naval Battery at Washington, 1850. 



REMARKS. 


401 


one-third of the number discharged,—and thus 
a fire which would have been decisive at 260 
yards, so far as accuracy was concerned, would 
have been utterly useless at 1300 yards. 

There is a limit also to the effective fire 
even of the heaviest pivot-guns, which is de¬ 
pendent on the circumstances under which it 
may occur. It will be perceived, for instance, 
that at 25 cables’* length, a stationary object 
as large as the hull of a first-class steamer, 
was only struck by ten shot out of 500 (two 
per cent.) fired in the most deliberate manner, 
(once in six minutes,) from a battery of 68-pdrs., 
manned by expert artillerists, which had also 
the advantage of being some 600 feet above 
the plane. At three-fourths the distance, (18 
cables’ length,) the accuracy was improved; but 
still only six shot out of 60 hit the Vladimir , (ten 
per cent.) Had the latter, or the battery, been 
in motion, the probability of striking would 
have amounted to the fraction of a chance, and 
would hardly have justified the expenditure of 
more ammunition than would have indicated 
such a probability. 

* We are not informed exactly what is the value of this 
expression in the Russian service. Even with ourselves it is 
somewhat changed. In the time of hempen cables it meant 
120 fathoms, (240 yards.) But chain cables, which have become 
almost universal, are not restricted to the 120 fathoms. Those 
made for the United States’ Navy vary from 120 to 180 fathoms. 
Thus the term may ere long become purely nominal. It may be 
noticed that the English Charts frequently divide the sea mile 
into lengths which are designated as cables’ lengths—making the 

measure equivalent to 203 yards, (101j fathoms.) 

26 




402 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


It was also obvious that the force of the 68- 
pdr. shot was so far spent, that no lesser calibres 
could have made any serious impression at so 
great a distance,—for it appears that the 68-pdr. 
shot were just able to get through the side some¬ 
times,—while at others they were arrested by 
the metallic fastenings; and it was only when 
they perforated about the water-line, that they 
proved troublesome. 

On the other hand, the shells from the bat¬ 
tery were rendered inefficient probably in part 
from a lack of calibre, but chiefly from an appa¬ 
rent desire to make too close practice; both 
elevation and fuzes seem to have been nicely 
adjusted to a distance just a little less than what 
it actually was, and had the Vladimir been some 
two or three hundred yards nearer, she might 
have suffered seriously. As it was, the shells 
either fell into the water, short of the mark, and 
then burst, or, if they ranged better, they burst 
in the air too soon. 

The explosion of the English shells in the 
water, as well as in the air, shows good fuzes,* 
and the sensation experienced in the vessel by 
the concussion, indicates that considerable effect 
would have resulted had the shell been lodged 
in the vessel; far more than that produced by 
the perforation of the shot. 

Captain Boutakoff thinks he was more lucky 


* In that particular practice at least. 



REMARKS. 


403 


with his shells, and expresses a decided prefer¬ 
ence for them under the circumstances. His 
practice conformed to this opinion, as it shows 
that he fired two shells to one shot, though the 
former were necessarily from the least efficient 
gun, (the 10-inch shell-gun;) and he avers that 
sometimes three shells would strike the embra¬ 
sures in succession,—which is indeed more sur¬ 
prising, at the distance, than that others which 
followed should go wide of the mark. 

It may be observed by the way, that the 
opinion expressed in regard to the value of a 
good side, (pages 202, 203,) finds some con¬ 
firmation in the different effect of like projec¬ 
tiles on the two vessels. The Gabriel was a 
line-of-battle-ship, and would therefore, be ex¬ 
pected to possess the advantage of the stoutest 
possible material and construction,—which, how¬ 
ever, was not the case,—for the Vladimir was 
built in England, and much more strongly. 
The difference was so considerable in the resist¬ 
ance of the two hulls, to whatever it be due, 
that the shot which barely perforated the Vladi¬ 
mir^ went through and through the Gabriel; and 
might have damaged her steam apparatus irre¬ 
parably had the ship been so fitted. 

We ought not to pass unnoticed the extraor¬ 
dinary and most powerful use which Captain 
Boutakoff made of grape. Showers of canister 
or grape from mortars are commonly resorted to 
in the attack and defence of land works, but the 


404 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


distances are limited, and the practice comes 
under the form of vertical tire. Direct prac¬ 
tice with grape from shell-guns, at one or two 
miles, is a novelty, and its efficiency in this 
case is so well authenticated, that one only 
wonders why it was not thought of before. The 
llussian and French commanders both speak of 
its powerful action on troops not likely to be 
checked by ordinary obstacles. (See page 418.) 


As the operations of the Allied fleets were en¬ 
tirely restricted to blockade, and the attack of 
llussian fortified harbors, the results contribute 
more directly to determine how far the previous 
relation between ships and forts have been modi¬ 
fied by the introduction of steam and shells, 
than to exhibit the influence which these agents 
are likely to exercise on the conduct or fortunes 
of strictly naval engagements. We are thus led 
to approach this much vexed question which 
otherwise might have been passed by. 

In general the main advantage of the ship is 
in the power of bringing to bear upon any given 
part of the fort, a larger number of powerful 
cannon—far greater than a single work can 
direct upon the ship. The material of the latter 
is easily penetrated by the shot, or shattered and 
ignited by shells; while the solid masonry is 
incombustible, can only be shaken and breached 



REMARKS. 


405 


by a continued repetition of shot striking within 
a limited section, and is proof against shells until 
disunited and laid open by shot. But the men 
and guns of an uncovered battery, not much ele¬ 
vated, are open to the storm of shell, shrapnel or 
grape, which the ship can direct upon them from 
her more numerous pieces. On the whole, how 
ever, the introduction of heavy shells is more 
advantageous to the fort than to the ship. 

But the new motor is entirely adverse to the 
fort. With sails alone, the privilege of the ini¬ 
tiative belonging to the ship was much circum¬ 
scribed, and the power of retreat very uncer¬ 
tain—but with steam, the choice of attack is 
almost independent of circumstances, so long as 
there is sufficient water to float in. 

The approach of the ship can be effected so 
promptly as to abridge materially the time of 
being subjected to the fire of the fort without 
the power of a return. The crew need no 
longer be exposed aloft to grape or musketry, 
but can be sheltered on deck by the bulwarks. 
The bustle and confusion inseparable from com¬ 
ing to under sail is avoided, and perfect silence 
reigns along the decks—the force at the guns is 
not enfeebled by the absence of men who are to 
shorten sail, and undivided attention may be 
given to the battery, the distance, and the direc¬ 
tion of the object. The desired position can also 
be taken with exactness,—a few signals from the 
bell arrests the ship there, and a brief order 


406 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR, 


suffices to make all secure with the anchors. 
Besides, the vessel is freed from the great disad¬ 
vantage entailed by the leverage of the sail- 
power which, from the ever-changing inclination 
of the decks, not to be foreseen or provided 
against, disturbs the position of the guns and 
the judgment of the surest marksman, thus ren¬ 
dering the tire of the battery uncertain until the 
vessel is relieved of her canvass. Finally, when 
the object is attained, or if the ship be badly 
cut up and in danger, the steam-power interposes 
its welcome assistance and conveys the crippled 
combatant beyond the reach of the battery, as we 
have noticed at Sevastopol, in the case of the Al¬ 
bion, Queen , London , Arethnsa , Bellerophon , and Rod¬ 
ney. So that whatever advantage the ship may 
possess in power of locomotion, or of a numerous 
and formidable artillery, is now made capable of 
its full exercise by steam; the want of which 
has hitherto greatly detracted from the ability to 
assail batteries of no great force: and thus, 
works which, though limited, isolated, or ill 
constructed, have hitherto sufficed to command 
intricate channels leading to important stations, 
are no longer to be relied on; they are now 
open to attack upon the least notice, and the 
weak points which may have been hitherto inac¬ 
cessible to sailing ships, are as liable to be bat¬ 
tered as the strongest. 

On the other hand a proper elevation of the 
site gives a commanding influence to the work; 


REMARKS. 


407 


indeed fully adequate to compensate for any de¬ 
fect in its character or extent, number or calibre 
of guns. For the accuracy of the ship’s tire 
is much impaired by the necessity of pointing at 
an object considerably elevated, as well as by the 
drifting smoke which renders very nice direction 
almost impracticable: while the fort, compar- 
tively free from this embarrassment, and able at 
all times to aim by the masts and yards that tower 
far above the indistinctive hull, plays down upon 
it with impunity. Illustrations of this will be 
remembered in the cases, so frequently cited in 
previous wars, where batteries rather insignifi¬ 
cant in character, have overmatched powerful 
ships;—and occasionally also in those of recent 
occurrence. 

Thus the small works on the heights of Cape 
Constantine, inflicted more severe injury than the 
redoubtable fort lower down at the margin of the 
water; damaging five ships in the most serious 
manner, and compelling them to haul out of 
action in order to avert consequences that might 
have been fatal; while the fort was unable to 
drive off the two ships that stubbornly held their 
stations until dark. 

But it may be observed that even this great 
advantage will not justify the reduction of the 
work to the least scale, such as that of the tower 
or redoubt with one, two, or three guns, so fre¬ 
quently cited to demonstrate the inferiority of 
the ship. For if this be absolutely the nature of 


408 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


the defence, unsupported by other works or by 
bodies of troops, it is open to an attack of 
another kind which, is perfectly convenient to a 
ship as large as a frigate. 

This mode of proceeding would naturally sug¬ 
gest itself to any officer under the circumstances, 
and it so happens that in most of the cases cited, 
it was actually resorted to. Many instances 
might be quoted of this, but one will suffice from 
those which are referred to in the more recent 
discussions on the subject. 

In 1805, the Loire while entering the Bay of Muros to attack 
two privateers, was fired on by a battery of two 18-pdrs.: the 
boats, with 50 men, were sent to take it, and the ship stood close 
in. Soon after, a fort, mounting 12 long 18-pdrs., opened a well- 
directed fire on the frigate, then a quarter of a mile distant, hull¬ 
ing her almost every shot. The Loire anchored with a spring 
and brought her broadside to bear: wfitli little or no effect, how¬ 
ever, while in a few minutes 9 of her seamen were wounded. Sud¬ 
denly the fire of the fort ceased, and the British flag ivas displayed 
on it. It seems that Lieutenant Yeo, having spiked the two 
18-pdrs. in the battery, observed the fort open fire on the frigate. 
The garrison were so occupied in this way as not to notice the 
approach of the party, which overcame the resistance offered to 
their entrance, and obtained possession after a gallant conflict in 
which ten men (including the Commander) of the garrison were 
killed and 30 wounded. The 12 guns were spiked, the carriages 
destroyed, and part of the fort blown up; the boats then returned 
to the Loire , carrying off 40 barrels of powder and two brass guns. 

(Allen, ii. 104.) 

This instance is by no means exceptional, and 
the same course of proceeding was of frequent 
occurrence during the war that existed from 
1793 to 1815 between England and France. 

Hence the advantage which superior eleva- 


REMARKS. 


409 


tion of site gives, can never be extended so far 
as to render works on this small scale capable 
of resisting the force which a ship can employ; 
—and there is hardly an instance where they 
have not been reduced by the ship when attacked 
as they should be. 

The fire of a small barbette or uncovered 
work, can always be kept under by the rifled 
musket and shrapnel, judiciously posted, taking 
the advantage of such shelter as the locality 
affords, or using pits for the sharpshooters if 
necessary. The broadside can then be brought 
to bear, or the men sent ashore in force to 
assault—circumstances may even admit of the 
landing one or two cannon to breach the work. 

The unqualified assumption, that a tower or 
small redoubt, with its two or three guns, can 
of itself make good the defence against a heavy 
ship, would naturally suggest more than is con¬ 
templated ; for in that case, why resort to the 
cost of extensive works to defend a harbor, 
when a few towers might fully answer the pur¬ 
pose'? But the fact is, that the advantage of 
site which is required to give effect to this 
species of defence, is rarely to be found just 
where it is needed. It existed neither at 
Cronstadt nor at Sveaborg; and at Sevastopol 
the elevated works of this nature only served 
to command the position for attack on Fort 
Constantine from seaward. Of themselves they 
could not have prevented the entrance of a 


410 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


single vessel into the port, nor have inflicted 
any material damage on an enemy making the 
attempt. 

Again, it frequently happens, that the works 
are too limited in extent, or isolated and not 
capable of mutual support:—the masonry may 
be bad,—the site low and the guns unprotected 
by casemates,—the ordnance of inefficient power, 
and not commanding all accessible positions,— 
the garrison, inadequate in numbers or quality. 
In such cases the ship cannot fail to have the 
advantage, and it only remains to use it by 
attacking in proper force, rapidly and energeti¬ 
cally, concentrating the full fire of the line at 
decisive distances upon the unguarded or weak 
points, and affording no opportunity for improv¬ 
ing the state of the works. Under this head 
may be classed those actions where ships have 
been eminently successful,—Algiers, Acre, Vera 
Cruz, Kinburn, Petropolski, &c., &c. 

In general, it is hardly to be questioned that 
when the locality admits of being fully guarded 
by works, and this has been done completely as 
to extent, construction, armament and garrison, 
an attack by naval forces merely, is only to be 
justified by urgent considerations, entirely inde¬ 
pendent of the consequences to the ships, which 
can hardly fail to be to their greater disadvan¬ 
tage, and may be irreparable.* 


* If then the employment of ships to batter the solid masonry 




REMARKS. 


411 


The attempt to pioneer a close attack with 



fortresses of this description, by dis 


tant bombardment and cannonade, is not likely 
to assist the operation materially as may be 
seen in the affair at Sveaborg, where it is 
known that the strength of the defences was 
untouched by the storm of bombs, shells and 
rockets which were hailed upon the place with¬ 
out intermission for two days. 

Works which are less complete in all respects, 
cannot, however, be assumed as impregnable; 
and just as they happen to be insufficient in 
plan, execution, armament or garrison, so are 


of shore works is so rare, that it should be regarded as really an 
exception to the general rule of their service, which is the attack 
of wooden structures like themselves, then it seems to follow that 
naval ordnance should correspond in its character to these pur¬ 
poses, and be adapted to shells rather than to shot; with the 
endurance, however, competent to discharge the latter if an 
exigency should arise. And these views have governed in the 
armament of the United States screw frigates (Merrimac and 
class) recently built; the new ordnance of which has been well 
proven to be able to fire a greater amount of solid shot than have 
ever been appropriated to guns intended for that service only. 

The first Xl-inch shell-gun, for instance, was fired 500 times with 
shells, and then 655 times with shot weighing 170lbs., without 
being burst,—which eventually only occurred at the 1959 th round. 
The whole practice was carefully conducted under the eye and 
direction of the intelligent and able officer, then acting as execu¬ 
tive of this department, Lieut. Ap. Catesby Jones, U. S. N. 

It is not, therefore, because these guns are unable to withstand 
the discharge of shot, that none have been supplied to the frigates 
armed with them, but because the occasions on which shot could 
be advantageously used, are so rare as hardly to warrant their 
being considered as part of the regular allowance. 



412 INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 

they liable to be assailed by ships with a corres¬ 
ponding prospect of effect. 

Advantage of site and position will, however, 
compensate for most of these defects, and enable 
the work to use its artillery with the greatest 
possible power, while that of the ship will be 
nearly nullified. 

The use that can be made of floating bat¬ 
teries as auxiliaries in attacking shore works, 
must depend on further confirmation of their 
asserted invulnerability. It may be that the 
performance at Kinburn answered the expecta¬ 
tions of the French Emperor as regards offen¬ 
sive power; for that is a mere question of 
the battering capacity of the heaviest calibres, 
which is undoubted: — but the main issue, 
which concerns their endurance, cannot be set¬ 
tled by the impact of 32-pdr. shot fired at 600 
and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in 
future be found on all seaboard fortifications; 
and the ingenuity of the artillerist may also 
be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn. 
Still it is not to be doubted that the floating 
battery is a formidable element in assailing 
forts, even if its endurance falls short of abso¬ 
lute invulnerability, and the defence will do 
well to provide against its possible employment.* 

But the question between the ship and fort 
assumes another phase when the object lies 
beyond the latter, and the passage only is com- 


* See Note at end of volume. 





REMARKS. 


413 


mancled by its artillery. This is expressed by 
high official authority, as follow:— 

“ In most cases, however, forts are not liable 
“ to a siege or to any attack that will keep an 
“ enemy more than a few hours before them; 
44 they are required by sudden action to defend 
44 the passage of a river or a channel leading to 
44 important objects,” &c., &c. (Report of Gen. 
Totten, Chief of Corps of U. S. Engineers.) 

The problem is then restricted to the time 
that the ship may be under fire, and the prob¬ 
able injury that can be inflicted in that period 
by the cannon of the work: and here the steam 
power intervenes to increase the chances of suc¬ 
cess, by conferring greater certainty and celerity 
of movement. 

By its aid, passages may be accessible that 
have proved too intricate to be attempted by 
sailing vessels. The period of exposure to fire 
can always be estimated very nearly, and the 
celerity of movement augmented by making 
use of a fair wind and tide; or advantage may 
be taken of dark and stormy nights, thus re¬ 
ducing the chance of being struck to a mere 
accident. Even in broad day, the opportunity 
of the marksman is much lessened by the 
celerity with which the object moves right 
across the direction of fire, and the difficulty 
is not a little enhanced by the absence of the 
voluminous canvass. The shot and shells that, 
in a direct conflict, might, by their continued 


414 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


operation, surely dismantle the ship, and per¬ 
haps eventually work out her destruction, must 
now act on vital parts only if they are to be 
effective. They must breach the water-line, or 
overcome the greatest endurance that the hull 
is capable of, and penetrate into the very vitals 
of the ship, disabling the engine or reaching 
the magazine. In this way alone will the 
assailant be arrested in his onward course; and 
the rarest good fortune will be needed to reach 
such a result. 

The operations at Kinburn furnish some inci¬ 
dents to the point:—There it became important 
to extend the attack along the north side, and 
thus to complete the circle of fire about the 
works; but the channel was not very direct, and, 
fey reason of the shifting bottom, uncertain ; it 
was moreover reached at the narrowest and most 
winding part by the guns of the three works, at 
ranges of not less than 900 yards. Yet eight 
gun-boats passed in under steam, and escaped the 
fire of the batteries unharmed. They had, it 
is true, the friendly obscurity of the night—but 
the next day one of them ( Cracker ) returned 
in broad daylight, and, though exposed to the 
deliberate fire of the works, passed unhurt again. 
The well-proved and excellent qualities of the 
Russian gunners, leave no room to call their 
skill in question on this occasion. 

It is true that these vessels offered no great 
mark; but then all they did offer was vital—no 


REMARKS. 


415 


shot or shell that reached the slight hull, even in 
its strongest part, could have failed to penetrate 
it; and in so doing would most probably inflict 
fatal injury to the engine. A frigate or Liner 
would have offered a more ample object, but 
little more of surface as important—and that far 
better defended by the greater resistance. Above, 
the towering sides might be shattered, men 
killed, and guns dismounted, without arresting 
her progress or impairing the offensive power to 
any material extent. 

Hence it is manifest, that the capacity of 
works to arrest a passing ship, or squadron, is 
very much lessened by the introduction of steam; 
if indeed it can now be relied on at all. 

Some such view must have been impressed 
upon the Russian councils, when it was deter¬ 
mined to close the port of Sevastopol. 

Probably no harbor was better adapted, by 
nature and art, for resisting offensive operations 
purely naval, the approach being commanded by 
batteries of unusual power; while within, the har¬ 
bor for 3000 yards from its mouth, was covered 
at every spot by the converging fire of works 
that either swept the surface with shot, or 
plunged them from above. And yet, upon the 
first news that the troops at the Alma had failed 
to arrest the invasion, and thereby laid open the 
road to the place, a part of the fleet was 
promptly sunk across the entrance so as to form 
a barrier to all access in force. 



416 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


For although no object, commensurate with 
the risk, was to be attained by passing the forts, 
so long as the attack was confined to ships, yet 
the issue assumed a totally different aspect when 
connected with an assault by land. The upper 
part of the harbor was remote from the heavy 
batteries below, and not guarded by works of any 
magnitude. Here, too, the Russians well knew, 
lay the key of the whole southern side, city and 
suburbs. The formidable lines that soon grew 
up across hills and ravines, were as yet untraced, 
and the tower of the Malakoff alone marked the 
position which, when subsequently appreciated 
by the attack, was so eagerly coveted and so 
dearly won. The whole site for the defence in 
this quarter was swept in reverse at grape range 
from the harbor, and liable to be enfiladed on 
either hand from the Careening Bay by a still 
closer fire. 

The sunken barrier evidently anticipated the 
hopes of the French General, who instantly com¬ 
prehended the full force of the measur 

In the official language of the Adm-^ 1, “ he 
44 could not help regarding it as deploy ie, be- 
44 cause it concurred to modify in more points 
44 than one, his plans of attack.” 

Had the entrance been left unobstrr, 'M. a 
division of ships might have chosen its o x i- 
nity to enter, in defiance of the scathing’ 1 of 
the batteries, which could only have bceh Con¬ 
tinued while the assailants were on their rapid 


REMARKS. 


417 


way. In a brief space the Russian ships would 
have been laid close aboard, and the batteries 
must then have ceased, or in the melee have 
dealt equal damage to friend and foe. The 
result could not but be fatal to the Russian fleet, 
and in that catastrophe must have been involved 
the destruction of the resources of artillery and 
gunners which, for nearly a year, fed the ever- 
memorable defence of Sevastopol. 

Looking to results, it was almost immaterial 
whether any of the attacking ships should escape 
capture. There was no need longer to continue 
a weary blockade; for the entire Russian Navy 
here was annihilated, to be renewed no more 
during the war,—while the right of entrance, 
subject to the condition of a passing fire, was 
secured to the fleet, speedily renewed by fresh 
ships,—and with it the ability to harass the 
defence,—to emperil the communication across 
the harbor so as to effectually cut off material 
supplie the south shore and thus reduce 

the defe f . there - from the imposing scale of an 
intrencl} front for a whole army, to that of a 
work with a limited garrison, that could not 
be reinforced to any extent with men or means, 
nor drawn off when these were exhausted. 

£ S'J J * * 

N , . mid an efficient co-operation have been 
inqm cable with an assault on the suburb— 
the b .vd >ides sweeping in reverse at close range 
the defences about the Careening Bay, thus 

taking the very part which the Russians played 

27 


418 


INCIDENTS OF THE WAR. 


so decisively on the 18th June, when the French 
storming columns attempted to carry the works 
to the east of the Malakoff.* 

The blocking of the harbor, then, was a mas¬ 
terly move.—It gave at once entire unity to the 
defence,—closed all access to the interior com¬ 
munications,—permitted the conversion of ship’s 
batteries and crews to service at the frontf— 
and enabled the battalions of an entire army to 
throw up the extended lines which rifle and 
bayonet and cannon so well defended afterwards. 
Finally, when the havoc and ruin of the be¬ 
sieger’s artillery had rendered untenable every 
spot on the south side, and their troops had 
wrested the key of the whole position, it made 
possible that superb feat of consummate general¬ 
ship, the withdrawal of an entire army across a 


* The French General, Pelissier, says :—“ This crushing fire 
“ came not only from the works which we wished to carry, but 
“ also from the enemy’s steamers, which came up at full steam 
“ and manoeuvred with great skill and effect. This prodigious fire 
“ stopped the effort of our troops, &c.”— 

The Russian General, Gortschakoff, says :—“ Our batteries on 
“ the north side and our steamers which swept the enemy’s 
“ columns at every point upon which they could bring their guns 
“ to bear, contributed considerably to the success of this brilliant 
“ affair : the steamer Vladimir , in particular, commanded by 
“ Captain Boutakoflf, approached repeatedly the entrance of Ca- 
“ reening Bay, from which point it swept the enemy’s reserves.” 

f “ Les ressources qu’il tire de ses vaisseaux immobilises dans 
“ le port, tant comme personnel, que comme materiel, sont presque 
“ inepuisables,” &c. 

(General Canrobert’s Official Dispatch, 22 d October.) 



REMARKS. 


419 


wide bay—not as terror-stricken fugitives, but 
in perfect order—to the northern shore, where 
the troops were displayed in full array and ready 
for battle—in sight of an enemy who, no less 
brave, could well appreciate the proud and im¬ 
posing spectacle. 


These views we think lead to the conclusions, 
that 

—The defence of a sea-board can only be made 
complete by the employment of Forts and of 
Ships; 

—And that it is indispensable in all cases 
when a Naval attack upon works can be con¬ 
ducted in full force, to be prepared to receive it 
with every advantage in plan and execution that 
the art of the Engineer can furnish;—a task 
certainly not difficult in a country like our own, 
where the most ample means abound, and an 
excellent Corps of Engineers are ready to apply 
them. 










r 












NOTES. 








NOTES. 


Rifled Cannon. 

Page 128.—“ Other efforts have been made which , though not 
“ so well known , promise to afford better results .” 


Among these may be mentioned the experiments in France 
upon the shell-gun of 22 ceDt -, bored to a 30-pdr. 

This is rifled with two grooves, 0 in *.275 wide—0 in \039 deep, and 
a length of 19 § feet to the revolution of the spiral. 

The projectile weighs 54^ lbs., and has a cylindro-conic form. 
On its surface, at the poles of a given diameter, are two rounded 
protuberances or nipples (tetons) with an elliptical base. 

These are to enter the two grooves in the bore, which they may 
be said to touch at but a single point, and thus the desired rotatory 
movement is imparted to the projectile. 

The principal dimensions of the projectile are as follows:— 


in. 


Whole length,. 

Length of the cylindric part (nearly),. 

Diameter,. 

Projection of the nipples, a, a,. 

Diameter of the circular base of the nipples, - 

Diameter of the fuze hole,. 

Length of the canal,,. 

The charging hole is at 60° from the fuze hole 

—its diameter is,. 

Windage,. 


12.838 

4.883 

6.419 

0.394 

3.307 horizontal. 
2.835 vertical. 

0.866 

0.433 

0.433 .512 
0.079 


The fuzes are of wrought iron and secured by a screw thread. 
The projectiles are cast vertically, the point downwards, and 
with a head upon their base, in order that the point where the 
fuze is to enter, shall be perfectly solid and free from cavities. 












424 


NOTES. 


It is understood that an order has been issued to the foundry 
at Ruelle to make 40 of these pieces, and that 30 of them have 
been cast. 

Their completion, and the casting of ten thousand projectiles 
are to be urged with the utmost activity. 

It is said that ranges exceeding 5400 yards have been obtained 
with this Ordnance, the elevation being 15° and the charge 7f lbs. 

Tables of practice have also been formed from the experiments 
at Gavre. 

In Belgium, experiments were instituted at Brasschaet to test 
the merits of the French Rifled Cannon, and the results are 
believed to have been satisfactory. 


Concussion Fuze. 

Page 151.—“ But all the devices that have yet come under my 
“ notice in the official examination of various inventions , were com - 
“plicated to a most objectionable degree , and proved exceedingly 
“ uncertain in their operation” 


An officer of the Belgian Artillery, Captain Splingard, already 
well known as the inventor of an ingenious Shrapnel Fuze, has, 
however, been more fortunate in contriving a Concussion Fuze 
which offers every expectation of successfully meeting the difficul¬ 
ties that have hitherto proved insurmountable to experimenters 
iu this matter. So that Military and Naval men will have ample 
means of comparing the effects of Concussion shells with those 
acting by time fuzes. 

An account of this fuze is found in the excellent work of Col. 
Delobel (Technologie Militaire,) for a copy of which I am 
indebted to my friend Colonel Bormann of the Belgian artillery. 
The description of it is thus introduced:— 

“ In July, 1850, Captain Splingard suggested an explosive fuze, 
“ simple of construction, easy of preparation, quite inexpensive 
“ and differing but slightly from the ordinary fuze in the facility 
“ and generality of its application. It is moreover entirely dis- 
“ tinct from all other explosive fuzes yet invented, in the total 




CONCUSSION FUZE. 


425 


“ absence of fulminating powder, and every species of percussive 
“ mechanism.” 

“ It may be conceived that, if possible, the Belgian artillery 
“ would have preserved for its exclusive use the secret of this 
“valuable invention; but it has been purloined from it, no doubt 
“ through the dishonesty of some inferior agent.” 

“ It being known certainly that specimens of the Splingard 
“ Fuze were in the possession of several foreign powers, particu- 
“ larly those of England and Holland ; and moreover that one of 
“ those bad citizens found every where, who would sell soul and 
“ country for a little gold, had also acquired the secret, and was 
“just at this time endeavoring to sell it abroad, the superior 
“ authority thought proper to allow Captain Splingard to publish 
“ his invention; it is in virtue of this authorization, and in order 
“ to disappoint the calculations of speculators, and counterfeiters, 
“ that we have requested leave of that officer to annex a descrip- 
“ t-ion of his fuze to the statement about to be given of experi- 
“ ments lately made in Prussia on the important question ol 
“ percussion projectiles, for in this species of missiles, as in 
“ Shrapnel, the difficulty lies entirely in the fuzes,” &c., &c. 

The limits of a Note hardly permit more than an abstract of 
the description that follows in detail. 

In the Splingard Concussion Fuze, the composition is driven 
into a paper case, which itself is to be received in a wooden 
tube set firmly in the fuze-hole. It is lighted as usual by the 
charge of the gun, and, unless its action be accelerated by the 
peculiar arrangement, will burn for a certain time and then act,— 
like any other fuze. 

The means to determine the explosion by concussion, are sim¬ 
ple and most ingenious. The composition is driven on a spindle, 
as frequently practised in driving rockets; this leaves a conical 
cavity extending from the bottom well up into the mass of the 
hardened composition, precisely like that of a rocket. The inte¬ 
rior surface of the cavity is then protected by a coat or two of 
shell-lac; and when this is perfectly dry, it is filled with a paste 
of plaster of Paris and water, which, before becoming hard, is 
also pierced with another spindle, smaller than that used to drive 
the composition, and producing a cavity in the plaster also. So 
that when dry, it forms an interior crust upon the composition. 

Now, at the time of firing, this casing of plaster being fully 
supported, remains unbroken, — but when the composition has 
been lighted it consumes rapidly, and reaches the plaster cylin- 


426 


NOTES. 


der, around which the combustion continues, and thus exposes it 
gradually. So that more or less of the upper portion is laid 
bare when the shock of impact takes place, and is fractured by 
it, opening a communication from the flame to the charge of the 
shell. 

There are several neat little contrivances by which the fuze is 
rendered better able to fulfil its function. 

The first trials were made in 1850, from an 8-inch mortar, and 
resulted so well, that a more formal experiment was ordered. 

This took place at Brasschaet in 1851, resulting as follows:— 

Mortar of 29°-, (11| inches); elevation, 60°; target, 600 paces. 

224 bombs were fired. 204 exploded at the first graze; 13 
exploded when the fuze had burned its whole length, the concus¬ 
sion apparatus not acting. Two exploded prematurely. Two 
not at all,—and the fuzes of three bombs did not catch fire. 

Col. Delobel considers these the most perfect results ever ob¬ 
tained with a concussion fuze, and conclusive as to the success of 
the invention, so far as mortars and light howitzers are concerned. 
Some trials from a 24-pdr. howitzer followed. 31 shells were fired, 
of which 10 burst at the first graze, 17 at the second, and 4 in the 
gun. The failures to act as intended, were accounted for so far 
to the satisfaction of the commission, that the fuze was deemed to 
be as suitable for practice from cannon with high velocities, as 
from mortars; which opinion was amply confirmed afterwards by 
trials executed annually with every variety of ordnance. 

In 1853, experiments were made upon a wooden target, which 
were also satisfactory. 

We hope to have a future opportunity to explain this excellent 
device in detail, and perhaps to offer some results of practice with 
it, on this side of the Atlantic. 



COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 427 


Composition of Batteries. 

Page 279.—“ In some of the ships the shell-guns in broadside 
“ were so numerous, as to be constituted into an entire tier,” doc., doc. 


The preference for shell-guns so clearly manifested by the 
British authorities, in the changes here noted in the armament 
of their ships, appears to be sustained by the results of their 
experience, if we may judge from the style of armament said to 
be adopted for one of their finest ships recently built, and just 
put into service, the Shannon. 

As much interest must necessarily attach to this vessel, we 
note, in the absence of official data, the following details from 
the public journals :— 


Length between perpendiculars,. 235 feet. 

Beam,. 50 “ 

Burden,. 2661 tons. 

Armament,, .main deck, 30 8-inch of 65 cwU 

“ ..spar-deck, 20 32-pdrs. of 58 cwt> ,—1 68-pdr. of 95 cwt * 

Horse Power, (nominal,). 600 

Cylinder, diam.,. 70 in’s. 

Stroke, length,. 42 “ 

Screw, diam.,. 18 feet. 

Crew,. 550 


The Shannon is strictly a frigate; that is, she carries her bat¬ 
tery in two tiers, one being uncovered, but in tonnage is equal to 
a large two-decker,—with much more length, equal beam, and 
less draft. 

The main force of armament is an entire tier of shell-guns, 
(8-in. of 65 cwt ), on the gun-deck. On the spar-deck are 20 
32-pdrs. of 58 CW S and a long 68-pdr. (of 95 cwt ) on the forecastle. 

The remarks that have been made in relation to the compara¬ 
tive force of the United States’ ship Merrimac, and the British 
ships Shannon and Euryalus, induce me to offer a few words on 
the subject. 

The batteries of these ships may be stated thus, from the best 
sources that are accessible to us. 











428 


NOTES. 


Gun-deck. Spar-deck. 

Euryalus, 28 of 8-in. (of 65.) 22 32-pdrs. of 45. cwt - 

Shannon, 30 of 8-in. of 65 cwt ‘. 20 32-pdrs. of 56 fWt- , and 1 68-pdr. of 95 cWt * 
Merrimac, 24 of IX-in. 14 8-in. of 63 cwt -, and 2 X-in. of 107 cwl - 

Taking the mean weight of iron that goes out of the guns to 
any one point, the ships will discharge, Euryalus, 10G6 lbs.; Shan¬ 
non, 1167lbs.; Merrimac, 1424lbs.; so that even by this standard, 
the Merrimac would have the superiority in offensive capacity by 
a ratio of 100 to 82. 

But such a mode of estimating the power of ordnance is only 
admissible when the description of gun is the same in both ships, 
or, if different, when the distances are so short that the hastiest 
shot will neither miss the mark nor fail to perforate. When, as 
now, it is expected to use the advantages of heavy calibres for 
superior accuracy and force beyond mere point blank, the amount 
of metal that issues from the broadside, does not supply the crite¬ 
rion of power, hut that which strikes the object and with due force. 

Relative accuracy and penetration are, therefore, to be con¬ 
sidered in estimating the value of ships’ batteries like those now 
spoken of. 

There is no difficulty in deciding between the Shannon and the 
Euryalus, because both have similar calibres, 8-inch on the gun- 
deck, and 32-pdrs. above. 

But the Shannon has more of the 8-inch shell-guns, and heavier 
32-pdrs. than the Euryalus, and hence has unquestionably the 
more powerful armament, whether far or near, in a ratio some¬ 
what greater than the absolute weight of broadside. Besides 
which, she has a 68-pdr. on the forecastle. 

Now, as regards the Shannon and Merrimac, the 772 lbs. of 
8-inch shells from the gun-deck of the former are inferior not only 
in mere weight to the 864 lbs. of IX-inch from the gun-deck of the 
latter, but also in accuracy and power, so that a distant object 
will be struck by less of that weight and with less force. The 
accuracy of the 8-inch to IX-inch being about as 5 to 7, the pene¬ 
tration as 9 to 10, and the content of powder as 5 to 6, with the 
further advantage to the IX-inch of greater effect by reason of the 
superior content of the individual shells—larger orifice and greater 
shock of impact. 

Then on the spar-deck, we have for the Merrimac 360 lbs. of 
8-inch shells to oppose the 325 lbs. of shot from the Shannon; the 
accuracy of the 8-inch shells to the 32-pdr. shot being as 5 to 3— 


COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 429 


the shock and orifice greater, with the addition of the explosive 
force of 14 lbs. of powder. 

The Merrimac has also 2 pivot X-inch to meet the one 68 -pdr.; 
that is, 200 lbs. in heavy shells to meet the one 68 -pdr. shot or 
one 8 -inch shell. 

It is of course impossible, nor is it necessary, to deduce the 
exact value of the combined results, but we think that a glance at 
the facts will convince that the Merrimac not only has the advan¬ 
tage in absolute weight of projectile, supposing all strike , but that 
the greater accuracy and power beyond point blank will increase 
this difference very much in favor of the Merrimac. 

The United States’ ship has also the capacity to bear more bat¬ 
tery than now carried. Her tonnage is one-fifth greater than that 
of the Shannon , and according to the ratio of armament to bur¬ 
den in the latter ship, (1 : I 65 ,) the Merrimac should (other 
things being equal) bear with equal ease about 196 tons of ord¬ 
nance, while in reality she only carries 153 tons, which is abso¬ 
lutely seven tons less than the weight of the Shannon's guns. 
The addition would give 10 more IX-inch guns, for which the 
Merrimac has at this time unoccupied ports on the gun-deck, 
and would raise the power of the Merrimac's broadside to 1780 
lbs.—placing it, not only overpoweringly above that of the Shan- 
non, but also on an equality with the broadside of the heaviest 
two-decked line-of-battle-ship in the British or any other navy. 
(See page 282.) 

As for the speed of the Shannon or Euryalus, if superior, as 
claimed, to that of the Merrimac, the only advantage conferred by 
it, would be to choose the terms on which an action should take 
place; but the Merrimac having the greater ordnance power at 
any distance, the only privilege to be derived by the other ships 
from their superior speed, would be to avoid the action altogether, 

_which, as regards the Shannon, it is not to be supposed the 

commander would choose to do. 

We are inclined, however, to question the greater speed of the 
Shannon under steam; because it is observed, that the comparison 
now referred to is based on 7 knots as the best rate of the Mer¬ 
rimac. Now, I happened to be in the ship when she went 8 
knots, and have since seen a letter from an officer who states that 
in steaming from Brest to the Tagus, the rate of going was as 
high as 9^- knots. 



430 


NOTES. 


The war between England and Russia, commencing early in 
1853, contributed to a prompt and prodigious development of the 
steam-force of the former Power; so that the British fleet that 
was equipped for the Baltic in that year, may be considered to 
have embodied the most formidable power afloat, which had ever 
been created to that time. 

All of the vessels carried a great proportion of shell-guns— 
most of them were screw-vessels with some pivot ordnance, and 
there was quite a number of side-wheel steamers for towing the 
few sailing ships, or to act independently as a light squadron on 
detached service if required. 

But the character which the war assumed, soon compelled the 
Allies to resort to lighter classes of vessels, in order to give any 
effect to their measures: and in a short time a numerous flotilla 
was created, composed of small screw-steamers of the least draft, 
and mounting two or four of the heaviest pivot cannon. 

Too little has yet been made known from official sources, to 
supply means for giving any satisfactory account of this descrip¬ 
tion of vessels. We shall, therefore, merely note a few of the 
particulars respecting them, gleaned from the current publications 


of the day. 






Class represented by, 

Tons. 

Steam Power. 

Dimens. 

Armament. 

1. Flying Fish,.... 

850 

350 H. P. 


f 2 68-pdrs. of 95 cwt - 

670 

200 

U 

180 

£8 

1 4 32-pdrs. 

2. Vigilant,_... 

3. Arrow,. 

470 

160 

u 

w 

w 

f 2 68-pdrs. of 95 cwt * 

4. 

238 

60 

u 

l 4 how. (12-pdr.) 

5. 

232 

40 

« 



6 . 

212 

20 

u 




It will be perceived that the largest of these (classes 1, 2 and 
3) are equal in tonnage to sloops-of-war, and their armament is 
chiefly two long 68-pdrs. of 95 cw \ The first class has in addition 
four 32-pdrs., while the third class has only four 12-pdr. boat- 
howitzers. 

The last three classes are not only much smaller, but appear to 
be a different style of vessel. They are in fact gun-boats, carrying 
a 68-pdr. at each end, and the bow open without cut-water or bow¬ 
sprit, and only a light jib-boom—so as to permit the forward gun 

\ 




COMPOSITION OF BATTERIES. 431 


to stand right over the line of the keel, and bear directly ahead— 
the draught is very light. There are about 1G0 of the gun-boats. 

All these are driven by screws,—the steam-power correspond¬ 
ing to the class of vessel. The rate of the gun-boats is said to 
vary from 7 to 9 knots, and their draft from 4^ to 5^- feet. The 
larger classes have more speed, and are deeper in the water. 

The rig is also alike in all,—being designed for a small spread 
of canvass, they have three short masts for fore-and-aft sails only, 
—no square sails. 

In this flotilla are included two vessels, Recruit and Weser, of 
like denomination, but differing in many important particulars 
from the others, which indeed they preceded in point of time, 
having been originally constructed by private builders for the 
Prussian government. 

These are of iron, 186 feet long, 29 feet beam, 550 tons burden, 
7 feet draft at load-line. 

They are driven by side-wheels, with an engine of 160 horse 
power. 

The armament is heavy — four long 68-pdrs.—carried at the 
ends of the wheel-guards, one gun looking forward and another 
aft on each side; and in this way the line of fire may be made 
directly parallel with the length of the vessel. 

The Recruit did good service in the shoal waters of the Sea of 
Azof, and is highly spoken of, being fast and an excellent sea-boat. 

For the service contemplated, this fleet of small screw-vessels 
was well adapted—far better than any other—indeed, a very brief 
experience had demonstrated plainly the absolute necessity of 
some such means, in order to operate with any efl'ect whatever in 
the Baltic and Black Sea. 


432 


NOTES. 


English Mortars in the Baltic. 

Page 387.—“ Next day, jive more ( mortars) showed defects oj 
“ like character, three burst, and the remaining three were seem- 
“ ingly in no condition for much further service .” 


Extract from Mr. R. Mallet’s “ Physical Conditions,” &c., &c.:— 
“ A number of 13-inch sea-mortars have been brought home dis- 
“ abled from the Baltic, having failed on board the mortar-boats 
“ during the bombardment of Sveaborg, after a greater or less 
“ number of rounds, in a very remarkable way.”—“ Of the whole 
“ number of mortars three have burst, or to speak more correctly, 
“ split ,—the remainder still appear to hold together, but the 
“ strong probability is, that there is not a serviceable or trust- 
“ worthy mortar remaining amongst them.” 


List of 13-inch Sea-mortars and names of Mortar-boats, with 

THE NUMBER OF ROUNDS FIRED AND RESULTS. 


Names of 

Mortar-boats. No. of Rounds. Cast at, 

Pickle,. 414.. Low Moor, . Split. 

Growler,. 355 . Carron, . “ 

Mastiff,. 148 . Carron, . “ 

“ Each of these three mortars was split with almost perfect ex- 
“ actness into equal halves, by a plane passing through the axis, 
“ and through the centre of the vent. There were no signs of 
“ unsoundness in the metal at any point, nor any defect or sign of 
“ injury, other than the splitting up, save that at the centre of the 
“ bottom of each chamber, a small irregular cavity was formed, 
“ with jagged sides and bottom, as though slowly burrowed into by 
“ some corroding agent. 

“ The fractured surfaces, when rusty, presented a uniform, very 
“coarse grained character of metal; and when the latter was 
“ freshly exposed by a large fragment recently cut out, close to 
“ the interior at the muzzle of each split mortar, it proved to be 
“ a mixed metal of the very coarsest grain, consisting of nearly 












FLOATING BATTERIES. 


433 


“ white cast iron, filled with large grains of very dark gray and 
“ highly graphitic iron, greatly wanting in homogeneity,—a mate- 
“ rial ill suited to ordnance of any sort. 

“ The following mortars remained together, but in what condi- 
“ tion I was unable to judge. 


Names of 

No. of 


Names of 

No. of 

Mortar-boats. 

Rounds. Cast at. 

Mortar-boats. 

Rounds. Cast at. 

“ Havoc,. 

. 94 

Carron. 

Porpoise,.. 


“ Rocket,.... 

. 241 

Low Moor. 

Prompt,... 


“ Beacon,.... 

. 176 

Carron. 

Drake,. 

.. 129 

“ Surly,. 

. 131 

U 

Manly,. 


“ Grappler,... 

. 311 

a 

Blazer,. 

.. 287 


— “I may mention, that an officer stationed in the Baltic 
“ informed me, that these mortars w’ere fired for some time as fast 
“as they could be loaded,—perhaps at the rate of 12 shells per 
“ hour, or more. Possibly the success of the bombardment de- 
“ manded great rapidity of fire ; but the French mortar-boats, 
“ having two mortars on board, which can be fired alternately, 
“possess an advantage over ours with but one.”—“One of these 
“ mortars was cast at Carron, perhaps more than 40 years ago.” 


Floating batteries—13-inch gun. 

Page 374.—“ Iron floating batteries which could hardly swim , 
“ and if they could, would have been useless, for had they been placed 
“ within 400 yards of Sveaborg, they would have been annihilated: 
“ and at 800 yards, they would have done no harm." 

Adm. Napier’s Letter to the “ Times.” 


The scepticism of Admiral Napier has not been borne out by 
subsequent experience, if we are rightly informed. It is said that a 
floating Battery was so fitted in England as to resist all the prac¬ 
tice made upon it, with the common broadside calibres, and the 
British authorities are now about to test it by firing shot of an 
extraordinary size. 


28 














434 


NOTES. 


The published accounts of the gun to be used in the experiment, 
state that it is made of wrought iron, weighs 21 tons, 17 c ' Tt -, 
(48944 lbs.) is 14 feet long, has a diameter of 42 inches at the 
base ring, and a bore of 13 inches, which would require a shot of 
280 lbs * 

We are toldf that at Shoeburyness, 50 such shot have been fired 
from this gun with charges of 50 lbs. Selections from the prac¬ 
tice are given thus:— 


No. of the 


Time of 

First 

Extreme 

round. 

Elevation. 

flight. 

graze. 

Range. 



Seconds. 

Yards. 

Yards. 

9 


... 1.1 . 

615 .... 

... 4835 

5. 


... 1.2 . 

648 .... 

... 5925 

13. 

... 1° .... 

... 2.2 . 

1008 .... 

... 4561 

17. 

... 1° .... 

... 2.3. 

1115 .... 

... 4600 

99 

... 3° .... 

.;. 5.1 . 

1890 .... 

... 3783 

29. 

... 30 .... 

...5. 

1757 .... 

... 4161 

32. 

... 50 .... 

... 7.7 . 

2518 .... 

... 3510 

37. 

... 50 .... 

... 7.2 . 

2464 .... 


44. 

... 70 _ 

... 9.2. 

3004 .... 

... 3488 

o0* • • • • 

... 70 .... 

... 9.2 . 

2964 .... 

... 3396 


The mean ranges of ten rounds are as follows :— 


Level, 

1 . 

3. 

5. 

7. 


1st Graze. 
Yards. 

599 

10234 

1800" 

2433 

2988j 


The deviation at 1st graze is said to have been “usually from 2 
“ to 4 yards ; several times within a yard; twice at 12, once 16, 
“ once 20, and once 26 yards, from the exact line, and 4 times 
“ out of the 50 in exact line, without any deflection. At the 
“ extreme range—the balls were usually found from 10 to 20 
“ or 30 and once over a hundred yards out of line.”— 


* The Illustrated News says 336 lbs., which must be an error if the ball be 
spherical. 

f London Times quoted by New York Herald of Dec. 14th, 1856- 








































FLOATING BATTERIES. 


435 


We are somewhat at a loss to apply these data with exactness, 
not knowing the height of the gun above the plane, which is of 
importance as regards ranges to 1st graze, when the elevation 
is within 3°: but the power of such a projectile may well be 
imagined as enormous. 

The material of which the British wrought iron gun is com¬ 
posed, must be good, in order to endure the strain even of 50 
such fires. 

Still the mass of metal is very considerable if estimated in terms 
of the projectile, the ratio being as 1 : 175, and much higher 
than that used in the new ordnance of the U. S. Screw Frigates. 

Thus the English gun is three times heavier than the largest 
of our pieces (the Niagara’s XI- inch -); and, as the latter dis¬ 
charges shot and shells of 170 and 135 lbs. respectively, should 
throw a shot of 500 lbs. or a shell of 400 lbs.; while in reality its 
shot is 280 lbs. only, which is but twice as heavy as the XI- in - 
shell. 

So the British 13-inch gun does not perform an amount of 
work proportional to its mass when compared with the U. S. 
XI- in * gun. 

Now as regards endurance, the XI- in * gun, notwithstanding the 
economy of metal in its construction, has shown all that could 
be required, and very much more than usual. The first cast, was 
burst at the 1959th round with service charges,—as already 
stated in Note, page 411,—1304 being with shells of 135 lbs., and 
655 with solid shot of 170 lbs. 

So that notwithstanding the 13-inch wrought iron gun has 
thrice the weight of material to throw twice the weight of hall , 
it has a severe ordeal to pass through before it exhibits equal 
endurance with the XI- in - gun. 

When the strength of the gun has been sufficiently established, 
however, it will then remain for those interested to determine on 
the practicability of using ordnance weighing fifty thousand 
pounds: and whatever may be deemed possible in adapting such 
to fortifications, some time will elapse before seamen will feel 
justified in taking the question into serious consideration. At 
present they are by no means agreed on the feasibility of using 
guns even of one third this weight. 

The proper material for the piece will also come into question 
then. 


436 


NOTES. 


Of course no such mass of Iron (22 tons) has ever been cast 
into a piece of ordnance, and it is altogether conjectural, if it were, 
whether the endurance would go as far as that of the English 
13-in. wrought iron gun has already gone. But if the Naval ser¬ 
vice should ever require such an operation to be undertaken, we 
can only say that we would not hesitate, if authorized, to set 
about it, and that in no despairing frame of mind. For our 
credulity has been so far taxed by the extraordinary progress of 
the times that we have long since come to the conclusion that it 
is not well to deny the test of trial to any project on the ground 
of its seemingly apparent impracticability. 

The result might prove, that in such enormous masses, wrought 
iron alone would withstand the strain of projecting balls of 
280 lbs., with 50 lbs. of powder. 

But it is beyond doubt that cast iron cannon may be had suffi¬ 
ciently strong to project balls of 170 lbs., and in a mass only 
one third that of the English wrought iron 13-inch gun. It 
may also be, that wrought iron can accomplish quite as much; 
but it is certainly superfluous to require more , and equal strength 
in less weight would not serve, for the inertia would then be too 
low. 

It was contemplated to enter at length on the subject of 
“ Endurance,” and a section had been written out; but the 
demands of other duty compelled the postponement for the 
present. * 










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